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TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES, 
REALIZING RIGHTS
PROGRESS OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN 2015-2016
A quality education, a decent job, access to 
healthcare and a life free from violence and 
discrimination are necessary foundations for 
women and girls to be equal partners with men 
and boys in every aspect of life.
Progress of the World’s Women: Transforming 
economies, realizing rights is a timely reminder of 
the importance of women’s economic and social 
rights to building strong and resilient economies 
and societies, today and for future generations. It 
shows where governments and the international 
community have fallen short on realizing the full 
inclusion of women and girls and it illustrates how 
and where immediate action can redress this 
critical imbalance. 
It is fitting that Progress of the World’s Women 
2015 is published when the world is poised 
to embark on a transformative post-2015 
sustainable development agenda. The report’s 
findings and recommendations underline the 
need to respect and promote the specific rights 
and needs of women and girls, and to integrate 
gender equality in all dimensions of sustainable 
development. 
I commend Progress of the World’s Women to 
a wide readership. The report’s authoritative 
analysis, sharp insights and compelling stories 
make it essential reading for those committed to 
a more just and equal world. 
Ban Ki-moon
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In 2014, an unprecedented number of countries 
provided reports on the extent to which they had 
been able to implement the Beijing Platform for 
Action, adopted 20 years ago in 1995 as a global 
blueprint for the achievement of gender equality. 
These 167 reports, and the associated regional and 
global reviews, gave us the clearest reading to date 
of the status of gender equality across the world. 
Progress of the World’s Women: Transforming 
economies, realizing rights, provides a timely, 
action-oriented counterpoint to the Beijing+20 
findings. With a view to changing both economic 
and social institutions, it distils and confronts the 
most glaring gaps between the laws and policies 
that guarantee equal rights for women and girls, 
and the reality on the ground. The drive to achieve 
substantive equality – making rights real for 
women – is at the heart of this Progress report, and 
it provides the evidence and recommendations for 
public action to achieve it.
Our analysis shows that economic and social policies 
can contribute to fairer and more gender-equal 
societies, as well as stronger and more prosperous 
economies, if they are designed and implemented 
with women’s rights at their centre.  For example, 
to increase women’s access to decent work, the 
removal of formal legal barriers to their employment 
is important, but we also need measures that free up 
women’s time, such as affordable childcare options 
and investments in basic infrastructure. We need to 
enable shifts both great and small in social norms, so 
that men can take on care work and engage in other 
areas that foster and demonstrate altered attitudes 
of responsibility. 
As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said, ours is 
the first generation with the potential to end poverty. 
Equally important, and intrinsically linked to that 
goal, it is in this generation’s reach to transform 
gender relations, to empower women and girls, and 
humanity as a whole.
We know what needs to be done to achieve equality 
and a 50:50 Planet by 2030. Together with the 
findings of the Beijing +20 review, let this report be 
a call to urgent and sustained action, frontloaded 
for the next five years, to start real, visible change, 
especially in the lives of the most marginalized. My 
hope is that everyone will be inspired to be part of 
a re-energized and growing movement for gender 
equality. With determined people from all walks 
of life, and with more determined leaders, gender 
equality can be a defining achievement of the first 
quarter of the 21st century. 
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Twenty years after the landmark Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing, and at a time 
when the global community is defining the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for the 
post-2015 era, the global consensus on the need to 
achieve gender equality seems stronger than ever 
before.1 Empowering women and girls is among the 
goals aspired to by all, from grassroots organizations, 
trade unions and corporations, to Member States 
and intergovernmental bodies. But how far has this 
consensus been translated into tangible progress on 
the ground, and what more is needed to bridge the 
gaps between rhetoric and reality? 
Drawing on promising experiences from around the 
world, this Report proposes a comprehensive agenda 
for key policy actors— including gender equality 
advocates, national governments and international 
agencies—to make human rights a lived reality for all 
women and girls. 
Governments in every region have made legally 
binding commitments to respect, protect and fulfil 
women’s human rights, recognizing their intrinsic 
value as well as the synergies between women’s 
rights and wider prosperity. Women’s access to 
decent employment is not only likely to improve their 
agency and the distributional dynamics within the 
household but can also lift whole households out 
of poverty. Improvements in women’s health and 
education are key contributors to women’s own well-
being and life chances and are also linked to better 
outcomes for their children. In the long term, societies 
and economies can only thrive if they make full use of 
women’s skills and capacities.
There have been significant achievements since 
Beijing: more girls are enrolling in school; and more 
women are working, getting elected and assuming 
leadership positions. Where once it was regarded as 
a private matter, preventing and redressing violence 
against women and girls is at last on the public policy 
agenda. Women have gained greater legal rights 
to access employment, own and inherit property 
and get married and divorced on the same terms 
as men. These areas of progress show that gender 
inequalities can be reduced through public action. 
However, while hugely important, these changes 
have not yet resulted in equal outcomes for women 
and men. Globally three quarters of working age 
men (15 years old and over) are in the labour force 
compared to half of working age women. Among 
those who are employed, women constitute nearly 
two thirds of ‘contributing family workers’, who 
work in family businesses without any direct pay.2 
Everywhere, women continue to be denied equal 
pay for work of equal value and are less likely than 
men to receive a pension, which translates into 
large income inequalities throughout their lives. 
Globally, on average, women’s earnings are 24 
per cent less than men’s, and even in countries 
such as Germany—where policies are increasingly 
supportive of female employment—women on 
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average earn just half as much income as men over 
their lifetimes.3 Yet in all regions women work more 
than men: on average they do almost two and a half 
times as much unpaid care and domestic work as 
men, and if paid and unpaid work are combined, 
women in almost all countries work longer hours than 
men each day.4 
This Report focuses on the economic and social 
dimensions of gender equality, including the right 
of all women to a good job, with fair pay and 
safe working conditions, to an adequate pension 
in older age, to health care and to safe water 
without discrimination based on factors such as 
socio-economic status, geographic location and 
race or ethnicity. In doing so, it aims to unravel 
some of the current challenges and contradictions 
facing the world today: at a time when women 
and girls have almost equal opportunities when it 
comes to education, why are only half of women 
of working age in the labour force globally, and 
why do women still earn much less than men? In 
an era of unprecedented global wealth, why are 
large numbers of women not able to exercise their 
right to even basic levels of health care, water and 
sanitation?  
As the Report shows, these inequalities are not 
inevitable. Economic and social policies can 
contribute to the creation of stronger economies, 
and to more sustainable and gender-equal 
societies, if they are designed and implemented 
with women’s rights at their centre. 
Across the world, gender equality advocates in 
civil society, ministries, parliaments, the media 
and universities have demonstrated how to make 
women’s rights real. And they have won significant 
victories: examples include the domestic worker 
alliance in New York that refused to accept poor 
conditions, and so mobilized nannies and carers 
in parks, streets and churches to push through 
the most progressive bill of rights for domestic 
workers worldwide; the feminist researchers and 
policy makers in Egypt who joined forces to design 
an empowering cash transfer programme that 
puts money in the hands of women; the feminist 
bureaucrat in Brazil who collaborated with women’s 
organizations to provide sugarcane workers with a 
powerful understanding of their own rights as well as 
vocational training in non-traditional occupations for 
a sustainable route out of poverty; the organizations 
of unpaid caregivers in Kenya who, after years of 
advocacy, finally have their place at the policy table 
when it comes to health and welfare decision-making 
at the local and national level; and the male policy 
maker in the Ministry of Finance in Morocco, who 
insisted that his country’s policies would only be 
legitimate if all budget decisions were assessed for 
their impact on women and girls and has opened up 
space for women’s organizations to influence change. 
These visionary advocates for change have refused 
to accept the status quo, have rejected the idea that 
poverty and gender inequality are a fact of life and 
have recognized that progress for women and girls 
is progress for all.
A CHALLENGING GLOBAL CONTEXT FOR 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
The world has changed significantly since the 
Beijing conference in 1995. The rise of extremism, 
escalating violent conflict, recurrent and deepening 
economic crises, volatile food and energy prices, 
food insecurity, natural disasters and the effects 
of climate change have intensified vulnerability 
and increased inequalities. Financial globalization, 
trade liberalization, the ongoing privatization 
of public services and the ever-expanding 
role of corporate interests in the development 
process have shifted power relations in ways that 
undermine the enjoyment of human rights and 
the building of sustainable livelihoods. The world 
is both wealthier and more unequal today than at 
any point since World War II. The richest 1 per cent 
of the world’s population now owns about 40 per 
cent of the world’s assets, while the bottom half 
owns no more than 1 per cent.5  
The gap between rich and poor women remains 
huge both between and within countries. A woman 
in Sierra Leone is 100 times more likely to die in 
childbirth than a woman in Canada.6 In the least 
developed countries, a woman living in a rural 
area is 38 per cent less likely to give birth with a 
skilled health professional than her counterpart in 
the city.7 In Latin America, for example, indigenous 
women are more than twice as likely to be illiterate 
than non-indigenous women.8 Since 2000, these 
glaring disparities have narrowed in some countries, 
but in others they have actually widened.9 Overall, 
the gaps between rich and poor women remain 
significant. Gender discrimination compounds other 
forms of disadvantage—on the basis of socio-
economic status, geographic location, race, caste 
and ethnicity, sexuality or disability—to limit women’s 
and girls’ opportunities and life chances.  
Seven years after the global financial crisis, the 
world continues to struggle with low growth and 
high unemployment. Policy makers in rich and poor 
countries alike face huge challenges in creating 
enough decent jobs for all those who need them. And 
austerity policies in both developed and developing 
countries are shifting the burden of coping and caring 
back to families and onto the shoulders of women 
and girls.10 
Changes in the global economy have not been 
beneficial for the majority of men either. At the global 
level, the narrowing of gender gaps in labour force 
participation from 28 to 26 percentage points has 
occurred primarily because men’s participation rates 
have declined faster than those of women. Similarly, 
the gender pay gap has narrowed over the past 
decade in most countries with available data, but this 
is not always a sign of progress: for example in some 
countries where gender pay gaps have narrowed this 
has been in the context of falling real wages for both 
women and men, and the gaps have narrowed only 
because men’s wages have fallen more dramatically 
than women’s. This can hardly be considered 
‘progress’: instead of women catching up with men, 
there is a levelling down for all.
In response to these challenges, a variety of actors—
bilateral and multilateral agencies, governments, 
civil society organizations and the private sector—
have embraced the need for women’s economic 
empowerment. Some see in women a largely 
untapped market of consumers, while others speak 
about the opportunity of ‘unleashing the economic 
power and potential of women’11 as a means to 
solve the persistent problems caused by the global 
financial crisis and stalled growth. But while gender 
equality clearly contributes to broader economic 
and social goals, not all pathways to economic 
development advance gender equality.12 Indeed, 
some patterns of economic growth are premised 
on maintaining gender inequalities in conditions of 
work and earnings and enforcing unequal patterns 
of unpaid work that consign women to domestic 
drudgery. Without a monitoring framework solidly 
anchored in human rights, it is difficult to know 
whether claims of empowering women stand up 
to scrutiny. This Report therefore underlines the 
centrality of women’s human rights as both the 
‘end’ and an effective ‘means’ of development.
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY: MAKING RIGHTS 
REAL FOR WOMEN
Laws that establish that women and men have 
equal rights provide an important basis for 
demanding and achieving equality in practice. They 
can be a central reference point for political and 
cultural struggles, driving changes in social norms 
and popular attitudes as well as policy shifts. But 
making women’s rights real requires more than 
just legal reform. The translation of equality before 
the law into equal outcomes is not automatic. Even 
where gender-equal laws have been put into place, 
entrenched inequalities, discriminatory social norms, 
harmful customary practices, as well as dominant 
patterns of economic development can undermine 
their implementation and positive impact. 
International human rights treaties—such as the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)— are legally binding 
commitments that require States to respect, protect 
and fulfil women’s rights. As such, they encapsulate 
a substantive understanding of gender equality 
that can serve as both a vision and an agenda for 
action for those seeking to advance women’s rights 
in today’s challenging context. While formal equality 
refers to the adoption of laws and policies that treat 
women and men equally, substantive equality is 
concerned with the results and outcomes of these, 
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‘ensuring that they do not maintain, but rather 
alleviate, the inherent disadvantage that particular 
groups experience’.13  
This Report uses international human rights 
standards to assess laws and policies for 
their actual effect on women and girls on the 
ground. From this perspective, the achievement 
of substantive equality requires action in three 
interrelated areas: redressing women’s socio-
economic disadvantage; addressing stereotyping, 
stigma and violence; and strengthening women’s 
agency, voice and participation (see Figure 1.4). 
Coordinated public action across all three of these 
dimensions has the potential to trigger lasting 
transformations in structures and institutions that 
constrain women’s enjoyment of their rights. 
More of the same will not do for women and girls. 
While numerical parity in access to education, 
employment or social protection is an important 
goal, it does not mean concrete enjoyment of rights 
or substantive equality. Rather than simply absorbing 
more girls into fragile and underfunded educational 
systems, schools must provide a safe learning 
environment for girls and boys, should aim to provide 
quality education and should contribute to the 
promotion of equality through progressive curricula 
and well trained teachers. Rather than incorporating 
more women into increasingly precarious and 
unrewarding forms of employment, labour markets 
must be transformed in ways that work for both 
women and men and benefit society at large. Rather 
than simply adding paid work or poverty reduction 
to women’s already long ‘to-do’ lists, responsibilities 
for income-earning, caregiving and domestic work 
need to be redistributed more equally, both between 
women and men and between households and 
society more broadly. Substantive equality requires 
fundamental transformation of economic and social 
institutions, including the beliefs, norms and attitudes 
that shape them, at every level of society, from 
households to labour markets and from communities 
to local, national and global governance institutions.
Progress towards substantive equality should be 
measured against how inclusive it is of the rights 
of poor and marginalized women and girls. It is 
therefore important to look beyond the ‘averages’, 
to make sure that all women are able to enjoy their 
rights. Rights are also indivisible: how can women 
claim the rights to quality health care, to decent 
working conditions or to own land on which to 
grow food without having the rights to information 
about laws, policies and government budget 
allocations and the right to organize to claim 
their rights? The right to organize and scrutinize 
public budgets often drives efforts to ensure public 
services meet women’s needs better; and having 
access to a range of high quality services can 
in turn support women’s right to work, creating 
powerful synergies.
TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES, REALIZING 
RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION
To support substantive equality, economic and 
social policies need to work in tandem. Typically, 
the role of economic policies is seen primarily in 
terms of promoting economic growth, while social 
policies are supposed to address its ‘casualties’ by 
redressing poverty and disadvantage and reducing 
inequality. But macroeconomic policies can pursue 
a broader set of goals, including gender equality 
and social justice. Conversely, well-designed social 
policies can enhance macroeconomic growth 
and post-crisis recovery through redistributive 
measures that increase employment, productivity 
and aggregate demand. 
The specific policy package to achieve substantive 
equality will differ from context to context. Ultimately, 
the aim is to create a virtuous cycle through the 
generation of decent work, gender-responsive social 
protection and social services, alongside enabling 
macroeconomic policies that prioritize investment in 
human beings and the fulfilment of social objectives. 
Action is needed in the following three priority areas 
to transform economies and realize women’s social 
and economic rights.
1. Decent work for women 
Paid work that is compatible with women’s and 
men’s shared responsibility for unpaid care and 
domestic work as well as leisure and learning, 
where earnings are sufficient to maintain an 
adequate standard of living and women are 
treated with respect and dignity, is crucial to 
advancing gender equality. Yet, this type of work 
remains scarce and economic policies in all regions 
are failing to generate enough decent jobs for those 
who need them. The vast majority of women still 
work in insecure, informal employment. In South 
Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and East and South-East 
Asia (excluding China), more than 75 per cent of 
all jobs are informal. In rural areas, many women 
derive their livelihoods through small-scale farming, 
almost always informal and frequently without 
any direct pay. Alongside economic policies that 
can create decent employment, extending labour 
rights and social protection to those in informal 
employment, such as domestic workers and home-
based workers, is essential to increase the viability 
and security of their livelihoods.  
Inspiring initiatives, some led by women, point 
to ways forward. For example, working with 
local government and urban planners, street 
vendors in India and Papua New Guinea have 
negotiated improved and safer spaces to sell 
their goods. In Colombia, waste pickers have 
demanded recognition for the invaluable service 
they provide and won the right to bid for lucrative 
municipal contracts. In rural areas, including in 
Ethiopia, Ghana and Rwanda, enabling women to 
register land titles in their own names or jointly with 
husbands, reforming agricultural extension services, 
supporting women’s organizing in cooperatives 
and subsidizing their access to inputs and resources 
has been vital to enhance the productivity and 
sustainability of women’s agricultural self-
employment.
Despite women’s increasing levels of education, 
gender stereotypes in households and labour 
markets continue to structure the kinds of work 
that women and men do, the conditions under 
which they work and their rewards from work. 
Occupational segregation by gender means 
that women are still overwhelmingly clustered in 
low-paid, poor-quality jobs. The most pernicious 
impact of segregation is pervasive gender pay 
gaps, which mean that women are systematically 
paid less than men for work of equal value. Some 
83 per cent of the world’s 53 million domestic 
workers are women, and their number is increasing 
steadily in developed and developing countries 
alike. Working behind closed doors, almost 30 per 
cent of these women are deprived of any labour 
rights and more than half of them are not entitled 
to earn the minimum wage.14 Many also suffer 
from systematic abuse and violence. For these and 
millions of other low-income workers, minimum 
wages are a crucial step towards their enjoyment of 
the right to an adequate standard of living. Action to 
end harassment and violence against women in the 
workplace is also essential to restoring their dignity. 
Women’s continued heavy responsibilities for unpaid 
care and domestic work limit the types of work 
they can undertake, which further reinforces their 
socio-economic disadvantage. Measures to reduce 
the drudgery of unpaid work through investment 
in time-saving infrastructure such as safe water 
sources within easy reach, can free up women’s time 
for paid work. Parental leave and childcare services 
can help women and men with care responsibilities 
and enable women to enter and remain in the 
labour market when their children are young if they 
choose to. Among developing regions, Latin America 
has seen the most progress in family-friendly 
policies over the past decade and has also seen the 
most significant increase in women’s labour force 
participation.15 
2. Gender-responsive social policies 
Social transfers—including family allowances, 
unemployment benefits and pensions—protect 
women and men in the face of contingencies 
such as unemployment or old age. They also help 
families shoulder some of the costs involved in 
raising children or caring for other dependents—
challenges that have become more pressing in the 
face of population ageing and changing family 
structures. A growing number of women in both 
developed and developing countries raise children 
on their own, and social transfers can make a huge 
difference for these families. In Brazil and Poland, 
for example, they reduce poverty rates among 
single mothers by 21 and 34 per cent, respectively. 
Social services that directly address women’s rights, 
including housing, health, education, training and 
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childcare, are just as important and often have 
an even greater impact than social transfers in 
reducing poverty and gender inequality.
A comprehensive approach to social policy that 
combines universal access to social services with 
social protection through contributory and non-
contributory transfer systems is the best way to 
realize economic and social rights for all without 
discrimination. Currently, only 27 per cent of the 
world’s population enjoys full access to social 
protection, whereas 73 per cent are covered 
partially or not at all.16 Women are often over-
represented among those who lack access to 
social protection. The definition of national social 
protection floors, including basic income security 
for children, working-age adults, older people and 
people with disabilities as well as the extension of 
basic social services to all, therefore holds significant 
promise for women. The introduction of universal 
social pensions in countries such as the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, Lesotho and Mauritius, for example, 
has helped close gender gaps and provide women 
with basic income security in old age. 
In order to contribute to substantive equality, 
social policies have to be designed with women’s 
rights at the centre. Particular care is needed to 
ensure that policies redress women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage without either reinforcing gender 
stereotypes or stigmatizing women for needing 
support. Policy makers should progressively move 
towards universal, rather than targeted, transfers 
and services and eliminate co-payments that 
compromise affordability of health and education, 
particularly for poorer women and girls. Where 
possible, conditions tied to the receipt of transfers 
should be removed, particularly those that reinforce 
women’s traditional roles and add to their overall 
work burdens. Instead, women’s empowerment 
should be an explicit goal of social protection. 
Investing in more and better services—including 
health services, education and training, credit and 
childcare services—to address women’s needs head-
on and to bolster their income security in the long 
term is crucial here. With women’s rights placed at 
the heart of policy design, sustainable and equitable 
routes out of poverty are possible. 
Investing in social protection and social services may 
seem daunting in the current economic climate. But 
it is possible. It has been estimated, for example, 
that the introduction of universal social pensions 
would cost around 1 per cent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per year in most countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. In many low-income countries these 
benefits will have to be implemented gradually. But 
as well as realizing women’s rights, the long-term 
benefits of social investments—such as maintaining 
a skilled workforce, healthy and well-nourished 
children capable of learning and creativity and 
societies where no one is left behind—will more than 
outweigh their immediate costs.17  
3. Rights-based macroeconomic policies 
Because macroeconomic policy is treated as 
‘gender-neutral’ it has, to date, failed to support 
the achievement of substantive equality for women. 
From a human rights perspective, macroeconomic 
policy needs to pursue a broad set of objectives 
that include the reduction of poverty and gender 
inequality. Integrating these social objectives 
would mean: expanding the targets of monetary 
policy to include creating decent work; mobilizing 
resources to enable investments in social services 
and transfers; and creating channels for meaningful 
participation by civil society organizations, including 
women’s movements, in macroeconomic decision-
making. 
Conventional monetary policy typically has one 
target—inflation reduction—and a narrow set of 
policy tools for achieving it. Although managing 
inflation is an important goal of monetary policy, the 
benefits of maintaining very low rates of inflation 
are not clear cut, particularly when trade-offs 
exist—with employment generation, for example. 
There are policy choices to be made: in the wake of 
the 2008 crisis, many central banks changed their 
approach to monetary policy by stimulating real 
economic activity rather than focusing exclusively 
on inflation. 
In the arena of fiscal policy, countries can raise 
resources for gender-sensitive social protection 
and social services by enforcing existing tax 
obligations, reprioritizing expenditure and 
expanding the overall tax base, as well as through 
international borrowing and development 
assistance. Several developing countries, 
including Ecuador, Lesotho and Thailand, have 
taken advantage of debt restructuring in order 
to free up resources for social protection.18 Other 
countries such as Cambodia, Costa Rica and 
Sri Lanka have reduced defence and security 
expenditures to support increased social spending. 
Some countries, such as the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia and Botswana, have used revenues 
generated from natural resource extraction to 
finance their social protection systems, including 
health-care programmes, income support for 
vulnerable populations and old-age pensions. 
Deficit spending is another option. Such spending 
is usually justified for ‘hard’ infrastructure projects 
that are classified as ‘investments’. While spending 
on education, health or water and sanitation 
is often seen as ‘consumption’, it can actually 
raise productivity, encourage private investment 
and stimulate higher rates of growth that can 
generate the taxes needed to pay back the debt. 
There are therefore strong grounds for using 
deficit spending to finance social protection and 
basic social services, since critical investments in 
human capacities can ultimately create stronger 
economies and fairer societies.
Tax systems can also be used to redistribute income 
and redress women’s socio-economic disadvantage 
by ensuring that women and marginalized 
groups are not disproportionately burdened. For 
example, value-added and sales taxes on basic 
consumption items should be exempted or zero-
rated, since such spending absorbs a large share of 
poorer people’s and specifically women’s income. 
Meanwhile, tax exemptions and allowances 
that primarily benefit wealthier groups can be 
minimized or removed to ensure these groups 
contribute their fair share. Gender-responsive 
budgeting is increasingly being used to assess and 
guide revenue collection and spending decisions. 
In the United Republic of Tanzania, for example, 
primary school fees were abolished and farm input 
subsidies were reintroduced in response to gender-
responsive budget initiatives led by women’s rights 
organizations. 
Global policy coordination is essential to create 
a macroeconomic environment that is conducive 
to the realization of women’s rights. The growing 
integration of the world’s economies means 
that actions taken by one government affect the 
realization of rights elsewhere. Moreover, the 
proliferation of agreements to liberalize trade and 
financial flows between countries limits the policy 
space of individual governments. The lack of global 
coordination also affects the ability of governments 
to mobilize resources. Multinational corporations, 
for example, use a variety of accounting techniques 
to lower their tax obligations, thereby diminishing 
their overall contribution to the economies where 
they operate. Estimates of tax revenue lost to 
developing countries due to trade mispricing alone 
amount to an estimated US$98 to $106 billion 
per year, nearly $20 billion more than the annual 
capital costs needed to achieve universal water 
and sanitation coverage by 2015.19  
The current system of global governance 
exacerbates, rather than mitigates, the gender 
bias in macroeconomic policy. In most existing 
institutions, including the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, the G20 and the World 
Trade Organization, power relations are such 
that governments of the poorest countries do not 
have an equal say in the decisions that affect 
them the most, let alone women in those countries. 
Global cooperation for the realization of economic 
and social rights can only be achieved if these 
institutions are democratized and powerful 
global players, from national governments 
to transnational corporations, accept that the 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights extends beyond borders.
SHARING RESPONSIBILITY AND ACTING 
COLLECTIVELY FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS
Human rights treaties have been used as the 
basis for new national legislation—for example, to 
address violence against women. But the power of 
human rights goes beyond the legislative domain. 
They provide the ethical basis and inspiration 
for collective action to change policies as well 
as social norms, attitudes and practices. Human 
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rights principles are also an important basis 
for the design of policies, for monitoring their 
implementation and outcomes and for holding all 
duty-bearers—States as well as global institutions 
and corporations—to account for the realization of 
substantive equality.    
Human rights emphasize the dignity and freedom 
of the individual, but their realization depends 
heavily on solidarity and collective action. Putting 
in place policies for substantive equality requires 
collective financing, ideally through progressive 
taxation. The narrow targeting of social protection 
to the poorest households may seem to make it 
more affordable than building universal systems 
that benefit everyone. But universal systems can 
actually expand financing options by increasing the 
willingness of middle and higher income groups to 
pay taxes for well-functioning education, health or 
pension systems that they would also use.20  
Collective action is crucial as well. Women who 
experience multiple and intersecting forms of 
discrimination need to first understand and claim 
their rights—something that often happens when 
women get together to discuss their grievances and 
act collectively to seek solutions. Women workers, 
including those in informal employment, have 
set up their own organizations to represent their 
interests in the workplace. Women’s organizing 
and the strength of their autonomous movements 
are the strongest predictors of gender equality 
laws and policies across a range of areas from 
family law to violence against women and from 
non-discrimination in employment to childcare 
services.21 Women’s collective action has also been 
crucial for ensuring the translation of legal rights 
into the effective delivery of services on the ground, 
as well as for demanding accountability and 
redress for major delivery failures. 
The potential to advance towards substantive 
equality is greatest when the claims of organized 
groups of women find openings and receptivity 
among actors in positions of power, and when 
there are mechanisms in place—such as public 
consultation and petitioning processes, or 
parliamentary committees—through which women 
can legitimately articulate their claims and policy 
demands. The success of autonomous women’s 
movements in mobilizing for women’s rights 
critically depends on the alliances women are 
able to build with other social justice movements, 
and with sympathetic insiders in political parties, 
parliaments, government bureaucracies, research 
institutions and international organizations. 
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When Maria Jose Pereira was growing up in the rural town of 
Escada, her father’s tools were off limits.
“Everyone in my house worked in construction. My father 
and brothers were all stonemasons,” Maria says.  “I wanted 
to work with them, but they said I couldn’t because I was a 
woman.”
Thanks to a groundbreaking government initiative, Maria 
has now proven her family wrong. Not only is she a licensed 
stonemason, she is also a plumber and electrician.
Chapéu de Palha Mulher, which is derived from ‘straw 
hat’ in Portuguese, is a social inclusion programme that 
provides professional training for women living in poor rural 
communities in the north-eastern state of Pernambuco. 
Launched in 2007, the programme was created by the 
state’s Secretariat for Women’s Policies in order to provide 
alternatives for female sugarcane farmers during the off-
harvest months.
Transforming women’s lives  
in north-eastern Brazil
MAKING 
RIGHTS REAL 
MAKING PROGRESS/STORIES OF CHANGE
Cristina Buarque, former State Secretary for Women’s Policies, Pernambuco, watches 
women from the Chapeu de Palha Mulher programme fish for shrimp in the River Goiana
Photo: UN Women/Lianne Milton
 “Most of these women did not choose to work in the 
plantations, they usually went with their husbands or 
fathers,” Cristina Buarque, who led the Secretariat until late 
2014, says. “This patriarchal ‘machista’ culture infantilized 
them. We wanted them to know they had other options.”
According to Cristina, women working in the fields were 
not provided with the same training or compensation 
as their male counterparts. They were often victims of 
discrimination, verbal and physical assault and domestic 
violence.
For Maria, who worked in the fields for five years, the job 
was draining.
“It was very difficult. I would spend twelve hours under the 
hot sun picking sugarcane with my hands full of blisters,” 
she recalls. “After that, I would come home and have to 
clean and cook for my 
husband and kids.”
Chapéu de Palha Mulher 
provides women with a 
mandatory three month 
course in public policy, and 
a small monthly stipend 
and childcare to support 
their participation. The 
course, taught by feminist 
trainers, teaches women 
about rights and citizenship, covering topics such as 
the history of slavery; the struggle of women, black and 
indigenous people for equality; gender stereotypes; and 
the government’s human rights commitments under the 
Constitution. Once the participants complete this stage, 
they choose a professional training course, often opting to 
develop skills for traditionally male-oriented jobs.
“The course is a key component to Chapéu de Palha Mulher,” 
Cristina explains. “We needed these women to understand 
how their local government works and what their rights as 
individuals are in order to train better professionals and 
better citizens.”
Cristina was instrumental in designing the Chapéu de 
Palha Mulher programme. She was handpicked in 2007 
by the late former governor Eduardo Campos to lead 
the Secretariat for Women’s Policies.
“I wasn’t a politician, I came 
from an academic research 
background,” Cristina says. 
“When I was approached 
to do this work, I knew this 
was an opportunity to bring 
the work I was a passionate 
about to a larger scale.” 
When she joined the state 
government, Cristina was 
“The patriarchal `machista’
culture infantilized the 
women. We wanted 
them to know they had 
other options”
Maracatu de baque is an Afro-Indigenous dance typically performed by all men, but women in Pernambuco formed the first and only all-female group to perform 
the dance
Photo: UN Women/Lianne Milton
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the only woman serving among 24 other secretaries. 
Through Chapéu de Palha Mulher, she integrated the 
work of different departments and more than 40 women’s 
organizations, helping to strengthen the relationship between 
the government and civil society.
“We wanted the women to learn how to take better care of 
their bodies, so we called upon the health secretariat. We 
wanted them to learn how to read and write, so we called 
on the education secretariat,” Cristina says. “However, the 
people working on the ground were in the local women’s 
organizations. We knew their participation was crucial.”
In addition to learning new skills, the programme brought 
women together. Many, like Angela, who chose to identify 
herself by first name only, found a sense of community within 
the classroom. 
“My husband would beat me constantly,” Angela says, who 
escaped her abusive marriage. “I never had anyone to turn 
to. Now I know I can count on these women.”
Nearly 100,000 women have participated in the programme 
since 2007, which has expanded to 89 municipalities 
in Pernambuco to include rural women working in fruit 
plantations and artisanal fishing. There are also plans to 
open a school in the town of Pesqueira, where courses will be 
offered year-round.
Cristina resigned from the Secretariat last August shortly after 
a fatal plane crash killed presidential candidate Eduardo 
Campos, the former governor who first appointed her to 
office.
“I’m proud of the work I did in the secretariat, but it was time for 
me to move on,” Cristina says. She is hopeful that the work will 
be continued under the new governor, Paulo Câmara and the 
new Secretaria da Mulher, Silvia Cordeiro. Silvia comes to the 
Secretariat having led one of the local women’s organizations 
that has been so instrumental to the programme’s success.
Back in the sleepy town of Escada, Maria examines the 
water valve she recently installed in her shower. Her home 
has become the canvas on which she practices the skills she 
learned in Chapéu de Palha Mulher.
“We were having problems with the electricity, so I fixed it,” 
Maria says. “I also worked on the plumbing. My next project 
will be laying down ceramic tile in the kitchen and bathroom.”
She has also begun remodeling a neighbour’s home with 
one of her Chapéu de Palha Mulher classmates.
“I love looking at the repairs in my house and other jobs 
and knowing that I am the one who did them,” Maria says, 
as she opens the faucet in the kitchen and lets the water 
run. “I am the one who fixed this, I did this with my own 
two hands.”
“The people working on 
the ground were in the local 
women’s organizations. 
We knew their participation 
was crucial”
Story: Flora Charner. For more information on Chapeu de Palha Mulher see Cornwall 2015, 2012 and A Quiet Revolution (https://vimeo.com/44520506).
Photo: UN Women/Lianne Milton
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SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
FOR WOMEN:  
The challenge for public policy
Laws that establish women and men’s equal rights provide an 
important basis for demanding and achieving gender equality 
in practice. But equality before the law is not enough to 
ensure women’s enjoyment of their rights: power inequalities, 
structural constraints and discriminatory social norms and 
practices also need to be addressed. 
International human rights standards provide an 
understanding of gender equality—substantive equality for 
women—that goes beyond formal equality to emphasize 
women’s enjoyment of their rights in practice.  
Equality should be understood in relation not only to 
opportunities but also to outcomes. Unequal outcomes may 
result from indirect as well as direct discrimination, and 
‘different treatment’ might be required to achieve equality in 
practice.   
Progress towards substantive equality for women requires 
public action on three interrelated fronts: redressing socio-
economic disadvantage; addressing stereotyping, stigma and 
violence; and strengthening agency, voice and participation. 
Transformation in women’s lives happens when actions along 
these three dimensions reinforce each other.
IN BRIEF
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The international human rights system clarifies the obligations 
of States to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. States, 
therefore, have a proactive role as arbiters of social and 
economic rights.
In an increasingly integrated global economy, where state 
functions are often ‘outsourced’, the realization of women’s 
economic and social rights requires a wider framework 
of accountability, which encompasses the private sector, 
States’ actions outside their own borders and international 
organizations.
Women’s collective action strengthens accountability for 
women’s human rights, by legitimizing these rights as issues 
of public concern and building the capacity of women who 
experience multiple forms of discrimination, to claim their 
rights. 
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/6
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INTRODUCTION
This Report reflects on the ‘progress of the 
world’s women’ at a critical moment, 20 years 
after the Fourth World Conference on Women in 
Beijing set out an ambitious agenda to advance 
gender equality. As the global community is 
defining the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) for the post-2015 era, it takes stock and 
draws lessons from policy experiences around 
the world to chart a forward-looking agenda for 
action. 
Has the vision of gender equality set out in the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 
become a reality for women everywhere? This 
Report draws on experiences, evidence and 
analysis from diverse national and regional 
contexts to answer this question. It reviews 
women’s gains in obtaining equality before 
the law, access to education and other social 
services; in increasing their visibility as political 
actors; in participation in paid work and its 
benefits; and in increased public recognition 
of the scale and severity of the violence they 
experience. But it also asks why progress in 
ensuring women’s practical enjoyment of a range 
of economic and social rights has been so slow 
and uneven across countries and between social 
groups. 
At a time when the world has witnessed such 
impressive gains in material wealth, why are 
millions of women denied their right to even basic 
levels of health care, water and sanitation? Why 
does living in a rural area continue to increase a 
woman’s risk of dying in pregnancy or childbirth? 
Why are women still more likely than men to have 
no income security in their old age? And why are 
the inequalities among women widening, leaving 
millions of poor women behind? 
In seeking to understand why progress in 
women’s enjoyment of their rights has been 
slow and uneven, this Report shares experiences 
from women’s rights advocates and movements 
around the world. Their struggles underline how 
persistent and pervasive discriminatory social 
norms, stereotypes, stigma and violence remain, 
holding back women and girls everywhere from 
realizing their full potential.
Multiple and rising inequalities 
The realization of women’s rights cannot be 
separated from broader questions of economic 
and social justice. Militarism and violent conflicts, 
the global financial and economic crises, volatile 
food and energy prices, food insecurity and 
climate change have intensified inequalities and 
vulnerability, with specific impacts on women 
and girls. Dominant patterns of development 
have led to increasingly precarious livelihoods. 
As of 2011, 1 billion people live in extreme poverty1 
and many more survive without access to basic 
services and social protection, exposed to 
recurring economic shocks, ecological crises, 
health epidemics and armed conflict. 
Alongside poverty and vulnerability, levels of 
inequality are rising both across and within 
countries.2 The world is said to be more unequal 
today than at any point since World War II. The 
richest 1 per cent of the population now owns 
about 40 per cent of the available assets while 
the bottom half owns 1 per cent or less.3 These 
inequalities—among the triggers of the 2008 
economic crisis—have been further reinforced 
by the subsequent recession and austerity 
measures. Public spending cuts have shifted the 
burden of coping and caring into the household 
and onto the shoulders of women and girls.4 
Rising levels of inequality compromise the 
advancement of women’s rights by reinforcing 
inequalities among women, making it harder for 
them to join forces across class, racial and other 
divides.  
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No empowerment without rights  
A wide variety of actors—bilateral and multilateral 
donor agencies, governments, civil society 
organizations and, more recently, the private 
sector—have embraced the goal of women’s 
economic empowerment. Some see in women 
a largely untapped market of consumers, while 
others speak about the opportunity of ‘unleashing 
the economic power and potential of women’5 as 
a means to solve the lingering problems caused by 
the global financial crisis and stalled growth. 
Synergies between women’s economic 
empowerment and wider prosperity clearly need 
to be nurtured. Increasing women’s ownership and 
control over agricultural assets and productive 
resources is likely to have a positive impact on food 
security and livelihood sustainability for the whole 
household.6 Women’s participation in the workforce 
can enhance the competitiveness of export 
industries.7 A fundamental question, however, is 
whether the presumed ‘win-win’ scenarios actually 
expand women’s own practical enjoyment of their 
rights or simply harness women’s time, knowledge 
and resourcefulness to serve development ends, 
with no benefit to women themselves. 
Without a monitoring framework solidly anchored 
in human rights, it is difficult to know whether 
claims of empowering women stand up to scrutiny. 
Human rights standards—set out in a range of 
international treaties to which the great majority 
of governments have voluntarily signed up—
provide a framework of binding principles to which 
countries must be accountable, irrespective of their 
economic, social and political characteristics. It 
is a framework that is centred on the rights and 
freedoms to which all are entitled by virtue of 
being human. This Report therefore underlines the 
centrality of women’s human rights as both the 
‘end’ and an effective ‘means’ of development.8  
Indivisible rights, synergistic policies
This Report also underlines the indivisibility of 
rights. The focus is on women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage, but economic, social, civil and 
political rights are deeply intertwined. When a 
woman leaves an abusive relationship, she wants 
justice but also a safe place to live, medical care 
and a job so she can maintain an adequate 
standard of living for herself and any dependents 
she may have.9 Her rights to housing, health care 
and work are distinct but indivisible. Economic 
and social rights are closely interlinked with all 
other rights, especially the civil and political rights 
that enable women’s organizing and claims-
making. Conversely, an enabling economic 
environment is an important foundation for States’ 
capacity to respect and fulfil other rights.  
Not only are women’s rights seamlessly 
connected, so are the actions that help advance 
them. In practice, economic and social policies 
have to work in tandem to be effective and to 
enable the realization of rights. Yet, there is a 
tendency in policy debates to artificially separate 
the two. The role of economic policies, especially 
macroeconomic policies, is seen primarily in 
terms of promoting economic growth, while social 
policies are supposed to address its ‘casualties’ by 
redressing poverty and inequality. 
In fact, macroeconomic policies can support 
a broader set of goals, including gender 
equality and the realization of human rights. 
Macroeconomic management is essential to 
ensure the availability of resources to support 
the realization of rights and to provide economic 
opportunities. Conversely, social services, 
whether provided through government, private 
providers or unpaid care and domestic work, 
have economic effects. Investments in child 
development, education and health improve 
productivity and contribute to sustainable 
growth. Social transfers, such as pensions, 
family allowances and unemployment benefits, 
have positive multiplier effects on the economy, 
especially—but not only—during recessions.
Chapter overview and report structure 
This Report aims to bridge the gap between global 
discussions of human rights, on the one hand, and 
the deliberation of policies to support gender equality 
and women’s empowerment, on the other. Bridging 
this divide is essential if public policies are to rise to 
the challenge of making rights real for all women. 
This chapter elaborates the Report’s central and 
guiding concept: substantive equality for women. 
The first section discusses progress towards equality 
before the law in various domains, highlighting 
advances as well as setbacks, underscoring that 
having legal rights on the statute is no guarantee 
that women can actually exercise or enjoy those 
rights in practice. The second section draws on 
human rights principles and norms to elaborate on 
the understanding of substantive equality. It shows 
the need to address both direct and indirect forms of 
discrimination as well as structural inequalities that 
constrain women’s enjoyment of rights. 
Finally, the third section proposes a three-part 
framework for advancing substantive equality, 
which requires progress in: redressing women’s 
socio-economic disadvantage; addressing 
stereotyping, stigma and violence against 
women; and strengthening women’s agency, 
voice and participation. The framework guides 
the Report’s identification and assessment in 
subsequent chapters of the range of economic 
and social policies that are likely to enhance 
women’s enjoyment of rights in relation to work 
and care (Chapter 2), social protection and social 
services (Chapter 3) and the macro-economy 
(Chapter 4). Tackling all three dimensions can 
lay the foundation for lasting transformation 
of social structures and institutions—families, 
markets, States—that currently hamper women’s 
enjoyment of rights.10  
Equality before the law is crucial for gender 
equality. Laws that establish that women and men 
have equal rights provide the basis for demanding 
and achieving equality in practice. They are a 
touchstone for political and cultural struggles, set 
standards and incentives for changes in social 
norms and attitudes and influence shifts in policy. 
It would be hard to find a country in the world 
that has successfully tackled entrenched gender 
or racial discrimination without any constitutional 
or legal reform.11 It is therefore not surprising that 
women’s movements have so often mobilized to 
demand changes in the law.
PROGRESS IN LEGAL REFORM 
Progress in achieving women’s civil and political 
rights has been a key achievement of women’s 
movements. Within less than a century, women 
have gained the right to vote and to stand for office 
in virtually every country of the world.12 Progress is 
also evident in other areas of the law: as of 2014, 
143 countries guarantee equality between women 
and men in their constitutions; 132 have equalized 
the minimum age of marriage (without parental 
consent) at 18 years or older, protecting girls from 
early marriage; at least 119 have passed legislation 
on domestic violence; and 125 have passed laws 
to make workplaces and public spaces safer for 
women by prohibiting sexual harassment (see 
Figure 1.1). 
Reforming discriminatory family laws 
Progress towards equality before the law has been 
less consistent on family laws, also called personal 
status laws. Often derived from customary or 
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religious laws, family laws are of particular 
significance for women because they regulate 
gender and age hierarchies embedded within 
the ‘private sphere’ of the home, by shaping the 
rights and obligations of spouses in marriage 
and divorce, the relationship between parents 
and children, marital property, child custody or 
guardianship and inheritance. These laws shape 
power relations between women and men, 
parents and children and brothers and sisters. 
They also have a direct impact on women’s ability 
to access and control resources.13 Reform to such 
laws, and changes in the practices that surround 
them, are necessary for women to be able to 
claim fundamental rights to personhood. 
Data on equality between women and men in 
family laws covering 71 countries and spanning 
a 30-year time span (1975–2005) show that 
progress on this front has been mixed. While 18 
countries started the period with family laws that 
were fully in line with gender equality, a further 
15 had achieved this goal by 2005.14 Therefore, 
by 2005, women in 33 out of 71 countries had 
acquired equal rights within the family, enabling 
them to make decisions about their children and 
to engage in employment without requiring the 
permission of a spouse, for example. 
The remaining 38 countries covered by the 
study had not fully transitioned towards gender-
equal family laws by 2005. Some of these 
countries - including Morocco, the Republic 
of Korea and Turkey— began the period with 
extensive discriminatory provisions, but have 
since advanced significantly towards more 
gender-equal family laws. However, as of 2005, 
eight countries—Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia— had maintained 
highly discriminatory laws that, for example, 
endorse men’s authority over women in marriage, 
give men greater rights over property and 
limit women’s ability to file for divorce.15 These 
countries span different regions but all apply a 
conservative interpretation of Islamic family law. 
By contrast, in Morocco, women’s rights advocates 
were able to spearhead extensive reforms in family 
law that appealed to both Islamic and human 
rights precepts (see Box 1.1). 
Figure 1.1
Number of countries with or without select women’s rights provisions, 2014  
 The majority of countries now have laws in place on some key aspects of women’s rights
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In 2004, Morocco overhauled its Islamic family law, the Moudawana, as a result of longstanding 
mobilization by the women’s rights movement.16 Women’s rights activists first started to rally in the 
early 1990s, launching a grassroots campaign for Moudawana reform that collected over 1 million 
signatures. Minor reforms of the family law took place in 1993, but major changes were resisted. 
Shifts in political leadership in the late 1990s—including the victory of a socialist opposition party and 
the ascendance to the throne of King Mohamed VI—enhanced support for political liberalization and 
gender equality, enabling women’s demands to be heard. 
At the same time, growing public support for women’s rights triggered a backlash from conservative 
Islamist groups. Women’s rights advocates responded to this challenge by establishing alliances 
with other change-oriented forces, engaging in public awareness campaigns and framing their 
claims in ways that appealed to Islamic precepts as well as to universal human rights principles. The 
reformed 2004 law remains faithful to Islamic values and traditions while giving women significantly 
more rights. In particular, it introduces women’s right to autonomous decision-making by abolishing 
the notion of male guardianship and the wife’s duty of obedience; establishes equal rights and 
responsibilities in the family; and equalizes and expands women’s and men’s rights to initiate 
divorce. 
The 2004 reform of the Moudawana paved the way for further changes in the law. Most 
significantly, the 2011 Constitution guarantees equality between women and men, prohibits all forms 
of discrimination against women and requires the State to promote women’s rights in their entirety. 
While these momentous changes have been welcome, considerable work remains to be done in 
aligning all domestic laws with international human rights treaties to which Morocco is a State 
party and ensuring that all groups of women benefit from the equal protection of the law (see story: 
Counting women in).
BOX 1.1  
Women’s collective action paves the way to legal reform in Morocco
Political agency is key to family law reform 
What explains why some countries have made 
significant progress in legal reform but not others? 
Analysis of data across these 71 countries suggests 
that women’s political agency, especially the 
influence of autonomous feminist movements, is an 
important catalyst for family law reform.17 In both 
authoritarian and democratic settings, women’s 
rights advocates have seized political opportunities 
for equality-enhancing legal reforms by establishing 
alliances with other actors, including government 
officials, lawyers, politicians and development 
practitioners. Civic pressure alone is not enough, 
however; there must also be receptivity on the part 
of the state for change to happen.
What factors determine the disposition of the 
state toward family law reform? Analysis reveals 
that there is a powerful association between the 
character of the state-religion relationship and 
the degree of gender equality in family law. In 
countries where the state plays an active role 
in upholding religious practices, doctrines and 
institutions, family law tends to discriminate 
against women. In contexts where political and 
ecclesiastical institutions are more separated, 
family law tends to be more egalitarian. This 
is not to suggest that religions are inherently 
patriarchal; they are only historically so (as are 
most secular traditions). The key finding is that 
religious doctrine is less likely to evolve and 
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adapt to changing social practices where it is 
upheld by the state. In such contexts patriarchal 
interpretations of religion get frozen, and it 
becomes hard to reform family law. Challenges 
to the religious interpretations endorsed by the 
law come to be seen as challenges to the entire 
institutional configuration, binding state power 
and religious authority.18  
Historical legacies also influence the scope 
for legal equality. Countries that experienced 
communist rule often have gender-equal family 
laws due to communist governments promoting 
changes in women’s roles in order to encourage 
full employment and to marginalize religion 
and traditional cultures. The legacy of British 
colonialism, by contrast, has been to stymie 
reform by creating multiple family laws on the 
basis of cultural identities of the communities 
lumped together in post-colonial States. The 
existence of plural legal systems based on 
cultural or religious identity can pose particular 
challenges to women seeking justice.19   
Even where progress towards equality in family 
laws has been achieved, sustaining this progress 
can be challenging, especially in countries where 
conservative forces and extremist groups that 
resist gender equality are gaining ground. These 
groups, in developed and developing countries 
alike, misuse religion, tradition and culture to 
reshape laws, state institutions and social norms 
to curtail women’s and girls’ human rights and 
entrench stereotypical gender roles, both within 
the ‘private sphere’ as well as in public life.20 To 
resist this rollback and make it clear that culture 
and religion cannot be a justification for the 
violation of rights, alliances between women’s 
Figure 1.2
Gender equality in property ownership and inheritance law by region, 1990 and 2010 
 There has been progress in some regions, but in others discriminatory laws remain in place
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rights advocates and other like-minded forces, 
whether in government or in national and global 
civil society, are key.
Another area of the law where customary 
and religious provisions are often influential is 
property ownership and inheritance. As Figure 
1.2 shows, there has been significant progress 
between 1990 and 2010 in reducing legal 
discrimination against women regarding their 
ability to inherit and own assets in their own 
name – although here too progress has been 
uneven across regions. Central and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia and Developed Regions 
have all but removed legal restrictions on 
women’s property rights. There has also been 
tremendous progress in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
which began the period with the largest number 
of legal restrictions compared to other regions, 
have made significant strides in removing gender 
based differences in the right to own property. In 
contrast, progress in reducing gender disparities 
in legislation has been less impressive in the 
Middle East and North Africa and in South Asia.21  
Reforming women’s legal status at work, 
parental leave and childcare  
What about legal rights that shape women’s 
access to paid work and equal conditions 
at work, maternity and parental leave and 
childcare policies? Based on analysis of more 
than a dozen laws and policies spanning 70 
countries over three decades (1975–2005), a 
more recent study charts the uneven progress in 
these areas as well.22  
Figure 1.3
Percentage of countries with legal provisions and policies, 1975-2005 
 An increasing number of countries have introduced laws and policies to equalize women’s status at work and 
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The number of countries with policies that formally 
entrench sex discrimination in the workplace—for 
example, by prohibiting women from working in 
certain types of jobs, doing night work or overtime—
declined during this period.23 In 1975, it was most 
typical not to take action to outlaw discrimination. 
By 2005, the opposite was true, with most countries 
outlawing workplace discrimination (see Figure 
1.3). For example, in 1975 only about one third of 
countries had legislated for equal pay; by 2005 the 
proportion had gone up to 86 per cent.24   
Similarly, as Figure 1.3 shows, the number of 
countries that provide paid maternity leave to 
working women has increased and there has 
been a dramatic expansion in parental leave. 
Moreover, by 2005, more than 81 per cent of 
countries out of the 70 studied had a national 
day-care policy in place and 43 per cent had 
committed to public day-care provision.25 
As with family laws, women’s movements have 
played a pivotal role in pushing for women’s legal 
rights to work and at work. Women’s organizing 
on their own behalf has played a critical part 
in triggering changes with respect to women’s 
legal right to work—by prohibiting discrimination, 
for example, or promoting equality in hiring 
and promotion. Overall income levels were a 
significant factor for the adoption of maternity 
and parental leave provisions: without an 
adequate revenue base, countries are unlikely 
to adopt publicly-funded paid maternity leave.26 
Women’s movements have also been influential 
in the development of childcare policy and have 
found useful allies on this issue among political 
parties with a redistributive agenda. 
PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES IN PRACTICE
Gaps remain, but in many countries legal barriers 
preventing women from pursuing the same kind 
of opportunities and careers as men appear to 
be diminishing. Nevertheless, widespread gender 
segregation continues to confine women to the 
lowest paid segments of the labour market. At 
home and in their communities, women and girls 
continue to assume the lion’s share of unpaid care 
and domestic work. Gender inequalities with 
regard to earned income, wealth, time use and 
social security, documented in detail in Chapters 
2 and 3, clearly indicate that something is 
terribly wrong: why are ‘equal opportunities’ 
not translating into equal outcomes? It is 
highly unlikely that women as a group would 
deliberately and consistently choose less 
remunerative livelihoods.27 And even if women 
and men did ‘freely choose’ different livelihood 
options, why should the economic activities that 
women typically choose systematically attract a 
lower valuation in the market than those chosen 
by men?28   
Discriminatory social norms
Even in countries where gender-equal laws 
have been put in place, power inequalities 
between women and men as well as gender 
stereotypes and discriminatory social norms are 
deeply embedded. In some contexts patriarchal 
structures and practices constrain women’s 
ability to seek paid work, or even health care, 
and to participate in social and political life. 
Gender stereotypes reinforce norms of gender 
inequality such as the continued devaluation 
of ‘women’s work’ or the belief that women 
and men should be confined to narrow and 
segregated social roles.29  
In the labour market, stereotypes about 
suitable occupations for women and men 
serve to maintain the existing gender division 
of labour. Young women and men who move 
into occupations that are associated with the 
opposite sex risk disparagement or ridicule. 
Women who work in male-dominated sectors 
may find their performance devalued and their 
competence questioned. This, in turn, can affect 
their prospects for receiving promotion or pay 
awards.30 Men have little incentive to move into 
female-dominated occupations, given that those 
jobs often pay less than equivalent jobs that are 
male-dominated.31 Such stereotypes inevitably 
influence women and men’s choices, even where 
legislation provides for ‘equal opportunities’. 
More broadly, social norms generally assume 
that women will take primary responsibility for 
domestic chores and the care of young children 
and other family members. This limits their 
participation in the labour market compared to 
men or confines them to lower quality and lower 
paid jobs and livelihoods that can be ‘reconciled’ 
with unpaid work, but often at great cost to 
women themselves. 
The power of social norms is such that women 
sometimes do not claim their legal rights due 
to pressure on them to conform to societal 
expectations. For example, even where women 
can legally inherit land on an equal basis with 
men, a woman may forego this right in order to 
maintain good relations with her brothers, whose 
support she may rely upon in case of marital 
dispute, widowhood or economic need. This 
practice is prevalent in many parts of South Asia, 
especially when women are married far away 
from their birth villages.32 
In 2005, India took a major leap forward by 
amending the Hindu Succession Act (1956) to 
grant daughters and sons equal inheritance 
shares to agricultural land at the national level. 
In practice, a number of factors have hampered 
implementation of these provisions on the 
ground. These include: resistance from brothers 
against their sisters inheriting parental land; the 
belief that the dowry constitutes the daughter’s 
share of her natal family’s property; complicated 
administrative systems; and women’s own 
fragmentary understanding of their legal rights.33 
Even though most women reported wanting to 
inherit land, they were reluctant to upset their 
natal families, especially brothers. 
To address the gap in the implementation of 
this important law requires efforts at multiple 
levels: legal literacy campaigns are needed to 
raise women’s awareness of their entitlements 
and erode discriminatory social norms; and 
legal procedures need to be simplified and 
government functionaries trained to increase 
their responsiveness to women’s land rights. Job 
creation and social protection measures would 
also help reduce women’s dependence on family 
networks for their economic security.
Structural constraints
Where women have secured access to land, this 
does not always translate into remunerative 
livelihoods due to various structural constraints 
that they face. Even subsistence farming 
requires some capital to buy seeds and tools, 
but more remunerative cash-crop farming 
requires more generous outlays. Research from 
sub-Saharan Africa suggests that the sums of 
money required to make farming viable are 
beyond the reach of many women farmers. 
In addition, women face barriers to their 
engagement with markets (see Chapter 2).34   
Gaining equal outcomes from equal rights 
legislation is particularly hard for poor working 
class, ethnic minority or indigenous women. 
Lack of awareness of their rights and social 
barriers may prevent such women from 
coming forward to pursue cases through the 
formal justice system.35 For example, poor Dalit 
women in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh 
are more likely to experience abuse by service 
providers, or to come under pressure to pay 
bribes, compared to wealthier or higher 
caste women. In such cases, they rarely lodge 
complaints due to fear of victimization and 
further abuse.36 Similarly, migrant domestic 
workers face frequent violations of their rights 
at work. However, national labour laws often 
exclude them from coverage and residency 
laws stipulate that they have to be sponsored 
by their employers. Financial costs, language 
barriers and discriminatory attitudes among 
the judiciary further hamper their recourse to 
justice.37  
In political life, women’s equal rights to vote and 
to stand for political office are now recognized 
35
The international human rights system in 
general, and the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) in particular, recognizes the limitations 
of formal equality in delivering equality in 
practice. Within the human rights system and its 
associated treaties, there is strong support for 
going beyond formal equality and the provision of 
‘same treatment’. 
The concept of substantive equality has been 
advanced in key human rights treaties to capture 
this broader understanding: that inequality 
can be structural and discrimination indirect; 
that equality has to be understood in relation 
to outcomes as well as opportunities; and 
that ‘different treatment’ might be required to 
achieve equality in practice (see Box 1.2). While 
formal equality refers to the adoption of laws 
and policies that treat women and men equally, 
substantive equality is concerned with the results 
and outcomes of these: ‘ensuring that they do 
not maintain, but rather alleviate, the inherent 
disadvantage that particular groups experience’.40 
The concept of substantive equality arose out of 
the recognition that—because of the legacy of 
historical inequalities, structural disadvantages, 
biological differences and biases in how laws 
and policies are implemented in practice—formal 
equality is not enough to ensure that women are 
able to enjoy the same rights as men. To achieve 
substantive equality, therefore, requires both 
direct and indirect discrimination to be addressed. 
It also requires specific measures to be adopted 
that redress women’s disadvantages and, in the 
longer term, the transformation of the institutions 
and structures that reinforce and reproduce 
unequal power relations between women and 
men. 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS FRAMEWORKS
in the vast majority of countries. However, ‘equal 
opportunities’ do not become real just because 
formal barriers are removed.38 Women continue to 
be excluded from political office by discriminatory 
attitudes and ‘old boys’ networks’ in political 
parties, by lack of funds to run election campaigns 
and by family responsibilities that clash with the 
inflexible working hours of political institutions. In 
recognition of these structural constraints, quotas 
to increase women’s representation have been 
adopted across a number of developing and 
developed countries alike.39
The understanding that special measures are 
necessary to overcome  the disadvantages that 
women face can be usefully extended to other 
domains. Indeed, the need for such measures, 
to achieve equality in practice has long been 
recognized in the international human rights 
system.
Article 1 of CEDAW takes a first step towards advancing the notion of substantive equality in its 
comprehensive definition of ‘discrimination against women’: 
(it) shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.41
This foundational definition prohibits discriminatory treatment (direct discrimination) as well as 
discriminatory outcomes (indirect discrimination); it also precludes discrimination that is intended 
(purposive) as well as unintended (discrimination in effect).42  
The need to address equality of outcomes is clearly stated in article 3 of the Convention, which 
obliges States parties to take all appropriate measures 
to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing 
them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of 
equality with men. 
This emphasis on equality of outcomes is further elaborated in the CEDAW Committee’s 
landmark General Recommendation No. 25 on temporary special measures, which underlines 
the insufficiency of a ‘purely legal or programmatic approach’ for ‘achieving de facto equality 
with men, which the Committee interprets as substantive equality’.43 Similarly, the Committee that 
monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), states that ‘(s)ubstantive equality is concerned, in addition, with the effects of laws, 
policies and practices and with ensuring that they do not maintain, but rather alleviate, the inherent 
disadvantage that particular groups experience’.44 
BOX 1.2 
Substantive equality as defined in the human rights system 
Addressing indirect discrimination
The CEDAW Committee’s General 
Recommendation No. 25 on temporary special 
measures explicitly prohibits indirect discrimination 
‘which may occur when laws, policies and 
programmes are based on seemingly gender-
neutral criteria which in their actual effect have a 
detrimental impact on women’. 
Gender-neutral laws, policies and 
programmes unintentionally may perpetuate 
the consequences of past discrimination. 
They may be inadvertently modelled on male 
lifestyles and thus fail to take into account 
aspects of women’s life experiences which may 
differ from those of men. These differences may 
exist because of stereotypical expectations, 
attitudes and behaviour directed towards 
women which are based on the biological 
differences between women and men. They 
may also exist because of the generally existing 
subordination of women by men.45 
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In other words, ‘discrimination includes any 
treatment that has the effect of nullifying the 
enjoyment of human rights by women in all 
spheres, though such discriminatory effect was not 
intended’.46 Thus, even where unequal outcomes 
cannot be attributed to particular, conscious 
acts, this does not mean that discrimination is 
not happening. This contrasts with a narrow 
understanding of discrimination as the intended 
acts of individuals, which suggests that if there is 
no intent then there cannot be discrimination. 
An example is the austerity measures adopted 
since 2010 in many countries across the world 
to reduce budgetary deficits. These do not 
specifically intend to hurt any particular group, 
but evidence suggests that they are strongly 
biased against low-income households, and 
especially against women within them.47 In the 
January 2015 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) by 
the Human Rights Council, for example, Spain 
came under criticism from its peers for the harsh 
impact of its austerity measures, especially on 
women, migrants, people with disabilities and 
children.48 The concept of indirect discrimination 
serves to emphasize how seemingly ‘neutral’ 
policies or practices can act to put some groups 
at a disadvantage due to structural and historical 
inequalities.
The need for temporary special measures
CEDAW also makes it clear that non-identical 
treatment aimed at redressing women’s 
disadvantages may be necessary to facilitate 
the achievement of substantive equality for 
women.49 The idea that ‘same treatment’ is not 
sufficient to achieve substantive equality and non-
discrimination is also recognized by other human 
rights treaties, such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which 
recommends ‘special measures’ to be put in place 
(article 1). 
Article 4(1) of CEDAW promotes the use of 
‘temporary special measures’, which are aimed 
at ‘accelerating de facto equality between 
women and men’ by remedying the effects of 
past or present discrimination against women 
and promoting the structural, social and cultural 
changes necessary for the realization of women’s 
substantive equality. The CEDAW Committee 
has clarified that such measures should ‘not be 
deemed necessary forever, even though the 
meaning of ‘temporary’ may, in fact, result in the 
application of such measures for a long period 
of time’. The Committee goes on to explain that 
such measures may be discontinued ‘when their 
desired results have been achieved and sustained 
for a period of time’.50  
To enable the equal enjoyment of rights, States 
must take positive steps to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women, including structural 
and indirect discrimination. In doing so they 
can build on the foundations of formal equality, 
but also need to go further to ensure that the 
effects of laws, policies and practices redress the 
disadvantage that women experience. 
WHO HAS OBLIGATIONS TO UPHOLD 
WOMEN’S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS?
In addition to CEDAW, which is a vital reference 
point for understanding the meaning of gender 
equality, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the work 
of the committee that supervises its work, are 
also essential to understanding and addressing 
women’s economic and social rights.51 The 
ICESCR covers the realization of economic 
and social rights in great depth. Specifically, 
it addresses the rights to work and to just and 
favourable conditions of work (articles 6 and 7), 
the realization of which is extensively explored 
in Chapter 2 of this Report. The Covenant also 
includes the right to social security and an 
adequate standard of living (articles 9 and 11), 
which are tackled in Chapter 3. In several of its 
articles the Covenant makes specific references to 
women’s rights, including to equal pay (article 7) 
and paid maternity leave (article 10). 
The international human rights system has helped 
clarify the duties of States to respect, protect 
and fulfil rights.52 The obligation to respect 
requires them to refrain from interfering directly 
or indirectly with the enjoyment of human rights. 
The obligation to protect requires them to take 
measures that prevent third parties, including 
individuals and the private sector, from interfering 
with the enjoyment of rights. Finally, the obligation 
to fulfil requires them to adopt appropriate 
measures towards the full realization of rights. 
States, therefore, have a proactive role to play 
as arbiters of social and economic rights. For 
example, when health services are provided by 
third parties such as private providers, as is often 
the case, the State is required to regulate these 
actors to ensure that the availability, accessibility, 
acceptability (including affordability) and quality 
of health care are not compromised. By the same 
logic, the State has a duty to regulate the conduct 
of employers in order to ensure the realization of 
the various rights to which workers are entitled. 
The obligation to fulfil means that when individuals 
cannot realize their right to, for example, social 
security through existing contributory systems, for 
reasons that are beyond their control, then the 
State has the duty to establish ‘non-contributory 
schemes or other forms of social assistance’ to 
ensure that everyone can enjoy their right.53 Box 
1.3 describes other key obligations of the State with 
respect to economic and social rights, discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4.
The ICESCR spells out a number of obligations that States must comply with to realize the rights 
specified in the treaty. According to article 2(1) State parties must take steps ‘individually and 
through international assistance and cooperation … to the maximum of available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights’ recognized in the Covenant.  
Although steps to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights may be undertaken progressively, 
States should apply the ‘maximum available resources’ to advance as swiftly as possible using 
both national and international resources.54 United Nations special rapporteurs have clarified the 
importance of taxation in this regard, underlining the need to widen the tax base, tackle tax abuse, 
reassess the contribution of corporations and ensure the sustainable use of revenues generated 
from natural resources.55 
According to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), State parties have a 
‘core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of 
the rights’.56 The provision of minimum essential levels is an immediate obligation. This is a helpful 
complement to CEDAW: it clarifies that not only do gender gaps in enjoyment of rights matter, so 
does the level of enjoyment of rights. It also means that it is the duty of the State to prioritize the 
rights of the poorest and most vulnerable, particularly in relation to minimum essential levels of 
food, education and health.57 Even in times of severe resource constraints, States must ensure that 
the rights of vulnerable groups are fulfilled.58  
BOX 1.3 
State obligations under the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR): Accountability for what?
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States must also guard against deliberate retrogression (backsliding)—for example, cuts to 
expenditures on public services that are critical for the realization of economic and social rights 
or cuts to taxes that are necessary to fund such services.59 Even in the context of economic crisis, 
governments are required to apply these principles.60 
Another immediate obligation is ensuring non-discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights.61 This means any steps that a State takes to progressively realize such rights must 
be non-discriminatory in both policy and effect. 
Finally, the right of individuals to participate is an ‘integral component’ of any policy or practice that 
seeks to meet the State’s obligation to ensure the equal rights of women and men to the enjoyment 
of all human rights.62  
Enlarged web of accountability 
Under international human rights law, States are 
primary duty-bearers with respect to the protection 
and fulfilment of the rights of those within their 
jurisdiction. At the national level, human rights 
are the concern of all ministries—not only health, 
education, housing and employment but also 
finance, planning, trade and central banks—as well 
as local, municipal and regional governments.
However, in today’s increasingly integrated global 
economy, where States are also undergoing 
political decentralization and ‘outsourcing’ public 
service provision and other functions, state 
accountability for human rights lies within ‘a larger 
web of accountability’.63 The latter encompasses 
not only the range of state agencies operating at 
different levels but also the private sector, other 
governments and international organizations. 
Non-state actors are answerable to the wider 
public for how their actions affect the realization 
of human rights, including social and economic 
rights. This particularly applies to the private sector, 
which has an important role to play in economic 
development and employment generation.  
The turn to ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR), 
and later to corporate accountability, is part of 
a response not only to market failure but also to 
‘the perceived or real inability of governments, 
particularly in developing countries, to be effective 
agents of regulation and development, and 
providers of essential goods and services’.64 The 
corporate accountability agenda has evolved 
considerably over the past two decades to 
encompass more companies and industries and a 
broader set of issues, including labour rights, and 
also to involve trade unions and other civil society 
organizations alongside companies.65    
The percentage of companies involved is still 
very small, however, and CSR initiatives are more 
prevalent in sectors where there is concern about 
‘reputational risk’ among developed country 
consumers (e.g., toys, electronics or horticultural 
products). There is a risk that well-intentioned 
monitoring initiatives create ‘enclaves of good 
practices’ that have few linkages to the rest of the 
economy.66 Ongoing efforts to improve corporate 
accountability must not divert attention from the 
need for better regulation and enforcement in all 
sectors, not just those that produce for export.67 
Assessments of the long-term effects of voluntary 
private sector initiatives on working conditions 
point to some positive impacts in terms of worker 
health and safety, payment of minimum wages 
and reduction of unreasonable overtime but 
much weaker impacts on gender equality, wage 
discrimination and freedom of association.68 
Furthermore, benefits tend to be limited to 
regular and permanent workers and fail to reach 
casualized workforces, especially the large 
numbers of female temporary and contract 
workers who work at several degrees of separation 
from parent firms.69 But voluntary self-regulation 
is most vulnerable to criticism for its record on 
enforcement.70 Existing CSR initiatives are unable 
to ensure the compliance of companies with 
established human rights standards. In particular, 
they lack the capacity to impose meaningful 
sanctions or stipulate appropriate remedial 
action.71
These failures were starkly shown by the 2013 
Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh, in 
which more than 1,000 workers were killed. After 
years of voluntary initiatives to clean up garment 
global value chains, this disaster has finally spurred 
stronger action including the binding Bangladesh 
Accord on Fire and Building Safety, which makes 
companies legally responsible for making factories 
safe (see story: Out of the ashes). Meanwhile, 
at the global level, the 2011 endorsement by the 
Human Rights Council of the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights,72 which affirms that 
business enterprises have at the very least a duty to 
respect all human rights in their operations under a 
‘do no harm’ standard, is a promising development 
that may strengthen the accountability of business 
for human rights.
The actions or omissions of transnational 
corporations, international and regional financial 
institutions, multilateral development banks, credit 
rating agencies and private foundations can limit 
the policy space for States to meet their human 
rights obligations. In addition, global inequalities 
mean that actions and omissions by the more 
powerful States will have adverse repercussions on 
the capacities of smaller and less powerful States 
to meet their human rights obligations. 
In 2013, high-income countries accounted for 
only 18 per cent of the world’s population but 
generated close to 70 per cent of global income.73 
The failure of rich countries to regulate volatile 
financial flows, which triggered the 2008 financial 
crisis, not only plunged their own economies into 
recession but also had knock-on effects on the 
rest of the world. The fiscal deficits that resulted 
from the crisis have led both developed and 
developing countries to cut back on public social 
expenditure, which is threatening to increase 
poverty and gender inequality.74 There is a need 
therefore for a set of principles on extra-territorial 
obligations that provides standards to make 
governments, international financial institutions, 
intergovernmental organizations and transnational 
corporations accountable for actions that affect the 
realization of rights across the world. This issue is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
In recognition of the transformations that are 
taking place within, below and above the State, a 
multidimensional understanding of human rights 
accountability is beginning to emerge.75 While 
this creates more complex lines of accountability, 
States remain primary duty-bearers and must 
create conditions in which people under their 
effective jurisdiction can enjoy their rights, including 
their economic and social rights.       
DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS
The notion of substantive equality is premised on 
an enabling State, one that has positive duties 
to protect and fulfil rights. But how can these 
principles be made real so that they define state 
action on the ground? Some would argue that 
there is a paradox here: States, which are seen as 
the main duty-bearers and guarantors of rights, 
may have neither the capacity nor the political 
will to protect and promote rights. Worse, they 
often violate the rights of more disadvantaged 
social groups. The process of translation—of rights 
into policies and of policies into real changes in 
women’s lives—has been extremely uneven around 
the world.76 How can human rights be used to 
create the kind of States that respect, protect 
and fulfil human rights, and women’s rights in 
particular?
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International human rights mechanisms can be 
very useful in reminding States of their duties 
vis-à-vis women. In its July 2013 concluding 
observations on the United Kingdom, for example, 
the CEDAW Committee raised concerns about the 
way in which austerity measures adopted by the 
Government have led to ‘serious cuts in funding 
for organizations that provide social services to 
women’, as well as budgetary cuts in the public 
sector that ‘disproportionately affect women, 
owing to their concentration in this sector’.77  
The fulfilment of human rights is sometimes seen 
as being contingent on a democratic framework, 
its minimal conditions being the universal right 
to participate in elections both as voters and 
as representatives, regular and free elections, 
free association and free media.78 In practice, 
however, the relationship between rights activism 
and democracy works in more complex ways.79    
First, human rights activism on a global level 
has been so successful that even States that are 
not formally democratic are signatories to at 
least some human rights treaties. This creates 
the possibility for advocates to campaign for 
measures to support the realization of women’s 
rights even in non-democratic or weakly 
democratic political systems. In the process by 
which States compile their national reports for 
the CEDAW Committee, for example, women’s 
rights advocates have the opportunity to prepare 
their own shadow reports, to comment on the 
official government report and to campaign for 
greater policy attention. Activists have used this 
process and their governments’ commitments 
under CEDAW to leverage positive change for 
women’s rights: from family law reform in Fiji in 2003 
and Morocco in 2004 (see Box 1.1) to the lengthy 
campaign for legislation against sexual harassment 
in India, which was finally successful in 2012.80  
This is not to deny that civil society faces huge 
challenges where freedom of expression and 
association and the right to information are weak 
and where mechanisms for holding governments 
accountable for the violation or inadequate 
realization of rights are feeble or absent. Civil 
and political rights are critical if conditions for 
accountability are to exist and flourish.81 But even 
where national political systems are not formally 
democratic, localized forms of organizing can 
take place around, for example, labour rights, 
social rights or women’s civil and political rights. 
Rights advocacy does not have to wait for a fully-
fledged democratic regime to emerge. In fact, the 
process of claiming rights can itself contribute to 
building state accountability for women’s rights.82 
Second, even in formally democratic settings, the 
idea of human rights may not be enthusiastically 
embraced by all. The struggle for human rights 
has often had to contend with two critical sets 
of challenges: one is that States may have little 
or no accountability, especially to poor and 
disadvantaged social groups; and the other is that 
inequalities—of gender, race, class, ethnicity and 
sexual identity—may have become so normalized 
that they are not perceived as unjust even by 
those who are most subordinated or who suffer 
most from discrimination.83  
The importance of women’s collective 
action
The presence of women’s organizations can 
make a significant difference on both these fronts 
by legitimizing women’s rights concerns within 
public policy-making; putting onto the public 
agenda concerns that were hitherto hidden or 
deemed ‘private’, such as violation of women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights; and fostering the 
capacity of those who experience multiple forms 
of discrimination to engage in forms of advocacy 
that resonate with their experience.84 This is 
evident in grassroots work by non-governmental 
and women’s organizations in urban slums, rural 
villages and marginalized migrant communities 
that seeks to create the time and space for 
women to meet and discuss their situation and 
constraints and channel their recommendations 
on how they would like to change things for the 
better.    
Indeed, the relevance of human rights does not 
lie exclusively in how they are used to inspire new 
legislation, whether nationally or internationally.85  
Those whose human rights have been violated 
can also use them to assert their moral claims. 
Activists can employ them as a tool to monitor 
policies or do advocacy work in order to advance 
the effective reach of acknowledged human rights. 
Public debate, political campaigns and collective 
organizing around human rights are also important 
means to question discriminatory social norms, 
unequal power relations and unequal distribution 
of resources and to encourage poor and 
marginalized women to see themselves as rights 
holders. Work with marginalized communities 
must begin with the realities of women’s lives and 
create the space for critical reflection and sharing 
of experiences. In doing so activists may not always 
use the language of human rights as their starting 
point, preferring to employ notions of fairness 
and dignity that resonate better with grassroots 
women.86 
Going back to the issue of legal rights with which 
this chapter began, the reason for putting women’s 
economic and social rights into law is not only to 
make them justiciable in court; it can also create 
the political and societal momentum to ensure 
that women’s rights can be enjoyed in practice. 
When economic and social rights are recognized 
in constitutions and enshrined in laws, it helps build 
political legitimacy behind them. It can also create 
a horizon of societal expectations and spur public 
action. It can help women engage with those who 
administer the laws and programmes that shape 
their lives, be they land registration officers, health 
service providers or public school teachers and 
administrators.87
As the previous sections have shown, a key 
challenge around the world is transforming formal 
rights into reality to enable women’s practical 
enjoyment of their human rights. This is how 
substantive equality can be achieved. Public action 
is fundamental to support this process. Based 
on the work of Sandra Fredman and elaborated 
by Fredman and Goldblatt (2014), this section 
proposes a framework, derived from human rights 
treaties as well as the work of the treaty bodies, to 
support governments and other key actors to make 
this change happen.88 The framework identifies 
three interconnected dimensions along which 
actions need to be taken in order to transform 
existing structures and institutions so that all 
women are able to enjoy their rights:  
Redressing women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage 
Addressing stereotyping, stigma and violence
Strengthening women’s agency, voice and 
participation.89  
This Report puts the spotlight on the first 
dimension—redressing socio-economic 
disadvantage—and the achievement of women’s 
economic and social rights. But as Figure 1.4 shows 
and the following chapters make clear, women 
cannot enjoy these rights without action to address 
stereotyping, stigma and violence and strengthen 
women’s agency, voice and participation.
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY FOR WOMEN: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
43
TRANSFORMING 
INSTITUTIONS AND 
STRUCTURES
Implement 
minimum wages 
for all workers
Introduce 
universal social 
transfers  
that do not 
stigmatize poor 
women
Support women’s 
organizations to 
influence economic 
policymaking
REDRESSING 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
DISADVANTAGE
STRENGTHENING 
AGENCY, VOICE  
AND PARTICIPATION
ADDRESSING  
STEREOTYPING, STIGMA 
AND VIOLENCE
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SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
Stereotyping, stigma and violence are pernicious 
means by which gender hierarchies, whether in the 
labour market or in day-to-day life, are held in place 
and reinforced. Tackling these is necessary to break 
down barriers that prevent women from exercising 
their rights to work and social security, for example. 
The strengthening of women’s agency and collective 
voice is an important goal in its own right and has 
also been a driver of changes in laws, policies and 
practices that enable the realization of economic 
and social rights. The lasting transformation of social 
structures and institutions is possible when changes 
along these three dimensions—of resources, respect 
and agency—intersect and work in concert. 
The remainder of this chapter reviews overall 
progress towards substantive equality along these 
different dimensions to set the scene for the more 
detailed analysis of public policies in subsequent 
chapters. It addresses three questions: Are 
economic and social policies redressing women’s 
socio-economic disadvantage? Are public policies 
addressing deeply entrenched gender stereotypes, 
stigma and violence? And does the process of public 
policy formulation create spaces for different groups 
of women to act collectively and have their voices 
heard by policy makers? 
REDRESSING WOMEN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
DISADVANTAGE
Women’s socio-economic disadvantage is reflected 
in pervasive gender inequalities in earned income, 
property ownership, access to services and time use. 
The absence of sex disaggregated data makes it 
difficult to establish if women are, across the board, 
more likely to live in poverty than men (see Box 1.4). 
But, globally three quarters of working age men 
are in the labour force compared to half of working 
age women. And among those who are employed, 
women constitute nearly two thirds of contributing 
family workers, who are employed in family 
businesses and farms, but receive no direct pay.90 
Globally, women earn on average 24 per cent less 
than men (see Annex 4) and are less likely than men 
to receive a pension (see Annex 5). This translates into 
large lifetime inequalities in income between women 
and men (see Box 2.4). Yet in all regions women work 
more than men: on average they do at least two 
and a half times more unpaid care and domestic 
work than men, and if paid and unpaid work are 
combined, women work longer hours than men in 
nearly all countries (see Annex 3). 
The root causes of these inequalities lie in unequal 
power structures that are sustained by laws, social 
norms and practices, market forces and public 
policies within both the ‘private sphere’ of home 
and family and the public arena. Both economic 
and social policies have a role to play in tackling 
the causes of these inequalities. Policies need to pay 
particular attention to ensuring the enjoyment of rights 
by women and girls from disadvantaged and poorer 
households who face multiple forms of discrimination. 
How far have public policies supported the 
progressive realization of women’s economic and 
social rights over the past decade? Overall women 
have made important social gains in many countries 
in terms of access to education and, to a lesser 
extent, health services and employment. But it has 
been difficult to sustain these gains and to translate 
them into an adequate standard of living. Economic 
policies have either undermined women’s social gains 
or failed to support them through improved labour 
market opportunities. Gender gaps are narrowing in 
some domains, but entrenched and growing wealth 
inequalities mean that poorer women are being left 
behind. To sustain and amplify women’s hard-won 
gains requires a different set of economic and social 
policies, as the following chapters will elaborate. 
Gaps between rich and poor women and girls
Disaggregated data collected to monitor progress 
towards the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) since 2000 show that 
there has been progress for women overall in 
access to education and health in all regions.91 
Nevertheless, country level data show that this 
progress has been very uneven among different 
social groups. Particularly alarming is that in 
many countries a gap remains, or is widening, 
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Poverty remains a serious global challenge. There has been progress in reducing extreme poverty 
since 1990, but 1 billion people—or around 15 per cent of the world’s population—were still living in 
extreme poverty in 2011. It is unknown how many of those living in poverty are women and girls.92  
In part this is because the headcount measure of extreme poverty ($1.25 a day) is estimated using 
aggregate household level income or consumption data, which makes it difficult to estimate 
individual rates and hence gender differences in the incidence and severity of poverty.   
In the absence of data on individual poverty rates, a proxy measure of women’s risk of poverty has 
been developed where the percentage of working age women living in poor households (defined 
as the bottom 20 per cent of households) is compared to the percentage of working age men in 
such households.93 Using this measure, as Figure 1.5 shows, women are more likely to live in poverty 
in 41 out of 75 countries with data. Many factors contribute to women’s heightened vulnerability to 
poverty, including unequal access to paid work, lower earnings, lack of social protection and limited 
access to assets, including land and property (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
An analysis of the characteristics of poor households indicates that countries where women are at 
greater risk of poverty also tend to have an over-representation of ‘female-only’ households (i.e., 
those with no male adults) among the bottom 20 per cent. This suggests a greater risk of poverty 
among separated women, widows and single mothers, including heads of household without a 
male partner.94 
Even where women and men are both just as likely to live in a poor household, women are more 
likely to be deprived in other key areas of well-being, such as education, and less likely to have 
an independent source of income through paid work (see Annex 1), which can result in the uneven 
distribution of power and resources within the household.
Latin America and the Caribbean is the only region where analysis of the poorest households 
by gender composition has been done over time. It shows not only that women outnumber men 
among those living in households below the poverty line but also that the proportion of women 
compared to men in poor households has increased over time: from 108.7 women for every 100 
men in 1997 to 117.2 women for every 100 men in 2012. This upward trend has taken place in the 
context of declining poverty rates for the region as a whole: 44.8 per cent of people lived below the 
poverty line in 1997 compared to 32.7 per cent in 2012. New social policies directed to the poorest 
segments of the population have contributed to reductions in poverty in the region, but their impact 
varies depending on the reach of programmes and the size of transfers.95 Furthermore, the poorest 
women still face major barriers in accessing decent work. Greater efforts are therefore needed for 
the realization of women’s rights to and at work if they are to benefit equally from economic growth 
and poverty reduction.
BOX 1.4 
Gender and poverty: What do we know?
between the access to health services of the 
poorest groups of women compared to women 
from the better-off social groups.
The picture is more positive with respect to wealth-
based inequalities in girls’ attendance in secondary 
school. The investments in education made since 
the adoption of the MDGs have contributed to 
reducing gender gaps in enrolment at both primary 
and lower secondary levels in developing countries, 
although drop-out rates remain high in some 
contexts, especially among girls.96 There has also 
been significant progress in reducing gender gaps 
in gross enrolment at the upper secondary level. 
These investments have narrowed the gaps in 
educational attendance between rich and poor, 
but have not succeeded in closing them. Based on 
data from 23 countries, Figure 1.6 shows that net 
attendance in secondary school was, in most cases, 
significantly lower for girls in the poorest quintile than 
in the richest quintile in the early 2000s.97 In almost 
all of these countries, wealth-based inequalities in 
attendance have narrowed over the past decade, but 
they remain very significant in some. In Mozambique, 
for example, girls from the highest wealth quintile 
were still 27 times more likely than girls from the 
poorest wealth quintile to be attending secondary 
school in 2011, down from 47 times in 2003. 
Figure 1.5
Ratio of the share of women to men of prime working age (20-59 years) in the poorest 20 per cent of households 
 Women are more likely than men to live in the poorest households in 41 out of 75 countries
Source: UN Women calculations using latest available data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). 
Note: This indicator is weighted by the ratio of female to male aged 20-59 in all households to take into account the fact that women may be overrepresented in the entire population. See Annex 1 
for details. Values above 103 indicate that women are over-represented in the poorest quintile. Values below 97 indicate that men are over-represented in the poorest quintile. Values between 97 
and 103 indicate parity. ‘Poor households’ refers to the bottom 20 per cent of households, using the wealth asset index as a proxy measure in DHS and MICS.
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Figure 1.6
Ratio of net secondary attendance rates of girls in the richest wealth quintile to girls in the poorest quintile, 2000-2005 
and 2007-2013 
 Inequality in secondary school attendance between the richest and poorest girls has declined in most 
countries, but large disparities remain   
Source: UN Women calculations using data from DHS.98     
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Disparities across regions also remain wide. 
Between 2000 and 2012, the gender parity index 
(GPI) in net secondary enrolment increased 
from 0.92 to 0.96 overall, but GPI values ranged 
from a high of 1.07 in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (denoting an advantage for girls) 
to a low of 0.87 in sub-Saharan Africa.99 The 
heavy focus on increasing enrolments in recent 
years, in the drive towards achieving the MDGs, 
has also arguably come at the cost of attention 
to the quality of education. The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) reports that at least 250 million of the 
world’s 650 million primary school age children 
are not learning the basics in reading and 
mathematics.100 Several country studies show 
that gender, rural location and poverty play a 
key role in determining learning outcomes.101  
Slow progress in health 
Progress has been slower in women’s health 
outcomes. There are serious challenges in 
obtaining data on maternal mortality, but 
globally there were an estimated 289,000 
maternal deaths in 2013, down 45 per cent 
from the level in 1990.102 This is a very significant 
decline but far short of the MDG target to reduce 
the maternal mortality ratio by three quarters 
Figure 1.7
Ratio of skilled assistance rates of women in the richest wealth quintile to women in the poorest quintile, 2000-2005 
and 2007-2013 
 Inequality in access to skilled assistance in childbirth between the richest and poorest women has decreased 
in some countries, but disparities remain
Source: UN Women calculations using data from DHS.103
Note: Skilled assistance refers to assistance by a doctor, nurse or midwife during delivery for all births during the last 5 years.      
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by 2015. High levels of maternal mortality persist 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, which together accounted for 86 per cent of 
total maternal deaths in 2013.104 Such deaths are 
largely preventable. They are linked to the low 
status of women, as well as inadequate health 
services in developing countries, including low 
rates of skilled attendance at delivery, women’s 
lack of access to emergency obstetric care, 
unsafe abortions, and the lack of health care 
for underlying conditions such as malaria and 
HIV and AIDS, which lead to complications in 
pregnancy. 
Patterns and trends in the percentage of births that 
were assisted by a skilled health professional in 25 
countries since the early 2000s suggest significant 
and ongoing disparities in women’s access to health 
services, as shown in Figure 1.7.105 In all 25 countries, 
women from the poorest quintile had less access to 
a skilled professional during childbirth than those 
from the richest quintile throughout the 2000s. The 
gap has narrowed in 14 countries, showing that 
poorer women were catching up, but in 11 countries 
the gap either did not change or is larger than it 
was in the early 2000s, indicating that the poorest 
women were being left behind. In Nigeria, for 
example, at 82 per cent, skilled birth assistance for 
the richest quintile did not change much between 
2003 and 2013, but the situation for the poorest 
quintile has actually worsened with a decline from 11 
to 5 per cent.
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Crisis and austerity are jeopardizing 
women’s economic and social rights
The 2008 global economic crisis and the austerity 
policies that followed in many countries since 
2010 have further curtailed progress towards the 
realization of women’s economic and social rights.106
Overall, employment expansion in the 2000s has 
been sluggish, and the rise in female labour force 
participation has slowed down after significant 
growth in previous decades. Gains in women’s 
rights at work are limited: in sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia, particularly, the majority of working 
women remain concentrated in low-paid, low-
quality forms of employment that do not provide 
even basic rights at work (see Chapter 2). 
Particularly in developed countries, there has 
been retrogression in social and economic rights. 
Industries where men were strongly represented—
such as construction and finance—were most 
severely affected by the crisis. As a result, the 
gender gap in unemployment narrowed in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis through a process 
of levelling down: more men lost jobs than women. 
However, where economic recovery is taking place—
for example in the United States of America (United 
States)—men’s employment is recovering faster than 
women’s.107  
The effects of crisis and austerity policies were 
less acute in developing countries, but they did put 
a brake on employment creation and on public 
investment in infrastructure and services. In Asia, 
women have been much more affected than 
men by job losses due to their concentration in 
the export-oriented manufacturing sector, which 
has been particularly hard hit.108 Moreover, the 
persistence of high and volatile global food prices 
following the 2008 price hikes has affected the rights 
of millions of people to food and to an adequate 
standard of living. Faced with higher food prices, 
households are shifting to cheaper and lower-quality 
food items and eating less diverse diets, which often 
means additional time and effort expended by 
women in buying and preparing food.109
With the onset of austerity measures since 2010, 
there have also been significant cutbacks in 
government spending on welfare services and 
benefits. Spending on child benefits, for example, 
which had peaked in Europe in 2009, fell back to 
below 2008 levels.110 In developing countries, cuts 
have affected subsidies for food, fuel, electricity 
and transport and threatened the expansion of 
emerging social protection programmes.111 These 
effects of economic crisis and austerity continue 
to be felt and may continue to jeopardize the 
realization of women’s economic and social 
rights in the coming years.112 
ADDRESSING STEREOTYPING, STIGMA 
AND VIOLENCE
Stereotyping, stigma and violence often 
compound material disadvantage and 
prevent women from accessing services and 
opportunities that could improve their position. 
Being subjected to violence, for example, is not 
only a violation of one’s dignity and physical 
and mental well-being but can also lead 
to homelessness and poverty.113 Preventing 
maternal mortality is not simply about scaling 
up technical interventions or making health 
care affordable but is also about addressing 
stigma and discrimination on the part of service 
providers that can influence women’s decisions 
to seek reproductive health-care services.114  
Gender stereotyping translates into gender 
segregation first in the education system and 
subsequently in the labour market. Girls are 
still less likely than boys to choose scientific and 
technological fields of study and, when they 
do, are less likely to take up high-paying jobs 
in those fields. These ‘choices’ are informed by 
stereotypes about suitable occupations for girls 
rather than based on ability.115 Similarly, in the 
labour market, women are over-represented 
in clerical and support grades, rather than 
in managerial roles, as well as in ‘caring’ 
professions, which tend to be low paid (see 
Chapter 2).116  
Gender stereotypes also shape how women and 
men allocate their time between paid and unpaid 
care and domestic work as well as between work 
and leisure. Stereotypes that define caregiving 
as quintessentially female (and maternal) seem 
to be much harder to dislodge than those around 
breadwinning, previously seen as a male domain.117 
Increasing numbers of women are adopting 
what are widely seen as masculine lifestyles and 
patterns of work by engaging more intensively 
in the labour market. However, men are not, to 
the same extent, taking on greater responsibility 
for unpaid care and domestic work, widely 
seen as ‘feminine’. Gender gaps in unpaid work 
are narrowing in developed countries, but they 
remain starker than those in market-based work 
virtually everywhere.118  
Described as ‘a process of dehumanizing, 
degrading, discrediting and devaluing people in 
certain population groups’,119 stigma is a weapon 
employed by the powerful to define what is 
‘normal’ or ‘acceptable’, as a means to uphold their 
position in relation to a subordinate group. Stigma 
and even violence are often used to enforce 
stereotypes and social norms about ‘appropriate’ 
female and male behaviour.120 Stigma is frequently 
invoked where gender intersects with other 
characteristics including disability and sexuality 
as well as poverty, race, caste, ethnicity and 
immigrant status. For example, immigrant, ethnic 
minority women working in domestic service 
are often stigmatized as being backward, dirty 
or carrying diseases, thereby justifying their 
subordinate position vis-à-vis their employers.121 
Stigmatization has far-reaching consequences 
for the realization of economic and social rights: it 
renders the needs of certain groups and individuals 
invisible, pushes them to the margins of society 
and excludes them from access to resources and 
services, as Chapter 3 shows.122
Addressing violence against women
Men’s use of violence against women is 
widespread across all countries and socio-
economic groups. Globally, one in three women 
reports having experienced physical and/or 
sexual violence at some point in their lives, usually 
perpetrated by an intimate partner.123 Changes in 
the prevalence of violence against women over 
time are hard to assess given a paucity of reliable 
and comparable data, but there is no doubt that it 
continues to be a very widespread problem.
Over many decades, women’s rights activists 
and researchers have documented how gender 
inequality and men’s power over women create 
a conducive context for the perpetration of 
violence against women. As girls and women have 
entered schools, workplaces, public transport 
and marketplaces in greater numbers, they 
are frequently subject to unwelcome scrutiny, 
harassment and even assault. Violence is also used 
as a way to punish nonconformity with dominant 
gender stereotypes, for example in relation to 
sexual orientation (see Box 1.5).
Violence against women also tends to increase 
during periods of upheaval and displacement 
associated with armed conflict and natural 
disasters, as well as in times of crisis and instability, 
when people are dealing with uncertainty. 
For example, domestic violence may increase 
when men are unemployed even if—sometimes 
especially if—women are bringing in income.124   
In response to the massive mobilizations of 
women’s movements from the 1970s onwards, a 
range of countries has adopted legislation that 
criminalizes violence against women, as shown in 
Figure 1.1. However, the implementation of these 
legal provisions is rarely supported by adequate 
investments in services, in capacity building of 
service providers and in the public campaigns 
needed to effectively prevent violence against 
women. Addressing these deficits requires a 
significant investment in making homes and public 
spaces safe for women and girls and ensuring 
access to justice. It also requires a commitment 
from policy makers to prevent violence before it 
happens by changing community attitudes that 
accept it.125  
Police services in some countries are starting 
to respond more effectively to violence against 
women, especially intimate partner violence. In 
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the state of Victoria in Australia, for example, in 
what is widely seen as a ‘best practice’, high-level 
leadership in government and the police agency 
itself have been key to positive changes in the way 
services deal with the issue. Other critical factors 
have been: training on violence against women for 
police at all levels; the adoption of performance 
measures related to increased numbers of charges 
and prosecutions and reduced rates of repeat 
offending; and a shift from ‘criminal justice’ models 
to a broader approach of providing referrals 
and support to victims. Central to the success of 
these changes has been the expertise and advice 
provided by women’s organizations working on 
violence against women.127  
Women’s activism has also played a fundamental 
role in the recognition, in international norms 
and agreements, of violence against women 
as a human rights violation and form of 
Women and girls with nonconforming sexual identities, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT) women, frequently face emotional, verbal, sexual and physical abuse, and 
even murder, as well as denial of employment, education, health and other basic rights. ‘Corrective’ 
rape, a practice used to punish nonconforming women and girls, ostensibly to ‘cure’ their sexual 
preferences, is a particularly appalling example of such abuse. 
South Africa has been a pioneer in the constitutional recognition of LGBT rights, but these rights 
continue to be widely violated. Women and girls who transgress social and cultural norms on 
sexuality, or who do not conform to dominant prescriptions on how women ‘should act’ and what 
they ‘should look like’ are frequently targeted. Lesbians who are poor, black and live in townships 
are at particular risk. LGBT support groups claim that 10 new cases of ‘corrective’ rape occur every 
week in Cape Town alone. Many cases go undocumented due to the perception among victims that 
the criminal justice system is unresponsive. More than 31 lesbians were murdered in South Africa 
between 1998 and 2009, but only one of these cases resulted in a conviction. 
NGO and LGBT activists have criticized the Government for failing to uphold its constitutional 
obligations to prevent and prohibit these crimes. In response to their demands and a petition with 
170,000 signatures from 163 countries, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
established a National Task Team in 2011 to devise a strategy for combating the problem. The 
Task Team developed the National Intervention Strategy (2014–2017), which takes a multi-sectoral 
approach by introducing prevention programmes, enhancing criminal justice system responses and 
strengthening institutional capacity to address and prevent such forms of violence. Civil society and 
non-governmental organizations, and activist groups are currently monitoring the implementation 
of these measures. Meanwhile, concerns remain regarding the need for greater public education to 
address underlying discriminatory attitudes.126
BOX 1.5 
Gender stereotypes and punishment for nonconformity: The case of ‘corrective’ rape in 
South Africa   
discrimination. CEDAW did not originally specify 
it as such, leading to waves of global activism 
and advocacy from feminists to address this gap. 
Finally, in 1992, the CEDAW Committee adopted 
General Recommendation No. 19 on violence 
against women. This unequivocally states that 
it is a form of gender-based discrimination 
that ‘seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy 
rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with 
men’.128 This and other subsequent gains were 
consolidated during the Beijing Conference in 
1995, which recognized violence against women 
as a critical area in its official declaration, 
underlining that it is an impediment to the full 
enjoyment by women of their human rights. In 
recent years, United Nations intergovernmental 
and expert bodies have continued to advance 
the global agenda on violence against women, 
including at the Commission on the Status of 
Women (CSW) at its fifty-seventh session in 
March 2013.129 
STRENGTHENING WOMEN’S AGENCY, 
VOICE AND PARTICIPATION
Redressing the socio-economic disadvantage 
that women experience and contesting the 
stereotypes, stigma and violence that directly 
and indirectly violate their rights require 
strengthening women’s agency, voice and 
participation, both at the individual and 
collective level.  
Agency refers to ‘the ability to define one’s goals 
and act upon them’.130 It is often associated 
with decision-making within households 
about the day-to-day allocation of resources 
and responsibilities. These decisions have 
implications for the capacity of women to 
exercise their rights in both the public and 
private spheres. Increasing women’s agency in 
intra-household decision-making is an important 
goal in itself and also has positive impacts on 
women’s own well-being as well as that of 
other household members, especially children. 
Women’s agency is affected by a variety of 
factors, including their earning capacity; social 
norms and laws governing marriage, divorce, 
inheritance and child custody; and their social 
and collective engagements beyond their 
immediate family and kinship networks.131  
Voice is defined in terms of ‘acts or arguments 
that influence public decisions – usually in public 
decision-making arenas like legislatures’.132 
Voice and influence in decision-making, like 
agency, have intrinsic value as enabling 
individual and group enjoyment of democratic 
freedoms and rights. In addition, they serve 
to ensure that group-specific interests are 
represented and advanced in public policy and 
other decision-making arenas. For example, 
women’s voice is important in decisions over 
public spending priorities to ensure adequate 
provision of services, infrastructure and social 
security to guarantee their physical integrity 
and reproductive rights. The provision of better 
services for women enhances their power and 
agency within their intimate relations by reducing 
their dependence on other household members 
and giving them a stronger ‘fall-back’ position in 
case of conflicts or relationship breakdown. 
Participation can be understood as ‘organized 
efforts to increase control over resources and 
regulative institutions in given social situations 
on the part of groups and movements hitherto 
excluded from such control’.133 Meaningful 
participation of women is about more than just 
numerical presence in decision-making forums, 
whether at the local or national level. Women 
in decision-making positions must be able to 
articulate and act on issues that concern different 
groups of women, especially those who are 
disadvantaged. Women’s rights advocates and 
autonomous feminist organizations have a critical 
role to play here in bringing women’s concerns into 
the policy-making process and holding decision-
makers and service providers to account.134   
Women’s voice and participation in politics 
and policy-making 
Recent years have seen a ‘rising tide’ of women’s 
political representation, with more women than 
ever before in elected national assemblies. The 
global average has been climbing and in 2014 
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stood at close to 22 per cent—far from equality 
but nevertheless an improvement compared to 
14 per cent in 2000.135 The adoption of affirmative 
action measures—such as quotas on party 
electoral lists or reserved seats—has been critical in 
facilitating women’s entry into national assemblies. 
Innovations in electoral systems and affirmative 
action measures have come about both as a 
result of pressure from women’s movements and 
through the influence of global declarations and 
resolutions. In local governance, too, women are 
making inroads in some countries.136 In executive 
positions in government, however, women continue 
to be very much in a minority and confined mainly 
to gender-stereotyped portfolios.137 
Moving towards numerical parity in political office 
remains an essential component of deepening 
democracy and creating a more just society. 
Women’s involvement in politics can also have a 
positive ‘role-modelling’ effect by encouraging 
other women to seek public office. But does 
women’s presence in formal politics help bring 
women’s interests into policy-making? Here the 
evidence is mixed.  
There is some evidence, mainly from Scandinavian 
countries, to support the contention that having a 
‘critical mass’ of women in decision-making forums 
can trigger a shift in priorities to favour women’s 
concerns.138 Women parliamentarians in a number 
of developing countries too have taken steps to 
raise the profile of gender issues in legislative 
debates: some have formed women’s caucuses 
to work across party lines and to coordinate 
their work in legislative committees, while others 
have formed standing committees on women’s 
rights and equal opportunities.139 Moving below 
national legislatures to local governance bodies, 
there is some evidence to show that when women 
have a greater voice and participation in public 
administration, public resources are more likely 
to be allocated to human development priorities, 
including child health, nutrition and access to 
employment.140 Recent research on community 
forestry institutions governing access to and use of 
forest products in Gujarat (India) and Nepal also 
suggests that having a critical mass of women 
increases the likelihood of women attending 
meetings and voicing their concerns.141  
Easing women’s access to political office does not, 
on its own, ensure that a women’s rights agenda 
is brought into policy-making. Women politicians, 
like their male counterparts, may address the 
issues of concern to their parties and constituents, 
and women’s rights may not be on the agenda 
of those representing traditional social groups or 
conservative parties. Moreover, their links with 
women’s rights organizations may be weak or 
non-existent. The deficiencies in government, 
in particular the control of dominant groups on 
local level bodies, are not magically fixed by 
having more women incorporated in them.142 As 
more women have entered political office, many 
have discovered deeply entrenched patterns and 
practices in public decision-making and policy 
implementation that ‘stop progressive public 
policy in its tracks’.143 Translating women’s political 
presence into progressive policy change also 
requires that the state and political parties are 
responsive to these issues and the political culture is 
compatible with human rights and equality claims. 
The capacity of the state to effectively implement 
policies and regulate market actors also plays 
a decisive role in determining whether women’s 
rights can be advanced in practice.144  
The number of women in formal politics may not 
be the best indicator of the quality of women’s 
political participation or its effectiveness in 
orienting policy-making towards gender concerns. 
The number, size and influence of active women’s 
organizations may be far better indicators of 
women’s political participation.145 Most importantly, 
the strength of autonomous women’s movements 
and how they engage with women in political 
office and the bureaucracy has been shown 
to be a key ingredient in progress towards 
gender-responsive public policies (see section 
Equality before the law).146 This requires time 
and resources that women and women’s 
organizations often do not have. Hence, actions 
that equalize the distribution of resources, in 
terms of time and money, between women and 
men—as captured in the first dimension of the 
Formed in 1993, Via Campesina is made up of over 160 grassroots organizations representing 
peasants, smallholders, agricultural workers, migrants, youth, indigenous groups and landless 
people in more than 70 countries.151 At its International Conference held in Txacala (Mexico) in 1996, 
as a result of women’s collective organizing within the movement, gender issues were identified as 
central to Via Campesina’s internal functioning. After the conference, Via Campesina women started 
to meet in autonomous spaces to define a common agenda. In the words of one observer: ‘as 
women spoke from their own experiences of working within peasant and farm organizations, a real 
sense of camaraderie, sharing of insights, and respect for one another permeated the discussion of 
potential models and plans for work within Via Campesina’.152 
BOX 1.6 
Challenging male dominance in agrarian movements: The case of Via Campesina
framework shown in Figure 1.4—also contribute 
to strengthening women’s agency, voice and 
participation. 
Women’s organizing and women’s 
movements 
Significant advances in women’s formal rights 
have been achieved particularly where women’s 
movements have been present, organized and 
broad-based. However, to build inclusive and 
effective movements, women have to confront 
tenacious hurdles stemming from gender-biased 
governance structures as well as the many cleavages 
that divide them—whether based on ethnicity, 
race, class or sexual orientation.147 For example, 
in Latin America legislative progress to strengthen 
the rights of domestic workers, who are often 
from disadvantaged ethnic and racial groups, has 
frequently stalled as a result of foot-dragging in 
national parliaments. This resistance has, at times, 
come from female legislators who are able to 
participate in politics only because their domestic 
workers put in long hours to sustain their households. 
In some contexts, including the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, Brazil and Chile, however, domestic worker 
organizations have been able to overcome such 
resistance and gain legal reforms by combining 
sustained autonomous movement pressure and 
strategic alliance building with progressive parties 
as well as labour and indigenous organizations.148 
In addition to organizing through their own 
movements and organizations, women have played 
a key role in mobilizing for women’s economic and 
social rights within broader labour and social justice 
movements. Such movements can generate deep 
and lasting transformations. However, women’s rights 
and gender equality have not usually been high on 
the agendas of ‘mainstream’ social movements even 
when women are active members.149 Around the 
world, women have too often worked alongside men 
towards shared goals—independence, democracy, 
labour rights and redistribution—only to experience 
their needs and interests as women being sidelined 
and postponed.150  
But there are also more sanguine experiences 
that illustrate how progress can be achieved by 
and for women within broader movements and 
organizations (see Chapter 2 on recent changes 
in trade unions). For example, women’s specific 
concerns have come to the fore within Via 
Campesina, a transnational agrarian movement 
that campaigns for rural people’s access to land, 
territory, food, water and seeds within a human rights 
framework (see Box 1.6). 
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Achievements have been significant. Today women are a central force in this movement. Women’s 
participation and representation has increased, they have taken up positions of leadership and 
significant strides have been made to achieve parity in women’s representation in decision-making 
bodies. In its Latin American section, for example, parity was established in 1997. 
Training schools have been set up to show the links between gender and class inequalities, which 
have helped women to challenge male-dominated structures and sexist behaviour within their 
respective organizations. Women’s specific concerns have also gained greater visibility on the 
movement’s agenda. When Via Campesina developed its political position on food sovereignty in 
the late 1990s, for example, women argued that because women are primarily responsible for the 
well-being of their families, food sovereignty must include a drastic reduction in the use of health-
endangering agrochemicals. Furthermore, they argued that because of women’s unequal access to 
productive resources, food sovereignty could only be achieved by increasing their participation in 
agricultural policy-making. 
Most recently, in 2008, Via Campesina launched a high-profile campaign to end violence against 
women, which it sees as a structural issue supported by both capitalism and patriarchy, including 
such violence within the movement itself. 
This positive example of women advancing 
their own agenda within a broad-based social 
movement highlights the kinds of strategies 
and alliances that women’s movements need 
to adopt in order to advance the social and 
economic rights of women and girls. Yet, one 
of the greatest obstacles that confront gender 
equality agendas is the difficulty of working 
within gender-biased political and governance 
institutions—all the way from political parties to 
justice systems and state bureaucracies—that 
remain resistant to women’s equality claims and 
require deep institutional reform. 
TRANSFORMING STRUCTURES 
AND INSTITUTIONS FOR WOMEN’S 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
Change in women’s lives happens when increases 
in their resources, respect and agency reinforce 
each other in a synergistic way: when resources 
and life chances enable an adequate standard 
of living for all women, as well as the time and 
resources for greater agency and voice; when 
women can live their lives with dignity and respect; 
and when they are able to voice their interests 
and participate on equal terms with men in all 
decisions that affect their lives. This is the long-term 
goal and vision towards which public action has 
to move. Long-term change is enabled by both 
small and big initiatives that transform structures 
and institutions, to disrupt discriminatory norms 
and gender stereotypes, redistribute resources 
and create spaces and mechanisms for women to 
articulate their grievances and act collectively to 
claim their rights. 
The groundbreaking government initiative 
in Brazil, Chapéu de Palha Mulher (see 
story: Making rights real), captures the key 
elements necessary for such transformations. 
This anti-poverty initiative goes much further 
than conventional conditional cash transfer 
programmes (CCTs) directed at poor women 
by setting out to change the structures that 
keep gender hierarchies in place and constrain 
women’s enjoyment of their rights. It provides: 
a three month course on citizenship and public 
Laws that establish equal rights for women and 
men provide a solid foundation, and indeed a 
pre-condition, for demanding and achieving 
gender equality. However, the achievement 
of gender equality in practice, especially for 
poorer women and those who are marginalized, 
requires the dismantling of structural barriers 
as well as of discriminatory social norms and 
stereotypes. International human rights standards 
and principles set out clear obligations for going 
beyond formal equality and the provision of ‘same 
treatment’ by recognizing that different treatment 
might be required to achieve equality of outcomes. 
Under their commitments to human rights treaties, 
including CEDAW and the ICESCR, States have 
obligations to take positive steps to eliminate all 
forms of discrimination against women, including 
structural and indirect discrimination that may occur 
when laws, policies and programmes based on 
seemingly gender-neutral criteria have a detrimental 
impact on women. Women’s collective action 
has been critical to bringing gender equality into 
the human rights system and remains vital to the 
realization of their substantive equality. In the process 
of claiming rights, women’s collective action can 
contribute to building state accountability to women.  
The framework outlined in this chapter can 
support governments to meet their obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil human rights and it can 
also galvanize women’s rights advocates to hold 
governments and other duty-bearers to account for 
their commitments. 
CONCLUSIONS
policy that brings women together to raise their 
awareness of their rights and provide a space 
for critical reflection and discussion; training in 
male-dominated occupations that can challenge 
gender-based segmentations in the labour 
market and provide work that is better paid; 
and childcare services that enable them to take 
part in the training sessions.153 The challenge 
is to take the transformative approach of 
programmes such as Chapéu de Palha Mulher to 
scale—providing resources, services and spaces 
that respond to women’s immediate needs 
while disrupting the structures that reinforce 
their subordination and constrain the practical 
enjoyment of their rights.   
As subsequent chapters will show, more 
of the same is not enough for women and 
girls. Substantive equality requires the 
fundamental transformation of economic and 
social institutions at every level of society, 
from households to labour markets and from 
communities to local, national and global 
governance institutions. Rather than simply 
adding paid work or poverty reduction to 
women’s already long `to-do’ lists, responsibilities 
for income-earning, caregiving and domestic 
work need to be redistributed more equally. 
Male-biased employment structures must be 
transformed in ways that work for both women 
and men and benefit society at large (see Chapter 
2); social protection and social services must not 
only aim to equalize access, but also need to be 
redesigned with women’s rights at their heart (see 
Chapter 3); and existing macroeconomic policies 
should be significantly reoriented to support 
rather than constrain the realization of rights (see 
Chapter 4).
57
Drawing on the understanding of substantive 
equality in human rights texts, this framework 
has three interconnected dimensions along 
which actions need to be taken to achieve 
progress towards substantive equality for women: 
redressing women’s socio-economic disadvantage; 
addressing stereotyping, stigma and violence; 
and strengthening women’s agency, voice and 
participation. Public action across these three 
dimensions makes meaningful change in existing 
institutional rules and incentive structures possible, 
enabling the fulfilment of rights and triggering 
lasting transformation in the lives of women and 
girls.
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On the morning of 24 April 2013, thousands of factory 
workers went to work in the eight-storey Rana Plaza 
commercial building just outside of Dhaka. A few hours later 
the building collapsed, killing 1,137 people and injuring a 
further 2,500 workers.  Most of those who died that morning 
were women. 
Women make up 80 per cent of the 4.2 million strong 
workforce in the garment export industry and for 
many, these jobs are the first opportunity for economic 
independence and a job outside the home. Yet the Rana 
Plaza tragedy underlined what a double-edged sword this 
employment has proved to be. The industry has created 
tragically unsafe, exploitative and dangerous workplaces 
where women workers face poor pay, inequality, 
harassment and violence.  
Today, while they are four out of five workers on the 
production lines of Bangladesh’s 5,000 textile factories, only 
1 in 20 supervisors is a woman.
Creating change from tragedy in 
Bangladesh’s garment industry 
OUT OF  
THE ASHES
MAKING PROGRESS/STORIES OF CHANGE
Kalpona Akter, Executive Director of the Bangladesh Centre for Worker Solidarity (BCWS) in 
her office
Photo: Saiful huq Omi/UN Women
 “They are happy to give a woman a job operating a 
sewing machine, but less happy to see her become a 
supervisor,” says Kalpona Akter, executive director of the 
Bangladesh Centre for Worker Solidarity, who began 
her working life on the garment factory floor aged 12. 
“Many of these women are forced to work in unsafe and 
unfair work environments because they have no ability to 
change things,” she says.
The day before Rana Plaza collapsed the building had 
been condemned as unsafe, yet factory owners demanded 
the workers return to their machines.  
“In Bangladesh the garment industry has never allowed 
workers to raise their voices, the political focus has 
always been on the growth of the industry and keeping 
the international corporations happy,” says Kalpona. “It 
is this kind of power over workers’ rights that created the 
environment in which this disaster was allowed to happen.”
Yet Rana Plaza proved a turning point. The global outrage 
following the disaster led the Bangladeshi government to 
announce a raft of changes to its labour laws, including 
easing restrictions on workers forming trade unions, 
hiring additional factory inspectors and increasing the 
minimum wage for garment workers by 77 per cent. 
At the same time, international clothing brands 
sourcing from Bangladesh joined with Bangladeshi and 
international trade unions, international worker solidarity 
movements and NGOs to create the Bangladesh Accord 
on Fire and Building Safety. 
The Accord aims to address the serious issues with health 
and safety in the garment sector through a system of 
independent safety inspections at factories, the findings 
of which are made public. The Accord also protects 
workers’ rights by making companies legally responsible 
for making factories safe and protects their right to 
refuse dangerous work or to enter unsafe buildings. 
What makes the Accord different from previous worker 
safety initiatives is that its commitments are legally 
enforceable through binding arbitration backed up 
by the courts of the home countries of the companies 
signed up to The Accord.
It also breaks new ground by putting workers at the centre 
of health and safety reform of the garment industry. The 
agreement is jointly governed by companies and worker 
representatives and includes a central role for independent 
worker representatives in its implementation.
So far more than 190 brands from over 20 countries have 
signed the Accord, covering 1,500 factories employing 
around 2 million workers. This year its network of 110 
independent engineers have carried out inspections at 
hundreds of sites, identifying more than 80,000 safety 
issues and suspending production at 17 factories. 
The aftermath of Rana Plaza has also created the 
conditions for garment workers to take advantage of the 
government’s easing of restrictions on trade unions. 
“The Rana Plaza disaster created a platform for workers 
to organize themselves,” says Kalpona. “In the last two 
years about 200 new garment worker unions have been 
registered, where 65 per cent of the leadership and the 
majority of members are women. In 2014, these women 
union leaders have started collective bargaining with 
their respective factory managements, which is a positive 
sign that changes are starting in improving women’s 
“The Rana Plaza disaster 
created a platform for 
workers to organize 
themselves.”
Photo: Saiful huq Omi/UN Women
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rights at factory level. The challenge is how we can make 
these changes sustainable.”
These challenges are considerable. Despite the new labour 
laws, still only 5 per cent of garment workers and fewer than 
300 factories are unionized. The UN-backed Rana Plaza 
Donors Fund, set up to provide injured workers and relatives 
of those who died with US $40m of compensation is still $9 
million short of its target.  A handful of prominent US brands 
who refused to sign the legally-binding Accord have set 
up a parallel worker safety scheme called the Alliance for 
Bangladesh Worker Safety, which could fragment political 
and corporate support for The Accord.  
Yet there is continued optimism that out of the ashes of 
Rana Plaza, positive changes can endure.  
“We have created a collective voice both locally and 
internationally and this continues to create momentum 
for holding those wielding the power to account,” says 
Kalpona.  She points to continued social media campaigns, 
online petitions and consumer actions led by international 
NGOs, worker unions and consumer groups, which are 
maintaining pressure on clothing companies to sign the 
Accord or pay compensation.
“The women on the factory floors in Bangladesh are 
beginning to feel like their voices are finally being heard,” 
she says.  “And this is a real step forward.”
So far more than 
190 brands from over 
20 countries have signed 
the Accord
Kalpona meets with union members in her office
Photo: Saiful huq Omi/UN Women
Story: Annie Kelly. For more information on the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety, see www.bangladeshaccord.org; and on the campaign for 
compensation for the victims of the Rana Plaza disaster, see www.cleanclothes.org/ranaplaza
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TRANSFORMING WORK 
FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS
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Across the world, 53 million people, over 80 per cent of 
them women, are employed as domestic workers. Their 
work helps economies grow, advances the participation 
of women in the workplace and provides crucial care for 
millions of dependents. Every day they cook, clean, look 
after the elderly, help children with homework, performing 
vital roles in keeping households and communities running.
“Domestic work makes all other work possible,” says Ai-jen 
Poo, director of the National Domestic Workers Alliance, a 
national membership body made up of domestic worker 
groups across the United States.  
“Domestic workers have always been critical to the 
functioning of national economies, but they are now 
absolutely critical to the growth of our global economy.” 
Yet as a workforce, these millions of women remain largely 
invisible. In many countries, domestic workers remain 
excluded from national labour laws. This leaves domestic 
Collective action brings victory to 
domestic workers in New York 
ON THE 
BOOKS 
MAKING PROGRESS/STORIES OF CHANGE
Ai-jen Poo, Director of the National Domestic Workers Alliance (NDWA) and Co-director of 
the Caring Across Generations campaign 
Photo: UN Women/Ryan Brown
 workers open to abuse and exploitation and unable to 
demand safe and protected workplaces.
“Because women are so chronically under-represented 
in positions of power and wealth, the work of women 
continues to be undervalued and exploited and nowhere 
is this clearer than in how we treat our domestic workers,” 
says Ai-jen.
“While there has been a huge shift in the role of women in 
the workplace, there remains an assumption that all of the 
work that goes into raising families is just done by women. 
Plus there is the historic race dynamic. The attitude that 
this kind of work would be done for free or for very little 
money by women of colour persists and remains deeply 
embedded and qualified by labour laws across the world.”
Around 200,000 people, the vast majority of whom are 
women from outside of the United States, are employed as 
domestic workers in New York City. Yet until 2010, none of 
these workers were protected or even recognized in New 
York State law.
In 2000, a group of domestic workers from the Philippines 
living and working in the city started mobilizing to try 
and change this. They founded Domestic Workers United 
(DWU) with the aim of trying to build power collectively 
as a workforce and establish fair labour standards for the 
industry. 
Through a series of monthly meetings, DWU started 
to take shape, with hundreds and then thousands 
of domestic workers from across the city becoming 
members.  
Daily outreach programmes in parks, playgrounds, 
churches and the street, helped to organize workers in the 
neighbourhoods where they lived and worked. 
A network of alliances with unions, employers, church 
leaders and members of the New York State legislature 
built momentum for DWU’s aim of creating a Bill of 
Rights for domestic workers, which for the first time 
would provide them with the same basic rights that other 
workers had been entitled to for decades. 
Ai-jen marching with members of NDWA and National People’s Action to demand accountability for the financial crisis, in Washington, DC. 
Photo: NDWA
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“For many in the legislature it was a huge learning curve 
because the concept of rights for domestic workers was so 
alien to them,” says Ai-jen. “For many domestic workers 
there was great fear of being exposed, of losing their 
jobs or being blacklisted for taking part in the campaign. 
We had resistance from employers because while many 
appreciated that domestic workers were entitled to 
rights, they were scared of losing their affordable home 
care.”
In 2010, DWU succeeded in helping pass the New York 
State Bill of Rights for Domestic Workers, the United 
States’ first comprehensive piece of legislation protecting 
domestic workers.  Among other provisions, the bill set 
out the right to overtime pay, a day of rest every seven 
days, paid holidays and protection under state human 
rights law. 
“What was crucial were the alliances we made,” says Ai-
jen. “We spent years building relationships with employers, 
with labour unions and other workers’ groups. Many 
of our champions in the legislature were the sons and 
daughters of domestic workers.”
In the past five years, the DWU has been working on 
trying to ensure successful implementation of the bill, 
through expanding their outreach programmes and 
continuing to build strong networks with employers, who 
are the crucial link to ensuring that the provisions in the 
bill are upheld.
“It’s always going to be a struggle ensuring that domestic 
workers realize their rights because there is still a huge 
culture of respecting the privacy of the family home,” 
says Ai-jen. “What we’re now focusing on is ensuring 
that employers know what their legal responsibilities are 
and workers know how to ensure that their terms and 
conditions clearly reflect the rights they are entitled to 
under this legislation.”
Since the bill has passed, momentum has continued 
to build around domestic worker rights both in the US 
and internationally. In July 2013, Hawaii followed New 
York’s lead and became the second state to pass labour 
protections for domestic workers, followed by California 
in January 2014 and Massachusetts in July 2014.  
In 2013, the first ILO convention on domestic workers 
came into force, which Ai-jen considers a “huge driver for 
change”. She says many domestic workers in countries 
around the world are using the demand for national 
ratification of this convention as a rallying cry for 
collective action.   
“Our movement is about creating not only a dignified 
working environment for domestic workers but a more 
caring society – one that recognizes that addressing the 
rights of domestic workers is fundamental to addressing 
social inequality across the world,” she says.
“The work of women 
continues to be 
undervalued and 
exploited and nowhere 
is that clearer than in 
how we treat our 
domestic workers”
Organizers rally in the streets for better recognition of the rights of domestic 
workers 
Photo: NDWA
Story: Annie Kelly. For more information on NDWA, see www.domesticworkers.org
Paid work can be a foundation for substantive equality for 
women, but only when it is compatible with women’s and 
men’s shared responsibility for unpaid care and domestic 
work; when it gives women enough time for leisure and 
learning; and when it provides earnings that are sufficient to 
maintain an adequate standard of living.
Over the past two decades, women’s labour force 
participation stagnated around the world, albeit with 
significant regional variation. Globally, only half of women are 
in the labour force, compared to more than three quarters of 
men, and nowhere has this gap been eliminated. 
In developing regions, in urban and rural areas alike, 
the majority of women remain concentrated in insecure, 
unprotected and poorly paid employment. Occupational 
segregation and gender pay gaps remain stubbornly 
persistent everywhere. 
Unequal outcomes for women in the labour market are 
the biggest contributor to their overall socio-economic 
disadvantage. Over a lifetime, gender differences in 
employment rates and pay combine to create large 
cumulative income differences between women and men.
IN BRIEF
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The remarkable progress in closing gender gaps in education 
has contributed to advances for women’s employment, but it 
has not been sufficient to overcome women’s disadvantage in 
the labour market. 
Unpaid care and domestic work severely limits women’s 
economic opportunities. Recognizing the economic value of 
this work, reducing its drudgery and redistributing it more 
equally between women and men, and between households 
and society, is critical for the achievement of substantive 
equality.
Public action is needed to create decent jobs, support women 
to take up employment opportunities and empower them 
to shape their working environments. Only then can paid 
work contribute to the realization of substantive equality for 
women. 
Across the globe, women workers have developed a range of 
strategies to advance their rights. Greater support is needed 
to empower women, both within broader labour movements 
and in their efforts to build autonomous organizations. 
/5
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INTRODUCTION
Access to decent employment is a basic human 
right, providing income as well as other intrinsic 
rewards such as dignity and social integration. The 
creation of decent work is central to inclusive and 
pro-poor development strategies, strengthening 
individuals, communities and nations.1 For 
women, specifically, access to good quality, 
paid work outside the home is perhaps the most 
important contributory factor to their economic 
empowerment.2 It plays a critical role in enabling 
women to be financially autonomous and to 
exercise greater agency in their lives. This, in turn, 
can improve the distribution of resources and 
power within the household as well as expanding 
opportunities outside of it. 
International human rights treaties and International 
Labour Organization (ILO) conventions recognize 
the central importance of both the right to work—to 
have full and productive employment—and rights 
at work—to non-discrimination and to fair, safe and 
just working conditions (see Box 2.1). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘everyone has the right to work, to free 
choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment’.3  
According to The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
rights at work are fundamental to the very definition of work, which must be decent: ‘the 
characterization of work as decent presupposes that it respects the fundamental rights of the 
worker’, including ‘respect for the physical and mental integrity of the worker’ and remuneration 
that allows ‘workers to support themselves and their families’.4  
For women, specifically, the right to work requires equal opportunities and treatment as well 
as the elimination of discrimination on the grounds of marriage or maternity, as defined in the 
ICESCR and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW).5 
In addition, rights at work include:
• Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value
• Safe and healthy working conditions6  
BOX 2.1 
The right to work and rights at work in human rights frameworks
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Progress on formal equality but barriers 
persist
The world has advanced significantly in ensuring 
equality in women’s and men’s legal rights to work, 
rights at work and access to economic resources.11 
Rapid progress on expanding access to education, 
alongside greater control over their fertility, 
have both played a part in giving women better 
opportunities for paid work.
By 2014, 59 countries had passed laws stipulating 
equal pay for work of equal value;12 125 countries had 
laws to prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace;13 
128 countries had laws that guarantee married 
women’s equality when it comes to property; and 
in 112 countries daughters had equal inheritance 
rights to sons.14 Human rights treaties have been 
instrumental to the progress that has been made by 
setting global standards and by enabling gender 
equality advocates to hold governments to account.15 
However, there is still further to go to fill gaps in 
legal frameworks and repeal discriminatory laws 
in relation to women’s access to the labour market. 
Some 77 countries maintain restrictions on the types 
of work that women can do by, for example, banning 
them from working at night or in occupations such as 
mining or construction.16 
Other significant barriers remain to women’s entry 
into the labour force. At the global level, women’s 
labour force participation rates (LFPR) have 
stagnated since the 1990s. Currently, only half of 
women are in the labour force compared to more 
than three quarters of men. Despite considerable 
regional variations, nowhere has this gender 
gap been eliminated. Nor have improvements in 
access to education closed the gender gap in pay. 
Globally, women earn on average 24 per cent 
less than men (see Annex 4). The cumulative result 
of gender gaps in labour force participation, in 
earnings and in social transfers is substantial. A 
study of four countries estimates lifetime income 
gaps between women and men of between 31 and 
75 per cent (see Box 2.4). 
What explains the persistence of women’s socio-
economic disadvantage in the labour market 
despite the significant gains in formal equality? 
First, women have entered the labour market in 
large numbers, sometimes in response to economic 
crisis and distress, at a time when economies have 
not been creating sufficient decent jobs. As a result, 
millions of women and men are left in poor quality, 
insecure employment. 
• Equal opportunities and non-discrimination, including in relation to hiring, promotion and 
training7  
• Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay8  
• The right to form and join trade unions for the promotion and protection of workers’ economic 
and social interests9 
• Social security, including but not limited to ‘special protections’ such as paid leave and 
adequate benefits for women before and after childbirth10  
In addition to the provisions of the ICESCR and CEDAW, a comprehensive set of international 
labour standards are set out in 189 ILO conventions, which are legally binding international 
treaties, and 203 recommendations, which are guidelines to help countries apply the conventions. 
Second, the range of opportunities available 
to women is limited by pervasive gender 
stereotypes and social norms, as well as 
discriminatory practices, within both households 
and labour markets. Women’s skills and the types 
of work they perform—including paid care work, 
such as teaching, nursing, child- and elder-care, 
and social work—is undervalued relative to the 
jobs that men do.17  
Third, unpaid care and domestic work, which 
is critical to reproducing the labour force, 
remains a huge constraint on women’s capacity 
to engage in paid work. In all regions, women 
continue to take responsibility for the lion’s 
share of unpaid care and domestic work: in 
most countries, when paid and unpaid work are 
combined, women work longer hours than men 
(see Annex 3).18 This is a particularly burning issue 
for women in lower-income households with few 
options for quality and affordable childcare. 
The decent work challenge
In developed and developing countries alike, the 
dampening effect of macroeconomic policies 
means that labour markets are failing to create 
sufficient jobs of decent quality, particularly for 
young people (see Chapter 4).19 Even though 
LFPR have stagnated at the global level, due 
to population growth there were around 750 
million more women and 1 billion more men in 
the labour force in 2013 compared to 1990.20 
The dearth of decent jobs means that millions 
of women and men are being forced into poor 
quality work, often in the informal economy. 
Global unemployment has continued to rise, with 
an estimated 202 million women and men out of 
work in 2013.21 Of particular concern are rising 
levels of unemployment among young people: 
in the Middle East and North Africa region 51 per 
cent of young women and 23 per cent of young 
men aged 15–24 were unemployed in 2013. This 
compares to the global unemployment rate of 7 
per cent for women and 6 per cent for men.22
Trade liberalization since the early 1980s has led to 
an expansion of jobs in some developing countries 
producing goods for export markets, providing 
opportunities for women, including in rural areas. 
However, these jobs are often concentrated in the 
lowest paid and most insecure segments of global 
value chains, where women work as temporary or 
seasonal workers, producing horticultural goods for 
export or working in factories making garments.23  
Elsewhere, financial liberalization, labour market 
deregulation and the outsourcing of public sector 
employment have strengthened the bargaining 
power of firms vis-à-vis workers, with the result 
that real wages are under downward pressure and 
labour rights have been undermined. Women’s 
weaker bargaining position in labour markets 
has made it especially difficult for them to access 
decent work in this challenging environment. In 
most low- and middle-income countries, informal 
employment continues to be the norm, especially 
for women. 
The poor quality of many jobs and, associated 
with this, rising income inequality are a growing 
cause of concern among policy makers, as well 
as civil society organizations and some business 
leaders. The majority of women and men are 
living in societies where income is more unequally 
distributed today than it was in 1990.24 In both 
developed and developing countries, incomes 
among top wage earners have been rising rapidly 
while medium and low earners have seen little or 
no growth in their incomes.25 Growing inequalities 
have high social costs and are also damaging to 
economic stability.26  
There is increasing recognition across a wide 
spectrum of policy actors that, far from ‘distorting’ 
labour markets, state interventions can reduce 
power imbalances between workers and 
employers and contribute to a fairer distribution of 
risks, as well as better health and social cohesion 
and increased aggregate demand.27  
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Some countries, particularly in Latin America, have 
recently bucked the trend of rising inequalities.28 
They have shown that it is possible, with the right 
mix of economic and social policies, to create 
decent employment that supports the realization of 
women’s rights to work and rights at work (see Box 
2.2). 
Policy makers are also beginning to recognize 
the major constraints that women’s unpaid care 
and domestic work places on their labour market 
participation—constraints that are exacerbated by 
ageing populations and cuts in social services.29  
Addressing them requires more than workplace 
crèches and tinkering with fiscal policies. As long 
as labour markets continue to operate based on 
expectations of uninterrupted, life-long and full-
time employment, those who carry out the bulk 
of unpaid care and domestic work will inevitably 
be penalized. Nothing less than a fundamental 
rethink of how paid employment and unpaid care 
and domestic work are organized is required. 
Responsibilities for unpaid care and domestic 
work need to be more evenly distributed between 
women and men, and between households and 
society. 
Between 2001 and 2009, 17 million new jobs were created in Brazil, of which more than 10 million 
were those where employees hold social security cards (Carteira de Trabalho). This represents 
a major turnaround from the 1990s, when unemployment doubled, informality rose sharply and 
real wages declined.30 It shows that the right government action can yield impressive results, 
even against a backdrop of increasing flexibility and vulnerability of employment in the global 
economy. 
Women’s LFPR rose from 54 to 58 per cent between 2001 and 2009, and the proportion accessing 
jobs with social security cards increased from 30 to 35 per cent.31 The doubling of the minimum 
wage in the 2000s has also had a significant impact on gender pay gaps. Between 1995 and 
2007, the gender pay gap declined from 38 to 29 per cent. Importantly, this narrowing of the 
gender gap has been achieved through increases in both women’s and men’s wages rather than 
because men’s wages have fallen.32 
Brazil’s achievements in creating decent jobs are the result of a package of economic and 
social policies. Macroeconomic policy aimed at inclusive growth has contributed to job creation. 
Investment in labour inspection, and the simplification of registration costs and tax administration 
for small and medium-sized firms, have promoted the formalization of jobs and enterprises.33 
The rise in the real value of minimum wages has helped to reduce poverty and accounted for 66 
per cent of the decline in inequality during 2000–2008. Social protection policies have also had 
a major impact: a further 16 per cent of the drop in inequality was due to the increase in pension 
benefits and 12 per cent to the Bolsa Familia social welfare programme.34 
BOX 2.2 
The role of the state in generating decent work in Brazil
Chapter overview 
The first part of this chapter assesses progress 
in women’s and men’s LFPR, and reviews the 
contribution of wider economic and social policies 
to substantive equality in the labour market. The 
remainder of the chapter is concerned with how 
substantive equality at work can be achieved in 
a challenging global environment. Drawing on 
the framework set out in Chapter 1, it proposes 
a comprehensive agenda for public action by 
governments, labour organizations and employers 
to address persistent obstacles to women’s rights to 
and at work. 
The chapter shows that redressing women’s 
socio-economic disadvantage requires action to 
recognize and support unpaid care and domestic 
work, tackle gender segregation in occupations 
and close the gender pay gap. Gender segregation 
is a major cause of pay differentials between 
women and men. Tackling this requires a focus on 
the stereotyping, stigma and violence that lead to 
women being clustered into lower status and lower 
wage jobs. The chapter then lays out three priority 
arenas for public action: informal employment, 
rural livelihoods and public sector employment. 
The last section of the chapter highlights the 
need to strengthen women’s agency, voice and 
participation. Women’s capacity to influence 
and shape their workplaces and the conditions 
under which they work—whether via trade unions 
or in new forms of collective action—is crucial to 
achieving substantive equality. 
In the longer term, the challenge is to transform 
labour markets and households in ways that 
enable a decent standard of living for all. Drawing 
on experiences from around the world, the 
chapter demonstrates that, although progress 
towards strengthening women’s rights at work has 
been uneven, it is far from impossible. Even in the 
current challenging global context, some countries 
have been able to make significant headway in 
advancing substantive equality at work. 
UNEVEN PROGRESS IN WOMEN’S 
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION
Globally, women’s LFPR has stagnated since 
the early 1990s, albeit with significant regional 
variation (see Box 2.3 for definitions). In 2013, 
50 per cent of women were in the labour force, 
a decline of 2 percentage points since 1990. 
Although the gender gap in LFPR narrowed 
slightly during this period, this was primarily 
because participation rates for men declined 
faster than for women. The gender gap is 
striking and persistent: half of women are in 
the labour force compared to more than three 
quarters of men.
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The labour force participation rate (LFPR) captures people who are currently employed and those 
who are unemployed (i.e., people who are not employed but are available and actively looking for 
a job) as a percentage of the working-age population. The working-age population is generally 
defined as people aged 15 and above (with some national variation in cut-off points).35 
Relatively higher LFPR in many developing countries reflect the large proportion of people—mostly 
women—who are involved in subsistence production. Unemployment rates —defined as the 
number of unemployed people as a percentage of the labour force—are generally much lower in 
developing than in developed countries. This is because, in the absence of unemployment insurance, 
most people in developing countries cannot afford to be unemployed and instead are active in 
informal employment. None of these indicators takes into account unpaid care and domestic work, 
which is fundamental for the reproduction of the labour force (see Box 2.5).
Continued debate on the merits of these indicators led to the International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians (ICLS) agreeing in 2013 to their fundamental overhaul.36 Changes agreed include a 
redefinition of work and a narrower definition of employment, to comprise only those who are 
engaged in activities that are ‘mainly’ for pay or profit. This excludes people who are producing 
goods and services ‘mainly’ for their own personal use or those who are doing volunteer work. 
These changes would mean that subsistence farming, as well as unpaid care and domestic work, 
would be categorized as work but not as employment. As a result better—and more meaningful—
statistics on women’s and men’s work could be compiled, including LFPR and employment and 
unemployment rates, as well as on the time that women spend performing unpaid care and 
domestic work (see Monitoring women’s economic and social rights in Annexes).37  
BOX 2.3 
Labour force participation, employment and unemployment rates
WOMEN’S LABOUR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION: REGIONAL TRENDS
Beyond these global headlines, there is 
substantial regional variation. Figure 2.1 shows 
the trends in male and female LFPR by region 
between 1990 and 2013. In this period, women’s 
LFPR increased in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, in sub-Saharan Africa, in Developed 
Regions and to a limited extent in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Latin America and the 
Caribbean saw the largest increase in women’s 
LFPR from 40 to 54 per cent, narrowing the 
gender gap from 42 to 26 percentage points. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, women’s LFPR increased 
from 59 to 64 per cent during the same period, 
resulting in a gender gap of 13 percentage 
points, the lowest of all regions. 
Figure 2.1
Labour force participation rate by sex and region, 1990–2013 
 Globally, women’s labour force participation rates have stagnated, albeit with significant regional variation
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Meanwhile, women’s LFPR decreased in Central 
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, in East Asia 
and the Pacific as well as in South Asia, regions 
that account for about 60 per cent of the global 
female population of working age.38 The decline in 
women’s LFPR in South Asia is mostly the result of 
lower participation rates in India due to younger 
women staying in education, and a general lack of 
employment opportunities for women.39  
In Central and Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, the drop in economic output following the 
dismantling of state socialism and the transition to 
a market economy have had a negative impact on 
employment, despite some recovery since 2000. 
Since the transition, these countries have also placed 
less emphasis on policies that enable women to 
combine work and family responsibilities. The result 
of these factors combined is that women’s LFPR has 
not recovered to pre-transition levels.40    
Greater opportunities or quest for survival? 
Increases in women’s LFPR may indicate 
greater opportunities for women to access paid 
employment. In some countries in Latin America, 
targeted labour market, macroeconomic and 
social policies have contributed to a growth in 
formal employment, which has benefited women 
(see Box 2.2). 
Declining fertility rates have also played a part in 
increasing LFPR among women of prime working 
age (25–54). Globally, median female LFPR for this 
age group increased by 11 percentage points from 
63 to 74 per cent, while median male participation 
rates in the same age group changed very little, 
from 95 to 94 per cent. During their reproductive 
years (between ages 20 and 44), women’s labour 
supply reduces by the equivalent of nearly two 
years for each child born. Reductions in median 
fertility rates from 5.2 to 2.4 children per woman 
over the last four decades41 may have increased 
female labour supply by 5.3 years, or 12 per cent of 
a woman’s uninterrupted working life.42  
But for some women, higher LFPR also reflect the 
‘distress sale of labour’, whereby poverty and lack 
of social protection drive women into the labour 
market to meet survival needs.43 In developing 
economies, coverage of unemployment insurance 
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Figure 2.2
Gender gaps in labour force participation rates by age group, 1990 and 2013 
 Gender gaps increase sharply when women are most likely to have children 
Source: Weighted averages calculated by UN Women using data from ILO 2015c.
is low or non-existent and few people can afford 
lengthy spells without a job. Instead they have to 
take up informal and poor-quality work. 
Gender gaps remain everywhere 
As Figure 2.1 shows, women’s LFPR still lags far 
behind that of men in all regions. For example, 
less than one quarter of women in the Middle East 
and North Africa and one third of women in South 
Asia participate in the labour force, compared to 
at least three quarters of men in each region, and 
there has been little change in the gender gaps 
since 1990.
In these regions, women’s ability to undertake paid 
work outside the home is restricted by rigid social 
norms and cultural expectations about women’s 
role within the family and in the public domain. For 
those women that do join the labour force, social 
norms also restrict the types or locations of work 
they can do, as well as their earnings and their 
capacity to retain control over them. For example, 
the practice of purdah or seclusion in some 
communities means that women are confined to 
work in the home or in single-sex occupations.44
Figure 2.2 shows that gender gaps in LFPR vary by 
age as well as by region. Globally, gaps tend to be 
lower in younger age groups then increase sharply 
as women enter their reproductive years. Even 
though gender gaps have been narrowing in this 
age group in some regions, the large disparities in 
LFPR in the years when women have children indicate 
that combining paid and unpaid work remains a 
significant challenge everywhere (see Figure 2.3 and 
section Unpaid care and domestic work). 
In most regions, gender gaps in LFPR only decline 
again after the age of 65, when women and men 
are entering retirement. The exception is sub-
Saharan Africa, where 41 per cent of women and 
63 per cent of men aged 65 and over are in the 
labour force.45 High rates of poverty in old age 
and low pension coverage make retirement an 
impossibility for many women and men alike, in 
this region.
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Across all regions, almost all men of prime working age (25-54 years) participate in the labour force, while rates of 
participation vary widely for women. The gender gap is striking and persistent: in no region has it been eliminated.
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Figure 2.3
AN EYE ON THE GAP 
The global gender gap in labour force participation
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Another striking trend is the decline in LFPR 
among young women and men (aged 15–24), 
due to a growing demand for education. 
Globally, the LFPR of young women fell from 51 
to 39 per cent, and from 68 to 55 per cent for 
young men, between 1990 and 2013. The fact 
that young women are increasingly staying in 
education is a positive development that could 
ultimately contribute to improved labour market 
outcomes.46 However, as the next section will 
show, women’s increased educational attainment 
over the past few decades has not necessarily 
resulted in a commensurate improvement in their 
labour market outcomes relative to men.
EDUCATION: THE GREAT EQUALIZER?
One of the most important gains for gender 
equality and women’s rights over the last 60 
years has been the rapid increase in girls’ 
education.47 Education, particularly at secondary 
level, is associated with a range of positive 
outcomes for women and girls, including greater 
awareness of their rights, greater participation 
in decision-making, reduced probability of 
early marriage and childbearing, and reduced 
likelihood of dying during childbirth.48 
Mean years of education have increased faster 
for women than for men in most regions, leading 
to narrowing gender gaps. A case in point is the 
Middle East and North Africa region, which, in 
1950, had the lowest level of female educational 
attainment of all regions. By 2010, while average 
years of education for men had increased by 
a factor of seven (from 1.1 to 8.0), the average 
years of education for women had increased 16 
times (from 0.4 to 6.5).
In developing countries, advances in educational 
attainment are largely the result of increases 
in enrolment at primary and lower secondary 
levels. However, advances in tertiary education 
over the past three decades have also been 
remarkable. As of 2009, female gross enrolment 
ratios (GER) in tertiary education were higher 
than male GER in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North 
Africa and Developed Regions. This means 
that in a large number of countries, an entire 
generation of women have enjoyed higher levels 
of education than men.49  
Education and labour market outcomes 
In relation to employment, education is often 
seen as the ‘great equalizer’, based on the idea 
that by creating equal opportunities for women 
and men, more equal labour market outcomes 
will follow.50  However, the relationship between 
improved education levels and labour force 
participation in developing countries is not 
straightforward.  
In developed countries, a clear positive 
relationship between education and labour force 
participation generally exists, but in developing 
countries the relationship more closely resembles 
a U-shaped curve. Women with primary and 
lower secondary schooling have relatively low 
rates of labour force participation compared with 
those with no schooling and those with tertiary 
education. Women with little or no education tend 
to come from very poor households, forcing them 
to accept whatever low-paid, low-skilled work 
is available (particularly in the absence of social 
security), while those with some education are 
more likely to be able to afford to stay out of the 
labour force. At the highest levels of education, 
particularly tertiary, the opportunity cost of not 
working is substantial, resulting in high rates of 
labour force participation among this group.51
With regards to quality of employment, higher 
levels of educational attainment are associated 
with a narrowing of gender gaps in access to 
formal employment and increased earnings for 
women. High levels of education enable women 
to access better paid occupations, and higher-
earning jobs within those occupations.52  
However, rising education has not been a 
panacea for the disadvantages that women face 
in the labour market. Young women’s ‘transition’ 
rates from education to employment are 
consistently lower than young men’s, contributing 
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to high levels of unemployment among young 
women in many regions.53  
In addition, gains in women’s education have not 
had the expected positive impact on gender pay 
gaps. In a study of 64 countries, after accounting 
for gender differences in education, the size 
of the (adjusted) pay gap actually increased, 
indicating that rising female education has not 
been fully or equally rewarded in the labour 
market.54 At every level of education (including 
no education) women on average earn less than 
men. These gender gaps reflect different treatment 
in the labour market due to discrimination, 
occupational segregation and greater constraints 
for women in balancing employment and family 
responsibilities, none of which can be addressed 
through education alone.55  
TOWARDS SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY  
IN PAID AND UNPAID WORK
Unequal outcomes for women in the labour 
market are the biggest contributor to their 
overall socio-economic disadvantage. Over a 
lifetime, differences in employment rates and 
pay combine to create large cumulative income 
differences between women and men. Data from 
France, Germany, Sweden and Turkey suggest 
that women earn between 31 and 75 per cent 
less than men over their lifetimes (see Box 2.4). 
The gender gap in lifetime income is likely to 
be especially wide in countries such as Turkey, 
where women’s labour force participation is 
low, and in developing countries where social 
protection coverage is very limited.
Income inequality between women and men is usually measured in terms of gender gaps in pay 
per hour, week, month or year. These data provide a snapshot, but they do not tell us anything 
about how women’s disadvantage accumulates over their lifetimes. Gender pay gaps, as well 
as differences in labour force participation rates, types of employment (informal vs. formal, 
wage vs. self-employment), levels of education and experience, and the generosity of social 
transfers, all contribute to gaps in women’s and men’s income over the longer term. 
BOX 2.4 
Accumulating socio-economic disadvantage: Gender gaps in lifetime income 
In a study on Germany, France, Sweden and Turkey, the factors that generate or mitigate 
gender gaps in lifetime income were assessed using actuarial methods.56 These countries have 
diverse policy regimes: Sweden has a ‘universal’ and relatively gender-egalitarian welfare 
regime; France and Germany are two ‘conservative’, social insurance-based welfare regimes; 
and Turkey is a middle-income country with patchy social security coverage. The gender gaps 
in labour force participation in the four countries also vary widely. At one end of the scale, in 
Sweden, 60 per cent of women were in the labour force in 2013 (compared to 68 per cent of 
men); while in Turkey, in the same year, only 29 per cent of women were in the labour force 
(compared to 71 per cent of men).57 
Gender gaps in lifetime income are sizeable across all four countries. In France and Sweden, 
women’s lifetime income after all social transfers is 31 per cent lower than men’s. In Germany, 
women can expect to earn 49 per cent less than men, while in Turkey, a woman is likely to earn 
just 25 per cent of a man’s income over her lifetime. 
Women’s lower levels of labour market participation, which are in part the result of their unpaid 
care and domestic responsibilities, are the most important factor in explaining the gender gap 
in lifetime income. For example, in Germany, by the age of 45, a woman who has given birth 
to one child can expect to earn up to US$285,000 less than a woman who has worked full time, 
without interruption.58  
The results show that social transfer systems—such as pensions and family allowances, 
alongside comprehensive policies to support women’s employment, including childcare services 
and parental leave can make a critical contribution to reducing gender gaps in lifetime income 
(see Chapter 3). 
While the results of this study are only for four countries, those for France, Germany and Sweden 
they may be indicative of the range of gender gaps in lifetime income in developed countries. 
The results for Turkey demonstrate what might be expected in countries where women’s labour 
force participation is low, or in contexts where the majority of women work in informal jobs and 
social security coverage is limited.
Women’s employment options are hugely limited 
by societal expectations that burden them 
with disproportionate responsibility for unpaid 
care and domestic work. Without adequate 
support, they may ‘choose’ part-time or informal 
work that can be combined with these unpaid 
responsibilities. Labour market institutions and 
practices also channel women into a narrow 
range of gender segregated occupations at 
lower levels in the employment hierarchy, 
leading to gender-based pay differentials. 
And because women typically earn less than 
their male partners, household decisions tend 
to reinforce a division of labour where men 
‘specialize’ in paid work while women ‘specialize’ 
in homemaking. 
Redressing women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage requires concerted action on three 
fronts to break this cycle. First, a reorganization 
of unpaid care and domestic work is required; 
second, efforts are needed to break down 
occupational segregation in the labour force; 
and third, gender pay gaps need to be reduced. 
The next three sections analyse the challenges 
and assess progress in these three areas. 
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UNPAID CARE AND DOMESTIC WORK: THE 
FOUNDATION FOR ALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Unpaid care and domestic work contributes 
to human well-being and to overall economic 
development through nurturing people who are fit, 
productive and capable of learning and creativity.59  
Unpaid care and domestic work produces and 
reproduces the labour force on a day-to-day 
basis and over generations for the market, but 
conventional analyses of employment and labour 
markets tend to ignore it altogether (see Box 2.5).60  
Unpaid work includes a diverse range of activities that are carried out predominantly by women without 
remuneration. There are three broad categories referred to in this report:61 
• Unpaid work in a family business, involving the production of goods or services for sale on the 
market for no direct pay, which is referred to as contributing family work
• Unpaid work that involves the production of goods for self-consumption (e.g., collecting water or 
firewood)
• Unpaid work that involves the provision of services for self-consumption (e.g., cooking or cleaning as 
well as person-to-person care)
This Report uses the concept of unpaid care and domestic work to include the latter two types of work. 
In addition to person-to-person care (such as feeding a child or bathing a frail elderly person) and 
domestic work, this also includes other activities (such as the collection of water or firewood) that are 
critical for ‘reproducing’ people on a day-to-day basis, particularly in low-income settings. 
Despite its enormous value, unpaid care and domestic work remains largely invisible in standard 
measures of the economy (see Chapter 4). While unpaid work in family businesses is routinely included in 
calculations of gross domestic product (GDP), unpaid care and domestic work, as defined in this report, is 
rarely included in what is known as the System of National Accounts (SNA) production boundary. 
Although the collection of water and firewood has officially formed part of the SNA production 
boundary since 1993, this is rarely followed through in practice. All other unpaid care and domestic work 
at the household level continues to be referred to in the SNA as a ‘self-contained activity with limited 
repercussions on the rest of the economy’.62  
This Report takes a fundamentally different view: that the unpaid provision of services in households 
for own consumption is a form of work that has immediate repercussions for economies, large and 
small, through its impact on the wider labour force. This perspective is gaining ground: in 2013, the 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) agreed some important changes in how work 
and employment are defined and measured. It was decided that unpaid care and domestic work will 
now be categorized as work, which should lead to better measurement and valuation of these activities 
in the future (see Box 2.3).63  
BOX 2.5 
Unpaid work: A note on terminology 
The unequal distribution of unpaid care 
and domestic work
Across all economies and cultures, women 
and girls carry out the bulk of unpaid care and 
domestic work. Globally, women do nearly 2.5 
times as much of this work as men, with large 
gender disparities in time spent cooking, cleaning 
and caring for household members (see Annex 3).64 
Women’s involvement in this work varies greatly 
across countries depending on the extent and 
coverage of public services such as water and 
sanitation, energy, health and childcare. Within 
countries, there are also significant variations in the 
amount of unpaid care and domestic work carried 
out by women based on age, income, location and 
the presence of young children in the household.65   
For example, in Algeria, women in rural areas do 5.5 
hours of unpaid care and domestic work per day, 
compared to 5.1 hours for urban women, rising to 7.3 
hours a day for women with children younger than 4 
years. Men’s contribution to domestic work remains 
constant at less than one hour per day across all 
these categories.66 In Pakistan, rural women do 4.9 
hours of unpaid care and domestic work per day 
compared to 0.5 hours for rural men.67
The broader economic and social context also 
makes a difference to women’s unpaid care and 
domestic work. Health crises such as the HIV 
pandemic and the more recent outbreak of the 
Ebola virus disease create additional unpaid care 
and domestic work burdens, as well as health risks, 
for women (see Box 3.7). Where health systems 
are under-resourced or over-stretched, home-
based carers, predominantly women, take up 
the slack with little support or remuneration (see 
story: A seat at the table).68 Austerity measures 
adopted following the global financial crisis have 
further increased the burden of unpaid care and 
domestic work, particularly for poor women who 
are often the most reliant on public services.69 
Responsibility for care limits women’s 
economic opportunities 
Women’s disproportionate responsibility for 
unpaid care and domestic work limits their 
participation in the labour force. In the European 
Union (EU), in 2013, 25 per cent of women compared 
to only 3 per cent of men cite care and other 
family responsibilities as the reason for not being 
in the labour force.70 The impact of women’s care 
responsibilities on labour market outcomes is 
also reflected in significant differences between 
employment rates of women with and without 
children. 
Policy can also make a huge difference here: 
EU countries that provide comprehensive 
support to working parents have higher rates of 
female employment than countries without such 
policies.71 The provision of childcare services is 
strongly associated with higher rates of women’s 
employment, but policies to promote paid parental 
leave also have a significant impact.72  
Figure 2.4 compares employment rates of mothers 
in EU countries, according to different types of family 
policy regimes and the number of children they 
have. At one end of the scale, in the Nordic countries, 
where comprehensive support for working parents 
includes generous paid leave, high quality public 
childcare services and flexible working options, 
women with children have higher than average 
employment rates. At the other end of the scale, in 
Southern Europe, where such support is minimal, 
women with children are least likely to be employed. 
The differences in employment rates between 
countries are particularly wide for women with two 
or more children.
In developing countries, being married, as well as 
the presence of young children in the household are 
associated with lower employment rates for women 
but higher rates for men.73 For example, in Mexico, 
46 per cent of women aged 25–34 in households 
with very young children were in the labour force 
in 2010 compared to 55 per cent of women in 
households without children. The figures for men 
were 99 and 96 per cent, respectively.74 
Inadequate childcare support 
Survey data from 31 developing countries 
illustrate the problems faced by working women 
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in accessing childcare. When asked who minds 
their children while they are at work, 39 per cent 
of working women with children under the age 
of 6 said that they themselves care for them. 
Only 4 per cent of those surveyed reported using 
organized childcare or nursery arrangements, as 
shown in Figure 2.5. Among the poorest women, 
a negligible 1 per cent used such facilities, 
with many relying on other relatives or older 
daughters to provide care. The fact that so many 
women, especially the poorest, have to mind 
their children at their workplace influences what 
kind of work they can do, as well as the quality of 
care that their children receive. 
Figure 2.4
Average maternal employment rates by number of children in European Union countries, by family policy regime, 2013 
 In Europe, women’s employment rates are much higher in countries where family-friendly policies are in 
place
Source: UN Women calculations using data from Eurostat 2015. 
Note: Family policy regime classification as in Thévenon 2011:
1. Limited assistance to families. 
2. Long leave but low cash benefits and childcare for children under age 3. 
3. Period of paid leave is short, with support targeted to low-income, single-parent families and families with preschool children. 
4. High financial support but limited service provision to support dual-earner families with children under age 3.  
5. Continuous, strong support for working parents of children under age 3. 
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Figure 2.5
Typical childcare arrangement for employed women with children under age 6 
 Very few employed women in developing countries have access to organized childcare or nurseries
Source: Unweighted averages calculated by UN Women using data from ICF International 2015.
Note: N=31 developing countries. Surveys were conducted between 1995 and 2002. This indicator corresponds to the percentage of respondents answering the question ‘Who looks after your 
child(ren) while you are at work?’
The impact of elder care 
As populations are ageing, there are also rising 
demands to provide care for the sick and elderly. 
In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries, more than 10 per 
cent of adults aged 50 and over, of whom two 
thirds are women, provide some form of informal 
care—typically unpaid—to the sick or elderly. This 
figure is set to rise by 20 to 30 per cent by 2050 
in some countries.75 As with childcare, care of the 
sick and elderly impacts negatively on women’s 
employment options. In the United States, for 
example, a study found that women aged 55 to 
67 who provided unpaid care to their parents 
reduced their work hours by 41 per cent, on 
average.76  
Meanwhile, governments, particularly those 
in developing countries, have not consistently 
addressed elderly care as a policy issue. Two 
thirds of the global population aged 60 and 
over live in developing countries, and by 2050 
this share is projected to rise to 80 per cent.77 
The issue of elder care will therefore become 
increasingly important and, if left unaddressed, 
will continue to be a significant impediment 
to women’s employment opportunities (see 
Chapter 3).
Recognizing, reducing and redistributing 
women’s unpaid care and domestic work
Governments in developing countries can take 
a range of measures to recognize, reduce and 
redistribute women’s unpaid care and domestic 
work. These include: investments in basic social 
services and infrastructure, particularly health 
care, and water and sanitation, which are critical 
to reducing the drudgery of this work; and 
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provision of childcare services, which can enable 
women to participate in paid work. These policy 
areas are explored in more detail in Chapter 3.78  
Investments in electricity and energy infrastructure, 
such as clean cook-stoves are also essential. Some 
1.3 billion people lack basic electricity to light their 
homes, while almost 3 billion people worldwide 
rely on solid fuels for cooking and heating. Women 
and girls, especially those in rural areas, spend 
many hours collecting wood, charcoal, animal 
manure and crop residues for this purpose.79 
Traditional biomass-burning cook-stoves are the 
primary contributor to indoor air pollution, which 
is responsible for more than 4 million deaths 
annually,80 but in addition, these deficits impose 
unpaid work burdens that limit the time women and 
girls have available for paid work, education and 
leisure.81  
A comprehensive system of paid parental leave 
is also needed to facilitate women’s access to 
labour markets, including: maternity leave, which 
allows mothers to recover from childbirth and 
care for young infants during the first weeks of 
their lives; paternity leave, which enables fathers 
to support their partners in the weeks following 
the birth; and parental leave, which can be taken 
by mothers or fathers over a longer period of 
time. 
Maternity leave: Some progress but 
inadequate coverage
The ILO Maternity Protection Convention (No. 
183) provides that mothers, including those in  
informal work, are entitled to maternity leave 
of not less than 14 weeks, which should be paid 
for collectively (i.e., not only by employers) at 
a rate of at least two thirds of previous pay.82 
Virtually every country in the world has adopted 
some form of maternity protection legislation, but 
only 63 countries comply with these ILO minimum 
standards.83 Even where laws are in place, 
practical obstacles prevent women from claiming 
their rights: it is estimated that only 28 per cent 
of employed women worldwide enjoy any paid 
maternity leave in practice.84 
Within the developing world, Latin American 
countries have made considerable progress in 
complying with the ILO standard of 14 weeks 
paid maternity leave and in ensuring that more 
women, including those in informal work, are 
eligible. In Brazil, rural and domestic workers 
gained the right to maternity leave in 1991 and, 
following a court ruling in 2012, temporary 
workers are now also eligible. Chile and Costa 
Rica also grant rights to maternity leave to 
temporary workers. Yet, even where informal 
workers are legally entitled to take maternity 
leave, take-up is often low.85 Ensuring that 
maternity leave benefits are comparatively 
generous, preferably with full replacement of 
previous earnings, alongside efforts to extend 
coverage and monitor implementation, is 
important to reduce the barriers for low-income 
women to access their entitlements. 
While maternity leave provision can support 
women to remain in paid employment, 
substantive equality also requires policies to 
address gender stereotypes associated with 
caregiving and to promote more equal sharing 
of unpaid work.86 Short leaves from the labour 
force can strengthen women’s labour market 
attachment, but longer leaves can lead to 
detachment and a deterioration of skills. Longer 
leaves also increase the risk of employers 
discriminating against pregnant women or 
women of childbearing age.87 For all of these 
reasons, the introduction of policies to make 
paternity or parental leave both available and 
attractive to fathers is important.
Parental and paternity leave: Challenging 
gender stereotypes 
In 2013, provisions for paternity leave and parental 
leave were in place in 80 and 66 countries, 
respectively. However, entitlements tend to be very 
limited and variable—sometimes just one or two 
days of unpaid leave.88 In 1974, Sweden became the 
first country in the world to grant parental leave as 
a family entitlement that both parents could share. 
Over the next 15 years, Denmark, Finland, Iceland 
and Norway followed suit.89  
Today, parental leave is commonplace in 
Developed Regions and Central and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia. It is rare in other regions 
and, where it does exist, is usually unpaid.90 In 
Latin America, for example, where there has been 
good progress on extending maternity provision, 
attempts to extend paternity or shared parental 
leave have been very limited. This ‘maternalist’ 
approach leaves traditional gender roles firmly 
intact and potentially reinforces women’s role as 
the main caregiver for children.91 
In addition, the provision of gender-neutral 
parental leave does not automatically lead to 
gender equality in take-up. Even where policies 
allow sharing of parental leave, mothers still take 
the majority of this time.92 Studies find that men 
are stigmatized for taking their leave entitlements 
and considered less worthy of promotion.93 In 
response to low take-up, Norway was the first 
country to pioneer so-called ‘daddy quotas’, 
where portions of non-transferable leave are 
taken on a ‘use-or-lose’ basis. Such quotas 
have since been replicated in several countries, 
and evidence on take-up of leave shows that 
these measures make a difference. In Iceland, 
for example, 84 per cent of fathers took their 
full three-month quota of leave in 2007.94 Such 
policies may also increase men’s longer-term 
willingness to assume care responsibilities.95  
Financing maternity, paternity and 
parental leave 
The generosity of leave benefits, as well as how 
they are financed, matter for gender equality. 
First, all leave should be paid at a relatively high 
percentage of normal salaries (or ‘replacement 
rates’) to prevent loss of earnings for mothers, 
Figure 2.6
Financing of maternity leave by region, 2013 
 In a quarter of countries, employers alone fund maternity leave
Source: UN Women calculations using data from ILO 2014d.
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especially those on low incomes who would not 
otherwise be able to afford to take leave.96 In 
Developed Regions and Central and Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, replacement rates of at least two 
thirds of previous pay are the norm, but such rates 
are much less common in developing countries.97 
Where applied to paternity and parental leaves, 
high replacements rates are also important to 
encourage men to take up their entitlements given 
that they usually earn higher wages than women.98 
High rates also send a strong message that care 
work is socially valued.
Second, collective financing for paid parental leave 
through general taxation or social insurance systems 
is preferable to financing by individual employers, 
which may make them reluctant to hire women of 
reproductive age.99 Currently, maternity leave is 
funded through social security contributions in 58 
per cent of countries, by employers in 26 per cent 
and through a mix of government and employer 
contributions in the remaining countries (see Figure 
2.6).100 Employers are responsible for funding leave 
in most countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
and South Asia. These are also regions where the 
majority of countries do not meet the ILO standard 
of 14 weeks paid maternity leave and where 
women’s LFPR is particularly low.
Recommendations 
Policies to recognize, reduce and redistribute unpaid 
care and domestic work are vital to advancing 
substantive equality. Public investments in basic 
infrastructure and family-friendly policies broaden 
women’s paid employment options, thereby 
redressing their socio-economic disadvantage. 
Promoting more equal sharing of unpaid care and 
domestic work between women and men would 
also help to address stereotypes and change social 
norms, with the potential to transform both labour 
markets and households alike. To move towards 
substantive equality, governments need to:
• Invest in basic infrastructure and services (water 
and sanitation, health, electricity and clean 
cook-stoves) to reduce women’s unpaid care 
and domestic work burdens and liberate time for 
productive activities and leisure (see Chapter 3)
• Extend coverage of childcare services in line with 
the needs of working parents (see Chapter 3)
• Work towards comprehensive paid leave 
systems, including maternity leave of at least 14 
weeks, paternity leave and parental leave that 
can be shared between parents
• Extend coverage of maternity, paternity 
and parental leave entitlements to informal 
workers, along with measures to ensure 
implementation
• Ensure that leave is paid at a minimum of two 
thirds of previous earnings, so that poorer 
women and men can afford to take it 
• Finance leave through collective mechanisms 
such as social security contributions and/or 
general taxation
• Incentivize fathers to take up paternity and 
parental leave, including through ‘use-or-lose’ 
quotas.
ADDRESSING PERVASIVE OCCUPATIONAL 
SEGREGATION 
Increased participation in the labour force does not 
guarantee a level playing field for women in terms 
of their labour market outcomes. Gender-based 
occupational segregation—whereby women and 
men tend to be employed in different occupations 
(horizontal segregation) and at different 
levels, grades or positions of seniority (vertical 
segregation)—is a key factor in women’s socio-
economic disadvantage.101 It is prevalent in both 
formal and informal employment.
Patterns and consequences of 
occupational segregation 
Occupational segregation is widespread, 
persistent and relatively resistant to change even 
as countries develop economically.102 The negative 
consequences of occupational segregation are 
multiple and far-reaching, including on the quality 
of work women can access and the valuation of 
their skills. Its most pernicious impact, overall, is 
in maintaining pervasive gender pay gaps.103 The 
exclusion of large sections of the labour force 
from certain jobs is also a waste of human talent 
with negative consequences for the economy as a 
whole.104 
Figure 2.7 presents data on occupational 
segregation by region, showing that it is both 
prevalent and has a strikingly similar pattern 
across developed and developing regions. Each 
occupational category includes both formal and 
informal workers. 
Globally, women are over-represented in clerical 
and support positions (63 per cent) and in service 
and sales roles (55 per cent) compared to 
managerial occupations (33 per cent). They are 
under-represented in skilled work in agriculture 
and fisheries (37 per cent) and in craft and trade 
occupations (17 per cent). At 53 per cent, women’s 
share of professional occupations is significant 
in all regions, but there is also marked gender 
segregation within this category.105 For example, 
data for the United States shows that among 
health-care professionals, women are 36 per cent of 
physicians and surgeons compared to 90 per cent of 
registered nurses.106  
Figure 2.7
Share of women in total employment in select occupational groups, 2013  
 Patterns of occupational segregation are similar in all countries, with women over-represented in clerical and 
support roles
Source: UN Women calculations using occupation data from ILO 2015a.
Note: Data are weighted averages calculated for 99 countries of which 74 are in Developing Regions, and 25 are in Developed Regions, using the latest available data for each country.
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Figure 2.8
Change in women’s share of occupations, 2000–2010 
 More women have become managers and professionals, but segregation in female and male-dominated 
occupations has become more entrenched
Source: UN Women calculations using data from ILO 2015c.
Note:  The sample size is 83 countries. The classification of occupations as mixed or female- or male-dominated follows the rule proposed by Hakim 1993, cited in Bettio and Verashchagina 
2009. Female-dominated occupations are those where the female share is 15 percentage points above the share of women in total employment (i.e., 55 per cent or more); male-dominated 
occupations are those where the female share is 15 percentage points below their share in total employment (i.e., 25 per cent or less); and the rest are mixed. The female share calculation 
used to determine the sex dominated occupations are based on the latest country data. The averages used to calculate the change are unweighted.
Like formal work, informal employment is highly 
segregated along gender lines. The category of 
‘elementary’ occupations in Figure 2.7 includes 
many informal jobs, with women concentrated in 
domestic work and cleaning while men are more 
likely to be in low-skilled mining and manufacturing 
work. 
Trends in occupational segregation
Over the last two decades, there has been a slight 
decline in the extent of occupational segregation as 
women have continued to move into job categories 
that are already quite ‘mixed’. At the same time, 
occupations that were dominated by men to begin 
with have continued to offer few opportunities to 
women. Predominantly female occupations, which 
tend to be those with lower status and pay, have 
remained feminized or become more so.107  
Figure 2.8 shows an increase in the share of women 
in certain mixed occupational categories between 
2000 and 2010 such as leadership and management 
and professional and technical occupations. 
However, over the same period, women’s share in 
male-dominated occupations—for example, craft 
and trade jobs and plant and machine operator 
and assembler positions—declined by 2.1 and 1.6 
percentage points respectively. Female-dominated 
occupations such as clerks and service workers also 
saw little change. 
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Causes of occupational segregation 
The persistence of occupational segregation can 
be explained by gender differences in education, 
training and experience; discrimination; social 
norms; and the unequal distribution of unpaid care 
and domestic work.108 Deeply ingrained stereotypes 
about gender roles and differences in aptitudes, 
and the stigmatization of certain occupations, play 
an important part in shaping preferences and 
maintaining occupational segregation. 
Higher levels of education are associated with a 
reduction in occupational segregation in the United 
States: analysis of data from 1970 to 2009 found the 
largest decreases in segregation among college 
graduates, but very little change among those with 
incomplete secondary education.109 This analysis 
also found that the pace of change during this 
period decreased significantly, all but stalling in the 
2000s, suggesting that education is not enough on 
its own to eliminate the problem.110  
Furthermore, the differences in girls’ and boys’ fields 
of educational specialization remain entrenched 
and strongly influence occupational segregation. 
These differences start early but grow larger as 
young people progress through the education 
system. Women are more likely to study humanities, 
while men specialize in highly-valued technical 
and scientific fields.111 Gender differences in subject 
choices at school also lead to women’s lower access 
to technical and vocational education and training 
(TVET) that could improve their skills and labour 
market outcomes.112  
Gender-based violence perpetuates occupational 
segregation. Pervasive sexual harassment and other 
forms of violence in the workplace serve to reinforce 
or maintain existing hierarchies and gender power 
relations. For example, women may be reluctant 
to take up a job in a male-dominated occupation 
or apply for a promotion because of a real or 
perceived threat of harassment or violence, thereby 
perpetuating segregation. 
A recent survey in EU countries found that 75 per cent 
of women in management and higher professional 
positions and 61 per cent of women in service sector 
occupations have experienced some form of sexual 
harassment in their lifetime.113 In a study of women 
working in typically male trades in the United States, 
nearly a third reported that they frequently or always 
experienced sexual harassment.114 While there are 
no comparable surveys for developing countries, 
several studies highlight that women are frequently 
targeted for sexual harassment by employers, 
suppliers, managers or service providers asking for 
sexual favours in return for timely payment or for 
promotion.115  
Such violence impacts women at every level: women 
in leadership or management positions may be 
targeted because they present a threat to male 
power.116 For some women, such as domestic, migrant 
or sex workers, abuse may be especially difficult and 
risky to counter because of the lack of legal protection 
or access to justice.117 
The lack of support for childcare in developing 
countries and the fact that women often have to 
combine childcare with income earning (see Figure 
2.5) contribute to their segregation in informal self-
employment such as home-based work. Similarly, 
service sector jobs are more likely to offer work 
schedules aligned with unpaid care and domestic 
work demands (e.g., teaching) or flexible or part-time 
working hours (e.g., sales or clerical work) that enable 
women to combine paid and unpaid work. Women’s 
employment in the service sector has risen from 36 
per cent of total women’s employment in 1990 to 
51 per cent in 2013.118 The concentration of women 
in these roles means that these jobs are typically 
undervalued and come with a pay penalty.119  
A significant part of the growth of service sector 
jobs has been in paid domestic work. For example, 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, paid domestic 
work accounts for 15 per cent of the female workforce 
and contributed 22 per cent of the growth in female 
employment in the service sector in this region 
between 1995 and 2010.120 The clustering of low-
income women, many of them migrants and/or 
from ethnic minorities, into paid domestic work 
has contributed to the persistence of occupational 
segregation at the bottom of the employment 
ladder. Meanwhile, better off, professional women 
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have benefited from the availability of cheap 
domestic labour to improve their own job prospects, 
deepening class inequality between women.121  
Addressing occupational segregation
In recognition of women’s rights to work in any 
occupation they choose, 67 governments worldwide 
have legislated against gender discrimination in 
hiring practices (Annex 3). Governments have also 
repealed legislation that restricted the types of work 
that women can do by, for example, banning them 
from working at night or in particular industries.122 
These laws are an important step forward in 
preventing direct discrimination, but further policy 
action is needed to achieve substantive equality, 
to address the indirect drivers of occupational 
segregation and the limits that it places on women’s 
access to decent work. Tackling gender stereotypes 
about the jobs that women are ‘capable’ of doing 
and that are considered socially ‘appropriate’ are a 
crucial part of this effort.
Education, training and mentoring 
Innovative approaches to education and training 
that challenge stereotypes and are designed to 
reach women and girls throughout their lives have 
an important role to play in addressing occupational 
segregation. For women who are stuck in low-paid, 
informal employment, lack of basic education and 
training can be a major barrier to accessing better 
quality employment. Globally, nearly 800 million 
adults are illiterate and lack numeracy skills, and 
almost two thirds of them are women.123 Some 
groups of women are particularly disadvantaged: 
in Latin America, for example, indigenous women 
are more than twice as likely to be illiterate than 
non-indigenous women.124 Adult and non-formal 
education programmes that support women to 
qualify in more highly-valued occupations are 
essential to enhancing their opportunities in labour 
markets (see story: Making rights real). 
For women working in global value chains as wage 
workers or small producers, opportunities for training 
can help them to access more remunerative activities. 
Such training needs to be carefully designed to take 
into account women’s responsibility for unpaid care 
and domestic work, which makes participating in the 
evenings or weekends difficult, and to ensure that 
women working in temporary roles or as seasonal 
workers in value chains can afford to take part.125  
Programmes that encourage girls to study sciences 
and technical subjects and offer career advice can 
effectively challenge deeply ingrained stereotypes 
that contribute to gender differences in subject 
choices. In Nigeria, for example, the Youth for 
Technology Foundation has established the Young 
Girls Science and Health Tele-Academy, which 
encourages girls to identify real-life challenges in 
their communities and to conduct scientific research 
and adapt engineering techniques to address them. 
More than half of the graduates from the Tele-
Academy have gone on to study science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics (STEM) at university or 
pursue careers in these areas.126 
Young women’s access to TVET programmes can 
also be improved by providing support for their 
unpaid care and family responsibilities. The Joven 
programmes in Latin America have shown positive 
impacts for young women. In Peru, for example, 
the ProJoven programme targeted young women 
and men from poor families living in urban areas, 
providing three months of classroom training and 
internships, with the explicit aim of equipping women 
with skills for traditionally male occupations. Trainees 
received a stipend, with mothers receiving double the 
regular amount to support their participation. After 18 
months, female participants were 15 per cent more 
likely to be employed and they generated 93 per cent 
more labour income compared to non-participants 
with similar backgrounds. Levels of occupational 
segregation were also lower among participants.127 
For women who make it into traditionally male-
dominated occupations, support is needed to prevent 
the ‘leaky pipeline’ effect, whereby women drop out 
before they reach more senior positions. The African 
Women in Agricultural Research and Development 
project, for example, has provided tailored 
fellowships since 2008 to nearly 400 women 
scientists to build their skills and develop leadership 
capacity through mentoring and networking. With 
more women enrolling in agricultural science in 
sub-Saharan Africa, this career development 
programme aims to address the greater drop-out 
rates of women in this field.128 
Targets and quotas
Targets and quotas are another way to break 
down occupational segregation and tackle 
stereotypes. These have been more effective in 
addressing vertical than horizontal segregation, 
since breaking down stereotypes about women’s 
ability to take on management and leadership 
positions—for example, on corporate boards—
is easier than encouraging men to go into 
occupations such as childcare, which have 
traditionally been seen as ‘women’s work’ and 
poorly compensated.
But even where such jobs are relatively decent, 
encouraging men to take up feminized occupations 
can be difficult, as the experience of Norway 
illustrates. A ministerial decree passed there in the 
1990s aimed to increase the representation of men 
among kindergarten staff to 20 per cent.129 By 2010, 
after sustained effort by the Government, around 10 
per cent of these workers were men. Even at this 
low level, the country had the highest proportion 
of male kindergarten workers in Europe.130  
By contrast, Norway introduced a 40 per cent 
quota for women in corporate boards in 2006 that 
was fulfilled within two years.131 This visible success 
has led a number of other countries to follow suit, 
including Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Iceland, Italy, 
Malaysia, the Netherlands and Spain.132 Targets 
and quotas have also been used to increase 
women’s access to decision-making roles in the 
public sector (see section Boosting women’s public 
sector employment, below).
Ending violence in the workplace
By 2014, 125 countries had passed legislation on 
sexual harassment in the workplace (see Annex 
3).133 The scarcity of data on the prevalence 
of violence against women makes it hard to 
assess the impact of such laws, although they 
undoubtedly send an important signal that such 
behaviour in the workplace is unacceptable. 
Ensuring these laws are effectively implemented 
requires employers to invest in workplace 
training of employees and managers, as well as 
awareness-raising on grievance procedures and 
support for women to take cases to court. Training 
has been found to be associated with a change in 
attitudes and increased awareness about sexual 
harassment, particularly among men.134  
Additional measures are needed to ensure that 
women in informal employment are equally 
protected from violence and harassment. Ensuring 
that legislation is drafted broadly to encompass 
a wide range of workplaces, including homes 
where domestic workers are located, and 
includes provisions to support these women’s 
access to justice is critical. Investments in urban 
infrastructure for informal traders such as market 
women can also help to create safe environments 
for women workers (see Box 2.6).
Women comprise 80 per cent of market vendors in Papua New Guinea’s capital, Port Moresby. The 
markets are an important venue for women from the city as well as those from surrounding rural areas 
to sell their goods, generate incomes and develop social networks. However, until recently, the markets 
were not conducive or safe spaces for traders: waste management and water and sanitation facilities 
were virtually non-existent and violence against women was rife. 
BOX 2.6 
Safer marketplaces in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea
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The International Trade Union Congress (ITUC) 
and other trades unions are calling for a new ILO 
convention on gender-based violence to spur 
stronger action on this issue by governments 
and employers. A convention is needed that 
would address all forms of violence and sexual 
harassment in the workplace as well as outline 
measures for employers to support women 
experiencing intimate partner violence. It would 
cover socio-economic and legal issues, access 
to justice, occupational health and safety, 
and education.136 In 2015, with support from 
workers’ groups and some governments, the ILO 
Governing Body will consider putting this issue 
on the agenda of a future International Labour 
Conference.137 
Recommendations
Occupational segregation plays a significant part 
in maintaining and reinforcing women’s socio-
economic disadvantage. This has a direct impact 
on pay and perpetuates the gender pay gap. 
Policies are needed that ensure women have equal 
access to a full range of economic opportunities 
and can make the best use of their talents. 
Governments, trade unions, educational institutions 
and employers need to:  
• Ensure that laws are in place that prohibit 
discrimination against women in hiring, training 
and promotions and repeal laws that restrict 
women’s access to certain occupations
• Enable women’s lifelong access to education, 
training and mentoring, including basic literacy, 
on-the-job training to upgrade their skills and 
training in non-traditional skills to support them 
to move up the occupational ladder 
• Provide career advice and encouragement to 
young women through, for example, mentoring 
to study STEM and other male-dominated 
subjects, as well as improved access to TVET
• Adopt and implement quotas and targets to 
reduce vertical segregation
• Address sexual harassment in the workplace 
through passing and implementing appropriate 
laws as well as through training, awareness-
raising and support to women to access justice
• Galvanize further action by governments and 
employers through a new ILO convention on 
gender-based violence. 
Some 55 per cent of female vendors interviewed in 2011 said they had experienced some form of 
violence in the markets and 22 per cent spoke of incidents of sexual violence. Most women did not report 
these crimes or seek justice. Women were also targeted for extortion, where they were forced to make 
payments in return for security or safekeeping and storage of produce. Police and security personnel 
often lacked training and in some cases were themselves implicated in the violence.
The Port Moresby Safe City Free from Violence against Women and Girls Programme is implemented 
by UN Women and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat) in partnership with the 
local authority, the police, women’s organizations, vendors and customers.135 It focuses on making the 
city’s markets safe for all who use them. 
Local market bylaws now include articles that address women’s safety. Women vendors are returning 
to the markets following a first phase of infrastructure improvement. A targeted public awareness 
campaign on sexual harassment and sexual violence has been developed. One innovation of the 
programme has been a partnership between the National Capital District Commission (NCDC) and 
financial institutions to enable the collection of market fees via the use of mobile phone technology. This 
reduces women’s exposure to extortion and improves revenue collection by the NCDC.
CLOSING GENDER PAY GAPS
Persistent gender pay gaps are a feature of almost 
all labour markets.138 Globally, women on average 
are paid 24 per cent less than men. At the regional 
level, the pay gap ranges from 33 per cent in 
South Asia to 14 per cent in the Middle East and 
North Africa. In this region, relatively few women 
are employed, but those that are tend to be highly 
educated and in well-paid jobs, which accounts for 
the lower gender pay gap (Annex 4). Since gender 
pay gaps can only be calculated reliably for those 
in wage employment, these global and regional 
figures understate the real extent of earnings 
differentials in developing countries where self-
employment is prevalent.139 Gender pay gaps 
and women’s lower labour force participation, 
result in large cumulative gaps in lifetime income 
between women and men (see Box 2.4). They also 
contribute to women’s disadvantage in pension 
income in later life (see Chapter 3). 
Gender pay gaps: Progress and regress
Overall, gender pay gaps have narrowed slightly 
in the last decade, declining between 2000 and 
2010 in 45 out of 50 countries with available data 
(see Figure 2.9). But the pace of change has been 
slow and large gaps remain in most countries. 
In Australia, Colombia, Finland, Mongolia and 
Paraguay gender pay gaps have actually widened.
Source: UN Women calculations using nominal wage data from ILO 2015b and Consumer Price Index data from World Bank 2015d.
Note: Wage data used for this analysis refers to mean earnings of employees, and includes remuneration made in cash and in-kind for time worked, work done and paid leave.  
Figure 2.9
Unadjusted gender pay gap (GPG), 2000 and 2010 
 Gender pay gaps have narrowed in most countries, but sometimes in the context of declining wages for men
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For those countries where gender pay gaps have 
narrowed, it is important to look at why: is this 
happening in a context of overall wage growth, 
where women are catching up with men? Or is 
it happening in a context of declining wages, 
where living standards are falling for everyone? 
Figure 2.9 suggests a mixed picture. 
Out of the 45 countries where gender pay gaps 
have declined, 32 have seen unequivocally 
positive change, with an overall increase in 
real wages and a narrowing gender pay gap, 
meaning that women’s wages have grown faster 
than men’s. This has been the case, for example, 
in Brazil, Malta, Nepal and Ukraine. Meanwhile, 
in five countries gender gaps have narrowed in 
a context of falling real wages for both women 
and men. In these cases, gaps have narrowed 
only because men’s wages have fallen more 
dramatically than women’s. This pattern—which 
prevails in Egypt, El Salvador, Hong Kong (SAR 
China), Panama and Sri Lanka —can hardly be 
considered progress, because instead of women 
catching up there is a levelling down for all.140 
In the six remaining countries, the gender pay gap 
has narrowed in the context of rising real wages for 
women and falling or stagnating wages for men. 
This is the case in Austria, Honduras, Israel, Japan, 
Mexico and the State of Palestine, where women 
have been gaining some ground in terms of their 
pay while men have lost out. 
The deterioration of men’s wages is particularly 
marked for those on low incomes. In developed 
countries, the disappearance of manufacturing 
jobs due to technological progress and the 
decline of traditional industries, coupled with 
the reduced influence of organized labour, has 
led to downward pressure on the wages of less 
educated male workers.141 In developing countries, 
globalization and trade liberalization have 
increased skill-premiums for a minority of highly 
educated workers. But for the majority of lower-
skilled workers, greater capital mobility, declining 
unionization and lack of regulation have kept 
earnings at low levels.142  
‘Glass ceilings’ and ‘sticky floors’: 
variations in gender pay gaps
The largest gender pay gaps are usually found at 
the top of the wage distribution—the ‘glass ceiling’ 
for highly skilled women workers—and at the 
bottom—the ‘sticky floor’ for women working in the 
lowest paid jobs.143 As a corollary, gender pay gaps 
tend to be larger in countries where the overall 
distribution of wages is more unequal. In the OECD, 
for example, gender pay gaps are smaller in the 
Nordic countries where overall wage inequalities 
(or wage dispersion) are lower.144  
In a study of 26 European countries, a glass ceiling 
was found in 11 countries and a sticky floor in 12. 
In three countries—Germany, the Netherlands 
and Norway—women at both ends of the wage 
distribution faced large gender pay gaps.145 
Similar patterns are found in many developing 
regions if education is taken as a proxy for 
socio-economic status. Gender pay gaps tend to 
be large for workers without education but are 
even larger for those with secondary and post-
secondary education.146 They are also often wider 
in informal compared to formal employment. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the gender pay 
gap is 28 per cent in informal employment, where 
the majority of women work, compared to 6 per 
cent for formal workers.147   
With regard to rural-urban differences, gender 
pay gaps are sometimes wider in urban areas. 
This may be because employment options in rural 
areas for both women and men are quite limited 
and low paid across the board, while urban areas 
may offer a wider range of work opportunities, 
albeit with greater pay differentials.148 For 
example, in South Asia, urban women earn 42 
per cent less than their male counterparts; while 
rural women earn 28 per cent less than rural 
men. Both women and men have lower than 
average earnings in rural areas and, in absolute 
terms, rural women are at the bottom of the 
earnings ladder.149 In parts of Latin America, 
gender pay gaps are compounded by ethnicity, 
resulting in indigenous women being particularly 
disadvantaged.150  
Causes of gender pay gaps 
In looking for the causes of gender pay gaps, 
standard economic analyses often attempt 
to isolate direct or ‘pure’ discrimination by 
controlling for a host of factors that influence 
women’s and men’s pay, including education 
and work experience. While ‘pure’ discrimination 
is associated with employers who deliberately 
choose to pay women less than men for the same 
jobs, other components of the gender pay gap 
are often attributed to gendered preferences 
(i.e., women ‘preferring’ jobs in less remunerative 
sectors) or choices (i.e., women acquiring less work 
experience because they ‘choose’ to take time off 
to care for dependents).151  
However, this idea is questionable, because 
educational achievements, career ‘choices’ and 
employment trajectories are themselves shaped 
by an environment that assigns the bulk of unpaid 
care and domestic work to women and stereotypes 
that cluster women into undervalued occupations.152 
An emphasis on ‘pure’ discrimination therefore 
ignores all forms of indirect discrimination that 
women experience over their life course.
The subjects that women study (e.g., humanities, 
health and social work) are undervalued 
compared to the ones that men choose (e.g., 
engineering, science and agriculture) even though 
societies need teachers and nurses just as much as 
they need scientists and engineers. As discussed in 
the previous section, differences in subject choices 
in turn lead to occupational segregation, which is 
a major cause of the gender pay gap: in 33 low- 
and middle-income countries, gender differences 
in occupation and sector of employment account 
for 10–50 per cent of the observed gender pay 
gap.153 Research in the United States has found that 
where occupational segregation declined, so did 
gender pay gaps.154 The two phenomena are hence 
intimately linked.
Parenthood and marriage also impose a pay 
penalty on women while they award a bonus to 
men. In the United Kingdom and the United States, 
for example, as much as 40 to 50 per cent of the 
gender gap in pay can be attributed to parenthood 
and marriage. In both countries, while the overall 
gender pay gap has been narrowing overall, the 
parenthood pay gap is increasing.155 In the United 
States, unmarried women earn 96 cents to an 
unmarried man’s dollar, but married women with 
at least one child earn 76 cents to the married 
father’s dollar.156 In sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, the presence of children in the household is 
associated with gender pay gaps of 31 per cent 
and 35 per cent, respectively, compared to 4 per 
cent and 14 per cent for women living in households 
without children.157 
Closing gender pay gaps 
Addressing gender pay gaps requires a range of 
interventions that address both ‘pure’ and indirect 
discrimination. Family-friendly policies are shown 
to reduce the gender pay gap in EU countries, with 
a stronger impact on the ‘glass ceiling’, than on 
the ‘sticky floor’.158 Where workers are organized, 
collective bargaining agreements help to reduce 
wage dispersion and inequality and can therefore 
narrow gender disparities in pay.159  
One avenue that has been widely pursued is equal 
pay legislation, which has in some cases been 
enforced through the courts (see Box 2.7). Given 
the extent of occupational segregation, laws 
should specify equal pay for work of equal value 
rather than only applying to situations where 
women and men are doing exactly the same 
job, which are rare. However, assessing what 
constitutes work of equal value is a complex task, 
especially when women’s work is systematically 
undervalued.160 
In many European countries where equal pay 
legislation has been in place for several decades, 
but where gender pay gaps have remained 
stubbornly persistent, policy makers have made 
additional provisions to spur action by employers 
in the public and private sectors. For example, in 
Germany, the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, 
Senior Citizens, Women and Youth has developed a 
tool called Logib-D to help companies analyse pay 
and staffing structures to determine the existence 
and extent of gender pay gaps. Tailored packages 
of support are available to companies to help 
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them to reduce any gaps found. Logib-D is now 
available in the Czech Republic, Israel, Luxembourg 
and Switzerland.167 Recognizing that equal pay 
legislation, even where it is well implemented, is 
not enough on its own, the German Government 
has also introduced new family-friendly policies to 
support employed women. 
Minimum wages
Minimum wages play an essential part in 
addressing low pay, reducing inequality and 
narrowing gender pay gaps. Women tend to be 
over-represented in low-paid work: in 22 out of 
34 countries with data, women are more likely 
than men to be in low-paid jobs.168 As a result, 
they stand to gain the most from minimum wages, 
which are crucial for redressing their socio-
economic disadvantage and realizing their right to 
an adequate standard of living.
In OECD countries, the presence of a minimum 
wage, set at a relatively high level, reduces the risk 
of women being in low-paid work, and narrows 
the gender pay gap. The gender pay gap is 6 per 
cent in countries with a statutory minimum wage 
set at 40 per cent of median wages or above, 10 
percentage points lower than the average gender 
pay gap for OECD countries.169 In Brazil, the 
doubling of the minimum wage in the 2000s has 
been associated with a narrowing of the gender 
pay gap (see Box 2.2). A study on India estimated 
that if the minimum wage was extended to all 
wage earners, the gender pay gap would decline 
from 16 to 10 per cent for salaried workers and 
from 26 to 8 per cent for casual workers.170  
Of 151 countries with data, only around half have 
a comprehensive minimum wage system that is 
applied uniformly on a national or regional basis, 
Unison is the United Kingdom’s largest public sector union, representing 1.3 million workers, two thirds 
of them women. In 2013, it reached a groundbreaking equal pay agreement with Birmingham City 
Council, directly benefiting approximately 11,000 women council workers.161 It claimed that the Council 
had systematically discriminated against women working as cooks, cleaners and care assistants, paying 
them less in bonuses and benefits than male colleagues doing equivalent jobs as road cleaners and 
refuse collectors. Initially the Council argued that the time limit for taking the case had expired. So, in 
2012, the workers took the case to the UK Supreme Court, which ruled that the case should be heard in 
the civil courts rather than in an employment tribunal, giving them a time limit of six years rather than six 
months to bring their claim.162 As a result of this ruling, which has far-reaching implications for workers 
seeking redress for gender-based pay inequality in other sectors, Birmingham City Council agreed to 
settle the claim, costing an estimated $1.8 billion.163 
Between 2010 and 2012, in a historic case on equal pay initiated by the Australian Services Union, the 
Government’s employment ombudsman, Fair Work Australia (FWA), ruled in favour of 150,000 workers 
in the social and community services sector. FWA decided that gender had been an important factor in 
undervaluing the sector’s largely feminized workforce, which provides services to vulnerable children, 
sick and older people, disabled people, refugees and survivors of violence.164 As a result of the case, it 
was agreed that workers would receive pay increases of between 23 and 45 per cent over eight years, 
for which the Federal Government committed around $1.8 billion.165 Unions hope the case will help 
establish an equal pay standard in other industries.166  
BOX 2.7 
Unions fight for equal pay for work of equal value
while the rest have multiple minimum wages that 
are set by industry or occupation.171 Fears that 
minimum wages might dampen employment 
creation have largely proven to be unfounded.172  
Instead, by increasing the incomes of the poorest 
workers, minimum wages can help to support 
aggregate demand, thereby stimulating investment 
and creating stronger economies.173 
Whether the benefits of minimum wages are realized 
depends on the extent of compliance, which varies 
widely across countries. Uniform minimum wages 
are generally easier to enforce, but in all cases clear 
information for employers and workers, rigorous 
labour inspection and sanctions are needed.174 The 
level of minimum wages should also be regularly 
reviewed to ensure that wages increase at least in line 
with inflation so that they retain their real value.
In some cases, minimum wage legislation covers 
informal employment, where the majority of women 
workers are concentrated. Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico 
and Peru have minimum wage legislation for all 
workers, irrespective of the sector or the status of 
the enterprises that employ them.175 Chile, Portugal 
and Trinidad and Tobago, are among the countries 
that have recently extended national minimum 
wages to domestic workers who are often informally 
employed.176  
In South Africa, where 15 per cent of working women 
are paid domestic workers,177 a 2002 law established 
a minimum wage for domestic workers and 
mandated an 8 per cent wage increase for that year. 
The combined effect of these measures, evaluated 
16 months after their introduction, was a 20 per cent 
increase in the wages of domestic workers.178 Even in 
countries where informal workers are not covered by 
minimum wage legislation, they are able to use it as a 
way to negotiate better pay (the so-called ‘lighthouse 
effect’). In one study, average earnings of informal 
workers increased in 8 out of 11 countries analysed 
following the introduction of minimum wages—for 
example, by 15 per cent in Mali and by 7 per cent in 
Peru.179  
In developing countries with high seasonal 
unemployment peaks, employment guarantee 
programmes can help raise wage levels by 
guaranteeing a certain amount of work at a set rate 
of pay, so that poor women and men are not forced 
to take work under exploitative conditions (see 
Chapter 3). 
Valuing paid care work
Paid care work, including domestic work, childcare, 
early childhood education, teaching, nursing and 
social work, are highly feminized occupations. 
Despite widespread acceptance of the essential 
role of care work, the skills required for it are 
often devalued, contributing to women’s over-
representation among low-paid workers and the 
persistence of gender pay gaps.180  
A recent study of 12 developed and developing 
countries finds that paid care work often entails 
a ‘wage penalty’, meaning that care workers are 
not adequately compensated for their skills and 
experience in comparison to other workers.181 In 
common with other ‘public goods’, caregiving 
tends to be undervalued and underpaid by the 
market.182 Those requiring care such as children, 
the elderly, sick people or those with disabilities 
are often least able to afford to pay for the true 
costs of quality care services. Women, as the 
majority of care providers, end up subsidizing 
these costs through their underpaid labour. 
Legal action can be taken to tackle the issue 
of how to properly value paid care work (see 
Box 2.7).183 However, it should not be left to the 
courts to take action in this area. The same 12 
country study found that the undervaluation of 
paid care work is not inevitable and depends on 
the policy context. In countries with low levels of 
income inequality, high levels of union density 
and generous public spending on care, paid care 
workers do not suffer a pay penalty.184 Public 
policies are therefore needed to ensure that care 
providers are properly remunerated for their 
work. 
Equally important is adequate regulation of care 
work and training for workers, to maintain and 
upgrade their skills on a regular basis. These 
measures also support the recruitment and 
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retention of staff and are essential for maintaining 
the quality of care services, with benefits for workers 
as well as those in their care.185 
Recommendations
Rising levels of education for women have not 
consistently led to narrowing of gender pay gaps, 
which have also been resistant to equal pay 
legislation. Additional measures are needed. To 
address gender inequality in pay, governments, 
employers and trade unions need to: 
• Implement well-designed national minimum 
wage policies, set at an adequate level, 
which apply to all workers and are rigorously 
implemented through labour inspection and 
sanctions 
• Reverse the systematic undervaluation of paid 
care work through the provision of well paid, 
protected public sector care jobs, by working 
with employers to improve regulation and 
standards in the care industry and by investing 
in professional skills and training for care 
workers
• Protect the space for, and enable, collective 
bargaining over pay and conditions, which 
is proven to reduce wage dispersion and 
inequality 
• Ensure that equal pay laws are implemented 
through initiatives to encourage public and 
private companies to be more transparent and 
accountable for their pay structures.
PRIORITY ARENAS TO PROMOTE 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY AT WORK 
The vast majority of women workers in developing 
countries are employed, or self-employed, in 
informal work. Measures to make informal 
employment more economically viable and 
protected are therefore a priority for tackling 
women’s socio-economic disadvantage and 
advancing substantive equality. This requires 
a multi-faceted approach that considers the 
specific problems of women in different parts of 
the informal economy, in addition to the broader 
measures outlined in the previous section. 
Labour market interventions such as minimum 
wages can be extended and enforced for some 
women informal workers, such as those working 
in domestic service or small export-oriented 
production units. These policies may not, however, 
reach self-employed workers such as street 
vendors, who will benefit more from the provision 
of safe and sanitary spaces for marketing their 
goods. A different set of measures, again, are 
needed to improve women’s rural livelihoods, 
with a particular focus on enabling secure access 
to land, extension services and markets for their 
products. 
Policy action should also prioritize creating 
decent work in the public sector as a means to 
advance substantive equality for women. Well-
remunerated, secure public sector work has 
the potential to generate a double dividend by 
boosting women’s employment and extending 
access to services that reduce women’s unpaid 
care and domestic work. The following sections look 
at each of these arenas for action in greater detail. 
WOMEN IN INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT 
Realizing women’s rights at work—a key component 
of substantive equality—requires that women can 
access employment with decent pay, safe working 
conditions and social protection. However, in large 
parts of the world, employment does not meet these 
criteria. Informal work is the norm in developing 
countries, in both rural and urban areas.186 In South 
Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and East and South-East 
Asia (excluding China), more than 75 per cent of 
all jobs are informal (see Figure 2.10). The poor 
pay and conditions that characterize informal 
employment mean that these workers are more 
likely to live in poverty than formal workers.187  
Informal workers include those who are self-
employed—such as street vendors and petty traders 
in goods (food, small consumer items) or services 
(hairdressing, tailoring)—as well as subsistence 
farmers, who grow enough food for their families 
and perhaps a little extra to sell or exchange. But 
informal work also includes waged workers in 
domestic or seasonal agricultural work, as well as 
subcontracted industrial outworkers who work from 
their homes or small workshops. 
One of the most vulnerable forms of informal 
employment is contributing family work. Globally, 
women are 63 per cent of these workers, who are 
employed without direct pay in family businesses or 
farms (see Box 2.3).188 This limits their autonomy and 
decision-making role within the household, as well 
as their empowerment more broadly.189  
How widespread is informal employment?
Three quarters of the world’s poor people live 
and work in rural areas.190 Most derive their 
livelihoods through agricultural work, which 
is almost always informal.191 Figure 2.10 shows 
that in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, 
where agriculture remains a major employer, 
71 per cent and 59 per cent of employed 
women, respectively, are in informal agricultural 
employment, usually as small-scale farmers, 
compared to 47 per cent and 56 per cent of men. 
In East and South-East Asia (excluding China), 
one third of employed women and men are 
in informal agricultural self-employment.192 
Informal wage employment in agriculture is 
particularly important for women in South Asia, 
where out-migration means that tasks previously 
performed by men—such as land preparation, 
crop cultivation, spraying pesticides, harvesting, 
post-harvesting and marketing of produce—
are now performed by women, but for lower 
wages.193 
Gendered hierarchies within informal 
employment mean that men dominate in the 
more protected and remunerative jobs at the 
top (i.e., informal employers and informal wage 
workers), while women are over-represented 
among the least secure and lowest-paying 
occupations at the bottom (i.e., industrial 
outworkers/homeworkers and contributing 
family workers), as illustrated in Figure 2.11.194 
In South Asia, for example, 64 per cent of 
women compared to 54 per cent of men are 
self-employed, while 36 per cent of men are 
in informal wage employment compared to 31 
per cent of women. Even among informal self-
employed workers, women tend to be clustered 
in less remunerative activities. In waste-picking, 
for example, men usually collect the higher value 
scrap metal, while women collect less valuable 
plastics and cardboard.195 This segmentation 
contributes to the wide gender pay gaps 
discussed above.196
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Figure 2.10
Informal employment, as a share of total employment, by type and sex, 2004–2010  
 Up to 95 per cent of women’s employment is informal in Developing Regions
Source: UN Women calculations using data in Tables 2 and 4 in Vanek et al. 2014. 
Note: Estimates for East and South-East Asia (ESA) exclude China. The Middle East and North Africa is excluded due to lack of data for these different categories. Given that agricultural 
employment almost always lacks social protection, these calculations assume that all agricultural employment in developing countries is informal. 
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In Developed Regions, informal employment is 
often referred to as non-standard or atypical 
employment. These insecure forms of work, in 
which women are over-represented, tend to be 
own-account, temporary or on-call arrangements 
that can deprive workers of the protection 
offered by full-time regular employment.197 In 
OECD countries, women constitute 44 per cent of 
those employed overall but two thirds of workers 
on involuntary temporary contracts.198 There is 
evidence that since the economic crisis, levels of 
informal employment have been on the rise in 
some of these countries. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, most of the rise in total employment 
since 2008 is in low paid self-employment, 
with women accounting for 54 per cent of the 
increase.199 Women in this kind of employment 
earn on average just 35 per cent of median 
annual earnings in the United Kingdom, and 
42 per cent less than men in the same kind of 
employment.200 
Trends in informal employment 
Establishing trends for informal employment 
is challenging: the concept itself has evolved 
and data are not systematically collected for all 
countries over time.201 However, recent research 
on ‘unprotected’ employment—which shares 
many of the same characteristics as informal 
employment—points to a decline for both women 
and men between 2000 and 2010 (see Figure 
2.12). In two countries (Ecuador and Ethiopia), 
Figure 2.11
Segmentation of informal employment by average earnings and sex 
 Within informal employment, women are concentrated in the least secure and lowest paid jobs
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Figure 2.12
Proportion of women and men in ‘unprotected’ employment over the past decade (as a percentage of total non-
agricultural employment), around 2000 and 2010 
 In spite of declines in some countries, ‘unprotected’ jobs make up a large proportion of employment
Source: Raveendran 2014; Comblon et al. 2014; Dong et al. 2014; Gammage et al. 2014 a, b; Gammage and Kraft 2014; Said, Petrovich and Khalil 2014; Kedir 2014.
Note: Values reflect variables available in individual surveys. They are not comparable across countries and may not in some cases be comparable to official country estimates that follow the 
ICLS definition of informality.205 See endnote for definitions.
women’s rates of ‘unprotected’ employment have 
declined faster than those of men. By contrast, 
in China, Egypt and Mexico, the proportion of 
men in unprotected employment has declined 
faster than that of women. In Brazil, similar 
declines were observed for women and men. In 
Cameroon, India and Mali, where over 90 per 
cent of workers are in ‘unprotected’ employment, 
this share has changed very little for either 
women or men.202
Declining rates of ‘unprotected’ employment are a 
sign of progress. However, they have not kept pace 
with increases in the labour force, with the result 
that the absolute number of people in ‘unprotected’ 
employment continues to rise.203 In Egypt, for 
example, despite a reduction in ‘unprotected’ 
employment by 4 percentage points for women and 
10 percentage points for men between 1998 and 
2012, the actual number of women and men in this 
kind of work increased by 750,000 and 1 million, 
respectively.204  
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Extending rights at work for paid domestic 
workers
Alongside macroeconomic policies to generate 
more and better jobs (explored in Chapter 4), 
concrete measures are needed to extend social 
protection to informal workers and to regulate 
informal work to enhance the enjoyment of basic 
labour rights for these workers.
Paid domestic work is a very important and 
expanding source of wage employment for 
women, but the majority of it is informal and 
poor quality. As of 2010, there were 53 million 
domestic workers worldwide, an increase of 
almost 20 million since 1995. The overwhelming 
majority, 83 per cent, are women.206 According to 
the ILO, there are also nearly 12 million girls aged 
5–17 in paid domestic work.207 Domestic workers 
carry out their duties in the private homes of their 
employer, with whom they are in a subordinate 
and dependent relationship, and may experience 
psychological and physical abuse by the 
employer or family members.208 
About 30 per cent of domestic workers are 
currently excluded from national labour 
legislation, 43 per cent are not covered by 
minimum wage legislation and 36 per cent are 
not entitled to maternity protection.209 Migrant 
domestic workers are especially marginalized, 
frequently lacking support and protection under 
the law in both sending and receiving countries. 
For example, labour law does not cover migrant 
domestic workers in the majority of countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa. These workers, 
mostly women, make up between one quarter 
and one third of an estimated 22 million migrant 
workers in these countries.210  
Migrant domestic workers are particularly 
vulnerable to abuse because of their dependence 
on recruitment agencies and lack of reliable 
information on migration procedures. Once in 
the receiving country, they have limited freedom 
to change employers, because they often 
withhold travel and identity documents. In cases 
of abuse, these workers lack access to effective 
redress mechanisms.211  
ILO Convention 189: A victory for domestic 
workers worldwide
Thanks largely to the efforts of domestic worker 
organizations, global and national policy 
makers have begun to focus on how to improve 
the quality of this employment. These efforts 
culminated in 2011, in the adoption of the ILO 
Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189). The 
convention requires States to extend basic labour 
rights to domestic workers, such as normal hours 
of work with regular periods of rest, overtime 
compensation, annual paid leave, minimum 
wages, a safe and healthy working environment 
and social security benefits.212 To date, 17 
countries have ratified the convention.213 
In several countries, policy change was already 
underway. In the state of New York in the United 
States, the National Domestic Workers Alliance 
was successful in campaigning for one of the 
most progressive bills of rights for these workers 
in the world (see story: On the books). 
Implementation of these improved labour 
standards for domestic workers remains a 
major challenge. Model contracts, effective 
labour inspection and improved access 
to justice are priority measures to support 
compliance. For example, in South Africa 
since 2003, employers are required to register 
domestic workers and make social security 
contributions for them. By 2008, over 633,000 
domestic workers had been registered with the 
Unemployed Insurance Fund.214 Compliance 
is enforced through regular inspections as 
well as sanctions. In the event of a dispute, 
domestic workers can access the Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration.215 
In a similar vein, under its Migrant Workers Act 
of 1995, the Philippines established a fund to 
enable migrant workers to access legal services 
in cases of violations or disputes, including with 
employers.216 
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Increasing the viability of women’s urban 
self-employment 
Self-employment makes up the majority of 
informal employment for women in urban and 
rural areas. But policy frameworks either overlook 
these workers or in some cases make it harder for 
them to make a decent living. Constraints on the 
productivity of the informally self-employed are 
rarely visible to urban planners and policy makers. 
For example, homeworkers absorb many 
non-wage costs to provide the workplace, 
equipment, power and transport needed to 
make their products. Street vendors need reliable 
services such as electricity and transportation 
to marketplaces for timely sale of their goods. 
Without access to finance, it is difficult for self-
employed workers to keep their businesses afloat. 
Even basic infrastructure is lacking and women’s 
needs are often overlooked. For example, in 2013, 
the three municipal bodies of New Delhi, India, 
admitted to the High Court that they had 3,712 
public toilets for men and only 269 for women.217 
The lack of facilities affects the health of female 
street vendors, and many suffer from kidney 
ailments as a result.218 
To improve working conditions for urban 
self-employed women and help make these 
precarious forms of employment more viable, 
action is required at municipal, regional 
and national levels to provide services and 
infrastructure, legally recognize informal workers, 
introduce occupational health and safety 
measures and provide access to finance. Urban 
planners need to consider the needs of informally 
self-employed workers and understand the home 
and the street as sites of production and trade 
(see Box 2.8).219 These measures are not typically 
understood as labour market policies but have the 
potential to make a huge difference to informal 
women workers and their families.    
Women are a high proportion of India’s 10 million urban street vendors. In March 2014, the Indian 
Parliament signed into law the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) 
Act, after decades of struggle by members of the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) and the 
National Association of Street Vendors of India (NASVI), including a four-day hunger strike.220  
This law recognizes that street vendors have a positive role to play in generating employment. It seeks to 
balance vendors’ right to work with the need to prevent urban overcrowding and unsanitary conditions, 
and to establish legal status for vendors to protect them from the harassment that they often face from 
police and the authorities. 
The law mandates the involvement of street vendors in local government planning processes through 
their participation in Town Vending Committees alongside local government representatives, non-
governmental organizations and community organizations. The Committees oversee surveys of vendors, 
issue certificates of vending and recommend regulations. The Act also includes a dispute resolution 
mechanism to resolve grievances and disputes brought by street vendors.221 
BOX 2.8 
Involving informal workers in local and municipal planning in India
For example, the legal and regulatory framework is 
important for waste pickers, who rely on access to 
waste, at dumpsites, collection points, or by going 
door-to-door. As waste management and recycling 
have become big business, however, waste pickers 
and their associations often cannot meet the stringent 
requirements of tendering processes for large 
municipal contracts. 
Change has often come about in response to 
mobilizations by informal workers’ movements, which 
have had some important successes in recent years in 
negotiating collectively for better terms of engagement 
with state and market actors.222 After years of 
advocacy by Colombian waste pickers, the country’s 
Constitutional Court ruled in 2011 that those in Bogota 
must be included in municipal sanitation planning. 
Bogota’s waste pickers were subsequently recognized 
as public service providers and, as of March 2013, are 
paid by the city for the materials that they collect at 
fixed rates specified in formal contracts.223  
Improving health and safety for informal 
workers
Poor and dangerous working conditions are a 
daily fact of life for millions of workers worldwide. 
The impact of such conditions was tragically 
demonstrated in the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster, in 
which more than 3,600 workers were killed or injured 
when an eight-storey factory collapsed in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh (see story: Out of the ashes). 
Self-employed informal workers also face serious 
hazards in the course of their daily work. A street 
vendor works on a busy street, exposed to noise, 
traffic fumes, the sun and the rain.224 She may face 
eviction from the street or market, and this may 
be accompanied by violence from the authorities. 
The biggest risk for vendors in closed markets is 
fire that can destroy livelihoods. A self-employed 
homeworker operating out of her own home may 
work with poor ventilation, inadequate lighting and 
unsuitable working equipment. 
None of these occupational sectors and places 
of work is covered by rules and regulations on 
occupational health and safety (OHS, sometimes 
called environmental health and safety).225 Local 
government also has a major role in the health and 
safety of workers in both private homes and public 
places through its responsibilities for and spending 
on basic infrastructure such as water, sanitation, fire 
services and lighting. 
A Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and 
Organizing (WIEGO) action-research project in 
five countries integrates informal workers and their 
workplaces in the discipline and practice of OHS.226 
Among other strategies, the project supports 
collaborations between ergonomic designers 
and organizations of women informal workers to 
produce improved equipment such as carts, gloves 
and sorting sticks for waste pickers. The initiative 
has shown the short-term effectiveness of workers’ 
engagement in city dialogues on specific issues 
such as unblocking gutters and reducing fire risk. In 
the longer term, the challenge is to institutionalize 
permanent platforms for fair negotiations between 
city authorities and informal workers, in the interest 
of both better city management and more secure 
and safer working spaces. 
Access to finance for self-employed women
Access to financial services, including credit, loans 
and savings, is vital for low-income women but is 
rarely available to them. These services can help 
households to cope with economic shocks arising 
from unexpected expenses—for example, for 
health care, school fees or funeral costs. For self-
employed people, and especially women, access 
to credit can also be an essential pre-condition for 
their work. A survey of street vendors found that 
only 37 per cent of women were able to use their 
own capital to start up their businesses, compared 
to 68 per cent of men.227 As well as start-up costs, 
vendors rely on being able to access working 
capital on a daily basis, since the small profits that 
they generate each day are often insufficient to 
cover the cost of buying more stock the following 
day.228 As discussed in the next section, small-scale 
farmers also need access to financial services 
to be able to buy seeds and fertilizers, invest in 
equipment and so on.
Mainstream commercial banks are generally 
unwilling to engage with poor workers due to the 
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costs and risks involved in administering small 
loans. As a result, workers rely on exploitative 
moneylenders or suppliers who sell on credit 
at highly unfavourable rates. In response to the 
problem of financial exclusion, microfinance 
institutions have sprung up over the past few 
decades and have expanded rapidly in developing 
countries. Women tend to make up the majority of 
borrowers due to their perceived greater reliability 
in repaying the loans.229 However, experience 
has shown that the lending practices of many 
microfinance institutions, particularly those that 
are ‘for-profit’ and poorly regulated, can in fact 
increase women’s economic vulnerability and push 
households further into debt.230  
Access to microfinance can support women’s 
economic security when it is provided by civil 
society organizations as part of a holistic approach 
to extending opportunities and rights. A number of 
organizations of informal self-employed workers 
provide small loans and savings schemes as part 
of a wider package of support to their members. 
Examples include Didi Bahini Sewa Samaj in 
Nepal, which organizes home-based workers, 
providing training, access to markets and interest-
free loans that do not require collateral.231 However, 
even well-designed microfinance should not be a 
replacement for extending the reach of institutional 
finance. A set of inclusive financial institutions is 
needed such as credit cooperatives and local 
development and community banks. These need to 
be regulated and incentivized through subsidies to 
ensure that they are accessible to poor women and 
the micro-enterprises on which they depend.232 
Recommendations 
Policies to redress women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage must aim to increase the returns to 
informal work, improve working conditions and 
eliminate the violence and abuse these workers 
face. Domestic workers must be protected by the 
full range of labour laws. Including women informal 
workers in urban planning and decision-making can 
help boost their agency, voice and participation and 
ensure that city environments support rather than 
undermine their work. Priorities for public action 
include:
• Extend social protection measures such as 
health care and pension schemes to women in 
informal employment (see Chapter 3)
• Ratify ILO Convention 189 to recognize the 
rights of domestic workers to decent working 
conditions, adequate pay, freedom from 
violence and abuse, and access to social 
protection
• Broaden the scope of occupational health and 
safety regulations to include informal workers, 
recognizing the particular hazards that women 
face as homeworkers, street vendors and 
waste-pickers
• Invest in urban and rural infrastructure such as 
electricity, water and sanitation, and transport, 
as well as safe marketplaces with secure 
storage facilities
• Facilitate access to financial services for women 
informal workers, including credit and savings.
INCREASING RETURNS TO WOMEN’S 
SMALL-SCALE FARMING
The viability of rural livelihoods in developing 
countries has been under pressure since the early 
1980s.233 Structural adjustment policies led to 
the scaling back of state support for agriculture 
in many countries, including in the provision of 
marketing, credit, inputs and extension services, 
as well as investment in infrastructure, irrigation 
and research. Development aid for agriculture 
also declined during this period. Private traders 
and credit providers have not filled the gap left 
by state withdrawal, with poor farmers and those 
in remote areas particularly affected.234  
In recent years, rising and volatile global food 
prices, in part driven by financial speculation, 
as well as the large-scale dispossession of 
agricultural land have combined to produce 
adverse outcomes for poor and marginalized 
farmers, especially women (see Box 2.9).235 
Climate change has also impacted negatively on 
agricultural production and prices, compounding 
the problems faced by poor people living in 
rural areas.236 As a result of these factors, some 
governments, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, 
are beginning to recognize the need to take a 
more active role in the governance of markets in 
rural areas and in the provision of support to the 
agricultural sector. In some cases, these efforts 
have specifically focused on supporting small-scale 
farmers, including women.237 
Given the importance of women’s agricultural 
employment in rural areas, policies to make small-
scale farming more productive and viable are 
essential for redressing women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage in agrarian settings. Investments in 
rural infrastructure, including water and sanitation, 
and social services, such as health care, are also 
needed (see Chapter 3). In addition, secure land 
rights, bolstered by changes to marital property 
regimes are needed. Greatly improved access to 
agricultural inputs, services and markets to increase 
the returns to women’s farming activities, should 
also be priorities. Support to women’s collective 
action and public procurement programmes can 
be instrumental to increasing women’s access to 
markets. 
The expansion of oil palm plantations has been a major cause of land dispossession and deforestation 
in South-East Asia since the 1980s, but the recent boom in biofuels has accelerated the trend.238 Millions 
of hectares of forest have been cleared in Indonesia, land that is typically held under customary tenure 
by rural populations who depend on it for their livelihoods but whose claims are not recognized by the 
state.239  
In the Hibun Dayak community in West Kalimantan, the provincial government granted long-term land 
use concessions to private companies for oil palm plantations. Compensation schemes for dispossessed 
villagers involved incorporating them as contract farmers, or ‘out-growers’, on small plots surrounding 
the main plantation and on highly unfavourable terms. 
Before the concessions were granted, customary norms specified no gender differentiation in 
inheritance rights for individually owned land: whichever child cared for the parents inherited the most 
land. The State’s compensation system undermined the property rights that women had previously 
enjoyed. Only ‘household heads’ were registered as out-growers and, as a result, just 6 out of 98 of the 
contract farmers were women (who were either divorced or widowed). 
The effects on gender relations have been profound. Before the plantations there was a relatively 
balanced division of labour between women and men in subsistence and cash-crop production. 
Afterwards, women became responsible for the most labour-intensive work, such as maintaining the 
trees, on land they had no control over. This led to escalating domestic conflict over the control of oil 
palm income and an increase in violence against women. Women’s reproductive work was also placed 
under strain by the enclosure of common property resources: various kinds of local fruit and vegetables 
that were part of the local diet became scarce, and raw materials for craft production were lost when 
the forests were destroyed. 
BOX 2.9 
Impacts of land dispossession on women in Indonesia
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Increasing women’s access to and control 
over land
Women face systematic disadvantage in land 
rights because of laws, customs and norms that 
either exclude them from tenure or ownership or 
make their rights contingent on the relationship 
with a male relative or spouse. This has particular 
implications in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, 
where large numbers of women rely on land for 
their livelihoods. Strengthening women’s rights over 
land and other productive resources is critical not 
only to their productivity in the short term but also to 
expand their broader economic agency and provide 
protection against shocks.240  
Reforming marital property regimes 
Appropriate legal frameworks and gender-sensitive 
policies are needed to strengthen women’s land 
rights. First, recognizing claims to property acquired 
within marriage can increase women’s ownership of 
assets because women, especially when married, are 
less likely than men to be able to acquire individual 
assets. Such claims recognize women’s paid and 
unpaid contributions to the household by considering 
assets acquired during marriage as the joint property 
of the couple. 
Recent research on individual-level asset ownership 
found that women fare much better in marital 
systems with joint or common property (such as 
in Ecuador) than under those with ‘separation of 
property’ (as in Ghana and the state of Karnataka, 
in India). Under marital regimes that stipulate a 
‘separation of property’, in the event of dissolution of 
the marriage all property is treated as individually 
owned. In Ghana and Karnataka, women are 36 per 
cent and 20 per cent of landowners, respectively. 
By contrast in Ecuador, where children of both 
sexes inherit land and a ‘partial community’ of 
property prevails (whereby all property, except for 
inheritances, acquired by either spouse during the 
marriage belongs to both of them jointly), women 
constitute the majority of landowners at 52 per cent.241 
Gender-sensitive land titling and reform 
programmes
Land reform and titling programmes can also help 
women gain access to land if they are systematically 
designed with gender equality considerations in 
mind. Two factors make a difference. 
The first is joint titling. Individual titles can 
potentially increase women’s autonomy and help 
to rebalance unequal gender power relations in the 
household and may be appropriate in some cases. 
However, the majority of poor women rely on their 
membership of the household for their livelihoods 
and survival. Efforts to ensure women’s access to 
resources within the household, through joint titling, 
inheritance rights for daughters and copies of title 
deeds, should therefore be given priority.242 The 
second area requiring policy attention is efforts to 
bolster women’s agency, voice and participation, 
both through representation in decision-making 
bodies that administer land rights and via 
autonomous women’s organizations that monitor 
the process and demand accountability.243  
The land registration process in Rwanda initiated in 
the mid-2000s gave legally married women equal 
ownership rights over household parcels of land. A 
2011 study found that women in a formal union were 
17 percentage points more likely to be regarded as 
joint landowners after the reform than before.244  
Grievances mounted in the villages as it took years for families to have their rights to compensation 
plots of land recognized. Villagers blockaded and harvested part of the plantation and filed a court 
case. While women were excluded from formal political arenas, such as the local union, they were 
informally active in asserting their rights. These efforts have resulted in a number of villages receiving 
compensation plots, but apparently little more.
Women’s organizations, such as the Rwandan 
Women’s Network and Haguruka, collaborated 
with local authorities to monitor land registrations 
and sensitize officials and communities about the 
changes.245 However, the same study found an 
8 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of 
informally married women having documented land 
ownership, highlighting the importance of being 
sensitive to existing customary arrangements in 
reform processes.246 
Top-down land titling programmes that either 
undermine women’s existing land rights, ignore the 
constraints posed to women by existing customary 
tenure arrangements and land governance 
institutions, or fail to create widespread public 
awareness are unlikely to secure rights for 
women. In some cases, poorly designed land titling 
programmes have triggered waves of speculative 
land acquisition that have primarily benefited local 
elites at the expense of those with less secure claims 
on land, including women and migrants.247  
In some sub-Saharan African countries, efforts to 
make use of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions 
to reform land tenure have been problematic for 
women, who sometimes lack rights or decision-
making power within customary systems. Formal 
recognition of such institutions by governments or 
international development agencies can confer 
greater legitimacy on them than they previously 
enjoyed, which may further entrench women’s 
disadvantage and lack of agency.248  
Securing rural women’s livelihoods
Legal and policy efforts to strengthen women’s 
land rights over agricultural land are important, but 
secure land tenure alone cannot end rural women’s 
poverty.249 In Ethiopia, for example, even where 
women hold a land certificate or are informally 
acknowledged to control land, social norms dictate 
that they cannot plough the land themselves.250 
Female-headed households are therefore forced to 
sharecrop their land, which means they earn much 
less than households that have access to male labour. 
Therefore, alongside land tenure reform, other policy 
measures are needed to improve the returns to 
women’s agricultural employment and enterprises.
Increasing women’s access to agricultural 
services, markets and finance
Agricultural extension services provide vital support 
for women farmers to increase their productivity 
and incomes. The reach of these services is often 
inadequate overall, but women are especially likely 
to miss out. In Ghana, for example, on average 
only 12 per cent of male-headed households and 
less than 2 per cent of female-headed households 
reported receiving extension advice.251 In some 
cases, a lack of female extension workers means 
that it is not socially acceptable for women to 
receive these services.252 Exclusion from extension 
activities is a particular problem in the context of 
climate change, with less predictable rainfall and 
more crop failures making it especially important 
that small-scale farmers get the support they need 
to adapt. 
Women also face numerous barriers in accessing 
markets, including lack of capacity to produce 
sufficient volume or quality of produce; lack of secure 
markets or established relationships with buyers; 
problems with transport; restrictions on mobility; and 
lack of time due to unpaid work burdens.253 Where 
women do engage directly with markets, they are 
often confined to specific products, market segments 
or locations. In global value chains, contract-farming 
arrangements are rarely made directly with women 
farmers.254  
Participation in cooperatives or other collective 
action groups can deliver clear economic benefits 
to rural women and give them greater control over 
income and even land.255 In Mali, for example, 
women have created their own cooperatives in 
the shea butter sector over the past two decades, 
resulting in improved quality of the product and 
increased annual earnings for members.256 Women’s 
participation in the cooperatives has contributed 
to shifts in perceptions on gender roles, including 
greater recognition and opportunities for them to 
negotiate with community leaders to sustain their 
activities.257   
Well-designed rural savings groups targeting 
women have a role to play in increasing their 
access to finance, alongside institutional finance 
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provided by the state such as community and 
development banks.258 These groups have strong 
potential to contribute to increases in women’s 
earnings and productivity, particularly when 
linked to market opportunities.259 Participation can 
strengthen women’s social capital, reduce their 
vulnerability to shocks and improve their financial 
management and leadership skills.260 It can also 
enable the accumulation of individual and joint 
assets that women control directly. Membership 
links women with few resources to the services 
provided by more formal cooperatives, where 
their representation—particularly in leadership 
positions—is typically low.261  
In order for women to benefit from membership 
of collective action groups, national policies 
are required that stipulate women’s and men’s 
equal right to be members. Local bylaws and 
membership criteria may also need to be reviewed 
to enable women to join in their own right. 
Strategic use of subsidies and public 
procurement
Input subsidies on fertilizers and seeds were largely 
dismantled during the structural adjustment reforms 
of the 1980s. Critics argue that subsidies distort 
prices and mainly benefit well-off producers and 
agribusinesses. In the late 1990s, a reverse trend 
developed for ‘smart’, more targeted subsidies, 
which have the potential to deliver broader 
economic and social benefits.262  
Countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal and United Republic of Tanzania 
have recently introduced new input subsidy 
programmes. The Government of Malawi has been 
implementing a Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
(FISP) since 2005, targeting poor small-scale 
farmers who have land but cannot afford to buy 
inputs at market prices. While some studies have 
found that women are still disadvantaged when 
it comes to receipt of these subsidies, others 
have found that access to subsidized fertilizer 
improves the outcomes for female-controlled 
plots and increases the probability of female-
headed households cultivating higher-yielding crop 
varieties.263 
Public procurement from small-scale farmers 
is gaining ground as a policy approach. 
Ensuring that women agricultural producers can 
benefit from such procurement opportunities 
can help to redress the disadvantage they 
face in agricultural markets. The World Food 
Programme’s Purchase for Progress (P4P) 
programme procures staple food commodities 
for food aid from small-scale farmers. It was 
piloted between 2008 and 2013 in 20 countries, 
with the aim that 500,000 small-scale farmers 
would take part and that half of them would 
be women.264 Although the 50 per cent target 
has not been met, it is reported that since a 
gender strategy was put in place to overcome 
the constraints to women’s participation, P4P 
has facilitated women’s involvement in farmers’ 
organizations, improved women’s access to 
credit, increased incomes, strengthened skills 
and provided time-saving technology.265 
Brazil has made extensive use of public 
procurement from small-scale farmers as part 
of the country’s comprehensive food security 
policy (Fome Zero). Implemented since 2003, 
it has contributed to the sustained decline 
in hunger in rural areas, especially among 
female-headed households.266  Since 2009, 
it is a requirement that a minimum of 30 per 
cent of the financial resources transferred by 
the Government to states and municipalities 
to implement the National School Feeding 
Programme, which covers 49 million children, 
must be used to buy food sourced from 
family-based farms, including indigenous 
communities.267 
Recommendations
After years of neglect, there is greater 
recognition among policy makers that the state 
needs to take a more pro-active role in the 
governance of markets in agrarian economies 
to support rural livelihoods. In order to redress 
women’s socio-economic disadvantage, it 
is critical that public action recognizes the 
particular needs of women working in these 
contexts, who are almost all informal workers, 
many of them in small-scale agriculture. 
Governments should:
• Ensure that women have secure access to 
land through introducing gender-sensitive 
land reform programmes such as joint titling 
initiatives
• Involve women’s organizations in policy design 
and implementation to ensure that gender 
concerns are adequately addressed
• Reform other parts of the legal framework, 
including marital property regimes and 
inheritance laws, to help ensure that women and 
girls have equal access to assets and land
• Increase women’s access to agricultural 
extension services, including through the 
recruitment of female agents who, in some 
contexts, can be more effective at reaching 
women farmers
• Facilitate women’s access to markets by, for 
example, targeting them to be providers for 
public procurement programmes and school 
feeding programmes
• Support women’s collective action in rural areas 
so that women can access productive resources 
such as finance, training, processing technologies 
and irrigation systems.
BOOSTING WOMEN’S PUBLIC SECTOR 
EMPLOYMENT
Policies to generate employment generally target the 
private sector as the main engine for employment 
growth. But the public sector is also an important 
source of jobs, as well as providing services that 
benefit both the economy and society more broadly. 
Women working in the public sector are concentrated 
in health, education and care services, which both 
support and reduce women’s unpaid care and 
domestic work.268  
Public sector workers are essential to efforts to boost 
economic growth and to regulate markets. For 
example, as noted in the previous section, agricultural 
extension workers help to increase the agricultural 
productivity of small-scale farmers.269 In addition, 
tax officials can ensure efficient revenue collection, 
essential for funding infrastructure and public services, 
while labour inspectors monitor the implementation of 
labour market regulations such as minimum wages. 
The public sector has historically been an important 
source of formal wage employment for women, 
providing decent pay, good employment conditions, 
job security and pension contributions linked to high 
levels of unionization and opportunities for collective 
bargaining.270 As such, it can play an important role in 
setting and advancing standards for gender equality 
policies for the private sector. 
Women’s share of public sector employment 
Women are on average 57 per cent of government 
employees in OECD countries.271 The latest ILO data 
for 49 developing and transition countries show wide 
variation in women’s share of employment in public 
administration, ranging from 19 per cent in Guinea to 
70 per cent in Slovenia. Overall, the share of women in 
public sector employment exceeded their share in total 
employment in 46 out of 64 countries.272  
However, women employed in the public sector 
tend to be clustered in junior and lower-paying 
positions as well as in typically feminized sectors 
such as education and health.273 In some developing 
countries, female health- and care-workers are paid 
below the minimum wage—for example, Pakistan’s 
Lady Health Workers (see Chapter 3)—or are even 
employed on a voluntary basis, as in the case of 
Anganwadi childcare workers in India.274  
Meanwhile, in all regions, women remain under-
represented in the most senior decision-making 
positions in the public sector. In the 15 OECD 
countries with data, women hold 29 per cent of top 
management positions.275 Similarly, a recent study 
by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) showed that women are 30 per cent or more 
of those in decision-making positions in only 5 out of 
35 developing countries and territories (Botswana, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia and South Africa).276  
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A number of countries, including Colombia, 
Mongolia, the Philippines and South Sudan, have 
applied quotas or targets for women’s employment in 
the public sector. In Colombia, for example, a quota 
set at 30 per cent has been exceeded, with women 
holding 40 per cent of decision-making positions in 
public administration in 2011.277  
Women have faced particular barriers to entering 
public sector employment in post-conflict situations. 
Gender equality and social sectors, areas where 
women are more likely to be employed, are often 
deprioritized in the process of rebuilding state 
infrastructure and restoring basic government 
functions.278 In response to this, the United Nations 
Secretary-General’s 2010 report on Women’s 
Participation in Peacebuilding emphasizes the 
importance of women’s employment in public 
institutions in its 7-Point Action Plan.279 
The impacts of austerity and outsourcing on 
public sector employment 
Austerity policies implemented in the aftermath 
of the economic crisis have led to a sharp 
downward trend in public sector employment. 
Between 2008 and 2011, governments in 27 out 
of 45 countries with data put in place cuts or 
freezes to public sector wages, including the 
majority of EU countries.280 Cutting jobs as part 
of these cost-saving measures has particularly 
negative implications for women’s employment 
opportunities as they are more likely to be in 
temporary and part-time positions, which are 
more vulnerable to redundancy (see Chapter 4).
Another widespread trend in the public sector in 
both developing and developed countries is the 
increase in outsourcing of public services to private 
companies, which may not adhere to established 
public sector terms and conditions of employment. 
The blurring of the distinction between formal and 
informal employment as a result of outsourcing 
is leading to growing insecurity of public sector 
employment and increasing the complexity 
of employment relationships.281 Outsourcing 
frequently occurs in industries where women are 
concentrated such as catering, cleaning or care 
work (see Box 2.10). 
The University of Cape Town (UCT), like many other universities, is mainly financed by government 
and student fees but struggles to raise sufficient funds to provide quality teaching, research and other 
services. It therefore looked at cost-cutting options in order to balance the books and outsourced a 
number of services. In 1999, despite resistance from workers, who are mainly low-paid black women, 
general cleaning operations at UCT were outsourced to a private company called Supercare, which is 
one of the largest contract cleaning companies in South Africa. 
As employees of Supercare, the cleaners were no longer directly employed by UCT and instead found 
themselves in a triangular employment relationship. This arrangement, whereby a sub-contracted 
company provides workers and pays their wages while the work that they do is determined by the 
organization contracting the services, is increasingly commonplace. 
The Supercare cleaners lost significant benefits as a result of the outsourcing, including access to 
relatively generous medical aid and retirement funds, which previously had been cross-subsidized by 
higher-paid workers at the University. The workers were also put on fixed-term rather than permanent 
contracts. 
BOX 2.10 
Outsourcing of public sector jobs at the University of Cape Town
Despite being dispersed across several campuses and different buildings, the Supercare workers 
organized to demand their rights. Partly as a result of the pressure they applied, the University drew 
up a progressive code of conduct for contracted companies that led to significant increases in pay. 
However, the employers used the introduction of the code of conduct to increase the cleaners’ ordinary 
working hours from 40 to 45 hours per week, which they were expected to work without any overtime 
being paid. After a two-year struggle, the cleaners’ hours reverted back to 40 hours per week and 
compensation was finally agreed for various forms of underpayment over several years. 
In spite of this victory, the Supercare workers’ troubles are far from over. The process of outsourcing led 
to the cleaners’ formal jobs effectively being informalized, and even with the University’s code of conduct 
in place, the result has been a considerable loss of benefits and job security for these workers.282
Outsourcing is not inevitable and can be reversed. 
As a result of a similar campaign to that described 
in Box 2.10, mounted by cleaners, staff and students 
at the Queen Mary University of London, outsourced 
cleaners were brought back in-house. The cleaners, 
who had previously been paid the minimum wage 
with few entitlements, achieved significant pay rises 
and gained the right to sick pay, holidays, an annually 
negotiated pay increase and access to an employer-
contribution pension scheme.283 There have also 
been wider benefits: the University’s decision has 
stimulated improvements in productivity and service 
delivery with very little increase in costs.284  
Expanding women’s public sector 
employment
Scaling up public services to achieve women’s 
rights will require the creation of new jobs. Globally, 
10.3 million additional health workers (physicians, 
nurses and midwifery personnel) are required to 
ensure the effective delivery of universal health 
care, the majority in Asia (7.1 million) and Africa (2.8 
million).285 United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) estimates that 27 
million more teachers will be needed worldwide 
to achieve universal primary education by 2030.286 
This presents a major opportunity to create decent 
employment for women in these sectors, as well as 
in elder- and childcare services. 
Capitalizing on this opportunity would generate 
a double dividend, by providing support both for 
human well-being as well as employment and 
wider economic benefits.287 Locating care jobs 
within the public sector is likely to ensure better pay 
and conditions for care workers.288 Having more 
women in public sector jobs can also facilitate 
efforts to increase women’s and girls’ access to 
public services. Cross-country studies show a 
positive correlation between gender parity in school 
enrolment and the proportion of female teachers, 
for example.289  
There are a number of examples of governments 
creating employment through public investments 
in social services. In the Republic of Korea, the 
Government has significantly expanded social care 
provision since 2000 through universal long-term 
insurance schemes for the elderly and publicly 
subsidized childcare services. In Ecuador, the 
Government has increased investments in public 
services hand-in-hand with an expansion of public 
employment and the elimination of outsourcing 
practices, which has improved pay and conditions 
for workers.290  
Recommendations
Expanding public sector employment in paid care 
jobs, as well as in public administration more 
broadly, can make a significant contribution to 
substantive equality. Well-resourced public services 
support and reduce women’s unpaid work and 
can provide good quality jobs for women, thereby 
redressing their socio-economic disadvantage. 
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Increasing the capacity of governments to 
implement labour market regulations and collect 
taxes also supports the realization of rights by 
ensuring that work is decent and that social services 
can be adequately financed. Policy priorities for 
governments include:
• Recognize the potential for decent employment 
creation in the public sector and ensure that 
women can access these jobs
• Protect existing public sector jobs from 
unnecessary austerity cuts and, where cuts 
have to be made, ensure that they do not 
disproportionately fall on women’s jobs
• Avoid outsourcing public sector jobs to 
private companies and instead work with 
trade unions to increase the effectiveness 
of service delivery whilst also protecting 
workers’ rights 
• Ensure that women are fairly represented 
at senior and management levels of public 
sector employment. Quotas can play a part 
in making this happen.
WOMEN’S ORGANIZING FOR 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY AT WORK
This chapter has outlined an ambitious agenda to 
bring about transformation in labour markets so 
that women can access decent, paid employment 
that is compatible with unpaid care and domestic  
work and that provides safe and healthy working 
conditions, adequate pay and access to social 
protection. To achieve these changes, action needs 
to be taken on many fronts by a range of actors 
including policy makers, employers and civil society 
organizations, in particular trade unions. 
Collective action make a difference to improving 
women’s access to decent work. For example, 
as Chapter 1 shows, women’s organizing has 
played an essential part in legal reform to prohibit 
discrimination in the workplace and to introduce 
childcare services;291 countries with strong union 
coverage and collective bargaining tend to have 
lower gender pay gaps;292 women’s organizations 
have been instrumental in winning improvements 
to working conditions and pay (see Box 2.11); 
collective action through cooperatives, as in rural 
areas in sub-Saharan Africa, has helped women 
to pool resources, realize economies of scale 
and access markets;293 and savings and self-help 
groups have been shown to support women’s 
livelihoods and strengthen their agency, voice and 
participation in households and communities more 
broadly.294  
Women have been active in both mainstream 
trade unions and in other organizations of informal 
workers that have sprung up in recent decades, 
particularly in developing countries. In the 
mainstream, women have joined the longstanding 
fight for workers’ rights on issues such as adequate 
pay and working hours, but they have also brought 
new concerns to the table such as gender pay 
gaps, sexual harassment in the workplace, safe 
and affordable transport and childcare services.
In recent years, globalization and economic 
liberalization have undermined the power of 
organized labour, and some governments have 
marginalized trade unions from economic policy 
making. Unions also face intensified hostility from 
some corporations and employers, who have recently 
called into question the legal basis of the right to 
strike, the most fundamental right of all workers.295 In 
this hostile environment, women trade unionists have 
played an important role in renewing the movement 
to make it more representative, democratic and 
relevant in today’s world.296 They have argued that 
one way to reassert the power and influence of 
organized labour is to represent workers in all their 
diversity. 
WOMEN WORKERS AND THE TRADE UNION 
MOVEMENT 
The international trade union movement has played 
a pivotal role in expanding the reach and scope 
of workers’ rights worldwide. However, historically 
and in common with many social movements, trade 
unions have often failed to be inclusive of women, 
seeing women’s rights issues as less of a priority. 
Women have thus faced a struggle for voice and 
recognition on two fronts: to be heard by employers 
and also by trade unions themselves. 
Although global data on trade union membership by 
sex are not systematically collected, there is evidence 
of increases in women’s membership. A 2012 review 
of 39 developing and developed countries found 
that women were at least 40 per cent of members in 
two thirds of countries reviewed and that women’s 
membership increased between the early and late 
2000s in the majority.297 
There are a number of factors that may be influencing 
this shift. Changes in employment patterns have led to 
a decline in private sector unionism, which has tended 
to be male-dominated. In its place, unions of the 
public sector, where large numbers of women work, 
have become much more important. For example, 
Public Services International (PSI) brings together 
669 unions in 154 countries, representing 20 million 
public sector workers of whom two thirds are women. 
PSI campaigns on many familiar labour issues such 
as precarious work and the impact of privatization 
of public services, but it also takes up issues such as 
literacy and affordable access to water that are of 
particular relevance to women. 
In spite of increasing representation as members and 
greater take-up of gender issues, with some notable 
exceptions women remain under-represented in union 
leadership.298 An ILO study in 2002 found that women 
were a negligible 1 per cent of representatives on union 
decision-making bodies.299 A 2014 survey of EU trade 
unions showed a more positive picture, but it still found 
that women comprised only 10 per cent of presidents 
and 25 per cent of vice-presidents and general 
secretaries.300 The lack of women in senior positions in 
trade unions mirrors the problems in other sectors: the 
culture of trade unions remains male-dominated, with 
‘old boys’ networks’ exerting strong influence on who 
can get to the top. Women’s responsibility for unpaid 
care and domestic work makes it difficult for them to 
devote time to the networking activities needed to build 
support for their leadership. Women are often expected 
to fulfil administrative roles and are less likely to be 
identified as leadership material or given training and 
opportunities to develop these skills.301  
Quotas and reserved seats for decision-making 
positions can help to overcome barriers to women’s 
leadership. However, where women do reach the 
top, whether they are able to change the culture of 
trade unions and effectively represent women’s rights 
issues depends on the extent to which they have built 
support from the bottom up. As well as promoting 
their leadership, it is also necessary to create space 
for women’s caucuses, divisions and committees 
within union structures to foster, support and hold 
to account those in decision-making positions. This 
approach to amplifying women’s voices in civil society 
organizations has been used very successfully in the 
international peasants’ movement Via Campesina 
(see Box 1.6).302  
WOMEN AND INFORMAL WORKER 
ORGANIZING
While women’s membership has been increasing and 
trade unions have become better at incorporating 
gender concerns into campaigns and collective 
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bargaining, women in informal employment have, 
in parallel, opted to form their own organizations to 
represent their interests.303  
Informal workers confront many challenges in their 
efforts to organize. For self-employed informal 
workers, the traditional employer-employee 
relationship, which is the basis for collective 
bargaining, does not exist. For women working 
on the lowest rungs of global value chains—for 
example, in garment factories—negotiating on 
conditions with local factory owners may have 
limited impact when the downward pressure on 
pay and conditions of work originates many miles 
away with parent companies in the North (see 
story: Out of the ashes). Furthermore, informal 
workers frequently do their jobs in dispersed 
workplaces, making it difficult to come together 
to build a collective identity and coordinate 
campaigns.304  
Some informal work—such as sex work and waste 
picking—is stigmatized, which may make these 
workers reluctant even to identify what they do as 
work. Some informal workers face multiple forms of 
discrimination and exclusion—for example, migrants 
often contend with hostility from the authorities as 
well as from other workers, who perceive that they 
are undercutting their jobs.305 
Addressing these challenges calls for diverse, 
context-specific strategies. Alongside gender 
differences, class, caste, race, ethnic and nationality 
divisions have to be skillfully negotiated and 
incorporated into strategies built around shared 
identities and goals.306 What organizations 
of informal workers have in common are the 
overarching priorities to seek redress for the socio-
economic disadvantage they face, by making work 
more viable and remunerative and to combat 
stigma and redefine social norms (see Box 2.11). 
Organizations of women informal workers often start with initiatives to meet their immediate, practical 
needs and to empower members to see themselves as workers with rights, as a basis for building 
a collective identity. In the longer term, the aim is to support women to negotiate for change with 
employers, subcontracting firms and buyers, national and local governments or even the general public. 
The largest and best known organization of informal workers is the Self-Employed Women’s Association 
(SEWA), which was established in India in 1972. Today, SEWA counts almost 2 million members spanning 
diverse forms of informal work. The organization provides a range of services to members—including 
savings and credit, health and childcare, insurance, legal aid and capacity building—to enable women 
to become self-reliant.307 SEWA also supports members in negotiations with employers to improve 
working conditions. For example, SEWA Delhi, in partnership with the UK-based Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI), negotiated with lead firms to buy directly from home-based workers rather than through 
intermediaries in the supply chain. This enabled sub-contracted workers to become self-employed, with 
their own producer group, and to negotiate better rates for their goods.308  
In Brazil, the Domestic Workers’ Federation (FENATRAD) has been at the forefront of efforts to improve 
working conditions for the country’s 7 million domestic workers, resulting in successive legal reforms to 
advance their rights.309 Alongside these campaigns, FENATRAD has used radio, evening courses and 
networking in communities, families and churches to link with hard-to-reach and isolated domestic 
workers.310  
BOX 2.11 
Women informal workers organizing for change
The Veshya Anyay Mukti Parishad (VAMP) sex workers’ collective in India has promoted dialogue 
between sex workers and the public in order to transform perceptions and remove stigma surrounding 
their work. VAMP has forged a common identity among diverse women engaged in sex work and has 
sought to redefine their struggles in broad rights-based terms rather than just focusing on sexual health. 
Collective action among sex workers has been vital for their capacity to change their own and others’ 
perceptions of their work, claim their rights and demand equal treatment as human beings, workers and 
citizens. As a result, these women are gaining recognition not only as sex workers, but as educators on 
HIV, breadwinners and upwardly mobile women.311
Recommendations 
To achieve the transformation of labour markets 
required for substantive equality, women must 
be centrally involved in influencing and shaping 
their workplaces. In order to strengthen women’s 
agency, voice and participation, priorities for 
governments, donors, international organizations 
and trade unions include:
• Ensure a conducive legal framework for 
women’s collective action around economic 
and social rights, including the right to 
collective bargaining and the right to strike
• Scale up funding for women’s labour 
organizations, particularly those that represent 
marginalized or stigmatized informal workers, 
to improve working conditions and realize 
rights. Overseas development aid from 
governments or private donors can play 
a particularly important role in supporting 
organizations that need to remain independent 
from their own governments
• Create spaces for women’s organizing, such as 
caucuses and committees within mainstream 
trade unions and other workers’ organizations, 
to build women’s capacity and mainstream 
gender equality issues
• Increase the representation of women—
including those in informal and part-time 
employment—in trade unions, especially in 
decision-making positions, and ensure that 
women’s rights issues are consistently taken up 
in collective bargaining agreements.
Paid work can be a foundation for substantive equality 
for women, but only when it is compatible with women’s 
and men’s shared responsibility for unpaid care and 
domestic work; when it gives women enough time for 
leisure and learning; and when it provides earnings 
that are sufficient to maintain an adequate standard 
of living. This kind of work is the fundamental basis for 
women’s economic empowerment, with the potential to 
provide resources, respect and agency.
However, governments in all regions have struggled 
to generate enough decent employment in recent 
years, a period when the capacity of organized 
labour to negotiate better wages and employment 
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conditions has also diminished. In this difficult global 
context, women continue to face gender-specific 
barriers to accessing labour markets. Efforts to create 
a ‘level playing field’ by removing legal impediments 
to women’s employment and ensuring equal access 
to education have not been enough, on their own, to 
close gender gaps in participation and pay. 
The conventional view that regulation ‘distorts’ labour 
markets and dampens job creation has been widely 
refuted. This opens up space for a much more pro-
active set of policies to increase the quantity and 
improve the quality of employment available. As 
Chapter 4 highlights, getting the macroeconomic 
policy environment right is critically important for 
this endeavour. The policy framework must be 
designed in a way that supports substantive equality 
for women. Strengthening women’s agency, voice 
and participation as a central part of defining an 
agenda for change, through trade unions and other 
workers’ organizations that represent women’s 
diverse experiences at work, is one way to meet that 
challenge.
Measures to redress women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage should be a priority. Where they are 
set at the right level and properly implemented, 
minimum wages have a particularly important 
impact in raising the incomes of the poorest women 
workers and are also shown to narrow gender 
pay gaps. Extending the coverage of minimum 
wages as well as social protection, including 
pensions and health care, to all workers is also 
vital for providing a basic level of income security. 
For millions of informally self-employed women, 
measures to move them from survival-oriented 
activities to owning viable and profitable businesses 
are needed, from extending legal recognition to 
investing in urban infrastructure; from guaranteeing 
access to land and markets to making financial 
services accessible for all. 
But these measures will only be effective if 
stereotypes, stigma and violence against women are 
also addressed. Much of women’s disadvantage in 
labour markets stems from persistent stereotypes 
about the kind of work that is suitable for them. 
Gender stereotypes, which define caregiving as 
quintessentially female, have been much harder to 
dislodge than those that prescribe breadwinning as 
a male domain. In the absence of adequate care 
services, the result has often been greater uptake of 
paid work among women, but little change in their 
unpaid work responsibilities, with negative impacts 
on the quality of work they can accept and their 
quality of life more broadly. 
Gender stereotypes also feed occupational 
segregation, channelling women into a limited set 
of jobs that mirror their unpaid caring roles and are 
undervalued as a result. Hierarchies in the workplace 
are often maintained by violent means, including 
sexual harassment, which reinforces male power and 
deters women from moving into ‘non-traditional’ jobs 
or up the occupational ladder.
Addressing these issues requires a fundamental 
rethink of how paid employment and unpaid care 
and domestic work are organized, starting with a 
more even distribution of unpaid care and domestic 
work between women and men and between 
households and society. Radically altering the way 
that women’s work is valued in society would also 
mean recognizing the enormous contribution that 
paid care jobs in teaching, nursing and domestic 
work make to the everyday functioning of economies 
and societies and properly compensating women for 
this work. 
Employment and social policies are intrinsically 
linked, and both are critical for the realization of 
economic and social rights and substantive equality 
for women. Even if the agenda for change outlined in 
this chapter was fully implemented, social protection 
and public services are needed to guarantee the full 
range of rights, whether women participate in paid 
work or not. Social transfers, such as pensions and 
child benefits, are imperative for supporting families 
with children and providing income security over 
the life course. And social services, such as health-, 
elder- and childcare, and water and sanitation are 
not only crucial for women, but also contribute to 
the daily and intergenerational reproduction of a 
healthy workforce. It is to this set of policy issues that 
the Report now turns in Chapter 3.
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MAKING SOCIAL POLICY 
WORK FOR WOMEN
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Women’s empowerment is at the heart of the Egyptian 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme. Born in a 
turbulent political climate, the programme has survived 
the upheaval of the Arab Spring revolution and subsequent 
political turmoil, and delivered results for some of Egypt’s 
most marginalized women.
In the programme, low-income families get financial 
support from the Egyptian government as long as they 
meet certain conditions on school attendance, regular 
visits to health clinics and nutrition. 
Launched in 2008, it was the first of its kind in the Arab 
world, but it was not a new idea: across Latin America, CCT 
programmes have long been hailed for reducing poverty. 
These CCTs are aimed at women but not designed with 
women’s rights in mind, and feminists have argued the 
duty of fulfilling the necessary conditions to qualify for 
payment can become a burden for women, increasing 
their workloads and reinforcing the stereotypical notion 
that unpaid care work is their responsibility.
Transforming social protection for 
women in Egypt 
SHAPING A 
REVOLUTION 
MAKING PROGRESS/STORIES OF CHANGE
A family in Cairo’s Ain El-Sira neighbourhood
Photo: Pathways of Women’s Empowerment/Heba Gowayed
 The team behind the Egyptian programme, led by Dr. 
Hania Sholkamy, a feminist researcher from the Social 
Research Centre at the American University in Cairo, 
took the existing CCT policy framework and rebuilt it with 
women’s rights as its core.
The Egyptian team decided that women should be 
compensated for any time spent fulfilling the conditions, 
recognizing and rewarding their unpaid care work, and 
that payment should be made through bank transfers so 
women could keep control of their own finances. They 
launched a pilot scheme in 2009 with 400 families in 
Cairo’s Ain El-Sira slum.
“We were aware of the criticisms of conditionalities, but 
we soon realized that, designed well, they could actually 
strengthen women’s decision-making power in the 
household,” says Hania. The Ain El-Sira women told the 
team they wanted their children to be educated, well-fed 
and healthy, and if the state was endorsing their wishes, 
this gave them license to spend money in the ways they 
thought most important. 
“We talked to the women in the area, we talked to social 
workers, and developed our programme in consultation 
with women and with field workers who also happened to 
be women themselves,” says Hania.  
Perhaps the most significant change came when the women 
were issued with their bankcards. When they went to collect 
them, the bank manager closed the branch and called the 
police because he had never seen poor women in his bank. 
After some diplomacy, Hania got the cards to the women, 
and then trained them how to select a pin and use a cash 
machine. 
The team decided 
that women should be 
compensated for any time 
spent fulfilling the conditions, 
recognizing and rewarding 
their unpaid care work
Walking in Cairo’s Ain-El-Sira neighbourhood
Photo: Pathways of Women’s Empowerment/Heba Gowayed
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“These women were so focused on protecting their money, 
on how never to lose this card, never to give this card to 
anyone, never to forget the pin,” says Hania. The thin piece 
of plastic gave the women a new sense of dignity. They 
possessed something powerful that belonged to no one else 
in the family.
The role of the social workers was also key. Mostly low-
income women themselves, these workers provide support 
and information. They also organize monthly meetings, 
bringing together programme participants, to cover topics 
including housing, voting and health.
After a year, children’s school results were improving. The 
women were working fewer hours but in better jobs: the 
reliability of the payments meant they knew their minimum 
needs would be met, so they didn’t have to take on badly 
paid, exploitative work for survival. More than a quarter 
of women who had reported domestic violence said it 
had stopped now that financial pressure on the family 
had eased and they no longer had to ask their husbands for 
money. The pilot was a success.
Just as the team prepared to roll out the programme to 
25,000 families in 65 villages in Upper Egypt, the Arab Spring 
came. The project was put on hold. In 2012, the Government 
said they planned to scrap the entire programme, outraging 
the women of Ain El-Sira. “I got a phone call from the head 
of security at the Ministry of Social Affairs telling me that 
these women were protesting and were barricading the 
building,” Hania smiles. “They’d got on public transport and 
taken themselves to the Ministry to demand the programme 
not be scrapped.”  In the end their protests proved fruitless. 
The programme was deemed against the interest of Egypt. 
There was no longer political will for it.
Yet the idea for the programme remained in people’s minds. 
When the regime changed once more in June 2013, a new 
minister was appointed, Ghada Wali, who in her former role 
at UNDP had helped Sholkamy raise funds to cover research 
costs. She invited Sholkamy back to relaunch the programme 
and it’s now finally going national, with a budget allocation 
to cover half a million families in six months.
For Hania, it’s been a steep learning curve. “Initially I 
was hoping no one would realize that this money is going 
to women, that it would just be under the radar, but the 
revolution meant we were put under tremendous scrutiny,” 
she says. “Now at every juncture you’re never sure if this will 
continue or not.” But if the team can continue their work, she 
says, its momentum will become unstoppable.
“These things have to build like sedimentation. You need 
to have layer upon layer of people who have a vested 
interest in empowering women, particularly poor women, 
all working in union, building up one thing after the other. 
That’s when you have an achievement on which there can 
be no U-turn.”
“These things have to build 
like sedimentation. You need 
to have layer upon layer of 
people who have a vested 
interest in empowering 
women.”
Hania Sholkamy, lead researcher of Egypt’s CCT programme 
Photo: UN Women/Ryan Brown
Story: Jenny Kleeman. For more information on the Egypt’s Conditional Cash Transfer Programme see Sholkamy 2014 and the Pathways of Women’s Empowerment 
website: www.pathwaysofempowerment.org
Demographic, family and household structures are 
experiencing major shifts in both developed and developing 
countries with implications for income security and care 
provision. Social policies need to adapt to the reality of 
population ageing, single parenthood and migration.
Currently, 73 per cent of the world’s population have only 
partial or no social protection. Women are over-represented in 
this group.
The best way to realize economic and social rights for all, 
without discrimination, is through a comprehensive approach 
to social policy that combines universal access to social services 
with adequate social transfer systems in a ‘social protection 
floor’ (SPF). 
Policy makers designing national SPFs should conduct a 
thorough assessment of care needs to make sure that SPFs 
contribute to the recognition, reduction and redistribution of 
unpaid care and domestic work.  
IN BRIEF
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Social transfers can reduce poverty and inequality and 
increase women’s access to personal income. To achieve this, 
benefit levels should be high enough and regularly adjusted 
to guarantee the right to an adequate standard of living.
Accessible and affordable social services are also essential for 
substantive equality for women. Their effect on poverty and 
inequality can be even greater than that of social transfer 
systems.
Social services are particularly important to alleviate demands 
on women and girls to provide unpaid care and domestic 
work. Public investments in health, water, sanitation and care 
services, in particular, need to be increased.
Together, social transfers and services can be a powerful tool 
to redress women’s socio-economic disadvantage resulting 
from unpaid care responsibilities and unequal employment 
opportunities. In order to do so, however, they need to be 
transformed to better respond to women’s rights.
/5
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INTRODUCTION
Social policy is fundamental to the quest for social 
justice, women’s rights and gender equality. 
Defined broadly as a set of public interventions 
that affect the welfare and well-being of citizens,1  
social policy is typically understood to cover issues 
such as income security, health, housing and 
education. It is therefore crucial to the reduction 
of poverty and inequality, the strengthening of 
human capabilities and the realization of human 
rights, the enjoyment of which has long been 
enshrined in international human rights treaties 
(see Box 3.1). 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) clearly stipulates a series 
of economic and social rights, including:
• The right to social security (article 9)
• The right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing 
(article 11)
• The right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (article 12)
• The right to education (article 13)
In 2010, the United Nations General Assembly also recognized that safe and clean drinking water and 
sanitation was a human right ‘essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights’,2  reinforcing 
an earlier clarification by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) that the 
right to water was part of the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to health.3 
Although the above rights are separately codified, in practice their realization is highly interdependent. 
For example, realizing the right to health requires not only accessible and affordable health services 
but also the availability of food, water and sanitation, clothing and housing; access to quality 
education; and protection from risk and contingencies such as maternity, illness or work-related 
accidents through adequate social security. 
States are obliged to ensure that women and men can equally enjoy these rights without 
discrimination (article 3). The CESCR has also clarified that the realization of these rights depends 
on the accessibility, affordability, acceptability and quality of related social services as well as on the 
adequacy of transfer payments such as pensions, family allowances or unemployment benefits. 
BOX 3.1  
Economic and social rights: Interlinked and indivisible
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As Chapter 2 has shown, paid employment does 
not always provide a route out of poverty. Nor does 
it automatically lead to women’s empowerment 
or protect them from economic dependence. To 
guarantee women’s right to an adequate standard 
of living, employment policies aimed at the 
generation and regulation of decent work have to 
be accompanied by social protection and social 
services that provide income security and enable 
people to live their lives in dignity. 
Towards a universal social protection floor 
Recently, the United Nations Social Protection Floor 
(SPF) Initiative has given substance to the rights 
outlined here, as well as a concrete strategy for 
their progressive realization. The SPF proposes 
a nationally defined set of minimum guarantees, 
including basic income security for children, 
working-age adults, older people and people with 
disabilities, as well as basic social services for all.4  
This initiative holds significant promise for women, 
who are over-represented among those excluded 
from existing social protection schemes. 
Gender inequality in access to social services and 
social protection is particularly marked where 
public provision is weak, since women’s lower 
access to income and assets means that they 
are less able than men to join private insurance 
schemes and more likely to be deterred by user 
fees for social services.5 There are fears that 
the lingering economic crisis and ensuing fiscal 
austerity measures will have similar effects to 
those of structural adjustment programmes in 
the 1980s and 1990s, which had devastating 
social consequences, particularly for women and 
children.6  
In the absence of adequate public support, women 
and men, especially in low-income households, 
are forced to rely on informal social networks.7  
Dependence on kinship, family and community 
can be deeply problematic for women. On the one 
hand, informal networks rely heavily on women’s 
unpaid care and domestic work. On the other 
hand, women’s own needs for support are rarely 
adequately acknowledged and addressed due 
to prevailing social norms and gender power 
relations. In addition, family and household 
structures are rapidly changing in ways that affect 
the potential for informal support within and 
between households (see Box 3.2).  
Greater state involvement does not, in and of 
itself, ensure equitable outcomes from social 
policy. Examples abound of gender gaps in 
access to state-run social protection schemes and 
gender-biased delivery of social services. Social 
protection and social services are sometimes 
delivered in ways that stereotype or stigmatize 
women—especially those who are poor, disabled, 
indigenous or from an ethnic minority—or burden 
them with additional unpaid labour. Yet, the 
state ‘remains the only actor able to extract the 
vast resources from society that make possible 
significant distributive and redistributive policies 
and (…) the most readily available route for poor 
social groups to influence the conditions of their 
own lives’.8  
National SPFs can be a powerful tool for 
redressing women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage. But in order to advance substantive 
equality, their design needs to account for the 
gender, as well as other, sources of discrimination, 
that prevent women from enjoying their socio-
economic rights on the same basis as men. For 
example, women’s disproportionate responsibility 
for unpaid care and domestic work impedes their 
enjoyment of rights to work, rest and leisure, social 
security, education and health.9 This needs to be 
acknowledged in the design and implementation 
of SPFs by addressing stereotyping, stigma and 
violence through measures that reduce gender-
specific risks and responsibilities. Equally, women’s 
rights to income security and to access basic social 
services cannot hinge on a presumed relationship 
to a male breadwinner, which risks either 
exposing them to abuse, humiliation or violence 
or excluding them from these rights. In order to 
prevent unwanted economic dependence, social 
policies must treat women as individual right-
bearers. Greater efforts are also needed to make 
the delivery of social services—such as education, 
health, housing and water and sanitation—
responsive to the specific needs of women and 
girls. As this chapter shows, strengthening 
women’s agency, voice and participation in 
social policy design and delivery can improve 
state responsiveness to women’s needs and 
accountability for gender equality.
Investing in social protection and social services 
seems daunting in the prevailing economic climate, 
but it is by no means impossible. In fact, some 
countries, such as Argentina and China, have 
scaled up their investments in social protection in 
response to the recent economic crises.10 Even for 
the poorest countries, providing a basic benefit 
package along the lines of the United Nations SPF 
is within reach.11 It has been estimated, for example, 
that the introduction of universal social pensions 
would cost around 1 per cent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per year in most countries of sub-
Saharan Africa. In Viet Nam, a package for children 
under 16 years consisting of a family allowance 
per child equivalent to 50 per cent of the minimum 
wage plus additional educational services and one 
meal per day would cost 0.8 per cent of GDP. 
In many low-income countries, the introduction 
of these benefits will have to proceed gradually 
and alongside increased efforts to expand 
fiscal space (see Chapter 4). Governments and 
donors need to weigh the immediate costs of 
such social investments against their long-term 
benefits: adequate social protection can prevent 
the depletion of skills during times of widespread 
unemployment and ensure continued investment in 
child nutrition, health and schooling.12  
Chapter overview
In line with the building blocks of the SPF, the 
chapter is divided in two parts. Figure 3.1 provides 
a visual overview:
The first part of this chapter focuses on social 
transfers. These are the typical measures through 
which governments provide income security to 
their citizens throughout their life course. The 
second part looks in depth at the provision of social 
services and essential public goods. It focuses 
on health care, water and sanitation and care 
services, where significant challenges remain to 
the realization of the rights of women and girls.13  
These areas are of paramount importance for 
the achievement of substantive equality, but they 
have received limited attention from feminists 
compared to issues such as reproductive rights or 
violence against women. In both parts, the chapter 
scrutinizes existing policies and programmes 
from a gender perspective and highlights ways to 
improve their performance for the advancement of 
substantive equality for women. Specific attention 
is paid to the constraints faced by indigenous 
women, rural women, women with disabilities and 
ethnic minority and migrant women, who face 
multiple challenges to realizing their rights. 
This chapter supports the argument—also made 
by other United Nations agencies—that the best 
way to realize economic and social rights for all 
without discrimination is through a comprehensive 
approach to social policy that combines universal 
access to social services with social protection 
through contributory and non-contributory transfer 
systems.14  While the narrow targeting of social 
protection to the poorest households may seem 
to be more affordable in the short term, building 
universal systems that benefit everyone can 
actually expand financing options by increasing the 
willingness of middle and higher income groups to 
pay taxes for well-functioning education, health or 
pension systems that they would also use.15 
In order to achieve substantive equality for 
women, the challenge is not only to redress their 
disadvantage in access to transfers and services 
already in place. Existing provision must also be 
transformed to take better account of gender 
differences in status and needs and to effectively 
address stereotypes, stigma and violence. This 
chapter highlights promising innovations across 
a range of policy areas that can contribute to 
such transformations. It underlines the vital role 
played by women’s movements and organizations 
in raising new or neglected issues—including 
violence against women and unpaid care and 
domestic work—to be addressed through public 
policies. It also highlights the importance of 
women’s organizations working with others, 
including governments, bureaucracies and 
parliaments, to translate their claims into concrete 
policy changes.
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Well-designed social protection and social services can narrow gender gaps in poverty 
rates; enhance women’s income security and access to personal income; provide a lifeline 
for poor women, especially single mothers; and contribute to the reduction and redistribution 
of unpaid care and domestic work
* Public works or Employment Guarantee Schemes are not strictly speaking social transfers, since the cash benefit is usually conceived of as a wage in exchange for work participation. However, because 
they aim to fulfil a similar role as traditional unemployment benefits—namely enhancing income security among the unemployed—they are treated under the category of social transfers in this chapter.
Figure 3.1
Child benefits
Unemployment benefits 
/ public works*  
Old-age pensions 
Health services
Care Services
Water and sanitation
SOCIAL POLICY
MODES OF ACCESS
SOCIAL 
TRANSFERS
SOCIAL 
SERVICES
Non-contributory
Eligibility for transfers or access to services 
requires no prior contribution from 
beneficiaries
Universal
Eligibility for transfers or access to services 
is based on the single condition of 
residence
Unconditional
No further requirements
Contributory
Eligibility for transfers or access to services 
is contingent on prior contributions to social 
insurance, usually covering workers in 
formal wage employment
Means-tested
Eligibility for transfers or access to services 
is contingent upon proof of need, usually 
targeting households whose income falls 
below a certain threshold
Conditional
Eligibility for transfers is contingent on the 
fulfilment of further conditions, such as 
work requirements, medical visits or school 
attendance
Well-designed social protection and social services can bolster the realization of women’s rights
CHAPTER STRUCTURE AND TERMINOLOGY 
Both developing and developed countries have experienced major shifts in patterns of family 
formation and living arrangements, including population ageing, the postponement of marriage, 
declining fertility, increasing rates of cohabitation outside marriage, a rise in same-sex unions, rising 
rates of divorce and a growth in single-person, female- or child-headed and multi-generational 
and transnational households. These shifts have led to a huge diversity in family and household 
structures, challenging stereotypical assumptions about the ‘family’ that have long underpinned 
social policy in different countries and regions.20 
Today, about 15 per cent of children in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries live in single-parent households—and this number is expected to grow.21 Women, 
who head 85 per cent of these households in the OECD,22 often cannot—or choose not to—rely on 
income transfers from a male breadwinner. Across a range of developed countries, single-mother 
BOX 3.2 
Changing demographic, family and household structures: New challenges for social protection
TOWARDS GENDER EQUALITY  
IN SOCIAL TRANSFER SYSTEMS
SOCIAL TRANSFERS AND WOMEN’S INCOME 
SECURITY 
Social transfers—such as child and family 
allowances, unemployment benefits, paid 
maternity and parental leave, old-age pensions 
and disability benefits—play a major part in 
reducing poverty and inequality.16 From a human 
rights perspective, thoughtfully designed social 
transfer systems not only bolster the right to an 
adequate standard of living but also contribute to 
the realization of other rights, including those to 
education, food, health and work.17 They encourage 
investments in skills and human capabilities, 
facilitate the acquisition of productive assets, 
stabilize demand in times of economic downturn, 
stimulate productive activity and assist people in 
looking for employment.18  
Social transfers can be powerful tools 
for redressing women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage. Women are particularly vulnerable 
to economic insecurity and financial dependence 
due to their unequal employment opportunities. 
Changes in family and household structure also 
have major implications for women’s income 
security (see Box 3.2). In many parts of the world, 
large numbers of women raise children on their 
own, and the migration of both women and 
men raises additional challenges for the care of 
children or elderly parents. Informal safety nets 
are increasingly fragile: many households simply 
cannot afford to extend support to others for 
long periods, while community-based support 
is frequently minimal and precarious.19 Social 
transfers can mitigate these risks and lessen the 
effect of market-induced inequalities.
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households are three times as likely to be poor as households where mothers live with a partner 
or spouse, reflecting the difficulty of combining family responsibilities with earning an adequate 
income.23 Social policies—including income support, parental leave and childcare services—can 
make a big difference here. 
In Latin America, the prevalence of both two-parent nuclear families and extended families declined 
between 1990 and 2004 and the share of single-parent households increased.24 In Central America 
and sub-Saharan Africa, a particularly high share of children lives with only one or neither of their 
parents. In South Africa, for example, where childbearing often takes place outside of marriage, 
only 35 per cent of children were living with both parents in 2012, while 39 per cent were living with 
their mothers but not their fathers, 23 per cent with neither parent and 3 per cent with their fathers 
only.25 
Demographic ageing represents a major challenge for social policy in both developing and 
developed countries.26 Between 2013 and 2050, the global population aged 60 years or over is 
projected to more than double.27 By 2050, nearly 8 in 10 of the world’s older people will live in 
the less developed regions.28 Migration within and across national borders also raises challenges 
including the organization of care, given the increasing numbers of women on the move. In China, 
for example, rural-urban migration of working age adults has resulted in a large left-behind 
population: a full 28 per cent of rural children live with only one parent, grandparents or other 
relatives.29  
Social transfers reduce poverty and 
inequality 
Public social transfers have a major poverty-
reducing effect. A recent review of pre- and post-
transfer poverty rates in 27 high-income and 10 
middle-income countries shows that in developed 
countries, social transfers reduce by around 60 
per cent the proportion of women and men living 
in poor households and in Latin America, they 
decrease female and male poverty by 30 per 
cent.30 In South Africa transfers bring poverty rates 
down by 37 per cent. The poverty-reducing impact 
of social transfers is lower in China, India and the 
Republic of Korea, but still significant at 18 per cent, 
11 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively.31 
Social transfers also narrow the gender gap 
in poverty rates and increase women’s access 
to personal income. In 28 countries where 
women are more likely than men to live in poor 
households before transfers, the gender gap in 
poverty narrows substantially after transfers. In 
Guatemala, for example, women’s poverty rates 
are 4.2 percentage points higher than men’s before 
transfers but almost 1 percentage point lower after 
transfers.  
Across the 17 countries for which individual-level 
data on women’s access to income from paid 
employment and social transfers are available, 
women’s income from paid employment, before 
transfers lags behind men’s—with the female/male 
ratio ranging from 33 per cent in Guatemala to 75 
per cent in Denmark, as shown in Figure 3.2.32 With 
the exception of Colombia and Guatemala, this 
ratio improves after social transfers are taken into 
account. But women’s personal income continues 
to be substantially lower than men’s everywhere, 
indicating that existing social transfers are 
insufficient to fully redress the disadvantage arising 
from gender inequality in labour markets. 
From a gender equality perspective, the growing 
emphasis on social protection in low- and 
middle-income countries is encouraging. Greater 
access to non-contributory pensions can enhance 
women’s income security in old age, while 
increasing cash transfers to families with children 
can promote investment in girls’ education as well 
as women’s economic activity (both discussed 
further in this Chapter). Nevertheless, social 
transfer systems face serious challenges in many 
countries, including insufficient coverage, low 
benefit levels and institutional fragmentation. 
Meanwhile, many high-income countries are 
reducing social protection in response to austerity 
measures (see Chapter 4).33  
The following sections focus on the three main types 
of social transfers that support income security at 
different stages of the life course: child and family 
allowances, including conditional cash transfer 
schemes; unemployment protection, including 
employment guarantee schemes; and old-age 
pensions, including both contributory and non-
contributory schemes. For each type of transfer, 
different modes of benefit provision—universal and 
means-tested, conditional and non-conditional—
are analysed through the lens of substantive 
equality. Finally, the sections highlight pathways for 
transforming social transfer systems towards greater 
gender equality, through women’s active participation 
in their design, management and monitoring.
Source: Gornick and Jäntti 2014, based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.
Note: Market income includes, for example, income from earnings (both employee and self-employed earnings) and occupational pensions (public and private). Disposable income adds, for 
example, state old-age and survivors benefits, unemployment benefits, short-term sickness and injury benefits, child-related benefits and family leave benefits. Both market and disposable 
income are net of taxes. Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified.
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Figure 3.2
Women’s personal income as a percentage of men’s before transfers (market income) and after transfers 
(disposable income), 2000-2010 
 Across countries, social transfers narrow but do not eliminate the gender gap in income from paid 
employment
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Source: Gornick and Jäntti 2014, based on data from the LIS database.
Note: Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified.
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Figure 3.3
Poverty rates among single mothers before and after transfers, percentage of single mothers, selected countries, 
2000-2010  
 Social transfers are essential for reducing poverty among single mothers
SOCIAL TRANSFERS FOR FAMILIES WITH 
CHILDREN
There is growing interest among governments and 
donors in the potential of social policy to mitigate poverty 
among families, which is perceived to be especially 
harmful for children’s long-term development.34 Families 
with children are at higher risk of poverty due to the costs 
of childrearing and the difficulty of combining caregiving 
and paid work. Single-parent households, most of which 
are headed by women, face the greatest challenges 
(see Box 3.2). Indeed, as shown in Figure 3.3, without 
social transfers, more than half of single mothers and 
their children would be living in poverty across a range 
of countries. 
Social transfers are essential for reducing poverty 
among single mothers in all countries, although their 
impact varies. At one end of the spectrum, transfers 
in Denmark, Poland and Sweden reduce poverty 
among single mothers by 70–90 per cent. At the other 
end, transfers in India, Italy, Japan and South Africa 
reduce poverty among single mothers by 18–30 per 
cent. Although poverty rates among single mothers 
remain above average in almost all countries, 
transfers clearly do make an important difference. 
The growth of child-related transfer 
programmes 
Gender equality and women’s income security 
have never been the primary objectives of child or 
family allowances, which are usually intended to 
help families shoulder some of the costs associated 
with raising children. Nevertheless, since they often 
provide a source of autonomous income for mothers 
and a recognition of their role in society, they have 
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the potential to contribute to the achievement of 
substantive equality for women. 
Child-related transfers come in different shapes 
and sizes, including direct transfers or indirect 
tax benefits, universal or targeted, conditional or 
unconditional schemes.35 Such transfers have a 
long history in the developed world, where they 
have evolved from targeted transfers for vulnerable 
orphans and widows to more universal benefits.36 
In 2012, more than half of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)  
countries for which data were available provided 
universal family benefits. Yet, faced with economic 
crisis and austerity, the temptation is growing 
for governments to turn away from universalism 
towards targeted benefits. For example, since 
2011, the United Kingdom has frozen child benefits 
and transformed them from previously universal 
entitlements into means-tested ones.37  
In developing countries, a new generation of 
child-related cash transfer programmes channels 
payments to mothers in the knowledge that women 
are more likely than men to prioritize children’s 
well-being.38 Initiated in two countries—Brazil and 
Mexico—in the 1990s, conditional cash transfer 
programmes now operate in more than two 
dozen countries in Africa and Asia and virtually 
everywhere in Latin America (see Table 3.1 for 
selected examples).39 There is growing evidence that 
cash transfers contribute to the reduction of poverty 
and inequality.40 In most cases, receipt of benefits is 
conditional on ensuring school attendance, taking 
children to regular health checks or participating 
in parenting workshops. Access is also, for the most 
part, means tested, specifically targeting poor 
and vulnerable households. But exceptions exist: in 
Argentina, for example, a Universal Child Allowance 
was introduced in 2009 to make family benefits 
available to those who were not already covered 
though family allowances in the contributory system. 
Social transfers and girl’s education 
Conditional and unconditional transfers can 
also support the realization of children’s rights to 
education, food and health by improving school 
attendance, nutrition levels and immunization 
rates.41 In some cases, through affirmation action, 
cash transfers have been used to redress the 
disadvantage faced by girls with regard to 
secondary school attendance. Bangladesh’s 
Female Secondary School Stipend Programme, 
for example, has decreased gender disparities in 
enrolment and boosted girls’ completion rates by 
providing tuition fees as well as a monthly stipend 
for girls.42 In Mexico’s Oportunidades, recently 
rebranded as Prospera, transfers were 10 per 
cent higher for girls than for boys at the onset of 
secondary school, which is when the risk of female 
drop out is highest.43  
Such measures send a strong message to 
households and communities that girls are ‘worth 
investing in’ and can be a catalyst for the long-term 
realization of gender equality.44 Better educational 
opportunities for girls enhance their self-esteem and 
life chances through increasing their lifetime earnings, 
delaying marriage and reducing fertility and 
maternal mortality rates.45 In Malawi, for example, a 
cash transfer programme for girls resulted not only in 
higher school attendance but also in declines in early 
marriage and teenage pregnancy.46 
Child-related cash transfer programmes can also 
provide a regular and reliable source of income to 
women caring for children, particularly those who 
receive limited or no support from male partners. In 
a number of cases, they have been found to promote 
women’s economic activity. In Mexico, for example, 
women’s participation in the Oportunidades/
Prospera programme has been associated with 
increased investment in productive assets that they 
control, while the guarantee of a regular monthly 
stipend in Brazil eased women’s access to credit and 
allowed many to return to education.47 South Africa’s 
Child Support Grant has been found to facilitate 
women’s access to paid employment.48 Finally, cash 
transfers can enhance women’s self-esteem and 
financial security as well as giving them opportunities 
to access new public spaces and communicate with 
other women.49  
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Table 3.1
Cash transfer schemes for families with children in selected developing countries 
Country Cash transfer 
scheme
Year established Reach Benefit level Conditions
Argentina Asignación 
Universal por Hijo  
and Asignaciones 
Familiares
2009 Combined 10.5 
million children = 
85% of children
$46 per month Yes
Bolivia, Plurinational 
State of
Bono Juancito 
Pinto
2006 400,000 
households = 19% 
of population
$29 per year Yes
Brazil Bolsa Familia 2003 14 million 
households = 29% 
of population
$35–284 per month 
depending on 
household size and 
characteristics
Yes
Ecuador Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano
2003 1.2 million 
households = 41% 
of population
$50 per month Yes
Ghana Livelihood 
Empowerment 
Against Poverty
2008 70,000 households 
= 1% of population
$4–7 per month 
depending on 
household size and 
characteristics
Yes
Malawi Social Cash 
Transfer 
Programme
2006 28,000 households 
= 1% of population
$4–13 per month 
depending on 
household size and 
characteristics
No
Mexico Oportunidades/ 
Prospera
1997 6.6 million 
households = 27% 
of population
$25–219 per month 
depending on 
household size and 
characteristics
Yes
Namibia Child Maintenance 
Grant
1960 86,100 children = 
9% of children
$26 per month for first 
child, $13 for every 
additional child
Yes
South Africa Child Support 
Grant
1998 11.3 million children 
= 55% of children
$35 per month Yes  
(since 2011)
Source: ECLAC 2014b; DFID UK 2011; Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa 2010b; Fultz and Francis 2013; Levine et al. 2009; The Government of Ghana 2013; Patel 2011; Roca 2011.
Note: All benefit amounts are in US dollars.
No guarantee of empowerment 
However, cash transfer programmes do not always 
confer benefits on women and their impact is not 
automatically ‘empowering’. Benefit levels are 
often too low to provide women with financial 
independence or a greater say in household 
decision-making. Evaluations of Ghana’s 
Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 
programme, for example, found that, in spite 
of transfers being directed to women, decision-
making remained with husbands, brothers and 
sons.50 In this case, the low level of benefits 
was compounded by irregular and inconsistent 
payments. 
There is also a tension between the economic 
support that such programmes provide, on 
the one hand, and the risk of reinforcing 
exclusion, stigma or gender stereotypes, on the 
other, through the use of means testing and 
conditionalities. Means testing raises the danger 
of excluding potentially eligible and vulnerable 
people.51 The methods used are often complex 
and opaque, making it difficult for poor women 
to ‘scrutinize the targeting process, claim their 
entitlements, and hold administrators of the 
programmes accountable for mistakes or errors’.52 
Research on the Mexican Oportunidades/
Prospera, programme, for example, found 
widespread resentment and lack of understanding 
among non-beneficiaries over the beneficiary 
selection process and their exclusion from the 
programme, leading to social tensions and 
divisions within communities.53  
Means-tested interventions are also more 
likely than universal schemes to contribute to 
stigmatization because they single out specific 
disadvantaged social groups. In the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, Ecuador and South Africa, 
for example, cash transfers have generated 
stereotypes about beneficiaries being lazy 
or having more children in order to receive 
benefits.54 Fear of facing discriminatory attitudes, 
harassment and abuse may discourage women 
from accessing transfers even when they are 
entitled to them. The risk of stigmatization is 
greatest where gender inequalities intersect 
with other axes of disadvantage such as class, 
ethnicity, disability, location or race. In Ecuador’s 
conditional cash transfer programme, Bono 
de Desarrollo Humano, for example, some 
indigenous women did not collect their benefits 
because the private guards of the financial 
institution mistreated them while they were 
queuing.55  
Finally, means testing can enhance the 
discretionary power of programme administrators 
to withhold benefits or subject potential recipients 
to humiliating additional ‘tests’.56 Administrators 
may feel entitled to engage in the surveillance of 
beneficiaries’ behaviour or inspect their homes.57 
Centralized data systems and electronic payment 
technologies, introduced by some countries, can 
reduce the risk of administrative malpractice as 
well as increasing the efficiency and transparency 
of targeting methods.58  
Conditionalities: Neither effective nor 
empowering?
The conditions that mothers are expected to fulfil 
in cash transfer programmes—such as attending 
parenting workshops or taking children to health 
checks—reproduce gender stereotypes. Tying 
the receipt of transfers to mothers’ childrearing 
performance reinforces the idea that children’s 
well-being is a female responsibility and does 
nothing to encourage men’s involvement in 
parenting. Moreover, the requirements may add 
to women’s already heavy workloads and take 
away time from income-earning activities.59  
Conditionalities can also exacerbate the risk 
of stigmatization and abuse by authorities. 
Requirements to take children to regular health 
checks or ensure school attendance are based 
on paternalistic, and often racially biased, 
assumptions about the ability of poor people to 
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make rational choices. Rather than reflecting 
negligence on the part of beneficiaries, failure 
to comply with programme requirements may 
be due to the lack of accessible services, their 
inadequate quality or—in the case of indigenous 
populations— language barriers.60 Evidence from 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru, for 
example, suggests that distant health facilities, 
long waiting times and mistreatment by staff led 
women to forgo maternal health services even 
where conditionalities encouraged their use.61  
Whether conditionalities are necessary to 
achieve improvements in child nutrition, health 
and education has become a subject of intense 
debate among experts and practitioners.62 
Support remains strong among donors and 
international financial institutions, but emerging 
research suggests that the injection of additional 
cash into the household might well be enough 
to generate positive results.63 The South African 
Child Support Grant, for example— one of the few 
child-related transfer schemes that, until recently, 
was unconditional—achieved poverty reduction 
outcomes and improvements in children’s school 
enrolment and attendance without the use of 
conditionalities.64 A randomized cash transfer 
intervention in Malawi also found that conditional 
and unconditional transfers resulted in the same 
gains with regards to higher school enrolment and 
lower drop-out rates.65   
Monitoring and enforcement of conditions as 
well as proof of compliance have significant costs 
for both governments and beneficiaries. If, in 
practice, conditionalities have no or little bearing 
on child development, government budgets 
might be better used to invest in more and better 
schools and primary health care centres. The 
desired impact of conditionalities on child well-
being could also be achieved by other means 
including, for example, subsidized or free school 
meals, school-based health checks and local 
family health programmes that actively reach out 
to the poor, as is the case in Brazil.66 
Recommendations 
Universal child allowances are an important 
part of social protection floors and can help 
families shoulder some of the costs associated 
with childrearing. In order to contribute to the 
achievement of substantive equality, child-
related cash transfer programmes need to: 
• Make women’s empowerment an explicit
goal rather than an accidental side effect by
enhancing their income security and access
to decent work opportunities
• Provide adequate benefit levels and more
and better services—including health
care, education and training, credit and
childcare—to address women’s needs head-
on and bolster their income security in the
long term
• Work towards universal rather than means-
tested programmes to avoid stigma and
exclusion errors and reduce administrative
costs
• Reconsider the use of conditionalities; where
their contribution to social development
outcomes, such as child health and survival,
is questionable, these should be eliminated
• Sensitize beneficiary households,
programme managers and service providers
about harmful social norms and equal
sharing of responsibilities.
To achieve these changes, women beneficiaries 
and gender equality advocates must be involved 
in the design, implementation and monitoring 
of cash transfer schemes. Recent experiences 
in Brazil and Egypt, for example, show that the 
active involvement of women’s rights advocates 
can be a catalyst for transformation. In both 
cases, cash transfers were explicitly designed 
with women’s rights in mind, tackling the 
limitations of existing schemes (see also Box 3.3). 
In the State of Pernambuco in north-eastern Brazil, the Chapéu de Palha Mulher programme, 
launched in 2007, channels cash to poor rural households to combat hunger between sugar cane 
harvests (see story: Making rights real). Unlike Bolsa Familia (see Table 3.1), however, it supports 
women’s economic empowerment head-on by training them to take up non-traditional jobs in the 
growing construction industry in the region. Specific measures include:
• The stipend is tied to classes in citizenship rights and vocational training for women 
• Feminist popular educators encourage women to explore how gender stereotypes limit their 
ambitions, thus opening up a wider field of training options in non-traditional jobs such as 
welding, soldering, plumbing and electrical work 
• Training sessions include information on domestic violence legislation and related services
• Childcare services, transport and meals are provided to enable women to participate in the 
training courses.67 
In Egypt, feminist activists, academics and state officials came together to pilot a conditional cash 
transfer scheme in the Ain El-Sira slum in Cairo (see story: Shaping a Revolution). Drawing on an 
understanding of some of shortcomings of conventional conditional cash transfer programmes, the 
Ain-El-Sira pilot aimed to contest traditional gender dynamics that emphasize women’s roles as 
mothers and ignore their productive roles and agency. Four key programme design features stand 
out: 
• Women’s participation in paid employment was encouraged, departing from previous practice 
that made transfers contingent on proof of unemployment 
• Payments were transferred directly into women’s bank accounts in order to protect the cash 
from possible family demands or community thefts and to give women a sense of security 
• Self-monitoring tools were employed that enable women to monitor their own compliance with 
conditions and thereby avoid social workers gaining too much control over information 
• Collective sessions were organized for groups of 15 to 20 beneficiaries to support their 
involvement in programme governance and facilitate ongoing collective action among 
women.68  
BOX 3.3 
Transforming conditional cash transfer schemes to empower women in Brazil and Egypt
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SOCIAL TRANSFERS FOR WORKING-AGE 
ADULTS
In most of the world’s high-income countries, 
governments provide social transfers to women and 
men whose ability to participate in the labour market 
is constrained by sickness, disability, maternity/
paternity or unemployment. For working-age women, 
services such as childcare and water and sanitation 
(discussed in section Investment in social services) 
are critical to redressing their socio-economic 
disadvantage by enabling their participation in the 
workforce. In addition, child-related transfers can 
help them shoulder some of the costs associated 
with raising children (see section Social transfers 
for families with children), while paid maternity and 
parental leave ensures that income is available when 
parents stay at home during the first months of a 
child’s life (see Chapter 2). This section focuses on 
income security for the unemployed. 
In developed countries, income security for the 
unemployed is typically provided through temporary 
transfers from unemployment insurance or long-
term social assistance schemes. In much of the 
developing world, however, such schemes either do 
not exist or reach only a minority, particularly where 
most workers are in informal self-employment, 
as in many sub-Saharan African and South Asian 
countries (see Chapter 2). Worldwide, only 12 per 
cent of the unemployed receive public income 
support. Effective coverage reaches more than 
90 per cent of the unemployed in some European 
countries but only 7 per cent in Asia and the Pacific, 
5 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean, less 
than 3 per cent in the Middle East and under 1 per 
cent in sub-Saharan Africa.69 At the time of writing, 
more than half of the countries for which data 
are available do not provide any statutory social 
protection against unemployment, although some 
of these countries have legally mandated severance 
pay.70  
In some developing countries, large-scale social 
assistance programmes combining employment 
and social protection have emerged that offer 
a degree of income security, albeit limited, to 
those who are unemployed, underemployed or 
earning low incomes. Public works programmes 
or employment guarantee schemes such as 
those established in Argentina, Ethiopia, India 
and South Africa (see Table 3.2) are a form of 
conditional or self-targeted ‘workfare’ rather than 
rights-based welfare. Yet, these programmes can 
provide poor or unemployed women, as well as 
men, with an important source of income in the 
face of persistently high levels of unemployment, 
widespread rural poverty and economic crisis. 
And some programmes, such as the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India, 
may offer better conditions for women than available 
employment alternatives. 
Public works programmes have often been 
introduced as temporary measures in response 
to natural disasters or economic crises and 
subsequently phased out when conditions improve. 
This was the case for the Unemployed Heads of 
Household Programme (Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
Desempleados) in Argentina, introduced during the 
economic crisis in 2001 and closed in 2010. Moreover, 
budgetary constraints often limit the scope of 
programmes and prevent them from reaching all of 
those who may require employment. The case has 
been made for using such schemes on a permanent 
basis to promote the right to work as a guaranteed 
entitlement, as in India’s NREGS.71 In practice, few 
existing programmes are national in scope or 
provide a guaranteed entitlement, though some have 
become long-term interventions in response to high 
structural un- and underemployment or chronic food 
insecurity. This is the case for South Africa’s Extended 
Public Works Programme (EPWP) and, prospectively, 
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) 
(see Box 3.4).
Designing gender-responsive public works 
schemes 
Women’s participation rates in public works schemes 
have been high (see Table 3.2), reflecting the extent 
of women’s poverty and unemployment and, in the 
case of India’s NREGS and South Africa’s EPWP, aided 
by gender quotas. In 2004, South Africa’s EPWP set 
a quota for women at 60 per cent—later reduced to 
40 per cent—as well as for youth (20 per cent) and 
people with disabilities (2 per cent).72 By 2012, women 
Country Programme Benefits offered Year 
established
Current 
status
% participation of 
women (country 
average)
Argentina Plan Jefes y Jefas 
Desempleados
Stipends of 150 pesos in 
exchange of 20 hours of 
paid work.
2001 Ended 2010 71
Ethiopia Productive Safety 
Net Programme 
(PSNP)
Households with able-
bodied adults receive 
a transfer equivalent 
to 15kg of cereal (in 
cash/food) in return for 
five days of work per 
month and household 
member. Households 
whose members are 
unable to work (due to 
pregnancy, lactation, 
disability, illness or old 
age) receive the same 
transfer without work 
requirements.
2005 (pilot) Entered 
third phase 
in 2015
40
India National Rural 
Employment 
Guarantee Scheme 
(NREGS)
100 days employment 
in a financial year 
to registered rural 
households on demand, 
with minimum wages, 
gender parity of wages 
and provision of basic 
worksite facilities.
2005 Ongoing, 
enacted in 
legislation
48
South Africa Expanded Public 
Works Programme 
(EPWP)
Work opportunities for 
poor and unemployed 
people, along with basic 
training in some sectors.
2004 Entered 
third phase 
in 2014
62
Source: The Government of South Africa 2012; Holmes et al. 2011; Kelkar 2009; The Government of India 2014; Tabbush 2010.
Table 3.2
Selected employment guarantee schemes in Africa, Asia and Latin America
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represented more than 60 per cent of participants.73 
In India, women comprised almost 50 per cent 
of participants in NREGS nationally in 2010, even 
though the actual proportion varied widely across 
states.74  During the design phase, women’s rights 
advocates achieved several important victories, 
including a reservation of one third of all jobs for 
women and the mandatory provision of childcare 
at all worksites,75  although lack of monitoring and 
enforcement has meant that these services are 
rarely implemented.76  In some states, including 
Uttar Pradesh, women’s organizations have 
been successful in making NREGS more gender-
responsive and increasing women’s participation 
rates, wages and representation in supervisory 
roles.77 
The benefits offered by such schemes, however, 
have not always been sufficient to provide 
participants with an adequate standard of 
living. In the Argentinian scheme, for example, 
payments represented approximately 75 per cent 
of the monthly minimum wage up to 2002 but 
this gradually decreased to 10 per cent by 2010 as 
minimum wage levels were raised in subsequent 
years.78 Benefit adequacy was also a major issue 
in the first phase of South Africa’s EPWP. There was 
no specified minimum wage and stipends varied 
widely across regions and sectors, with payments 
in the social programmes being especially low. In 
2008/2009, the average rate for social sector work, 
where women dominate, was R43 (US$5.8) per 
day compared to R78 ($9.6) in the more traditional 
infrastructure components where men dominate.79 
In the second phase of the programme, a minimum 
wage of R60 per day was introduced to address 
the low and varying benefit levels. This was also 
inflation-adjusted on an annual basis, reaching 
R66.34 ($6.9) in mid-2013. This is similar to the 
minimum wage stipulated for domestic workers and 
higher than the average stipend paid during the first 
phase of the EPWP.80  
Many public works programmes still exhibit gender 
biases that dilute benefits or discriminate against 
certain categories of women. In the Indian NREGS, 
for example, the guarantee of 100 days of work per 
rural household risks putting women at the back of 
the queue, given rural power inequalities.81 While the 
reservation rule for women helps counter gender 
bias, expanding the overall availability of work 
opportunities and defining these as an individual 
entitlement would benefit both women and men. 
Public works programmes that only offer physically 
demanding work are also likely to exclude some 
women or put them at a disadvantage where 
wages are linked to workload. 
Benefits of public works participation 
More positively, some design features of public 
works schemes have enhanced their direct and 
indirect benefits, including specifically for women. 
In the NREGS, for example, wages are set in 
accordance with the state minimum wage, which 
in some states is higher than the wages women 
typically receive as unskilled agricultural workers.82 
The availability of work through NREGS may also 
have had a positive knock-on effect by ‘pulling up’ 
the wages paid to women agricultural workers 
in the vicinity.83  Evaluations of the Plan Jefes y 
Jefas programme in Argentina suggest that, while 
its impact on poverty is unclear, it has reduced 
unemployment and helped people to move into new 
jobs.84 Female participants particularly valued the 
acquisition of new skills and the greater probability 
of finding formal employment.85  
The introduction of a social service component in 
South Africa’s EPWP is also an important innovation 
that supports gender equality. Social service 
work opportunities offered by the programme 
include care of young children and home-based 
care for people living with HIV. This has benefited 
women directly since many of the social sector work 
opportunities have been allocated to them. It may 
also have benefited women and girls indirectly by 
alleviating the burden on unpaid family caregivers.86  
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) 
vividly illustrates the potential of employment 
guarantee schemes to include gender-responsive 
elements (see Box 3.4). It also demonstrates how 
difficult it is to make these elements work on the 
ground. This underlines not only the need for 
gender-responsive programme design but also the 
importance of monitoring implementation and of 
effective mechanisms for improving programme 
performance with regards to women’s rights.
Recommendations 
In order to create universal social protection 
floors, significant efforts are necessary to 
scale up unemployment protection, especially 
in developing countries. While unconditional 
support for the unemployed is preferable to 
maintain an adequate standard of living from a 
human rights perspective, the creation of public 
works programmes, if adequately designed, can 
contribute to redressing women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage. In order for these programmes to 
work for women, they need to: 
• Provide a minimum level of accessible 
employment and adequate income support 
to all those who may require it, ideally 
backed by a legally binding and enforced 
entitlement 
Launched in 2005 as a key component of the country’s food security strategy, the Productive Safety 
Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia has become one of the largest social protection programmes in 
sub-Saharan Africa. It provides food and cash transfers to over 7 million chronically food-insecure 
people, particularly in rural areas, in order to smooth household consumption and prevent the 
depletion of household assets. For households with available labour, benefits are provided in return 
for work in community agriculture and infrastructure projects. For households with no available 
labour—due to sickness, disability, old age, pregnancy or lactation—cash and food are provided 
without further conditions. The public works component also aims to create infrastructure and 
community assets, including roads, water and fuel sources, all of which potentially benefit women. 
One evaluation found that road construction and improvement has facilitated access to health care, 
including for pregnant women seeking maternity care.87  
Women represent approximately 40 per cent of public works participants. The design of the PSNP 
takes account of their practical needs on a number of levels.88 It foresees the provision of community-
based childcare services and reduced working time for women with children and provides for women 
to receive direct support without work requirements before and after childbirth. Responding to social 
norms that constrain women’s ability to plough their land, it also allows for public works labour to be 
used to cultivate the private land-holdings of female-headed households.89 In addition, public works 
are supposed to prioritize projects that will reduce women’s work burdens.90  
However, the implementation of ‘women-friendly’ measures was inadequate during the first and 
second phases of the programme, with on-site day care, reduced working time and less physically 
demanding tasks for women being scarcely offered.91 Nor does the programme address unequal 
gender relations at the household and community level.92 Participation in PSNP public works is on 
a household basis, as is payment, irrespective of who does the work, ignoring that women may not 
have equal say in decisions over how the money is spent. Similarly, at the community level, women’s 
unequal access to agricultural extension services and credit is not addressed, and extension services 
continue to be designed around the needs of male farmers.93 
BOX 3.4 
Ethiopia’s PSNP: Gender-responsive design meets implementation challenges
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• Provide access to benefits as an individual
entitlement rather than a household-based
one, and use quotas or reserve spots for
women to ensure equal participation
• Offer non-manual work that can be
reasonably performed by women and ensure
equal wages for such work
• Provide mandatory on-site childcare and
other basic services while making sure that
these are monitored and enforced.
SOCIAL TRANSFERS FOR OLDER PEOPLE 
Demographic change poses a significant 
challenge for both income security and the 
provision of care for rapidly ageing populations 
(see section Care services). Some governments 
are responding more effectively to this 
challenge than others, as this section will show. 
In developed countries, these issues are hotly 
debated. However, about two thirds of the 
world’s older people94 live in the developing 
world, and by 2050 this share will have risen 
to nearly 80 per cent.95 Globally, about half of 
people above the statutory retirement age are in 
receipt of an old-age pension while only 31 per 
cent of the working-age population contribute to 
a pension scheme.96  
Women’s socio-economic disadvantage in 
old age  
Ageing has specific implications for women 
and thus for gender equality outcomes. First, 
women tend to live longer than men. Second, 
they have less access than men to land and 
other assets that could help them maintain an 
adequate standard of living in old age. In India, 
for example, 60 per cent of women compared 
to 30 per cent of men have no valuable assets in 
their name, and few widows can count on family 
or community support.97 Even in countries with 
good pension coverage, women are significantly 
more likely to suffer poverty in old age than men. 
In the EU, for example, the poverty rate of elderly 
women is 37 per cent higher than that of elderly 
men.98 Third, prevailing gender norms and the 
fact that women tend to marry or co-habit with 
older men mean that it is women who provide 
the bulk of unpaid care and domestic work for 
elderly spouses, as well as for parents, parents-
in-law, friends and neighbours.99 
In most countries for which data are available, 
women are less likely than men to receive a 
pension in old age (see Figure 3.4), and where 
they do their benefit levels are usually lower. 
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
have relatively high coverage rates with some 
countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, having achieved 
universal coverage among both women and 
men, often thanks to the effective combination 
of contributory and non-contributory pensions.100 
Yet, important gender gaps remain in other 
countries in this region. In a number of 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
including the Dominican Republic and El 
Salvador, women’s old-age coverage is less 
than half of the already low coverage of men. 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia is a notable 
exception, with universal coverage for both 
women and men owing to the introduction of a 
universal non-contributory pension scheme. 
This is also the case of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Mauritius, the exceptions in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where coverage in most countries is low for men 
and almost insignificant for women. In Burundi, 
for example, 2 per cent or less of women above 
statutory pension age are in receipt of a pension 
compared to 7 per cent of men. The largest 
gender gaps in coverage, however, are found 
in Egypt and Jordan, where 62 per cent and 82 
per cent of men, respectively, receive a pension 
compared to only 8 per cent and 12 per cent of 
women. While some European countries have 
achieved high coverage rates among women, 
their benefits levels are often only a fraction of 
those of men. In France, Germany, Greece and 
Italy, for example, women’s average pension is 
more than 30 per cent lower than men’s.101 
Figure 3.4
Proportion of people above statutory pensionable age receiving an old-age pension by sex, selected countries, 
2006-2012 
 In most countries, women are less likely to receive an old-age pension than men
Source: ILO 2014h. 
Note: Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified. See Annex 5 for a complete list of countries with data. The amount of pension benefits women and men receive 
differ widely across and within countries. Even if a relatively large share of women and men receive an old-age pension, there may be large gender gaps in benefit levels; or non-contributory 
pensions, on which women rely more strongly than men, may not be enough to lift them out of poverty (see data on benefit levels in Annex 5). 
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These three countries achieve close to universal coverage and 
comparatively smaller gender gaps in pension coverage thanks to 
the introduction of widely available non-contributory pensions.
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Figure 3.5
Proportion of working-age population contributing to a pension scheme by sex, selected countries, 2007-2012 
 In most countries, women are much less likely than men to contribute to a pension scheme
Source: ILO 2014h. 
Note: Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified. See Annex 5 for a complete list of countries with data. 
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Gender gaps in pension outcomes reflect women’s 
and men’s different life courses and employment 
histories. In addition, key pension design features 
systematically penalize women, further reinforcing 
their socio-economic disadvantage in old age. 
These unequal outcomes are not inevitable, 
however, and can be remedied by action on 
several fronts. Chapter 2 has already outlined 
actions to facilitate women’s access to decent work 
and to eliminate gender wage gaps. In addition, 
pension systems can be designed or reformed to 
redress women’s socio-economic disadvantage 
in old age. First, in contributory pension schemes, 
access has to be equalized and gender gaps in 
benefit levels have to be reduced. Second, the 
coverage and benefit levels of statutory non-
contributory social pensions needs to be increased, 
particularly in countries where the majority of older 
people currently lack any form of social protection 
in old age. The following sections discuss these two 
strategies in greater detail.
Gender biases in contributory pensions
Currently, women face important disadvantages 
in earnings-related contributory pension schemes, 
which are the dominant form of coverage in 
countries with pension provision.102 Women 
participate less in the labour market and are more 
likely to be unemployed or to work informally or 
on a part-time basis. They also tend to earn lower 
wages and interrupt their market-based work 
more often than men to take care of dependants. 
As Figure 3.5 shows, women are therefore 
under-represented among active contributors to 
contributory schemes in most countries. 
Outside the developed world, contributory schemes 
exclude the majority of working-age women and 
men. Gender gaps vary widely, but they also tend 
to be greater in Developing Regions. In some 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, men 
are 10 to 20 times more likely to contribute to a 
pension scheme than women. While coverage 
rates are low for both sexes in South Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa, women still face significant 
disadvantages vis-à-vis men. Even in countries 
with relatively high coverage rates, such as Gabon, 
a much smaller share of women (24 per cent) than 
men (89 per cent) contributes to social security. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean as well as in 
East Asia and the Pacific, gender gaps are smaller 
but remain significant. In the Dominican Republic, 
for example, 23 per cent of men are active 
contributors to pensions compared to 18 per cent of 
women.103  
Large gender gaps are also evident in pension 
benefits derived from earnings-related schemes, 
and they are wider for women with children. In 
France, for example, the gender gap in pensions 
(relative to average pensions for all men) is 19 
per cent for women who have no children, 31 per 
cent for women who have one or two children 
and 50 per cent for women who have three or 
more children.104 These gaps not only undermine 
gender equality in old age but also women’s right 
to an adequate standard of living. In relative 
terms, mean pension income for single women is 
just above or equal to the poverty line in several 
European countries, including the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Slovenia and 
the United Kingdom.105  
The shift to individual capital accounts 
In at least 26 countries, mainly in Latin America 
and Central and Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, there has been an increase over the last two 
decades in individual capital account schemes, 
many of them privately managed, following the 
earlier experience of Chile in 1981 and the advice 
of international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank.106 The shift from social insurance to 
individual capital accounts has had detrimental 
effects, specifically on women’s income security 
in old age.107 This is both because benefit levels 
are directly based on past contributions and 
because the benefit formula usually considers 
the number of years during which the person is 
expected to collect benefits, penalizing women 
for earlier retirement and, in some cases, their 
greater average longevity through the use of 
gender-specific actuarial tables. In Chile, for 
example, the combination of these factors 
creates a gender gap of 66 per cent in pensions 
derived from the individual capital account system 
(see Figure 3.6). 
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If women were like men—in terms of their individual characteristics, employment 
patterns, wages and treatment in the pension system—their average monthly pension in 
the Chilean individual capital account system would be equal to that of men, but:
Multiple factors contribute to create a gender pension gap, so that in reality, women’s pensions 
equal only about one third of men’s pensions
WOMEN HAVE DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF LABOUR  
MARKET PARTICIPATION THAN MEN
WOMEN ARE PAID LESS THAN MEN,  
SO THEIR PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS ARE LOWER
THE GAP WIDENS IF WOMEN RETIRE AT THE  
LEGAL RETIREMENT AGE OF 60 YEARS COMPARED  
TO THAT OF MEN (65 YEARS)
WOMEN TEND TO LIVE LONGER THAN MEN,  
WHICH SPREADS THEIR PENSION SAVINGS OVER  
A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME
338 
274  
200  
129  
114  
US$
338  
US$
Source: Based on Fajnzylber 2014.
Note: The results presented in this figure are based on econometric projections using data for one cohort of Chilean women from the 2002 Social Protection Survey. Factors like age, education and the presence 
of children were kept constant. The impact of other factors depends on the order in which each factor was included in the calculation, giving more importance to the elements introduced earlier in the analysis
Figure 3.6
Individual savings accounts system, Chile
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But even where individual capital account systems 
have already been introduced, much can be done 
to redress women’s socio-economic disadvantage. 
Chile’s 2008 pension reform, led by President 
Michelle Bachelet, introduced a number of 
gender-sensitive measures and reversed some 
of the negative impacts of earlier policies (see 
Box 3.5). Bachelet’s leadership and commitment 
to advancing gender equality were crucial to the 
success of the reform process.108  
In the early 1980s, Chile carried out a major pension reform that introduced privately administered 
individual capital accounts and gradually phased out publicly managed social security schemes. This 
shift had a particularly adverse impact on women’s pension entitlements.109 Minimum pensions for those 
with limited individual savings required long contributory records (20 years), reducing women’s access to 
these benefits, while non-contributory pensions were low and tightly targeted. By the mid-2000s, only 55 
per cent of women over 65 years of age were in receipt of an old-age pension compared to 71 per cent 
of men. Gender gaps in the level of benefits derived from the individual capital account system were also 
large (see Figure 3.6).
When Michelle Bachelet stood as a Presidential candidate in 2006, she promised to undertake a 
profound review of the pension system. Once elected, she used her presidential powers to ensure that 
women’s access to pension benefits was central to the reform project, mandating the pension reform 
commission to eliminate gender discrimination from the pension system. Although this ambitious objective 
was not fully achieved, the 2008 reform did significantly enhance women’s income security in old age by:
• Extending the reach of non-contributory pensions to 60 per cent of the lowest-income households. In 
2013, more than 70 per cent of all non-contributory benefits went to women.110 
• Recognizing employment interruptions due to childrearing through care credits for mothers, which 
have been estimated to increase women’s average pensions by as much as 20 per cent.111  
• Creating provision for pension splitting on divorce, whereby the main (usually male) spouse’s pension 
funds accumulated during marriage are split upon separation if the divorce judge considers that one 
of the two parties faces economic disadvantage. 
These advances notwithstanding, the scope of gender-sensitive pension reforms has been limited 
by the country’s privatized pension system. Indeed, the administration was reluctant to overhaul the 
individual capital account system, fearing turmoil in the financial markets and facing opposition from 
powerful business interests including private pension fund administrators.112 While the expansion of non-
contributory benefits provided a less-contested reform path, this choice left unaddressed one of the most 
discriminatory features of the Chilean pension system: gender-specific actuarial tables. It remains to be 
seen whether the commission recently established to look at further reforms of the pension system will 
address this issue during Bachelet’s second term (2014–2018). 
BOX 3.5 
Redressing women’s socio-economic disadvantage in Chile’s 2008 pension reform
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Meanwhile, pension reforms in many countries in 
Europe are eroding entitlements. France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain have tightened eligibility 
rules, strengthened the link between contributions 
and earnings or shifted their benefit formulas from 
final salary to average lifetime earnings. In other 
countries, benefit indexation has been reduced 
or frozen. These measures are likely to have a 
disproportionate impact on women. To mitigate 
this risk, some countries have introduced measures 
to strengthen women’s pension entitlements 
alongside broader cost-containment reforms. 
In Spain, for example, recent reforms raised the 
retirement age as well as the number of years of 
contributions required for a full pension, but they 
also increased survivor benefits and care credits.113  
Reforming contributory pension systems
Key features of pension design, including eligibility 
requirements and a pension formulas, affect how 
much gender inequalities in the labour market spill 
over into old age. As a general rule, the closer the link 
between pension entitlements and past employment 
and contribution records, the greater women’s socio-
economic disadvantage vis-à-vis men. 
In contributory schemes, individuals are typically 
entitled to benefit at retirement age if they comply 
with a minimum number of years of work and/
or contributions, sometimes referred to as the 
‘vesting period’. Long vesting periods can limit 
women’s access to retirement benefits if there are 
no adequate mechanisms in place to compensate 
for time dedicated to unpaid care and domestic 
work. In Argentina, for example, when the vesting 
period was increased to 30 years in the early 
1990s, women’s coverage dropped from 73 per 
cent to 65 per cent.114 The trend was reversed a 
decade later when contributory requirements were 
waived, increasing overall access and reducing 
the gender gap in pension coverage. In addition, 
many countries have traditionally set the retirement 
age for women up to five years before that of 
men (Annex 5).115 This can have negative outcomes 
for women’s income security in systems where 
entitlements are strongly linked to contributions, 
as in the Chilean individual capital account system 
(see Figure 3.6).
Benefit formulas specify how benefit levels are 
calculated for each pensioner, typically based 
on past contributions or earnings. Formulas that 
closely reflect earnings and contributory histories 
tend to generate lower benefits for women than 
men, while the inclusion of flat or redistributive 
components tend to favour women. The period 
of earnings taken into account is also relevant for 
gender equality as is the existence of minimum 
benefits and mechanisms for indexation, meaning 
that pensions are regularly adjusted to inflation 
or wage increases. When benefits are calculated 
based on average lifetime earnings rather than 
final salary, for example, the penalties for time 
spent out of the labour market will be greater. 
When benefits are not indexed, pensioners may 
struggle to maintain living standards when the cost 
of living rises. Since women live longer than men, 
they face higher risks of depreciation of the value 
of their pensions.116  
Care credits 
Care-related contribution credits are another 
important policy tool to improve the adequacy 
of old-age pensions for women. They are widely 
used in developed countries and have recently 
been introduced in some developing countries too. 
Care credits acknowledge and compensate for 
contributions that were lost due to time spent out 
of the labour force—usually by women—caring for 
dependants. They can be provided irrespective of 
whether the care is provided to children, the elderly, 
the sick or people with disabilities, although in 
practice credits are primarily awarded for caring 
for children.117 In Uruguay, for example, women are 
credited with one year of contributions per child, up 
to a maximum of five children. Since 2010, mothers 
in the Plurinational State of Bolivia benefit from a 
care credit equivalent to one year of contributions per 
child, up to a maximum of three children. The credit 
can be used to get better benefits or to retire earlier.118 
Care credits are a valuable tool to improve 
women’s pensions in contributory systems, as 
part of a wider package of equality-enhancing 
measures, and contribute to redressing women’s 
socio-economic disadvantage in old age. They 
are less relevant in countries with low contributory 
coverage. In these cases, women will benefit most 
from the introduction of universal and adequate 
non-contributory pensions discussed in the next 
section. 
To be effective in redressing disadvantage, 
care credits need to be sufficiently generous to 
compensate for time spent on childrearing or other 
care-related employment breaks. At current levels, 
child credits show positive but limited impacts on 
women’s pension outcomes. In a number of OECD 
and EU countries, for example, mothers’ pensions 
would decrease by 3 to 7 percentage points on 
average if these credits did not exist.119 Where care 
credits are based on the minimum wage, as in Chile 
and Poland, this effectively penalizes women who 
earn above the minimum for periods spent out of the 
labour market.120  
In many pension schemes, care credits are paid 
to the main caregivers independent of their sex. In 
practice, however, credits accrue to women to a 
much greater extent than men, given that women 
take on the larger share of caring work. In Finland 
and Sweden, care credits are linked with ‘use-
or-lose’ leave and cash benefits for fathers, thus 
encouraging men to take on a greater sharing of 
caregiving and enabling transformative change in 
gender relations.121 By contrast, most of the newly 
created care credits in Latin America are targeted 
to mothers, excluding fathers or other caregivers. 
This is a missed opportunity to challenge gender 
stereotypes. 
The rising importance of social pensions
The relevance of non-contributory pensions—also 
referred to as basic or social pensions—is increasingly 
recognized. Social pensions are particularly 
significant in countries where the coverage of 
contributory social insurance schemes is limited 
and the majority of the labour force is in informal 
employment. Because individuals with limited 
contributory records tend to be concentrated among 
low-income groups, non-contributory social pensions 
are essential for old-age poverty prevention. 
Collective action by older women and men has been 
a key influence on both the introduction and the 
improvement of social pensions (see Box 3.6).122 
In the Philippines, older people’s associations—with the support of HelpAge International—successfully 
lobbied the Government to introduce social pensions in 2010. Older women have been at the forefront of 
these mobilizations. 
The Coalition of Services for the Elderly (COSE)—a local non-governmental organization—started its 
advocacy efforts for the introduction of social pensions in 2007. COSE drafted a social pensions bill, 
identified and approached potential sponsors in the legislature and mobilized its supporters to attend 
parliamentary committee hearings. These efforts were preceded by several years spent gathering 
evidence and building grassroots support through participatory research. 
Although convinced that a universal social pension is the best approach, COSE opted for a means-
tested scheme in the bill as a more realistic goal. COSE lobbied individual legislators, generated media 
coverage and used special occasions such as the International Day of Older Persons, to rally older 
BOX 3.6 
Advocating for social pensions: Civil society strategies in the Philippines
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Women benefit from universal pensions  
By 2014, HelpAge International had registered 
more than 100 social pension schemes around 
the world, with varying design, scope and 
impact.124 Women benefit disproportionately from 
the introduction of such schemes, given their 
greater longevity and large-scale exclusion from 
contributory pension schemes. 
In some countries—including the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Thailand 
and rural Brazil—access is granted as a universal 
right to all older persons. In the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, for example, Renta Dignidad has helped 
to make pension coverage almost universal—a 
significant achievement in a country that previously 
had very limited social protection for old age. 
Women are the majority of recipients of Renta 
Dignidad as well as of Mauritius’ Basic Retirement 
Pension and Chile’s Pensión Básica Solidaria.125  
In other countries, access is conditional on a 
pensions test and granted only if the applicant 
is not entitled to any other type of pension—be it 
contributory or based on widowhood or disability 
(e.g., Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Mexico and Nepal). Still 
others make access conditional on a means test 
with varying income thresholds, usually defined at 
the household level (e.g., Bangladesh, Chile, South 
Africa and Ukraine).
Women are most effectively reached as individuals 
by universal schemes that are either offered 
to all citizens or residents or that consider only 
whether the individual beneficiary is in receipt of 
any other pension. Universal or pension-tested 
benefits bolster women’s economic autonomy, 
strengthening their voice and agency within 
households and raising their social status.126 In 
contrast, means-tested pensions often require 
that households—rather than individuals—have no 
other income source. This means that they exclude 
women who live in households above the income 
threshold even if they have no access to personal 
income. This assumes that income from cohabiting 
spouses or other family members will be shared 
fairly, which is not always the case. 
The benefit levels of social pensions are almost 
always lower than those derived from contributory 
schemes, where men are over-represented. 
Annex 5 illustrates the enormous variation across 
countries in the level of benefits offered by basic 
pension schemes. In Mauritius, for example, which 
has had a universal social pension scheme since 
1958, the Basic Retirement Pension amounts to 
around $118 per month, equivalent to about five 
times the poverty line. By contrast, the Indira 
Gandhi National Old Age Pension in India and the 
Old-Age Allowance in Bangladesh offer benefits 
of around $3 per month—corresponding to only 
people in support of the campaign. In early 2010, demonstrators gathered in large numbers outside 
the presidential palace to make sure that the President signed the bill in the face of objections from the 
Ministry of Finance. Older people’s collective action was key to the eventual passing of the Expanded 
Senior Citizens Act in 2010. 
Since then, COSE has monitored the implementation of the law and developed concrete proposals for 
improving its delivery. Key challenges in this regard include the low value of the pension ($12/month) 
as well as its very narrow targeting. Currently the pension is only available to senior citizens aged over 
77 years who are frail or disabled and without either regular support from their family or other pension 
benefits. In 2014, the Government doubled the budget for social pensions, meaning that it can be 
extended to a greater number of people.123   
22 per cent of the poverty line. To the extent that 
women rely more heavily on non-contributory 
benefits than men, the adequacy of these benefits 
is of major concern from a gender equality 
perspective.127  
Recommendations 
The specific types of reforms required to redress 
women’s socio-economic disadvantage in old age 
depend on the economic and social context as well 
as on the extent and form of existing coverage. 
Combining contributory and non-contributory 
old-age pensions can be an effective way to 
advance towards national social protection floors. 
Universal social pensions are the best way to 
ensure an adequate standard of living for all older 
people, women and men, but they are particularly 
important for women, who have less access to 
contributory benefits, savings and assets in old 
age than men. For pension reforms to effectively 
support gender equality it is crucial to: 
• Mobilize older women and engage them, as 
well as women’s rights activists, in debates on 
pension reform
• Extend the reach of social pensions, 
particularly in low-income countries where 
the majority of older people currently lack any 
form of social protection in old age
• Pending the introduction of universal systems, 
choose pension testing over means testing 
based on household income to ensure that all 
women who do not have a pension of their 
own benefit from social pensions
• If means testing is chosen, adjust income 
thresholds to reflect the number of older 
people in the household and ensure that all 
eligible elderly people receive a social pension 
in their own name
• Equalize access to contributory pension 
schemes where these enjoy broad coverage 
and reduce gender gaps in benefit levels 
by adapting eligibility criteria and benefit 
formulas to women’s life course and 
employment patterns 
• Make care credits available to all caregivers, 
regardless of their sex, to compensate for 
contributions ‘lost’ during periods out of the 
labour force to look after dependants (whether 
children or elderly, sick or disabled family 
members).
INVESTMENT IN SOCIAL SERVICES:  
A LINCHPIN OF GENDER EQUALITY
SOCIAL SERVICES AND THE REALIZATION 
OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
Public investment in accessible and affordable good 
quality social services—including health, education, 
water and sanitation, as well as care provision—is 
key to the realization of economic and social rights, 
including the right to an adequate standard of 
living.128 Evidence shows that the effect of social 
services on poverty and inequality can exceed that 
of social transfers. Across OECD countries, in-kind 
social services increase disposable income by 
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By February 2015, the Ebola outbreak had claimed the lives of more than 9,000 people, mainly in 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.137 Lack of access to safe water, sanitation and other infrastructure 
as well as poor housing and overcrowding in urban slums have contributed to the rapid spread of the 
epidemic.138 And weakened by fiscal constraint, reductions in public sector employment and premature 
decentralization, health systems have struggled to respond.139 Ebola has taken a particularly harsh toll 
BOX 3.7 
Underinvestment in social services and the gender dimensions of Ebola 
around 30 per cent, compared to 23 per cent for 
social transfers in cash, almost halving poverty and 
reducing inequality by an average of 20 per cent.129  
In Brazil and Mexico, education and health services 
contribute twice as much to reducing income 
inequality as taxes and social transfers combined.130  
Social services are particularly important for 
women. Because of their reproductive and other 
gender-specific health needs, women rely on public 
health services to a far greater extent than men. 
They also tend to perform the bulk of unpaid health 
care, accompanying children and other relatives on 
medical visits and caring for sick family members 
at home. Where basic social services are lacking 
and care needs are great, women and girls’ unpaid 
workloads increase. Conversely, investment in basic 
services can reduce the demands of unpaid care 
and domestic work on women, freeing up time for 
other activities. A study from rural Senegal found, 
for example, that the time savings associated with 
small piped water systems and increased water 
availability allowed women to enhance productive 
activities and initiate new enterprises.131 A study of 
urban Morocco, in turn, showed that connection to 
the water grid increased women’s time for leisure, 
including social activities with neighbours and 
watching television.132 
Glaring disparities in service provision 
Millions of women and men are daily denied their 
rights to decent social services because of a lack 
of adequate public investment. Governments face 
enormous challenges to ensuring the availability, 
accessibility and quality of social services for all, 
without discrimination. On average, public per 
capita health expenditure increased between 
2000 and 2010 in most regions, but there are huge 
disparities in levels of expenditure and the share of 
GDP devoted to health care between developed 
and developing regions. In 2012, governments in 
the developed regions spent over 5,500 per capita 
on the health of their citizens (8.1 per cent of GDP), 
while the average numbers for South Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa were as low as $202 and $159 
(PPP) per capita (1.5 per cent and 3 per cent of GDP, 
respectively).133   
Low levels of spending on health translate into 
serious shortcomings in service delivery, including 
staff shortages and poor motivation, which are 
particular problems in rural areas. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, there are fewer than one physician per 1,000 
people and on average, one nurse and/or midwife 
per 1,000 people, while developed regions have 
16 and 9 times as many, respectively.134 According 
to the International Labour Organization (ILO),135 
10 million additional health workers are required 
globally to ensure the delivery of health services 
for all, most of them in Asia (7 million) and Africa 
(3 million). Health facilities also often lack essential 
equipment and medicines, or even energy or 
water supplies.136 The devastating consequences of 
underinvestment in health and other social services 
have become tragically clear with the ongoing 
Ebola epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa (see Box 3.7). 
on women and girls. Because they are over-represented among caregivers, nurses and cross-border 
traders, women have an increased risk of exposure, and more women than men have contracted the 
virus in Guinea and Sierra Leone.140 Some reports also claim that women are dying from Ebola in much 
greater numbers than are men.141 In addition, observations from the field point to a series of indirect 
consequences for women. Because medical staff are focused on Ebola and because many people 
are afraid of getting infected if they visit health facilities, women are not receiving treatment for other 
conditions; and childbirth has become more risky because maternal health clinics have had to close or 
pregnant women choose to stay home to give birth.142 
Affordability and accessibility are major issues, 
particularly for women who are less able to pay 
user fees or travel costs to reach facilities. Poor 
service quality as well as discriminatory social norms, 
stigmatization and fear of violence may also deter 
women and girls from using education, health, water 
or sanitation facilities. Addressing these barriers is 
essential to ensure their equal enjoyment of rights. 
Women have organized to improve their access 
to and delivery of social services through their 
involvement in water or school management 
committees, local health councils and patient 
forums.143 Ensuring the transformation of social 
services in the long term requires government 
action to hold service providers to account on 
gender equality outcomes. Such action must be 
bolstered by making information freely available to 
citizens, regularly monitoring the performance of 
providers as well as rewarding responsiveness and 
sanctioning neglect of women’s needs. Vigilant users 
and civil society organizations are also crucial to 
counter strategies by conservative lobbies or vested 
interests to subvert gender equality mandates during 
implementation. This is particularly important where 
service provision is contested, as is the case for sexual 
and reproductive health.144  
The remainder of the chapter focuses on three 
types of social services: health, care and water and 
sanitation. It reviews the extent to which current policy 
and provision in each of these areas supports gender 
equality and the realization of women’s economic 
and social rights. 
HEALTH SERVICES 
Biological differences between women and 
men—as well as socially determined differences 
in their rights, roles and responsibilities—have 
an impact on their health risks and status.145 
For example, although women across the 
globe tend to live longer than men, for both 
biological and behavioural reasons, their lives 
are not necessarily healthier. Lack of control 
over resources, the burden of unpaid care and 
domestic work and gender-based violence all 
undermine well-being among women. In some 
countries, gender-based discrimination dampens 
the general pattern of greater female longevity, 
such that female life expectancy at birth is similar 
to that of males.146 
The right to health is enshrined in a number of 
human rights treaties and instruments (see Box 
3.8). It goes beyond access to health services 
to encompass a range of factors influencing 
whether people can lead healthy lives. It is 
intimately connected to other economic and 
social rights, including rights to food, social 
protection, housing, water and sanitation as 
well as rights at work. For example, women’s 
greater morbidity in old age may be magnified 
by their lesser access to pensions, while women’s 
health risks during pregnancy are affected 
by the availability of paid maternity provision 
and health and safety conditions at work 
(see Chapter 2), as well as by their access to 
antenatal care.
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The right to health has been enshrined in a number of international treaties and conventions, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 25(1)) and the International Covenant 
on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (article 12 (2d)). 
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
explicitly states that ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning’ (article 12). The 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (1994) and the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) further clarified that women’s right to health includes 
reproductive health and rights. 
The right to health contains both freedoms and entitlements. Freedoms include the right to 
be free from non-consensual medical treatment, such as medical experiments and forced 
sterilization. Entitlements include the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a 
non-discriminatory basis, the right to prevention, treatment and control of diseases and the right to 
participate in health-related decision-making at the national and community levels. Health facilities, 
goods and services must be provided so that they are available, accessible, acceptable and of good 
quality for all without discrimination.
BOX 3.8 
The right to health 
Improving women’s access to health care 
Overcoming financial barriers to access to 
health care is an important first step towards 
the enjoyment of the right to health by all. Every 
year, about 100 million people are pushed below 
the poverty line as a result of catastrophic health 
costs, and even relatively small payments can 
result in financial catastrophe.147 Affordable 
health care is particularly important for women 
because they have less access to personal 
income, face costly health conditions, such 
as pregnancy and childbirth, and are often 
responsible for the health care of family 
members. As Figure 3.7 shows, across regions 
low-income women face major barriers to 
accessing health care to a far greater extent than 
high-income women. 
But even for better-off women, barriers to accessing 
health can be significant: in the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Haiti, Peru and Timor-Leste, for example, 
the majority of both higher- and lower-income 
women report major barriers. In addition to income, 
restrictions on mobility or the need to obtain 
consent from family members may limit women’s 
and girl’s access to health care, especially when 
health facilities are not nearby.148  Discrimination 
on the basis of race and ethnicity—among other 
factors—can also compromise women’s enjoyment 
of health care. In Nepal and Viet Nam, for example, 
ethnic and indigenous minority women are less 
likely than non-indigenous women to have access 
to contraception, antenatal care and skilled birth 
attendance.149 Patronizing and coercive practices 
Figure 3.7
Percentage of women who reported difficulties in accessing health care, by wealth quintile, 2010-2013  
 Women, particularly those from lower-income households, face major barriers to accessing health care
Source: ICF International 2015.
Note: Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified. The Demographic and Health Surveys ask survey respondents the following question: Many different factors can 
prevent women from getting medical advice or treatment for themselves. When you are sick and want to get medical advice or treatment, is each of the following a big problem or not? 
Getting permission to go to the doctor? Getting money needed for advice or treatment? The distance to the health facility? Not wanting to go alone? The data included in the figure capture 
the percentage of women who reported at least one of these problems.
of health providers may also keep women from 
consulting health services.150  
Efforts to extend coverage and ensure affordability 
of health care are critical to address financial 
barriers to women’s enjoyment of the right to 
health. Recently, many governments have begun 
to look at options to make health care more 
affordable, and the implications of different funding 
modalities for health services for gender equality 
are reviewed below. But achieving substantive 
equality in health also requires improvements in 
the quality of services as well as broader attitudinal 
and institutional change to address stereotyping, 
stigma and violence head-on. The section 
therefore goes on to examines how the delivery 
of health care can be transformed to enable all 
women and girls’ to have access to services, to 
address their specific health needs and to give 
them greater voice in the health system. 
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Out-of-pocket payments reinforce inequality
Most countries finance health care from a 
combination of sources, including government 
revenue, social insurance, community-based 
insurance, private insurance and out-of-pocket 
payments (OPPs). Each of these mechanisms has 
different implications for access to health services, 
for equity and for protection from the financial 
consequences of illness. 
OPPs at the point of service delivery are a highly 
inefficient and inequitable way of financing 
health care.151 In Africa, OPPs by households 
exceed public expenditure on health, while in 
richer regions such as Western Europe and North 
America they amount to only a small fraction of 
total health spending. In many countries, those 
living in poverty incur higher OPPs than other 
groups of the population because they are more 
often affected by sickness. Targeted measures to 
address the needs of poor and vulnerable groups 
in commercialized health systems—such as fee 
waivers or subsidies—have been put in place but 
have often proven ineffective in reducing out-
of-pocket expenditures.152 Current cutbacks in 
public health expenditure threaten to increase 
the financial burden on households. For example, 
between 2007 and 2011, OPPs for health care 
increased by 35 per cent in the United Republic of 
Tanzania, 8 per cent in the Ukraine and 6 per cent 
in Sri Lanka.153  
OPPs have also been found to reinforce women’s 
disadvantage in access to health care. Women’s 
OPPs have been found to be systematically 
higher than men’s in a number of countries, 
including Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Paraguay and Peru, not only because of gender-
specific health needs but also due to the greater 
prevalence of chronic illness and some mental 
health conditions among women.154 This also 
increases the likelihood of women not seeking 
care because of their lower capacity to pay.155 
Although women from poor households are most 
likely to forego treatment, a study from Latvia also 
found significant gender gaps in unmet need for 
health services among higher-income groups.156 A 
recent ethnographic study in Mali further showed 
that, where medical treatment requires co-
payments, access to health care for women and 
children hinged on the readiness of male partners 
and fathers to provide the necessary cash.157  
Making health care affordable: The quest 
for universal coverage 
Over the past two decades, several countries 
have started to roll out universal health coverage 
reforms, using a variety of approaches and 
funding sources to enhance affordability.158 
Universal health coverage is defined as ensuring 
that all people can use the promotive, preventive, 
curative, rehabilitative and palliative health 
services they need, of sufficient quality to be 
effective, while also ensuring that the use of these 
services does not expose the user to financial 
hardship.159 These experiences highlight both the 
potential and pitfalls of different approaches in 
terms of achieving substantive equality for women 
and girls.160 Gender equality outcomes can be 
assessed in terms of the numbers of women and 
men covered, as well as the types of services and 
degree of financial protection offered.161  
Whether or not the specific health needs of 
women and girls are adequately addressed is 
particularly important when universal coverage 
reforms define ‘essential service packages’ (ESPs). 
Decisions on what health conditions are included 
can be heavily gender-biased. In the late 1990s, 
for example, an assessment of publicly financed 
ESPs in 152 countries found that delivery care and 
emergency obstetric care were often missing.162 
Although unsafe abortions claim the lives of 
thousands of women each year, safe abortion is 
rarely included in ESPs, even where it is legal.163 
Where reproductive health needs are included, 
this is often done selectively, focusing on maternal 
health and safe delivery while ignoring the 
reproductive rights of adolescent girls and older 
women. 
Affordable health care in the United States 
The approval in 2010 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the United States 
was a watershed, bringing the country closer 
to universal health coverage after decades of 
failed attempts.164  Prior to the ACA, almost 16 per 
cent of US citizens had no health insurance, and 
since private insurers had significant authority to 
exclude applicants, set different rates or exclude 
certain medical treatments, even those with 
insurance could find themselves without cover for 
needed medical services. Once the ACA is fully 
implemented, health insurance will be mandatory 
for all citizens and insurance plans will be 
required to include basic health services. 
The Act is expected to vastly improve access 
to health services, including for women. It is 
expected, for example, that 47 million women will 
gain access to free preventative health care.165 
The ACA outlaws discriminatory pricing policies of 
private insurers that charge higher premiums to 
women and people with pre-existing conditions. 
It establishes mandatory, full-cost coverage of 
reproductive and family planning services as well 
as preventative medical services for women such 
as mammograms and cervical cancer screenings. 
And it foresees more comprehensive services for 
pregnant women and mothers on Medicaid and 
all women on Medicare.166  
Yet, while the ACA expands access to basic health-
care services, especially for women, it falls short of 
universal coverage for all without discrimination. 
Two main avenues for extending coverage—the 
expansion of employer-based insurance and 
of Medicaid—have in the past disadvantaged 
women, especially unmarried, poor and ethnic 
minority women, and are likely to do so in the 
future. 
First, employer-based insurance coverage allows 
companies to make decisions about the type of 
health plans they provide to workers, leading 
to variability in what is covered and how much 
employers contribute. This discretionary power 
was further bolstered by a 2014 Supreme Court 
ruling that allows certain employers to opt out of 
the newly introduced birth control benefits based 
on their religious beliefs.167 Higher-paid workers 
are more likely to have insurance through their 
employers and also to have better coverage 
than those in lower paid jobs. This has important 
gender implications given that women—
especially women of colour and immigrant 
women—are over-represented in low-wage 
occupations. 
Second, the eligibility rules and benefit levels of 
Medicaid vary and tend to be more restrictive 
in states that have a high proportion of women 
of colour in their population.168 Undocumented 
immigrants are excluded altogether from 
purchasing insurance coverage. Finally, the 
reform fails to address a major strategic health 
need of women by precluding any federal 
funding for abortion. As a result, the ‘right to 
choose’ will remain unaffordable for many, 
particularly those on low incomes. 
Expanding health coverage in Thailand 
In Thailand, the Government introduced the 
Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) starting in 
2001. Under this scheme, general revenue is used 
to pay the contributions of 80 per cent of the 
population, i.e., all those who are not already 
covered by public social insurance for private 
sector employees and civil servants.169 The 
introduction of the UCS followed a number of 
unsuccessful attempts to extend social insurance 
coverage to informal workers, who represent 
about 62 per cent of the workforce.170 The UCS 
enrols entire households and offers a relatively 
comprehensive benefit package, including a 
wide range of sexual and reproductive health 
services such as safe abortion in the case of 
rape and health risks.171 Because the state 
assumes almost the total cost of coverage 
for the majority of the population,172 the Thai 
system is comparable to the tax-financed health 
systems of Malaysia, Sri Lanka or the United 
Kingdom, which provide high levels of financial 
protection.173 
The UCS has achieved impressive results. By 
2010, total health coverage had reached 98 per 
cent of the population and the share of OPPs 
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in total health expenditure had fallen from 27 
per cent in 2002 to 14 per cent. Service utilization 
has increased among the previously uninsured, 
especially poor women of childbearing age and 
their infants.174 This dramatic progress is not only 
the result of the UCS as investment in the expansion 
of primary health-care centres, particularly 
in rural areas, has also ensured that universal 
coverage translates into access to services on 
the ground.175 Despite being formally covered 
under the UCS, however, some groups continue 
to experience access barriers. These include older 
women, women living in remote areas, as well as 
women and men from ethnic minority and migrant 
communities.176  
Scaling up community-based health 
insurance in Rwanda 
In contrast to tax- or social insurance-financed 
schemes at the national level, community-based 
health insurance (CBHI) targets lower-income 
populations with weak contributory capacity, 
often at the local level. CBHI schemes vary 
considerably but are usually based on solidarity 
among individuals with common geographic, 
occupational, ethnic, religious or gender 
characteristics, with risk being shared within that 
specific community. Membership is voluntary and, 
in most cases, CBHI schemes are run on a non-
profit and participatory basis.177  
CBHI schemes typically offer limited service 
packages and often exclude key health needs 
such as routine sexual and reproductive health 
services.178 Progress in extending coverage can 
also be painfully slow. In the United Republic 
of Tanzania, for example, it took social and 
community-based insurance schemes a decade to 
enrol only 17 per cent of the population.179 In Ghana, 
where community-based plans were absorbed into 
the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) from 
2003 onwards, almost two thirds of the population 
remained without coverage in 2011.180 Even when 
premiums are set at low levels, CBHI schemes often 
fail to reach the poorest groups: 39 per cent of 
women and 32 per cent of men in Ghana reported 
that they had not registered with the NHIS because 
the premium was too expensive.181 
The experience of CBHI in Rwanda has been 
more positive. CBHI schemes have been part 
of an overall strategy of the Government to 
rebuild the country’s health system after the 
1994 genocide. Mutuelles de Santé were piloted 
in three districts in 1999 and later extended 
to other districts. The Mutuelles enrol entire 
households and provide a minimum service 
package at the primary care level as well as 
a complementary services package at district 
level. Users contribute through co-payments,182 
but the poorest quarter of the population is 
exempt thanks to international donor funding. 
The service package includes family planning, 
antenatal and postnatal care, childbirth, HIV 
testing and treatment as well as prescribed 
drugs. By 2011/2012, the coverage of the 
Mutuelles had reached 91 per cent of the 
population.183 Together with pre-existing private 
and social insurance schemes, this has brought 
Rwanda close to universal coverage within a 
decade. 
The reforms in Rwanda have significantly 
reduced financial barriers to health-care access 
for women and expanded their uptake of 
services. The share of women who reported lack 
of money as the main barrier to accessing health 
care declined from 71 per cent in 2005 to 53 per 
cent in 2010. In the same period, skilled birth 
attendance increased from 39 per cent to 69 per 
cent and women’s use of modern contraceptive 
methods from 10 per cent to 25 per cent. Gaps 
in access between women from rural and 
urban areas and between women from higher- 
and lower-income groups have narrowed 
substantially and access has expanded for all 
groups.184 Box 3.9 highlights the dramatic impact 
of these changes on maternal mortality rates. 
These achievements have been bolstered by 
significant investments in health infrastructure 
and service delivery, heavily supported by 
international donors.185 A performance-based 
financing system rewards service providers for 
better patient follow-up. Improved indicators 
and monitoring systems track progress in health 
outcomes, including, for example, the proportion 
of women delivering at health facilities.186  
In 2013, sub-Saharan African countries accounted for an estimated 62 per cent of maternal deaths 
worldwide.187 Most of the complications responsible for women’s deaths during pregnancy and childbirth 
can be prevented by enhancing access to family planning, effective antenatal care and skilled birth 
attendance, including emergency obstetric care. However, take-up of these services is hampered by lack 
of information, inaccessible facilities and prohibitive costs. And shortcomings in the quality of care result in 
failures to diagnose and treat pregnancy-related complications.  
Rwanda’s experience shows that these barriers can be overcome. Following the 1994 genocide, it was 
among the poorest countries in the world, its health system lay in ruins and maternal mortality rates 
were well above the regional average. Yet, as shown in Figure 3.8, Rwanda has reduced the number of 
maternal deaths faster than most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, from 1,400 deaths per 100,000 
live births in 1990 to 310 in 2013. Along with Cabo Verde, Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda is one 
of only four countries in the region that are on track towards meeting the Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) target of reducing maternal mortality by three quarters between 1990 and 2015.188 
BOX 3.9 
Rwanda’s rapid decline in maternal mortality
Figure 3.8
Trends in the maternal mortality ratio: Rwanda and sub-Saharan Africa regional average, 1990-2013  
 Maternal mortality in Rwanda has declined faster than the regional average
Source:  WHO et al. 2014
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A combination of measures lies behind this impressive progress:189  
• The rapid roll out of health insurance removed financial barriers to accessing services, in particular 
for ambulance transfers to higher-level facilities for emergency interventions
• The nationwide expansion of adequately equipped public health centres with decentralized 
management allows for performance-based financing
• Well-trained community health workers (CHWs) provide antenatal care and delivery services in 
health centres as well as promoting hygiene, health insurance and family planning
• New mobile technologies help CHWs track pregnancies and enable a quick response to pregnancy-
related complications and referral for emergency obstetric care if needed
• CHWs and other health-care professionals are given incentives to meet maternal and child health 
targets and provide quality care, with regular visits to monitor compliance
• Participatory processes at the local level, which provide a mechanism to feedback problems and 
lessons into policy, are essential to enhancing accountability in the health system as a whole.
Overall, universal health coverage is an important 
step in the right direction and one from which 
women can benefit. But the experiences of 
Rwanda and Thailand demonstrate that in order 
to be effective, significant subsidies from general 
taxation or international aid are required to make 
up for the limited contributory capacity among 
low-income women and men. In both cases, the 
impressive improvements in health outcomes, 
particularly for women, are also the result of 
longer-term investments in decentralized health 
services and the development of administrative 
capacity to manage these effectively. This 
suggests that contributory social or community 
insurance schemes may not be the most effective 
way to achieve affordable access to health care, 
particularly in low-income countries where the 
amount of contributions that can be extracted 
from informal workers and other low-income 
groups is usually low.190 Instead, resources could 
be invested directly in the extension and operation 
of public health facilities with the aim of building 
national health systems that are free at the point of 
service delivery. 
Towards gender-responsive service delivery
Affordability is not the only barrier to equitable 
access to health care for women and girls. 
Gender-based differences and structural 
inequalities—including those resulting from 
stigma, stereotypes and violence—also need 
to be addressed at the service delivery level.191 
Gender norms and biases shape how women 
perceive their own health and influence 
whether and how they can act on their own 
health needs. At the household level, women’s 
health problems may be neglected because 
of the relatively low value attached to their 
lives, and resources for health care may be 
allocated preferentially to male household 
members.192  
Women also often need to obtain consent from 
family members to seek medical care. Figure 
3.9 shows that, across a range of countries, a 
significant proportion of women do not decide 
independently on their health care—more than 
two thirds of women in Senegal, for example.
Figure 3.9
Proportion of women who say they do not make the final decision on their own health care, 2010-2013  
 In many countries, women’s autonomy in relation to seeking health care is constrained
Source:  ICF International 2015.
Note: Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified. The data included in this figure captures the percentage of women who reported not having a final say alone or 
jointly (with husband/partner or other person) in their own health care. Regions are as follows: CEECA (Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia); Developed (Developed Regions); EAP 
(East Asia and the Pacific); LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean); MENA (Middle East and North Africa); SA (South Asia); SSA (sub-Saharan Africa). See UN Women’s regional groupings for 
the list of countries and territories included in each region in Annex 7. 
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Women’s access to health services may also 
be affected by the location, opening hours and 
staffing of health services. As Figure 3.10 shows, 
where services are far away, women may face 
transportation costs or safety risks that prevent them 
from seeking care, particularly if they live in rural 
areas. In some communities, women’s ability to move 
freely in public spaces is restricted, making it difficult 
for them to attend medical facilities outside their 
homes or to receive confidential medical advice. 
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Finally, women may be reluctant to consult 
doctors of the opposite sex or be culturally 
discouraged from doing so. In such cases, lack 
of female health staff constitutes a significant 
access barrier. In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
Ethiopia, Maldives, Peru, São Tomé and Príncipe 
and Timor-Leste, for example, half or more of the 
women reporting difficulties in accessing health 
care cite concerns over the availability of a female 
health provider.193  
Figure 3.10
Percentage of women who reported difficulties in accessing health care because of the distance to health facility, 
by location, 2010-2014 
 Distant health care services are a major barrier to access for many women, particularly those in rural areas
Source:  ICF International 2015.
Note: Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified. The data included in the figure captures the percentage of women who reported distance to the health facility as a 
problem in answering a question in the DHS on factors limiting access to health care (see note to Figure 3.7).
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Breaking down institutional barriers
Different measures can be taken to overcome 
these barriers. Multi-purpose clinics that integrate 
services—for example, sexual and reproductive 
health services alongside paediatric care—can 
save time for women who are in charge of children 
or other dependents. This increases the likelihood 
that women will seek advice or treatment for their 
own health problems.194 Upgrading village-level 
health centres, training community-based health 
workers for home visits and setting up systems 
for reliable emergency transport can make an 
important difference for women in rural areas, as 
the experience of Rwanda shows (see Box 3.9).
Outreach services can improve access, privacy 
and confidentiality for women who experience 
limits on their mobility or on their interaction with 
male care providers. In Pakistan, for example, 
the Lady Health Workers (LHW) programme 
provides door-to-door health services mainly 
for rural women who are unable to visit health 
facilities. Established in 1993, the programme 
has trained more than 100,000 women as 
community health workers (CHWs) who provide 
information, basic services and access to further 
care. The programme has been effective in 
improving maternal and child health care, 
including antenatal services and skilled assistance 
at birth. Positive outcomes include increased 
child immunization rates and greater uptake of 
contraceptives.195 The LHW programme has also 
strengthened the skills and capacities as well 
as income-earning opportunities of the women 
who are trained as CHWs. In a context where 
employment options for women are very limited, 
this has enhanced women’s status within their 
communities and households.196  
Addressing stereotypes, stigma and 
violence
Professional, respectful and non-abusive patient-
provider relations are an important aspect of 
quality health care broadly and of gender-
responsive service delivery specifically. For 
example, aggressive treatment of women during 
labour by overworked and underpaid health staff 
has been documented in maternity wards in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and sub-Saharan 
Africa.197 Action is needed to combat stigma, 
discrimination and abuse against women and girls 
who are seeking care.
The redesign of medical curricula and the provision 
of on-the-job training can address such problems 
and also enhance understanding among health 
providers of how gender norms and roles affect 
women’s health. Domestic violence is a case in point. 
Health-care providers have a critical role to play 
in detecting abuse and in caring for women who 
experience violence. Yet, without proper training and 
clear screening protocols or referral mechanisms, 
health personnel are often unable to identify and 
adequately support victims.198 They may also fail to 
respond in the face of obvious signs or even blame 
women victims, particularly in societies where 
violence against women is condoned. 
In the Dominican Republic, Profamilia, an 
affiliate of the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation, developed a comprehensive model for 
addressing this issue within its network of clinics.199  
The organization began training all clinic staff, 
developed a standard process for screening clients 
and created on-site spaces for psychological and 
legal counselling. Internal evaluations show that 
the programme changed the perception of service 
providers towards domestic violence, leading to 
a dramatic drop in the tendency to blame the 
victim. The experiences of women seeking care 
in their clinics also improved. Progress has also 
been made in the Pacific, where recent prevalence 
studies have detected high levels of violence 
against women (see Box 3.10).
Women’s organizations have often been at 
the forefront of uncovering and denouncing 
service delivery failures in health care, spurring 
important reforms. The mobilization of poor 
and marginalized women against low-quality 
maternal health services in Uttar Pradesh (India), 
for example, ushered in tangible improvements, 
including a reduction in demands for informal 
payments.200  In Peru, feminist lawyers and 
women’s rights organizations worked together 
to uncover mass sterilization campaigns that 
systematically targeted indigenous women in poor, 
rural communities, as part of a broader family 
planning programme. Their advocacy spurred 
an investigation by the national human rights 
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commission that eventually led to the programme’s 
reform.202 These and similar efforts pave the way 
for the wider transformation of health services to 
enable women’s enjoyment of their right to health. 
It is important to note, however, that the barriers 
to women and girls’ equal enjoyment of the right 
to health cannot be dismantled by the health 
system alone. For adolescent girls to realize their 
sexual and reproductive rights, for example, sex 
education in schools can be just as essential as 
access to confidential counselling and affordable 
contraception in health centres.203 Substantive 
equality in health requires broader changes in 
social norms and gender power relations as well 
as enabling policies that enhance women’s and 
girls’ rights and status.
Recommendations 
The transformation of health systems towards the 
achievement of substantive equality for women 
requires financial, geographical and social access 
barriers for women and girls to be removed and 
their health needs to be addressed head-on. In 
line with the social protection floor, national health 
systems that provide universal, affordable health 
Recent research on the prevalence of violence against women in the Pacific has been critical to spurring 
policy change, including in the health system. Prevalence studies from the Pacific Islands, supported 
by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the 
Governments of Australia and New Zealand, show that in 5 out of 10 countries for which data are 
available, intimate partner violence affects more than one out of two women. At 68 per cent, Kiribati 
has the highest rates of intimate partner violence in the region. In addition, 11 per cent of Kiribati women 
aged 15–49 reported physical violence by men other than their partners, most commonly by male family 
members including fathers or stepfathers, and 10 per cent reported having experienced non-partner 
sexual violence. The detrimental impacts of violence on women’s physical, sexual and mental health are 
well documented, including unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, miscarriages, sexually transmitted 
diseases, emotional distress and thoughts of suicide. 
In response, the Government of Kiribati has started to integrate the issue of violence against women 
into sexual and reproductive health programming by, for example, setting up a Women’s and Children’s 
Health facility in South Tarawa—close to a referral hospital and a shelter—that will support referral 
between psycho-social support, legal aid and health care. Gender-based violence coordinators have 
been put in place in the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Women, Youth and Social Affairs to 
support health promotion to outer islands, capacity building and improved availability of emergency 
contraceptives. Health providers have been trained, with support from UNFPA and the Auckland 
University of Technology, to follow a women-centred approach, allowing survivors to speak, finding 
solutions that they feel are safe for them and connecting them with other services. Special measures have 
been put in place to reach adolescents through community outreach, peer education and comprehensive 
sexuality education programmes. Improvements in health information systems, including standardized 
procedures for monthly reporting and for the assessment and management of violence against women, 
will help track progress.201
BOX 3.10 
Addressing violence against women through the health system: The case of Kiribati
care for all are the best way to ensure affordability 
and can be built gradually. To eliminate all barriers 
for women and girls, health systems need to: 
• Remove out-of-pocket payments and replace 
them with different financing mechanisms 
• Gradually move towards universal coverage 
that is affordable for all through national 
health systems or the effective combination of 
insurance contributions and public funding 
• Provide a basic level of care free of charge to 
all, independent of labour market and family 
status; at a minimum, sexual and reproductive 
health services should be available and 
affordable for all women and girls
• Invest in health service delivery, including 
in basic infrastructure, staff and essential 
medicines, to make universal coverage 
effective on the ground
• Upgrade village-level health centres, 
train community-based health workers for 
home visits and set up systems for reliable 
emergency transport to better reach women 
in rural areas 
• Train health staff in women’s rights and in the 
delivery of women-centred services
• Institutionalize mechanisms to enhance the 
accountability of service providers to women 
and girls, including effective monitoring and 
incentive systems, to make health services 
more gender-responsive. 
CARE SERVICES 
Care for dependent people—children, people 
with disabilities, the frail elderly, the chronically ill 
and others who need assistance in daily living—is 
intimately connected with health and other social 
services. This connection is particularly visible in 
the case of care for people with HIV and AIDS. 
Family and community caregivers in Kenya, 
Uganda, Zimbabwe and other countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, have been vocal in 
their demands for better health services, including 
access to anti-retroviral therapy, as well as for 
greater recognition and support of their unpaid 
caregiving (see story: A seat at the table).
The right to care and to be cared for
The international human rights framework has little 
to say on the right to care. Children’s right to care 
is explicitly recognized in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,204 for example, but there is 
little clarity on how this right is to be realized 
in ways that are equitable and do not infringe 
on women’s rights to an adequate standard of 
living, work, rest and so forth. The tendency has 
been to assume that mothers or other female 
family members are available to meet the care 
needs of children and other dependants on an 
unpaid basis. 
Feminists have long proposed that the rights to 
give and receive care should be recognized as 
human rights.205 More recently, interest in unpaid 
care and domestic work and its implications for 
women’s human rights has also been growing 
within the United Nations system. In her landmark 
report on unpaid care and domestic work, 
poverty and human rights, then United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda, argued 
that ‘heavy and unequal care responsibilities 
are a major barrier to gender equality and to 
women’s equal enjoyment of human rights, and, 
in many cases, condemn women to poverty. 
Therefore, the failure of States to adequately 
provide, fund, support and regulate care 
contradicts their human rights obligations, by 
creating and exacerbating inequalities and 
threatening women’s rights enjoyment.’206 
Against this backdrop, available, accessible and 
affordable care services have a double role to 
play. On the one hand, these services can promote 
the autonomy, rights and capabilities of those who 
need care and support. This has been a long-
standing demand of disability rights movements, 
for example. These movements have also 
denounced the fact that social services are often 
provided in ways that curtail rights by restricting 
the autonomy and preventing the full participation 
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of people with disabilities in their communities. 
People with disabilities are subjected to degrading 
procedures and confinement in institutions, often 
with high rates of abuse. Activists have also 
directly challenged the notion of care itself as 
disempowering and objectifying of people with 
disabilities, especially if it is conceived of as a one-
way flow of giving and receiving (see Box 3.11). 
On the other hand, care services can reduce 
the time constraints faced by those—especially 
women—who perform the bulk of unpaid care and 
domestic work on a day-to-day basis. As such, they 
play a pivotal role in promoting substantive equality 
for women. The availability of care services can help 
redress women’s socio-economic disadvantage by 
enhancing their ability to engage in paid work. Care 
services also contribute to the transformation of 
gender stereotypes by allowing women to move out 
of the home and into the public domain. In doing so, 
they can enable women’s enjoyment of a range of 
rights, including the rights to work, education, health 
and participation. 
In order to play these roles, care services must 
be affordable, accessible, of appropriate quality 
and respectful of the rights and dignity of both 
caregivers and care receivers.214 These conditions 
are far from being met at present. 
Early childhood education and care 
In most countries care services are still scarce, and 
where they exist their coverage and quality is often 
Research and advocacy on care have focused primarily on the rights and needs of caregivers, both 
paid and unpaid. They have highlighted the emotional and financial costs of caring and constructed a 
comprehensive policy agenda around greater recognition and material support for carers in terms of 
time, money and services.207 The rights and needs of care receivers, in contrast, have received relatively 
little attention in debates around care.208 The disability movement has forcefully exposed this bias. 
People with disabilities have broadened the policy agenda on care by identifying themselves as subjects of 
rights, not objects of care.209 Furthermore, they have drawn attention to the fact that people with disabilities 
are often caregivers themselves.210 In the fight for their human rights, people with disabilities have 
emphasized the importance of empowerment, autonomy and self-determination both in their lives and in 
how their support needs are met.211  
These challenges may seem to pit the rights of caregivers against those of care receivers. In fact, however, 
both constituencies share common histories, goals and interests. Both have struggled against oppression, 
inequality and discrimination. Both suffer from a lack of entitlements and social support systems that would 
protect them against impoverishment and exploitation.212 While each side has its specific concerns, there is 
a common agenda to be built around recognition and resources. 
For example, transformations in the physical and social infrastructure, by providing better and more 
accessible transport options, enhance the autonomy of people with disabilities while at the same time 
reducing the demands on those who support them. Alliances must be forged between the disability rights 
movement and organized caregivers around common demands for affordable, accessible and adequate 
services and infrastructure to work towards ‘a fulfilling life both for the carer and the cared-for’.213 
BOX 3.11 
Care and the rights of people with disabilities 
uneven. Data on early childhood education and 
care (ECEC) services illustrate this point.215 Across 
OECD countries, for example, coverage of ECEC 
services for children aged 0–2 years, when the 
care burden on women is largest, lags far behind 
coverage for children aged 3–5 years. Coverage 
for 3–5-year-olds is above 70 per cent in most 
OECD countries and close to universal in some, 
whilst average coverage for 0–2-year-olds is only 
about 33 per cent, with important variations across 
countries.216 Coverage is particularly low among 
Eastern European countries, where public support 
for family-friendly policies declined significantly 
with the transition from state socialism to a market 
economy. Meanwhile, the Nordic countries, the 
Netherlands and France, Malta and the Republic of 
Korea achieve high levels of coverage among the 
under-3s.
In addition, care services for under-3s are rarely 
provided free of charge and costs vary as widely 
as coverage rates. In OECD countries, the average 
cost of full-time care for 2-year-old children is just 
over 16 per cent of average earnings, but this ranges 
from less than 5 per cent in Greece to over 30 per 
cent in Switzerland. The high cost of childcare may 
restrict women’s ability to work outside the home or 
force parents to opt for informal care arrangements, 
which offer varying levels of quality and are often 
dependent on relatively low-paid female workers.217  
Figure 3.11
Net enrolment rates in pre-school and childcare, in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2012 
 In Latin America, childcare services have been extended, but coverage rates remain low, particularly for 
younger children
Source: ECLAC 2014a.
Note: Data refer to the most recent available. a. For pre-school education net enrolment was estimated based on linear models using household surveys in countries with available 
information. The age groups vary depending on the official school starting age of each country. b. Urban areas only
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Source: ECLAC 2014a. 
Note: Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified. a. Urban areas only
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Figure 3.12
Pre-school attendance rates by income quintile in Latin American countries, 2006-2012  
 In Latin America, children from higher income households are more likely to be in pre-school than children 
from lower income households
Public investment in ECEC services has been 
gaining ground on the policy agenda of both 
developed and developing countries. In Europe, 
there has been a gradual shift in spending over 
the last 15 years away from child-related financial 
transfers in favour of ECEC services, along with 
greater efforts to direct expenditure towards 
younger children.218 Even countries such as 
Germany and the Netherlands—often considered 
strongholds of traditional family policies—have 
made significant investments in the expansion of 
childcare services for under-3s.219 
East Asia and the Pacific as well as Latin America and 
the Caribbean have also seen significant progress 
in the expansion of ECEC services. Pre-primary 
enrolment for children in these two regions jumped 
by 30 and 21 percentage points, respectively, 
between 1999 and 2012.220 Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show, 
however, that in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
where more detailed data are available, average 
coverage for under-3s remains at very low 
levels and inequalities across income groups are 
significant. Some countries in the region have made 
important strides to scale up ECEC services and also 
succeeded in reducing income-based inequalities in 
access to these services, as discussed further below. 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay have 
invested in provision both at the preschool (3–6 
years) and day-care (0–3 years) levels.221  
Balancing educational and childcare 
needs 
In many developed countries as well as in Latin 
America, preschool and day-care services have 
developed in parallel.222 The educational model 
of preschool services holds that children need 
access to schooling before reaching the age 
of compulsory education. This model tends to 
be quite universalist, that is, concerned about 
the early education of all children. However, 
it is not necessarily in tune with the needs of 
working parents. Indeed, preschool services 
often run only part-time programmes. Day-
care provision, by contrast, is based on a work-
family conciliation model aimed at enabling 
parents to work outside the home and protect 
their offspring while they do so. However, unlike 
preschool services, which are offered to all 
children, this type of provision has tended to be 
more targeted, focusing on children from low-
income or vulnerable households.
Recent efforts to expand ECEC services in 
Chile and Mexico illustrate this split. In Mexico, 
preschool services for 3–5-year-old children 
are integrated into the broader educational 
system, with preschool enrolment mandatory 
for this age group since 2002. This strategy, 
which has also been pursued in Argentina, has 
helped raise attendance and reduce coverage 
gaps between high- and low-income groups. 
However, reflecting their educational mission, 
most preschools run only half-day programmes, 
limiting the extent to which they can free working 
parents from their childcare responsibilities. 
Access to formal, full-time day care, especially 
for younger children, has been largely restricted 
to women in formal employment.223  
To remedy this shortcoming, in 2007 the Mexican 
Government launched the Federal Day-Care 
Programme for Working Mothers (Programa de 
Guarderías y Estancias Infantiles para Apoyar 
a Madres Trabajadoras). This programme 
promotes the creation of home- or community-
based day-care centres for children from low-
income households, where parents have no 
access to other day-care services. The Hogares 
Comunitarios in Colombia and Guatemala 
follow a similar approach.224 In Mexico, parents 
are supported through a voucher system that 
reduces user fees on a sliding scale based on 
household income. The achievements in terms 
of expanded coverage have been remarkable. 
The programme now constitutes the single most 
important source of day care for children under 
the age of 4, running 84 per cent of day-care 
centres in the country and absorbing 56 per cent 
of total enrolment for that age group. 
The programme is an important step towards 
universal access to childcare services. However, 
there are concerns over the quality of services. 
The programme has a significantly lower budget 
than services available to formal workers who 
contribute to social security, and there are 
lower requirements in terms of staff educational 
credentials and basic infrastructure. The 
quality of jobs that have been created is also 
questionable. Paid caregivers and their assistants 
are self-employed and thus lack access to social 
protection. Caregivers have complained about 
the low level of subsidies, suggesting that it is 
difficult to both comply with programme delivery 
requirements and earn a decent wage.225  
Chile has also made progress in terms of 
equalizing access to childcare services, especially 
since 2006. In contrast to Mexico, day-care 
services were expanded by increasing the 
availability of tax-financed public services 
for 0–3-year-old children from lower-income 
households. As a result, coverage increased 
from 17 per cent in 2006 to 26 per cent in 2011 
and the gap in access to these services between 
socio-economic groups has also decreased.226 
In addition, efforts have been made to provide 
services in ways that meet the needs of working 
mothers by ensuring that the majority of newly 
created childcare centres offer full-day and 
extended schedules. Yet, in common with Mexico, 
day-care services for under-3s are followed by a 
preschool system for 4- and 5-year-old children 
that offers largely part-time programmes and 
operates on a school year calendar, with extensive 
holidays. 
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Care of dependent adults 
As shown above, ageing represents a growing 
challenge for the provision of income security 
through adequate pension schemes. It also creates 
new requirements for care. Some developed 
countries, including Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
provide tax-financed long-term care services for 
the elderly, while both Japan (since 2000) and the 
Republic of Korea (2008) have introduced long-term 
care insurance following the example of Germany 
(1995). Through these systems, older people have 
access to a range of services depending on the 
intensity of their care needs, including ambulant and 
home-based care as well as institutionally based 
day care and residential and nursing homes.227  
In general, however, policy responses to the care 
needs of dependent adults—including frail elderly 
people and people with disabilities—have been 
gaining ground more slowly than those responding 
to the needs for childcare, even in developed 
countries. Public expenditure on elderly care remains 
low.228 Families, friends, neighbours and community 
networks provide the bulk of long-term care, with 
women assuming most of the related unpaid work.229 
Meanwhile, in middle- and lower-income countries, 
services for the frail elderly and other care-
dependent adults remain very limited. In Myanmar, 
Thailand and Viet Nam, for example, governments 
have supported non-governmental organizations in 
the recruitment and training of volunteer caregivers 
and the creation of self-help groups as a way 
to manage the rising share of older people who 
require assistance.230 In other countries, such as 
China and Singapore, legislation has been put in 
place to stipulate the obligation of adult children to 
provide care for their elderly parents by threat of 
jail or fines.231 In both cases, state commitment in 
terms of funding and service delivery is minimal. As 
a result, there are few alternatives to unpaid family 
care, which can have enormous economic and 
psychological costs for women. 
A recent survey of long-term care arrangements 
in China, Mexico, Nigeria and Peru found that the 
principal caregivers of care-dependent older people 
with dementia were mostly women—daughters 
or daughters-in-law as well as spouses—and that 
many of them had cut back on paid work in order to 
provide unpaid care and domestic (see Table 3.3).232 
As in high-income countries, unpaid caregiving was 
associated with significant psychological strain.233  
With the exception of households in Beijing and Lima, 
few could afford to hire paid caregivers to ease the 
burden.
Table 3.3
Care arrangements for older people in China, Mexico, Nigeria and Peru
Peru Mexico China Nigeria
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Principal caregiver is 
female
86% 89% 83% 82% 67% 50% n/d
Principal caregiver 
has cut back on paid 
work to care
16% 23% 25% 37% 4% 48% 39%
Paid caregiver 33% 8% 4% 1% 45% 2% 2%
Source: Based on Mayston et al. 2012, Table 1.
Towards an integrated response: Care and 
the definition of national social protection 
floors
Care services are crucial for the achievement 
of substantive equality for women and girls. In 
order to address the rights of caregivers and care 
receivers comprehensively, however, a combination 
of investments are required: in basic social 
infrastructure, from water and sanitation to public 
transport systems; in social services, from primary 
health care to school feeding programmes; and 
in social transfers, from disability benefits to paid 
parental leave. This should also be kept in mind 
in the design of national social protection floors. 
Setting priorities for investment in social protection 
should include a thorough assessment of the needs 
of caregivers and care receivers to make sure that 
policies contribute to the recognition, reduction and 
redistribution of unpaid care and domestic work. 
The combination of transfers and services that will 
best respond to this goal depends on the national 
context. Low-income countries with serious deficits 
in basic social services might choose initially to 
focus on expanding access to safe drinking water, 
particularly in rural areas, to reduce the demands 
on women and girls’ time and energy. Middle- and 
high-income countries, on the other hand, might 
place greater emphasis on work-family conciliation 
policies, including parental leave and child and 
elderly care services. In both cases, priorities for 
social protection should be determined through 
open dialogue, involving all stakeholders, and with 
the active participation of women.  
Uruguay has pioneered such a process with the 
creation of a National Care System (Sistema 
Nacional de Cuidados) in 2011. Starting in 2007, 
the Government engaged in extensive civil 
society consultations in order to redesign its social 
protection framework. Women’s rights advocates 
have actively participated in this process, placing 
care squarely onto the government agenda (see 
Box 3.12). The ensuing National Care System is 
explicitly framed around gender equality and the 
human rights of caregivers, both paid and unpaid, 
as well as care receivers, including children, older 
people and people with disabilities. 
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The combined actions of women’s organizations, female legislators and feminist academics have 
been central in placing care on the public and political agenda in Uruguay.234 A network of women’s 
organizations—the Red de Género y Familia—and feminist academics began collaborating in the mid-
2000s. Together, they forged a common understanding of care from the point of view of gender equality 
and human rights, collected data, analysed existing policy frameworks and identified coverage gaps. 
The results of two time-use surveys, conducted by the National Statistical Institute, the National Women’s 
Agency and UN Women, provided powerful evidence on the unequal distribution of unpaid care and 
domestic work between women and men. They also highlighted other inequalities in access to care 
based on income and life course stage.235  
In 2008, the Red de Género y Familia organized roundtable discussions in order to bring government 
officials, civil society organizations and care service providers together to discuss these issues. The 
sessions brought the insufficient and fragmented nature of existing care services to the fore, giving rise 
to the idea of an integrated national care system. Female members of the ruling left-wing party Frente 
Amplio successfully placed this idea on the political agenda, such that the Frente Amplio’s re-election 
platform for 2010–2014 included the promise to create a national care system. After the Frente regained 
power, the Government organized 22 debates across the country to ensure broad participation in 
defining the new system, including by women’s organizations, pensioners, caregivers and their families, 
programme administrators, service providers and regional and local authorities. The Cabinet approved 
the ensuing proposal for the National Care System in 2011. 
The proposal is ambitious and explicitly rights-based, with reference to international and regional 
conventions and agreements. It is universal in thrust, starting with the most disadvantaged and foreseeing 
the progressive expansion of benefits and services. Caregivers, both paid and unpaid, were identified 
as a key target group for government support alongside three groups of care receivers: preschool 
children, the elderly and people with disabilities. Measures have been proposed to improve the working 
conditions and wages of paid care workers and increasing support for unpaid family caregivers. There is 
also a commitment to promote a more equal sharing of care responsibilities between women and men, 
including through awareness-raising campaigns as well as special incentives for hiring male care service 
staff.236 
These achievements notwithstanding, the actual implementation of the system’s components has been 
slow. One of the key challenges is to place the system on a secure financial footing. In parallel, strategic 
planning processes need to be scaled up in order to ensure implementation, including concrete goals, 
timelines and budgets as well as a clear definition of institutional leadership for different components of 
the system. To achieve these outcomes, civil society coalitions need to keep up the pressure and ensure 
that care remains high on the political agenda.
BOX 3.12 
Towards a national care system in Uruguay: The role of women’s agency 
Recommendations 
Care services are an essential component 
of social service provision and a powerful 
tool for promoting substantive equality for 
women. They support women to access better 
employment opportunities and reduce social and 
intergenerational inequalities by making extra-
familial care available and affordable for lower-
income and disadvantaged households. In order 
to reap the ‘double dividend’ in terms of women’s 
economic empowerment and child health and 
education, the ways in which services are delivered 
is fundamental. Priorities include:
• Improve the reach and quality of care services 
for both children and care-dependent adults  
• Develop comprehensive national care 
strategies through participatory processes, 
with implementation aiming at the progressive 
expansion of services and entitlements
• Consider making preschool education 
compulsory and invest in the provision of public 
childcare services to reduce access gaps in the 
context of high income inequalities  
• Make early childhood education and care 
services compatible with the needs of working 
parents and improve quality standards 
through curricular development and the 
professionalization of caregivers 
• Include assessment of and response to care 
needs, including those of older people and 
people with disabilities, in the development of 
national social protection floors, selecting the 
best combination of transfers and services for 
the national context
• In low-income countries, introduce or expand 
school feeding programmes as well as 
investments in water and sanitation to alleviate 
the burden on unpaid caregivers.
WATER AND SANITATION
In 2010 the United Nations General Assembly finally 
recognized the right to safe drinking water and 
sanitation as a fundamental human right (see Box 
3.1).237 However, despite significant progress since 
the early 1990s, close to a billion people in 2012 
were still without access to an ‘improved’ water 
source, defined by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) as water from a protected well, protected 
spring, collected rainwater or tap.238 Oceania and 
sub-Saharan Africa have the highest proportion of 
people who rely on unsafe water sources, including 
surface water from rivers, streams or ponds as 
well as unprotected open wells.239 Across the 
developing world, urban access to improved water 
is higher than rural access and high-income groups 
have significantly better access than low-income 
groups. In Sierra Leone, for example, 87 per cent 
of urban households have access to drinking water 
compared to 35 per cent of rural households.240 Even 
in urban areas, however, the reliability, quality and 
affordability of access for the poorest households 
are often insecure.241  
Similarly, over 2.5 billion people still have no access 
to improved sanitation facilities such as flush toilets, 
composting toilets or ventilated improved pits.242 
Of these, 700 million use shared facilities, which 
pose particular problems for women and girls due 
to their lack of privacy and safety. As with water, 
poorer and rural households are much less likely 
than wealthier and urban households to have 
access to improved sanitation. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, for example, 73 per cent of households 
from the richest fifth of the population have access 
to improved sanitation compared to 15 per cent 
of households from the poorest fifth.243 Globally, 
open defecation remains the norm for over 1 billion 
mainly rural people.244  
Even when improved water and sanitation are 
available in or near the dwelling, inequalities 
within households can affect women’s ability to 
use them. For instance, the Special Rapporteur 
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on the human right to safe drinking water and 
sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque, reported 
that in her mission to Senegal in 2012 she visited 
families ‘where the water connection tap was closed 
with a padlock in order to control consumption. 
Women and children complained about the lack of 
water for personal hygiene and housekeeping; in 
some cases, the key to the lock was held by the male 
head of the household’.245 
Realizing women’s rights to water and sanitation 
requires attention to decisions about who gets 
water for which purposes, who gets access to 
sanitation and how wastewater from sanitation is 
treated and disposed of, all of which reflect power 
dynamics and political prioritization. Existing data 
are insufficient to give a full picture of these issues. 
Most information about water and sanitation is 
gathered through household surveys, which do not 
disaggregate based on sex for most issues. This can 
mask intra-household inequalities.246 The Special 
Rapporteur has suggested that household surveys 
should be amended to capture these inequalities ‘by 
focusing on the actual use of water, sanitation and 
hygiene by all individuals within a household’. She 
has also urged for specific efforts to measure ‘the 
ability of all women and adolescent girls to manage 
menstruation hygienically and with dignity’.247 
Collecting data on the actual use of water and 
sanitation facilities at public places, such as schools 
and hospitals, is also crucial for building a better 
understanding of whether women and girls are able 
to enjoy this right. 
Inadequate access to water and sanitation 
jeopardizes women’s health
Apart from constituting a human rights violation in 
itself, the lack of adequate water and sanitation 
indirectly limits women’s enjoyment of range 
of other rights, such as those to education and 
health and to live free from violence. One of the 
major obstacles to girls’ education in developing 
countries, for example, is the lack of sanitation 
facilities that allow adolescent girls to deal with 
menstruation. 
Ill health caused by the lack of adequate water 
and sanitation increases the need to care for sick 
family members, a responsibility that falls primarily 
on women and girls. Women are also susceptible 
to greater health risks from certain water and 
sanitation-related diseases because of their caring 
role. For instance, trachoma, an infectious eye 
disease that can lead to blindness, spreads easily in 
overcrowded conditions and where there is a lack of 
safe water and sanitation.248 The disease affects 2.2 
million people worldwide. Women have been shown 
to be 1.8 times more likely than men to be infected 
because, as primary carers for the sick, they are more 
likely to be in close contact with infected individuals.249
Menstruation, pregnancy and pregnancy-
related conditions, as well as taboos and stigmas 
surrounding these, mean that safe water and 
adequate sanitation facilities are particularly 
important for women. During labour and childbirth, 
a hygienic environment, including safe water and 
sanitation, is paramount for the survival and health 
of both mother and child.250 Obstetric fistula—a 
pregnancy-related complication affecting 2 million 
women in Africa and Asia—leads to incontinence 
and in turn to social stigmatization as well as severe 
health problems. Lack of access to water and 
sanitation reinforces the stigma against women, who 
need to wash and bathe frequently.251  
Meanwhile, latrines continue to be constructed 
without facilities or spaces for women to wash 
themselves and use their sanitary method of choice, 
and they frequently provide no means for disposal 
of sanitary products. In addition, sanitary napkins 
are often unavailable or unaffordable because they 
are not considered essential commodities within 
health systems and may have to be imported. In their 
absence, women and girls are often forced to use 
unhygienic sanitary methods, such as rags, dirt, ash 
or newspaper. 
Women generally place higher priority than men 
on having a toilet in the home and require more 
privacy in order to attend to their needs. However, 
they rarely have the control over household 
resources that would enable them to make the 
decision to invest in a toilet. Where there are no 
sanitation facilities, women and girls will often only 
relieve themselves under the cover of darkness, 
seeking private spaces and potentially risking 
violence or attack by animals on the way.252 Women 
and girls who use shared sanitation facilities in 
informal settlements may be exposed to a very 
real threat of violence.253  
Stigmatization can result in social 
exclusion from water and sanitation 
services
Even where water and sanitation services are 
available, stigma can result in entire groups 
being disadvantaged and excluded from access 
based on caste, race, ethnicity or gender.254 In 
India, for example, Dalits are often not allowed 
to use taps and wells located in non-Dalit areas, 
and Dalit women are made to stand in separate 
queues near the bore well to fetch water after 
the non-Dalits have finished.255 In Slovenia, the 
requirement of proof of ownership or authorized 
occupation for receiving municipal services has 
been a major barrier to Roma communities’ 
access to water. Experience with waiving such 
requirements has been positive: all but three of 
the 38 Roma settlements in Prekmurje region, 
for example, have gained access to water and 
sanitation after removal of these conditions. By 
contrast, targeting vulnerable groups can further 
entrench stigmatization. Shower programmes 
for Roma children in some Eastern European 
Source: UN 2012.
Note: Based on population-weighted averages from 25 countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
62+23+6+9A Women62%Men23%
Boys
6%
Figure 3.13
Percentage distribution of the water collection burden, in sub-Saharan African households without piped water 
on the premises, 2006-2009 
 Women and girls are the primary water carriers for their families in sub-Saharan Africa
Girls
9%
181
municipalities, for example, had ‘the unintended 
effect of identifying them as being too “dirty” to 
receive education’.256
Stigma is often linked to perceptions of 
uncleanliness. This affects the rights of 
menstruating women and girls, women with 
obstetric fistula and women living with HIV, 
who may face seclusion, reduced mobility and 
restricted access to shared water and sanitation 
facilities. Societal silence and individual shame 
combine to keep women’s and girls’ water 
and sanitation needs, including for menstrual 
hygiene, invisible. 
Water collection puts a major strain on 
women and girls
In sub-Saharan Africa, only 55 per cent of 
households are within 15 minutes of a water source. 
Women and girls are the primary water carriers for 
their families, doing the fetching in over 70 per cent 
of households where water has to be fetched, as 
shown in Figure 3.13.257 Where rural water sources 
are distant, women walk up to two hours to collect 
water. Where urban water is obtained from shared 
standpipes, they may wait in line for over an 
hour.258 Survey data for 25 countries in the region 
indicate that women spend a combined total of 
16 million hours per day collecting water.259 Case 
studies from around the world show that water-
related ‘time poverty’ translates into lost income 
for women and lost schooling for girls.260 Fetching 
and carrying water also causes wear-and-tear to 
women’s bodies, and high levels of mental stress 
may result when water rights are insecure.261  
Increasing the availability, affordability and accessibility 
of water and sanitation provision is a priority for 
enhancing substantive equality because women are 
disproportionately burdened with poor health and 
unpaid care and domestic work in their absence.262 
Conversely, enhanced access to water has been 
associated with increases in women’s productive 
activities as well as children’s school attendance.263 
A regular supply of water piped into the household is the 
ideal but is not the reality for most women and girls in 
low-income countries, especially in rural or marginalized 
urban areas. A large proportion of the world’s poor rely 
on a ‘patchwork quilt of provision’,264 including water 
standpipes, water kiosks and delivery agents. These 
sources count as ‘improved’ but may still require women 
and girls to walk long distances or queue up for hours. 
It has therefore been suggested that, after 2015, one of 
the indicators for access to basic water should be the 
percentage of the population using an improved source 
with a total collection time of 30 minutes or less for a 
round trip including queuing.265 
Standpipes have also been found to charge prices 
several times higher than those associated with a 
network connection for low-income households in Benin, 
Kenya, Mali, Senegal and Uganda.266 Water resellers 
often charge a much higher per unit price than public 
utilities. The further away from the household, the higher 
the price—even without considering opportunity costs 
that arise from travelling and waiting time, particularly 
for women and girls. 
Regulating private sector participation in water 
and sanitation 
Investing in water and sanitation for women and girls 
is not only a necessary step towards the fulfilment 
of international human rights commitments but also 
makes good economic sense. Overall, the benefits in 
terms of health and productivity gains exceed the costs 
of providing and maintaining water and sanitation 
services.267 As is the case with other public goods, 
however, water and sanitation are unlikely to be delivered 
affordably, equitably and at scale by markets alone. They 
are hence clear candidates for public investment. 
In low-income slums or other informal settlements, 
where initial capital investment and set-up costs are 
high and short-term returns on investment are low, 
the state may be the only actor willing and able to 
finance the expansion of services.268  Community-
based approaches—such as rainwater harvesting, 
treadle pumps or community-based total sanitation 
campaigns—are also unlikely to go to scale 
without state support.269 Public involvement and 
regulation are necessary to ensure that water and 
sanitation services remain affordable and reflect 
the needs of marginalized groups. Even where 
network connections are available, hardware costs 
and connection and supply charges can present 
formidable access barriers, particularly for low-
income households, and may require subsidies.
Private sector participation in water and sanitation 
provision has had mixed results for availability 
and affordability. There are cases of success 
in increasing access to water and sanitation 
through privatization. In Senegal, for example, 
the private company SdE (Sénégalaise des Eaux) 
expanded the number of connected households 
from 58 per cent to 87 per cent, with many of 
these being subsidized ‘social’ connections 
where the connection fee is waived and 20 
cubic meters of water is provided every two 
months at a subsidized rate.270 Meanwhile, the 
Government continues to support the installation 
and maintenance of infrastructure, particularly 
in rural areas.271 However, there have also been 
spectacular failures in water privatization. In 
the early 2000s, for example, Argentina, the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Indonesia and 
the Philippines all terminated their concession 
agreements with private providers in response to 
public protest—often with women at the forefront—
or court disputes over tariff hikes.272  
In any case, an effective regulatory framework 
is key to ensuring that services continue to be 
extended to underserved areas, are provided 
to all groups without discrimination and remain 
affordable for the whole population.
Ensuring access and affordability 
A variety of approaches can be used to enhance 
affordability in networked water supply. These 
include waiving or subsidization of connection and 
supply charges, regulating tariffs and providing 
targeted subsidies to ease the financial burden on 
poor households. 
In Cambodia, for example, the publicly owned 
Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA), set up 
in the 1990s, was particularly successful in providing 
water access to the urban poor. The company’s 
pro-poor approach includes connection subsidies 
(up to 100 per cent), possibilities to pay in instalments 
for poorer households and a ban on disconnection. 
The cost of water is reportedly 25 times cheaper than 
before, while the service level has been maintained.273 
The company has also been proactive in seeking out 
households in need of financial assistance and raising 
awareness about the availability of subsidies. 
In South Africa, the right to water is enshrined in the 
Constitution. To fulfil this right, public authorities use 
various strategies for the provision of free basic water 
and sanitation services. Each household is entitled 
to a supply of 6,000 litres of free, safe water per 
month, and ventilated improved pit latrines and flush 
toilets are being installed to replace bucket latrines 
in townships. However, the implementation of this 
policy has highlighted concerns about how minimum 
entitlements are defined (see Box 3.13).
In 2009, the Constitutional Court of South Africa ruled on a case concerning access to water in Soweto, 
Johannesburg: Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg. The five complainants from an informal 
settlement, of whom four were women, were from households with between 3 and 20 people living in 
them. In line with South Africa’s constitutional guarantee of the right to water, Johannesburg implemented 
the Free Basic Water policy to provide all households with at least 25 litres of water per day by installing 
prepaid meters that provide water up to a defined maximum (6 kilolitres per month). Beyond this, users were 
required to purchase credit to obtain water from the meters. 
BOX 3.13 
Women claiming the right to water at South Africa’s Constitutional Court 
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Subsidising water use 
Subsidies are a suitable affordability mechanism 
where a large share of the population is connected 
to a network. Chile, for example, has been 
operating a tax-financed water subsidy for low-
income households since 1989. The subsidy covers 
between 25 per cent and 85 per cent of the cost 
of the first 20 cubic meters of water per month. In 
Colombia, a solidarity-based tariff scheme has 
been put in place whereby low-income households 
receive a graduated subsidy financed out of the 
higher tariffs paid by wealthier households.277  
But where network access is limited, subsidies can 
exclude those who struggle the most in accessing 
affordable water. Subsidizing and regulating the 
water sources that are actually used by the poor—
including standpipes and water kiosks—may be a 
better strategy in these contexts.278 Kenya’s overhaul 
of the water and sanitation sectors in the early 
2000s, for example, was driven by a pro-poor 
approach and explicitly sought to enhance the right 
to safe drinking water.279 Water kiosks are required 
to sell safe water at controlled affordable prices 
and offer alternative payment options for those 
who cannot afford a monthly bill. The new tariff 
guidelines also establish a maximum of 5 per cent of 
household expenditure on water and sanitation. 
Towards gender-responsive water and 
sanitation policies
Efforts to improve the availability and affordability 
of water and sanitation services must also take 
women’s specific water and sanitation needs into 
account and actively work towards strengthening 
the ability of women and girls to voice their 
concerns. This goes beyond providing a tap and a 
toilet in every home. 
Women’s participation at different levels is crucial 
for the development of gender-responsive 
and effective water and sanitation initiatives. 
Experiences from Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Nepal, 
Pakistan, South Africa and the United Republic of 
Tanzania suggest that placing women at the centre 
of water decisions leads to improved access, more 
cost-effective delivery and less corruption in water 
financing.280 Women have also been essential to the 
success of community-led total sanitation (CLTS), a 
subsidy-free approach that encourages people to 
build their own toilets/latrines with local resources to 
stop open defecation. CLTS encourages women to 
take leadership roles, but it can also add to women’s 
existing labour as it builds on traditional notions of 
women as the keepers of cleanliness and order in 
the family.281  
If they are to advance substantive equality, water 
and sanitation programmes must consciously 
address stigma, stereotypes and violence related to 
the sanitary needs of women and girls. Awareness-
raising and advocacy campaigns are one way 
to break taboos and to make such needs 
visible. Menstrual hygiene, for example, was a 
major theme in India’s Nirmal Bharat Yatra—a 
nationwide sanitation campaign spearheaded by 
The complainants challenged the city’s policy on various grounds. They argued that the amount of water 
provided free of charge was set too low and that it failed to consider household size. They also asserted that 
the policy did not consider the special needs of people who might require more water.
In the initial ruling, the lower court explicitly recognized the gender dimensions of access to water, finding 
that, since women and girls were disproportionately burdened with water-related chores, the policy indirectly 
discriminated based on sex.274 Ultimately, however, the Constitutional Court found the city’s policy to be 
reasonable and in line with its obligation to progressively realize the right to water—a position that was 
widely criticized by human rights activists.275 Despite this setback, the case has spurred policy change. The 
Johannesburg municipality subsequently agreed to provide larger amounts of free water to extremely poor 
households and to address some of the shortcomings attributed to the use of prepaid water meters.276  
the Geneva-based Water Supply and Sanitation 
Collaborative Council (WSSCC). The campaign 
travelled 2,000 kilometres across rural parts of the 
country in 2012, reaching over 12,000 women and 
girls with the message that menstruation is just as 
natural as hunger or sweating and that there is no 
need to be ashamed or afraid.282  
Similarly, Plan International set out to address 
stereotypes in CLTS projects in West Africa. In 
Sierra Leone, for example, projects started with 
an assessment of attitudes related to gender 
stereotypes around sanitation. Based on the 
information gathered, awareness-raising sessions 
were organized to tackle attitudes concerning the 
work considered to be that of women and girls, 
such as cleaning latrines, washing clothes and 
dishes, sweeping, fetching water and cleaning 
and dressing children. According to the project 
documentation, these efforts have been successful 
in changing attitudes: for example, since the 
awareness-raising campaign, girls and boys do the 
sweeping and cleaning of latrines and facilities on 
a rotational basis.283 
Recommendations 
Investing in water and sanitation services is not only 
essential for the realization of the right to water. It 
also has the potential to unburden women and girls, 
enhance their physical safety and promote their 
enjoyment of a range of other rights, including the 
rights to education, health, work, rest and leisure. 
Concrete steps to advance towards substantive 
equality in water and sanitation include: 
• Extend water and sanitation services to 
underserved areas, particularly poor rural 
areas and low-income settlements in urban 
areas, as a matter of priority 
• Ensure water is accessible on household 
premises or requires no more than 30 minutes 
collection time for a round trip including queuing
• Keep access to water and sanitation services 
affordable through effective government 
regulation, connection charge waivers, pro-
poor tariffs and subsidies 
• Design and deliver water and sanitation 
services with women and girls’ needs in mind
• Raise awareness of taboo issues such as 
obstetric fistulae and menstrual hygiene, which 
can limit women and girl’s access to services 
• Increase opportunities for women users 
and women’s organizations to participate 
in decision-making on and management of 
water and sanitation services.
Social policy is essential to advance towards 
substantive equality for women: it can reduce poverty 
and inequality, bolster women’s income security 
and economic independence and contribute to the 
realization of a broad set of economic and social 
rights. But, as this chapter has shown, reforms and 
innovations are needed in the provision of social 
transfers and social services to ensure that they reach 
women and girls and respond to their needs. 
First, redressing women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage requires an integrated response. 
A combination of enabling social services and 
adequate social transfers is necessary to ensure that 
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women enjoy their rights to social security and to an 
adequate standard of living. Provision of adequate 
and affordable social services—in particular health, 
water and sanitation and care—is essential to reduce 
the demands on women of unpaid caregiving and 
domestic work and thus increase their likelihood of 
gaining access to an education or an income of their 
own. 
Social transfers are critical means to address poverty 
and inequality, particularly for women who are 
raising children alone, those who struggle to find 
paid work in the face of widespread unemployment 
and labour market discrimination, and those who 
face old-age poverty as a result of a lifetime of 
socio-economic disadvantage. The growth and 
institutionalization of large-scale cash transfer 
programmes and of non-contributory pensions, 
especially in some middle-income countries, are an 
encouraging development for women. But much 
more needs to be done to remove gender biases and 
move towards universal coverage. 
Advancing substantive equality requires not only 
greater access to existing social transfers and services 
but also radical transformations in how they are 
organized and delivered.
Second, social policies and programmes can be 
effective means to address stigma, stereotypes and 
violence. There are many ways to do this. Minimally, 
policy and programme features that perpetuate 
gender stereotypes or social stigma need to be 
removed. Social transfer schemes, for example, 
should not impose conditionalities that increase 
women’s unpaid care and domestic work and 
should gradually work towards universal coverage 
in order to avoid stigma. More positively, policies 
and programmes can provide incentives for men 
to take on childcare responsibilities and build the 
capacity of health services to respond to violence 
against women. In addition, governments and civil 
society can roll out awareness-raising campaigns to 
break down gendered taboos around, for example, 
menstruation in order to enable women and girls to 
effectively enjoy their right to sanitation.  
Third, strengthening women’s agency, voice and 
participation by promoting feminist research, 
advocacy, legal action and mobilization as well 
as women’s political leadership is fundamental to 
achieving such transformations in social policy and 
programmes. From the design of empowering cash 
transfers in Brazil and Egypt, to the recognition of 
care in national policy-making in Uruguay and 
the delivery of affordable and adequate urban 
water and sanitation in South Africa, women have 
organized and networked to define, claim and 
defend their rights. 
The social protection floor (SPF) initiative is an 
important step in the right direction, but care needs 
to be taken in the definition of priorities for social 
investments. In their quest to define national SPFs, 
countries should conduct thorough assessments 
of the needs of caregivers and care receivers in 
order to ensure that the expansion of transfers and 
services contributes to the recognition, reduction and 
redistribution of unpaid care and domestic work. 
Realizing minimum levels of social protection for all 
should be a priority for countries with wide coverage 
gaps. The idea is not to stop there, however, but to 
expand the range and level of benefits as well as the 
quality of the services that are provided. Strategies 
for financing a progressive upgrading of transfers 
and services should therefore be mapped out from 
the start. The next chapter, on macroeconomic policy, 
discusses this issue in greater depth.
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Violet Shivutse knows from experience that to advocate 
effectively women need to organize, define goals, and then 
insist on a place at the decision-making table.
A 47-year old farmer, Violet is the founder of Kenya’s branch 
of the Home-Based Care Alliance, which brings together 
around 30,000 caregivers across 11 African countries.  The 
vast majority women, these carers collectively treat and 
care for around 200,000 friends, relatives and neighbours, 
many affected by HIV and AIDS.  
“Our main goal … is to make sure we have a collective 
voice to lobby for recognition of caregivers as key players in 
healthcare provision and HIV and AIDS in our communities. 
Most of our caregivers have gone to a level where they are 
really recognized by senior government people” says Violet.
It hasn’t always been this way. Violet says it has been a long, 
hard struggle to get to this point.  For years, caregivers received 
little or no recognition for the critical role they played in filling 
the gaps where formal healthcare facilities were lacking.
Caregivers in Kenya come 
together to demand a voice
A SEAT  
AT THE TABLE 
MAKING PROGRESS/STORIES OF CHANGE
Violet Sivutse speaks to the community in Kakamega, western Kenya
Photo: UN Women/Alex Kamweru
 The story of Kenyan caregivers’ 
empowerment goes to the 
heart of some of the issues 
of exclusion that affect many 
facets of women’s lives around 
the world.
Working with small-scale 
farmers in western Kenya in 
the late 1990s, Violet saw that 
male farmers had the power to take out loans or benefit 
from agricultural extension schemes, while women were 
more likely to be found in the fields, working hard, with little 
support and no role in decision-making.
She also noticed that many women in her community were 
dying in childbirth, and that the response of the nearby 
hospital was to blame traditional birth attendants.
Shaken by the death of a local woman, Violet made 
contact with the local hospital and asked them to include 
traditional birth attendants in 
their outreach programmes 
instead of ostracizing them.
The hospital agreed to work 
with traditional birth attendants 
to facilitate mobile clinics for 
women in the villages. Since 
many of the attendants were 
illiterate, they were unable to 
fill out the hospital’s paperwork so Violet agreed to be their 
secretary.
It was the first step on a journey that would lead Violet to form 
the Shibuye Community Health Workers. Since the group’s 
inception, it has expanded its work to include other health 
issues such as measles outbreaks, diarrhoea, and providing 
advice on sanitation, good nutrition and family planning.
Then, as Kenya’s AIDS pandemic took grip in the mid-
1990s, caregivers found themselves under increasing 
“Caregivers strengthen 
the social fabric because 
for us…health begins 
in the community” 
Violet with her colleagues at work
Photo: UN Women/Alex Kamweru
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strain. In 1996, the country’s HIV prevalence rate hit 10.5 
per cent and three years later HIV and AIDS was declared 
a national disaster and a public health emergency.  Since 
the beginning of the crisis, Kenya’s caregivers have been on 
the frontline of the response - treating long-term patients 
at home, ensuring their fields were tended, tackling stigma 
and defending the land rights of women with HIV/AIDS.
Yet initially their efforts were barely acknowledged.
“Every time resources for HIV and AIDS came or meetings 
(were held) to discuss policy around HIV, caregivers were 
excluded or represented by big organizations,” Violet says.
Her epiphany came during a meeting in Nairobi in 2003 to 
discuss the effect of HIV and AIDS on Africa.
“The donors, the policy-makers in the room said: ‘we know 
caregivers are there but they are fragmented, they work 
in small groups so it becomes difficult to bring them to a 
decision-making platform because they can’t represent 
each other well,’” she said. 
Violet relayed this to her community and set about creating 
a local chapter of the Home-based Care Alliance, which 
was already working on HIV and AIDS in other countries 
across Africa. The women organized and started talking to 
the authorities about how to refine policy around HIV and 
AIDS. One of the first meetings was with the Constituency 
AIDS Control Committee, part of the National AIDS 
Control Council.
As the Home-based Care Alliance grew, Violet 
realized there was a need to address some ingrained 
misconceptions about the nature of healthcare.
“The view was that health begins at the health facility. So 
we came in to say, health begins in the community.”
She says the work the caregivers were doing on HIV and 
AIDS was an economic necessity, as they helped prop up 
a national health system under incredible strain, but it 
was also a moral and social imperative.
“Caregivers strengthen the social fabric because for us, 
in an African context, any sick person belongs to their 
community … It’s not just about health facilities that are 
collapsing. No. It’s actually what … people should do 
when people fall sick and have a long-term illness. We 
are not just responding to healthcare,” she said.
Today, the Kenyan branch of the Home-based Care 
Alliance has around 3,200 members. In recent years 
her advocacy work has focused on creating enabling 
relationships between communities and health facilities, 
helping caregivers organize and access resources and 
key policy-making forums.  
For Violet, who often represents caregivers in global 
meetings, the fact that she remains rooted in her 
community is key to her effectiveness.
“I think this is a comprehensive, holistic way of doing 
development where you are not just handpicked to sit 
on a committee, but you come from a community,” she 
says.
The fact that Violet remains 
rooted in her community is 
key to her effectiveness
Story: Clar Nichonghaile. For more information on Violet and her work, see www.homebasedcarealliance.org
Photo: UN Women/Alex Kamweru
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TOWARDS AN ENABLING 
MACROECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT
Macroeconomic policies affect the availability of paid 
employment and of the resources needed to implement social 
policies. They are therefore critical for creating an enabling 
environment within which substantive equality for women 
can be advanced. 
Macroeconomic policies are typically assumed to be ‘gender-
neutral’. In practice, they have distributive consequences that 
impact differently on women and men and influence gender 
dynamics more broadly.
Current macroeconomic policies do not adequately consider 
the importance of unpaid care and domestic work and of 
non-market investments in human beings. They have also 
artificially constrained the resources available to governments 
to finance policies and programmes for gender equality.
Macroeconomic and social policies need to work in tandem 
to ensure economic sustainability. The economic contribution 
of social policy and unpaid care and domestic work need to 
be recognized and incorporated into macroeconomic policy 
formulation.
IN BRIEF
/1
/2
/3
/4
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A rights-based approach provides an alternative framework 
for assessing and prioritizing economic policy choices. This can 
enhance the realization of rights over time, the mobilization of 
resources for gender equality, the reduction of discrimination 
and the democratization of economic governance.
Improved global policy coordination and international 
economic governance, drawing on the Maastricht Principles, 
is essential to create a macroeconomic environment that is 
conducive to the realization of women’s economic and social 
rights.
/5
/6
INTRODUCTION
Advances in substantive equality for women can 
be achieved through establishing core social 
protections and improving the quantity and quality 
of paid employment, as previous chapters of this 
Report have argued. Macroeconomic policies 
shape the overall economic environment for 
realizing women’s economic and social rights 
through their impact on employment creation and 
fiscal space in particular. How macroeconomic 
policies are designed and implemented will thus 
have a direct impact on the likelihood that gender 
equality is achieved. Two broad categories of 
macroeconomic policies are fiscal policy and 
monetary policy. Fiscal policy involves the use 
of government expenditures, taxes and public 
borrowing to achieve economic and social goals. 
Monetary policy operates through financial 
markets and institutions to influence the money 
supply, interest rates, credit availability and 
exchange rates.
Despite its importance to a range of economic and 
social outcomes, macroeconomic management 
typically focuses on a narrow set of goals such as 
increasing gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
rates or reducing inflation to extremely low levels. 
Questions of inequality and distribution are absent 
or poorly addressed.1 It is often assumed that 
economic growth will provide solutions to persistent 
problems such as gender inequality, yet evidence 
shows that faster growth in itself will not achieve 
this.2 If economic and social policies are to support 
the realization of substantive equality, a rethinking 
of macroeconomic policies is essential.
Why does macroeconomic policy matter for 
gender equality?
Macroeconomic policies deal with economic 
aggregates, typically without any reference to 
gender equality. For example, macroeconomic 
policy targets, such as interest rates, do not 
consider distinct interest rates for women and men. 
Because of this, such policies are often said to be 
gender-neutral. However, broad-based economic 
policies do have gender-specific effects because 
these policies interact with structural features of 
the economy, such as the distribution of unpaid 
work and the segregation of women and men into 
different types of employment, to produce distinctly 
gendered outcomes. 
Box 4.1 provides an example of how apparently 
gender-neutral fiscal policy in the United 
Kingdom in response to the 2008 crisis had 
differentiated impacts for women and men. 
Macroeconomic policies can limit or broaden the 
possibilities for redressing women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage through several channels, directly 
and indirectly. 
First, macroeconomic policies have a direct 
impact on both the quantity and quality of 
employment opportunities available to women 
and men. Moreover, because of widespread 
occupational segregation in the labour market, 
described in detail in Chapter 2, economic 
policies that have distinct effects on particular 
sectors, such as the service sector, will affect 
women and men’s employment differently. 
Second, macroeconomic policies affect the 
burden of unpaid care and domestic work via 
their impacts on employment, household incomes 
and living standards. Demands on unpaid work 
may intensify during times of economic stress, 
increasing the burden on women.  
Third, macroeconomic policies have distributive 
consequences—for example, through taxation—
that affect women and men differently and can 
either reinforce the extent of women’s socio-
economic disadvantage or, potentially, promote a 
redistribution of resources towards women. 
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The Women’s Budget Group (WBG) in the United Kingdom has applied a gender perspective to the 
tax and government spending policies of the British Government in the wake of the 2008 crisis.6 It 
highlights that the strategy for rebalancing the budget since 2010 has relied primarily on spending 
cuts rather than increases in taxes. Women are more likely to be affected by cuts to government 
services and social protection while men, who earn more on average from paid employment, would 
be more directly affected by changes to tax policy.7 The WBG estimates that single mothers will be 
hardest hit by the cuts as well as by the changes to taxes that constitute the United Kingdom’s fiscal 
consolidation policies. The estimated decline in income for this group is 15.6 per cent, while childless 
working age couples stand to lose only 4.1 per cent.8
BOX 4.1 
Gender biases in budget and tax policy – the Women’s Budget Group
And fourth, macroeconomic policies influence 
the resources available to governments to 
finance social policies and social protection 
programmes that can be used to reduce 
women’s socio-economic disadvantage, as 
shown in Chapter 3. 
Macroeconomic management and financial 
regulation influence economic uncertainty and 
the likelihood of crises and system-wide risks, 
with women and men bearing different costs of 
negative shocks. Volatility at the macroeconomic 
level produces outcomes that both reflect and 
reinforce existing gender dynamics, although the 
outcomes will differ depending on the context. For 
example, during the four-year economic crisis in 
Argentina, which began in 1998, women entered 
the labour force to compensate for dramatic 
drops in household income.3 In the Philippines, 
following the 1997 East Asian economic crisis, men’s 
unemployment increased faster than women’s, 
while women in paid employment experienced 
longer working hours.4 In contrast, women 
withdrew from the paid labour force following the 
1997 crisis in the Republic of Korea.5 When women 
are ‘pushed’ into the labour market because of 
economic distress, they are often employed in 
precarious, informal and low-paid activities. When 
a crisis triggers women’s withdrawal from paid 
employment, they return to dependent positions 
within the household with less autonomy and less 
access to incomes of their own.
The consequences of macroeconomic policies 
thus go beyond the economic sphere to impact 
on gender dynamics in the household and 
society. Particularly in times of crisis, the effects of 
macroeconomic policies on social hierarchies can 
become pronounced, which can intensify stigma, 
stereotypes and violence. Macroeconomic policies 
that aim at ‘stabilization’—usually through reducing 
public spending or meeting very low inflation 
targets—tend to reduce employment opportunities 
and living standards, as happened with the 
austerity programmes adopted by a wide range 
of countries in response to the 2008 global crisis. 
As jobs become scarce and household resources 
shrink, more powerful groups tend to assert their 
collective identities through more pronounced 
patriarchal, racist or nationalist practices.9 This can 
reinforce stereotypes, including on gender, lead to 
stigmatization and even trigger violence in ways 
that perpetuate patterns of inequality and social 
hierarchy.10 Greece, for example, experienced an 
increase in racial and xenophobic violence as a 
result of economic downturn associated with the 
European sovereign debt crisis.11
Feminist economists and women’s rights advocates 
have developed frameworks, approaches and 
methodologies to support the integration of 
gender equality goals in macroeconomic policy 
and planning. A number of governments have 
adopted gender-responsive budgeting, for 
example, which has helped to prioritize the 
reallocation of existing resources to support 
gender equality. Effective implementation of such 
approaches requires better sex-disaggregated 
data and analysis on the impacts of policy on 
women and men. Crucially, it also requires 
strengthening women’s agency, voice and 
participation in macroeconomic decision-making 
to increase the responsiveness and accountability 
of national and global institutions in charge of 
economic policy design and implementation.
Chapter overview
Macroeconomic policies cannot, on their own, 
bring about gender equality; progressive 
employment and social policies are also critical, 
as the earlier chapters have shown. But the 
macroeconomic framework within which other 
policies are implemented either enlarges or 
constrains their scope to advance substantive 
equality for women. This chapter begins by 
highlighting ways in which current approaches 
to macroeconomic policy reduce the possibilities 
for realizing women’s economic and social rights. 
It discusses how lack of attention to social goals, 
failure to integrate unpaid care and domestic 
work and an insufficient focus on employment 
creation and resource mobilization severely limit 
the potential of these approaches to advance 
substantive equality. It then sets out the key 
components of a rights-based framework for 
macroeconomic policy that would support 
substantive equality. The chapter goes on 
to emphasize the need for new mechanisms 
of global economic governance to improve 
international coordination and realize economic 
and social rights. It concludes by underlining 
the need for macroeconomic policy that is 
accountable, incorporates issues of distribution, 
acknowledges the importance of investing in 
human beings and recognizes the role of unpaid 
care and domestic work in order to advance 
substantive equality.  
WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
MACROECONOMIC POLICY?
In practice, macroeconomic policy rarely 
takes into account economic and social rights, 
distributive outcomes or gender equality. 
Because of this, macroeconomic strategies may 
make progress towards substantive equality 
more difficult or actually work against realizing 
women’s rights. 
There are three key areas where macroeconomic 
policies currently constrain progress towards 
substantive equality. First, the narrow goals of 
macroeconomic policy and gender biases in 
macroeconomic analysis mean that policies 
often fail to address the structural disadvantages 
faced by women. Second, an insufficient focus 
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of macroeconomic policy on employment 
creation means that progress in redressing 
women’s socio-economic disadvantage in the 
labour market is limited. And third, restrictive 
macroeconomic policy choices mean that there 
are insufficient resources to sustainably finance 
social policies that support gender equality or 
to ensure that the ways in which spending and 
taxation are conducted have positive, rather 
than negative, distributive consequences. The 
next sections explore each of these issues in 
detail. 
GENDER ISSUES IN MACROECONOMIC 
POLICY AND ITS GOALS
Macroeconomic policy typically focuses on 
raising the level of GDP as its primary policy 
goal, with the expansion of GDP (growth) used 
as a measure of economic progress. However, 
broader economic and social outcomes may 
be more important to improving the lives that 
women and men are able to lead, including 
through enabling good health, access to 
education, decent employment opportunities, 
freedom from violence and a secure place to live. 
Alternative frameworks for evaluating progress—
such as human rights or human development—
emphasize what people are able to do or 
become in the course of their lives. Increases in 
GDP are important only as a means to better 
social outcomes, including greater gender 
equality. 
Does gender equality contribute to growth? 
Researchers and policy makers have started to 
pay greater attention to the relationship between 
gender equality and economic growth.12 For 
example, recent evidence on the relationship 
between gender inequality in education and GDP 
levels and growth suggests that more equality 
in schooling is positively associated with GDP, at 
least for lower- and middle-income countries.13  
Reducing inequalities in schooling and raising 
the average level of women’s education appears 
to support better economic performance, as 
measured by GDP per capita, and enhance 
individual productive capacities. 
Figure 4.1 graphs the ratio of female-to-
male secondary school enrolment against 
per capita income, illustrating the positive 
relationship between the level of GDP and gaps 
in educational attainment.14 The ratio increases 
with average income, but as it approaches 
parity the relationship flattens out. This indicates 
that the relationship between the secondary 
school enrolment ratio and per capita income 
is different for low-income and high-income 
countries. As a general rule, greater equality 
in education is associated with higher levels of 
GDP. However, at lower income levels there is 
also considerable variation in the female-to-
male ratio of secondary school enrolment among 
countries with similar incomes, suggesting that 
factors other than average GDP are important. 
For example, Burkina Faso (US$1,435) and 
Rwanda ($1,312) had similar levels of per capita 
income in 2011, but the ratio was significantly 
higher in Rwanda than Burkina Faso: 1.02 
compared to 0.78. This shows that even at lower 
levels of GDP it is possible to attain gender parity 
in education.
The figure does not tell us whether it is economic 
growth that raises the enrolment ratio or whether 
it is greater gender equality in secondary 
education that supports higher incomes. And 
focusing on the female-to-male enrolment 
ratio gives an incomplete picture in terms of 
substantive equality, because it does not control 
for the quality of education that young women 
and men receive or differences in retention and 
attainment.
Similarly, an increase in the female share of 
labour force participation, or a reduction in the 
gap between women’s and men’s labour force 
participation, has been shown to result in faster 
growth.15 Women’s labour force participation 
rates are typically lower than men’s—in some 
cases significantly so—and women working in 
paid employment are often concentrated in low-
productivity activities in which earnings are low 
(see Chapter 2). These patterns of segregation 
indicate an inefficient allocation of labour in 
which women are prevented from participating in 
Figure 4.1
Female to male secondary school enrolment ratio and per capita GDP, 2011  
 Greater equality in education is associated with higher GDP
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activities in which they may be more productive.16 
Therefore, relaxing gender constraints in labour 
markets can be expected to raise average 
incomes and growth rates.
Gender equality may also contribute to growth 
through its long-term impact on human 
development. Evidence shows that a mother’s 
education and health status have a positive 
impact on the health of her children. This can 
contribute to future economic growth.17 
However, the reverse can also be true: when other 
indicators are used, gender inequality (rather than 
equality) seems to contribute to economic growth 
and macroeconomic performance, at least in the 
short term. Women frequently earn less than men and 
gender wage gaps can help lower average labour 
costs. Research on emerging market economies in 
Asia, Europe and Latin America suggests that higher 
wage gaps boost competitiveness when women 
are disproportionately employed in labour-intensive 
export-oriented activities.18 Gender inequalities in 
wages can thus contribute to the success of export-
oriented growth and improve a country’s position 
with respect to its trade balance in the short term. 
Because it is premised on inequality, however, such 
growth cannot be considered inclusive; and in the 
long term, gender equality may be more beneficial 
to growth through its impact on women’s human 
development, such as improvements in educational 
attainment, discussed above. 
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The unequal gender division of labour, in 
which women perform a disproportionate 
share of unpaid care and domestic work, 
can also support GDP growth as currently 
measured. Many benefit from women’s unpaid 
labour, including care for others, performed 
in households.19 Firms, for example, rely on 
the human resources that are produced and 
sustained through such work. The unequal 
distribution of the costs of care therefore 
supports economic growth, since those who 
benefit from these investments in the next 
generation do not pay the associated costs. 
Overall, the evidence on the relationship 
between economic growth and gender 
equality or inequality is mixed and the causal 
relationship can be unclear.20 Does gender 
equality contribute to higher rates of growth? 
The World Bank has examined this relationship 
and concluded that improving gender equality 
is ‘smart economics’, that is, it contributes to 
growth and economic development.21  In fact, 
whether greater gender equality or greater 
gender inequality is associated with economic 
growth depends on the specific indicator used. 
Measurements of equality that emphasize 
women’s productive activity or attributes—
such as narrowing of the gaps in labour force 
participation and educational attainment—are 
generally associated with faster growth. In 
contrast, when the indicators are based on the 
returns to women’s productive activity, such as 
wage rates, gender inequality can contribute to 
growth.22 
Conversely, it is often assumed that economic 
growth will lead to greater gender equality. But 
growth that is predicated on enhancing global 
competitiveness by reducing costs can actually 
reinforce gender inequalities by lowering labour 
costs or transferring the costs of unpaid care 
and domestic work to women.23 In addition 
the benefits of growth may be distributed in 
such a way as to reinforce the existing patterns 
of economic power, gender hierarchies in 
employment and patriarchal norms. For 
example, the welfare arrangements under the 
Republic of Korea’s development strategy from 
the 1960s to the early 1990s, a period of rapid 
growth, depended on households and families to 
provide care services rather than on government 
programmes financed by taxation, reinforcing a 
highly unequal gender division of labour.24 
Gender equality is an important goal in its own 
right that cannot be seen as purely instrumental 
to economic growth.25 For macroeconomic 
policies to advance substantive equality, they 
need to look beyond economic growth and 
include a broader set of goals and targets, as 
discussed later in the chapter.
Uncounted and unrecognized: unpaid 
work in macroeconomic policy and 
statistics
International definitions from the System of 
National Accounts (SNA) define GDP as the 
market value of final goods and services 
produced within a country over a particular 
period. Much of the unpaid work carried out 
predominantly by women is not incorporated 
into the calculation of GDP or reflected in 
other macroeconomic indicators. In particular, 
the production of non-market services in the 
household through unpaid care and domestic 
work is excluded (see Box 2.5). Because 
macroeconomic policies do not account for 
the disproportionate costs to women of unpaid 
labour, they reinforce the undervaluation and 
marginalization of women’s work.26
Unpaid care and domestic work comprise 
different types of activity including housework 
(such as preparing meals and cleaning), care of 
people (children, the sick, people with disabilities 
and the frail elderly), collecting water and fuel 
and voluntary work in the community.27 Figure 
4.2 breaks down estimates of time spent in 
selected categories of unpaid care and domestic 
work per day for six countries: Argentina, India, 
Nicaragua, the Republic of Korea, South Africa 
Figure 4.2 
Time spent per day on unpaid care and domestic work, by sex and total value as a percentage of GDP 
 Women spend more time on unpaid care and domestic work than men do 
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Note: a Buenos Aires only. The value of unpaid care work is based on the wages of people employed in occupations with work similar to housework, whether performed in homes or 
institutions. See Budlender 2008 for estimates based on other categories of wages. Cross-country comparison should be made with caution as reference population and data collection 
methodology differ by country.
and the United Republic of Tanzania. In all cases 
women perform more total unpaid care and 
domestic work than do men.  
Time spent in unpaid work has real economic 
value, but this value is not recognized in current 
macroeconomic concepts and accounting systems. 
In the United States, for example, the total value of 
unpaid childcare services in 2012 was estimated to be 
$3.2 trillion, or approximately 20 per cent of the total 
value of GDP (valued at $16.2 trillion that year).28 For 
the countries featured in Figure 4.2, the total value of 
unpaid care and domestic work is estimated to be 
between 10 and 39 per cent of GDP.29 
The economic value of unpaid care and domestic 
work is comparable to, or greater, than that of key 
economic sectors. Analysis for Mexico, shown in 
Figure 4.3, estimates the value of unpaid care and 
domestic work at 21 per cent of GDP, higher than 
manufacturing, commerce, real estate, mining, 
construction and transportation and storage. 
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Figure 4.3 
Economic value of unpaid care and domestic work and select areas of economic activity as a percentage of GDP, 2013 
 In Mexico, the economic value of unpaid care and domestic work is greater than mining, construction, and 
transportation and storage combined
Unpaid care  
and domestic work
Manufacturing Commerce Real estate Mining Transportation 
and storage
Construction
21 17 16 11 7 7 6
Source: INEGI 2014.
Note: Unpaid care and domestic work includes care and support, cleaning and household maintenance, cleaning and care of clothing and shoes, food preparation, shopping and household 
management, help to other households and volunteer work. See Box 2.5 for definitions.
Exclusion of unpaid work biases economic 
planning 
Not all unpaid work involves the care of others. In many 
countries, time spent gathering fuel or carrying water 
constitutes a sizeable time burden for women (see Box 
2.5).30 Public investments in basic infrastructure, such as 
accessible water taps, could greatly reduce the amount of 
time spent in these activities (see Chapters 2 and 3). This, 
in turn, can have a positive impact on women’s labour 
force participation, their earnings from paid employment 
and their economic empowerment—yet these benefits of 
improved infrastructure are rarely considered.31
The exclusion of the value of unpaid work from the national 
accounts biases estimates of the total level of economic 
activity as captured by GDP downward (as indicated in 
Figure 4.2). At the same time, the exclusion of non-market 
activities is thought to bias estimates of the growth of 
economic activities upward.32 This is because the value of 
unpaid household production grows more slowly over time 
than the market value of those goods and services that are 
included in standard GDP calculations. Similar biases affect 
the accounting for women’s labour in GDP and growth 
statistics. When women enter the labour force in increased 
numbers, GDP goes up by definition, while any reduction 
in the value of unpaid work in household production that 
ensues is not accounted for and so is ‘hidden’.33 
These gender issues in economic accounting have direct 
policy consequences—for example, when the efficiency 
of budget allocations is evaluated. ‘Savings’ made from 
cutting back on government funding of public services 
often increase demands on unpaid care and domestic 
work. Because these hidden costs are not recognized in 
economic planning, this can create the illusion of efficiency 
gains when in fact costs are being transferred from the 
public sector to the private sphere.34 In the health sector, 
for example, efficiency may seem to increase when the 
time that patients spend in the hospital decreases and 
as a result the cost of providing treatment per patient 
appears to drop. But cuts to public health expenditure can 
have substantial and unrecognized knock-on effects for 
caregivers in households, who may be forced to take time 
off paid work to care for a sick family member. This is 
likely to have disproportionate impacts on women as the 
primary caregivers.
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In order to adequately recognize and value 
unpaid care and domestic work, it must be 
measured. Data from time-use surveys is essential 
for capturing the amount of time women and men 
spend in different activities, yet reliable time-use 
information is lacking for many countries around 
the world. There is a need for more regular time-
use surveys, with data disaggregated by sex, 
income level, geographical location and other 
relevant categories such as race and ethnicity. 
This information can be used by policy makers 
to make better decisions about macroeconomic 
policy that reflect a more complete picture of the 
activities that keep an economy going and of the 
consequences of the choices made for improving 
substantive equality. 
The development of human potential as 
investment
Other macroeconomic measurements are 
subject to similar conceptual problems, with 
potentially important consequences for policy. 
For example, household spending on children is 
currently classified as consumption expenditure. 
However, a strong case can be made that 
these expenditures represent an investment in 
future human capacities and should thus be 
accounted for separately from other consumption 
expenditure.35 Non-market and unpaid childcare 
activities represent a similar investment, yet these 
are not counted at all in macroeconomic statistics, 
whether as consumption or investment. It can thus 
be argued that total investment is underestimated 
in current economic statistics because the 
investment of both time and money in human 
potential is excluded. 
The same issue applies to budget expenditures. 
For example, spending on the operation of 
services for children in early childhood is classified 
as public consumption (current expenditure), 
although the construction of new nurseries and 
clinics is classified as public investment (capital 
expenditure). Borrowing to finance public 
investments is seen as acceptable, but borrowing 
to support the operations of these public facilities 
is not. Conventional definitions and statistics 
do not understand the development of human 
capacities as a form of investment that yields 
future benefits. The consequent misclassification 
of this spending biases policy decisions against 
public investment in the development of human 
capacities. Insufficient investment in such public 
facilities effectively reinforces societies’ reliance on 
the unpaid care and domestic work that parents, 
especially mothers, do in order to fill the gap.
MACROECONOMIC POLICY, 
EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER EQUALITY
Increasing women’s opportunities for quality, 
paid employment is key to redressing their 
socio-economic disadvantage and to achieving 
substantive equality, as Chapter 2 has shown. 
Macroeconomic policy can create an environment 
that encourages an improvement in the quality 
and quantity of jobs available. However, 
although prior to the 1980s, when neoliberal 
thinking began to dominate the policy landscape, 
macroeconomic strategies in many parts of the 
world tried to address a lack of employment 
opportunities, they currently often limit both 
the quantity and quality of the employment 
opportunities available. 
Jobless growth 
Policies to support better employment outcomes 
have two components: increasing the demand 
for paid labour in the economy; and increasing 
the mobility of workers so that people can take 
advantage of employment opportunities when 
they are created. Macroeconomic policies can be 
particularly important in influencing the overall 
demand for labour in the economy.
Although dominant policy approaches now 
recognize the value of social protection and the 
need for labour market regulation to improve 
employment outcomes, when it comes to 
macroeconomic policy there has been relatively 
limited change since the 1980s. It is common to 
assume that employment creation is an automatic 
by-product of economic growth. In reality, growth 
does not automatically translate into new and 
better jobs. Studies have documented a reduction 
in the number of new jobs generated when 
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production expands in many countries.36 Some 
countries have experienced bouts of ‘jobless 
growth’. In India, for example, over a 25-year 
period beginning in 1981, the manufacturing 
sector’s output as a whole expanded with little or 
no change in employment due to increases in the 
capital intensity of production.37 
One explanation for this sluggish growth in 
labour demand is that the rates of investment 
that could support employment creation have 
declined significantly in many parts of the world, 
specifically beginning in the 1980s.38 Slower 
growth of productive investment translates into 
slower growth in labour demand. 
Macroeconomic policies affect employment 
through a number of other channels in addition 
to affecting the rate of private investment. 
Reductions in government spending discussed 
above have led to the downsizing of public 
sectors and the privatization of public services 
and enterprises. This has reduced the relative 
contribution of government institutions and 
agencies to formal employment: during the 
1990s, government employment either declined 
faster or grew more slowly than private 
employment in most countries.39 The reduction in 
the share of public sector employment has been 
particularly noticeable in the transition economies 
of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. As Chapter 
2 has shown, public employment is an important 
source of good quality jobs for women and this 
downsizing is likely to disproportionately impact 
on women’s employment outcomes.
Monetary policy and employment 
opportunities 
Monetary policies can also affect employment 
outcomes. In the majority of countries, monetary 
policies are focused almost exclusively on meeting 
very low inflation targets, attained by raising 
interest rates to keep prices from increasing 
more rapidly.40 High interest rates slow economic 
activity by making credit more expensive and less 
accessible, thus reducing consumer purchases 
and raising the cost of financing productive 
investments. In addition, high interest rates 
make financial investments more attractive than 
investments in productive activities. All of these 
factors lower demand for labour. 
Monetary policy can also have gender-specific 
impacts on employment, though these impacts 
vary across countries and depend on structural 
factors. Recent research has shown that women’s 
employment has declined faster than men’s 
in a range of developing countries—including 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Philippines and 
the Republic of Korea—that are experiencing 
reductions in inflation associated with restrictive 
monetary policy.41 In countries that maintain a less 
restrictive monetary environment, such gender 
inequalities are less evident. Differences in the 
dynamics of women’s and men’s employment also 
appear to be less pronounced when exchange 
rates are kept at a competitive level. 
In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries, one study of 
monetary policy found no evidence of different 
effects on women’s and men’s unemployment 
rates.42 However, research focused on specific high 
income countries has revealed different effects of 
monetary policy on men and women: for example, 
research on Federal Reserve policy in the United 
States found evidence that higher interest rates 
raised women’s unemployment rates relative to 
white men’s, but this relationship varies from state 
to state and changes with the racial composition of 
the population.43
Higher real interest rates that raise the return on 
financial investments also attract short-term inflows 
of capital from other countries, which are potentially 
destabilizing since such flows can leave as easily as 
they come, as seen in the East Asian crisis in 1997.44 
Inflows of capital can also lead to an appreciation 
of the exchange rate, which in turn reduces the 
competitiveness of—and lowers investment in—
export-producing industries and those sectors 
that compete with imported products.45 An over-
valued exchange rate has a disproportionate 
effect on women’s employment when women are 
concentrated in export-producing sectors or sectors 
competing with imported goods and services.
Overall, since the 1980s macroeconomic policies 
have failed to support labour demand in the 
face of growing labour supply. When demand 
for labour grows slowly relative to supply, levels 
of open unemployment increase, informal 
employment expands and other atypical and 
non-standard forms of work—such as part-time 
work, short-term hires and day labour markets—
proliferate. At the same time, bargaining power 
shifts in favour of employers and the owners of 
firms. A reduced share of public sector jobs in 
overall employment reinforces this trend. The 
result is a downward pressure on wages and 
conditions of employment. As Chapter 2 showed, 
this has happened at a time when, in many parts 
of the world, women’s labour force participation 
has been increasing, so that the lack of availability 
of decent job opportunities specifically constrains 
women’s employment options and the prospects 
for redressing the socio-economic disadvantage 
they experience.
 
MACROECONOMIC POLICY, SOCIAL 
POLICY AND GENDER EQUALITY
The resources available to governments for 
implementing the kinds of policies to advance 
gender equality outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 
are not fixed. They are determined, in part, 
by macroeconomic policies, including tax 
policies, decisions over deficit spending and 
the management of debt.46 Neoliberal policy 
regimes have tended to reduce tax revenues 
relative to the size of the economy, such that fewer 
public resources are available to finance public 
expenditures. Faced with reductions in government 
revenues, efforts to control budget deficits have 
emphasized reductions in spending, with cuts 
often disproportionately affecting women. The 
2008 global financial crisis triggered a sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe, leading to severe cuts in 
social spending in some countries (see Box 4.2). 
These cutbacks have had important negative 
consequences for achieving substantive equality.
Although the 2008 global financial crisis originated in the private sector, one of its long-term 
impacts has been on public budgets. In many developed countries, governments used public funds 
to bail out the financial sector, moving bad debt and liabilities from the banks onto government 
balance sheets. Despite rising debt levels and declines in GDP, the initial policy response to the crisis 
was stimulus spending. However, this expansionary phase was short lived. 
By 2010 the combination of financial rescue packages and stimulus spending, along with falling 
revenues from taxation due to economic slowdown, had set the stage for a sovereign debt crisis 
in Europe. As a result, there have been drastic cuts in social transfers and public services in some 
countries, triggering a retrogression in economic and social rights for women, as well as men, and 
a setback for gender equality. Expenditure on benefits for families with children, for example, which 
had peaked in 2009, fell back to below 2008 levels in 14 out of 23 European countries for which data 
were available in 2011.47
Developing countries have also witnessed volatility in budget revenues resulting from the 2008 crisis. 
As public debt has mounted so too has pressure for spending cuts, threatening the subsidization 
BOX 4.2 
Crisis, austerity and retrogression in women’s economic and social rights
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Fiscal policy and the resources for realizing 
women’s economic and social rights 
Since the 1980s, there has been a reduction in the 
scope for many countries to mobilize resources 
needed to fund government expenditures, often 
referred to as a narrowing of ‘fiscal space’.49 
Countries in receipt of loans from the IMF were 
expected to simplify the tax structure and broaden 
the tax base through a variety of measures, such 
as reducing income and corporate tax rates, 
cutting trade taxes as part of wider liberalization 
measures and extending value-added taxes (VAT) 
on consumer goods and services.50 As a result, 
many low-income countries reduced trade taxes, 
causing a significant fall in revenues that was not 
compensated for by increases in revenues from 
other taxes.51 This in turn has led to an overall 
reduction in government tax revenues as a share of 
GDP.52
Government revenues as a share of GDP tend to 
increase with per capita income, as illustrated for 
168 countries in Figure 4.4.53 Low-income countries 
typically have a larger share of agriculture and 
informal activities that under-contribute to tax 
revenues. The tax base of poorer countries is also 
lower due to high poverty rates and less overall 
wealth, and the capacity of public institutions that 
collect taxes is also frequently underdeveloped. 
Where there are cutbacks to government spending, 
these may further reduce administrative capacity, 
making it even more difficult to mobilize resources 
through taxation.
Figure 4.4 also shows, however, that economies 
at similar levels of development (per capita 
GDP) exhibit very different capacities to mobilize 
public resources.54 This suggests that despite 
low incomes, many countries could mobilize 
additional resources through appropriate policy 
and institutional changes. In 2005, the United 
Nations Millennium Project estimated that the 
governments of five developing countries—
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ghana, Uganda and the 
United Republic of Tanzania—should be able to 
generate up to an additional 4 per cent of GDP 
in tax revenue within a decade.55 The IMF, in its 
Fiscal Monitor 2013, recognizes that in low- and 
middle-income countries ‘the potential for raising 
revenue is often substantial’.56 This suggests that 
‘fiscal space’ is significantly larger than the current 
level of government revenues would suggest. How 
a number of countries have expanded their fiscal 
space is discussed in a later section (A rights-based 
macroeconomic policy agenda).
Social policies can also be financed through 
borrowing. The sustainability of any fiscal 
of food, fuel, electricity and transport as well as the expansion of emerging social protection 
programmes (described in Chapter 3). At the time of writing this report, research into policy 
responses showed that, despite an initial expansionary response to the crisis, a growing number of 
developing countries were projected to significantly cut government spending, particularly in Latin 
America. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected that 92 of 133 countries would pursue 
contractionary fiscal policies in 2014 and would reform old-age pensions and the health sector as 
part of a further targeting of social benefits.48 
Women are likely to feel the impact of these cuts most acutely because they are over-represented 
among front-line service delivery workers in the public sector. Women also depend more than men 
on public transfers and services to meet their own needs. As unpaid care providers for family and 
friends, when public support is reduced, the burden of providing care falls disproportionately on 
women.
expansion—that is, an increase in spending—
depends critically on how government resources 
are used.57 A fiscal expansion is more likely to be 
sustainable when the spending finances investment 
rather than consumption. For governments 
that wish to pursue the kinds of social policies 
highlighted in Chapter 3 through fiscal expansion, it 
is important to recognize that investing in childcare, 
health or education generates long-term economic 
benefits. These investments are more likely to be 
self-sustaining since they have the potential to 
raise government revenues in the future to repay 
borrowing or finance future investments.58 A 
rethinking of the relationship between social policy 
and fiscal sustainability has the potential to change 
the approach to policy in ways that contribute to 
greater gender equality over time.
The distributive consequences of taxation 
policies
There are many strategies for financing the 
provision of social protection and social services, 
from private contributions to public taxation.59 As 
Figure 4.5 shows, how revenues are raised has 
important implications for social solidarity as well 
as gender equality. Services such as childcare 
for example, may be provided entirely by the 
household, in which case the costs are born by 
household members. This can be considered a 
form of implicit taxation (called a ‘time-burden 
tax’), with a regressive and disproportionate 
impact on women.60 Unpaid care and domestic 
work generates benefits for the economy and, in 
some cases, substitutes for public expenditures on 
social services. In effect, it represents a transfer of 
Figure 4.4
Government general revenues (as a percentage of GDP) and GDP per capita, 2013 
 Richer countries tend to have higher government revenues, but capacities to mobilize public resources vary 
widely among countries at similar income levels
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resources from women to others in the economy. 
If women did not provide this service, institutions—
such as the state—would need to step in to prevent 
the care economy from collapsing. 
When services are provided through state or market 
institutions—for example, school places or health 
care—individuals may be charged user fees. As 
Chapter 3 has shown, user fees at the point of 
service delivery can be particularly burdensome for 
women. Private insurance schemes allow people 
to pay in advance in order to access services when 
they need them, but such schemes are rarely 
affordable for low-income households. Public social 
insurance can be more redistributive because it 
pools risks and resources, including state subsidies 
for low-income households.61
Finally, social services may be funded entirely out of 
general government revenues that are generated 
through indirect taxes, such as VAT, or direct taxes, 
such as an income tax. Funding social services out 
of general government revenues tends to create the 
greatest scope for redistribution and substantive 
equality, but even here some taxes are more 
progressive than others. For example, indirect taxes 
such as VAT can be regressive, depending on their 
design, because low-income households spend 
more of their income on basic consumption goods 
than higher-income households.  
In addition, some tax policies contain explicit 
gender biases, treating women and men differently. 
In some tax systems, for example, men are 
automatically granted deductions for dependents 
whereas women are only allowed these in special 
circumstances.62
More often unequal treatment is implicit, when 
seemingly gender-neutral provisions have different 
effects on women and men due to structural 
sources of gender inequality. For example, work-
related tax exemptions may disproportionally go 
to men, who are more likely than women to be in 
Time burden tax (self-provision)
User fees (most regressive, least solidaristic)
Private insurance schemes (pre-paid schemes)
Public insurance schemes
Indirect taxes
Earmarked taxes
Direct taxes (most progressive, most solidaristic)
Figure 4.5
Types of revenue, their regressivity and their impact on social relations 
 Direct taxes are the most progressive and encourage the greatest social solidarity
Source: Based on Delamonica and Mehrotra 2009.
Regressivity
Solidarity
formal employment that benefits from these types of 
tax breaks. Women may face a larger burden of VAT 
when they are responsible for purchasing consumer 
goods needed in the household. Progressive income 
taxes may effectively tax women’s income at a 
higher rate than men’s when household income is 
pooled to calculate the taxes owed and women’s 
income is seen as supplemental to that of a male 
breadwinner.63 These distributional consequences 
are often not considered when setting tax policies.
Dominant macroeconomic strategies have 
artificially reduced the fiscal space available to 
governments, limiting the resources to finance 
social policies and programmes that can help 
improve gender equality. More generally, fiscal 
policy has been formulated with little attention 
to its impact on inequality and the social costs of 
cutbacks to government spending. There is the 
potential to mobilize additional resources to support 
the realization of economic and social rights. This 
requires a different approach to macroeconomic 
policy, as the next section will describe. 
The interconnectedness of macroeconomic 
and social policies 
Current policy frameworks and processes tend to 
artificially separate macroeconomic and social 
policies. The role of the former is seen primarily 
as maintaining price stability and promoting 
growth. When they are formulated, the impact of 
social policies on the macroeconomic environment 
and future trajectory of the economy are not 
considered. While social policies are recognized as 
important, they are to be implemented only once 
broad macroeconomic parameters have been set. 
In particular, how unpaid care and domestic work 
shapes the macroeconomic environment is not 
taken into account.
Social services, whether provided through the 
government, private providers or unpaid care and 
domestic work, have macroeconomic implications. 
Child development, education, health and social 
care policies, which were examined in detail in 
Chapter 3, have direct implications for productivity, 
growth and economic performance. Similarly, 
policies to support youth in the transition to young 
adulthood and into the labour market, discussed in 
Chapter 2, have implications for the performance 
of the economy as a whole. The artificial division 
between macroeconomic policies and these other 
policy areas means that too little attention is paid 
to employment, unpaid work and social issues in 
the formulation of macroeconomic strategies. 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the interconnectedness of 
economic and social policies, and shows what a 
rights-based approach to macroeconomic policy 
might look like.
A RIGHTS-BASED MACROECONOMIC 
POLICY AGENDA 
Many of the problems with macroeconomic policies 
discussed above are well known. Yet, in practice, 
policy alternatives are rarely adopted and, in most 
cases, the approach to macroeconomic policy as 
actually implemented has not changed much since 
the 1980s. There are alternatives to neoliberal 
The divisions between economic and social policy are artificial;  
connecting the two is key to the realization of rights 
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A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO MACROECONOMIC POLICY 
approaches to macroeconomics, however, 
including various forms of Keynesian and 
structuralist macroeconomics. These alternatives 
emphasize that markets do not always function 
well; unregulated markets can result in financial 
crises, too little employment, an inadequate 
supply of public goods and services and 
environmental deterioration; distribution matters; 
and inequality affects economic stability and 
performance. They call for action by governments 
to regulate markets and to improve economic 
outcomes through employment and social policies. 
Feminist macroeconomists have enriched and 
developed these alternative frameworks with 
a deeper understanding of the distributive 
outcomes of macroeconomic choices and by 
incorporating a consideration of unpaid labour, 
showing that these are critical to understanding 
how economies function.64 In addition, a human 
rights-based approach to economics provides a 
clear framework for assessing macroeconomic 
policy choices, drawing on key treaties and 
bodies in the international human rights system 
that are relevant to the achievement of women’s 
economic and social rights, particularly the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW).65 Applying their 
principles to the conduct of macroeconomic 
policy has potentially transformative 
implications. Specifically, a human rights 
framework for macroeconomic policy:
• Provides alternatives to GDP growth and low 
inflation as the primary goals of economic 
policies  
• Provides a set of ethical principles for 
formulating and evaluating economic 
policies that are derived from international 
agreements
• Clarifies the duties and obligations of States 
and links to a set of national and international 
procedures to hold States to account
• Incorporates a democratic and participatory 
approach to economic governance as, from 
the perspective of human rights, the process of 
macroeconomic policy-making is important as 
well as its outcomes.
The human rights framework has important 
implications for fiscal policy, monetary policy, 
policies to enhance macroeconomic stability, 
investments in human beings and the process 
whereby macroeconomic policy choices are made. 
Box 4.3 summarizes the human rights principles 
and obligations, introduced in Chapter 1 (Box 1.3), 
relevant to developing an alternative, rights-
based approach to macroeconomics.
A number of human rights principles and obligations are particularly relevant for assessing and 
evaluating macroeconomic policy from a human rights perspective.
Non-discrimination and equality: For rights-based macroeconomic policies, this means that 
consideration of distributive outcomes is essential. Macroeconomic policies need to be evaluated in 
terms of biased or unequal outcomes with regard to the enjoyment of rights. This is an immediate 
obligation of governments. 
BOX 4.3 
Key principles for a human rights-based macroeconomic policy 
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MAXIMIZING RESOURCES FOR 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
Domestic resource mobilization is critical to 
the realization of rights and greater gender 
equality. Governments should take steps, to 
the maximum of their available resources, to 
realize economic and social rights over time (see 
Box 4.3). Macroeconomic policies—including 
tax policy, government expenditures and debt 
management—directly affect the resources that 
can be used to realize rights. Although tax cuts 
and reductions in public spending have reduced 
fiscal space, many countries do have the ability to 
generate additional public resources. This section 
focuses on how additional resources can be 
mobilized by improving the efficiency of revenue 
collection, broadening the range of taxes used 
to generate revenues and borrowing to finance 
investments with significant social returns. The 
international dimensions of resource mobilization 
are discussed later in the chapter.
Raising revenues by improving the 
efficiency of tax collection
Tax revenues can be increased by improving the 
efficiency of tax collection through addressing 
institutional and capacity constraints or by 
introducing new taxes. This is particularly 
important in low-income countries, where 
problems with tax administration are often acute. 
A more efficient tax system also generates wider 
benefits by lowering the time and effort it takes 
to comply with tax laws and allowing countries to 
adopt more diverse forms of taxation.67
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have 
generated additional public revenues by 
Minimum essential levels: Macroeconomic policies need to be formulated such that minimum 
essential levels of economic and social rights are met. For example, individuals should not be deprived 
of essential food, basic shelter or education. This is also an immediate obligation.
Progressive realization and non-retrogression: Economic and social progress is measured in terms 
of the progressive realization of rights over time, not growth as captured by gross domestic product. 
Macroeconomic policy choices should guard against eroding those rights over time (i.e., against 
retrogression). 
Maximum available resources: Macroeconomic policies—including government spending, 
taxation, debt financing and monetary policy—influence the resources available for realizing rights. 
Governments have an obligation to take steps, to the maximum of their available resources, to realize 
economic and social rights over time.
Accountability, transparency and participation: There should be democratic participation in 
macroeconomic policy-making including budget processes and monetary policy. Meaningful 
participation requires access to information (transparency) and the ability to hold governments to 
account (accountability). 
Extraterritorial obligations: Within the human rights framework, extraterritorial obligations refer 
to acts and omissions of a government that affect the enjoyment of rights outside of the State’s own 
territory.66 At the global level, a coordinated approach to macroeconomic policy is necessary if rights 
are to be realized to the greatest extent possible.  
improving the way in which taxes are collected.68 
Reforms undertaken include organizing tax 
collection on a functional rather than geographic 
basis (e.g., business taxes, income taxes, VAT); 
creating independent collection agencies; 
issuing certificates of good tax compliance 
to businesses that pay their fair share; and 
improving tax education and services to assist 
taxpayers.69 Reforms by the Rwanda Revenue 
Authority (RRA), for example, have resulted in a 
60 per cent increase in government revenues as 
a share of GDP between 1998 and 2005—from 
9 per cent to 14.7 per cent. At the same time, 
the costs of collection have been lowered. The 
reforms include strengthening the RRA’s internal 
organizational structures and establishing greater 
accountability with other parts of government and 
the taxpayers.70 
As a result of trade liberalization, some countries 
have lost revenues from trade taxes and have not 
adequately replaced them with other revenue 
sources. A study of eight countries—Côte d’Ivoire, 
Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Sri Lanka 
and Uganda—compared countries that were able 
to recover lost trade tax revenues with those that 
had not succeeded in doing so and found that 
domestic tax reform, including an expansion of 
consumption and income taxes, was essential to 
protecting government revenues.71 More generally, 
macroeconomic policy should aim at expanding 
the mix of revenue sources in order to expand fiscal 
space and maximize potential revenue generation. 
The appropriate mix of taxes will vary from country 
to country depending on resource endowments, 
administrative capacity and the structure of the 
economy. However, all countries should be able 
to review the existing tax structure and tax base 
and identify reforms that would increase public 
resources.
Mobilizing tax revenues to fund social 
protection
The Plurinational State of Bolivia and Botswana 
have used revenues generated from natural 
resource extraction to finance their social protection 
systems, including health-care programmes, 
income support for vulnerable populations and 
old-age pensions.72 Along similar lines, Papua New 
Guinea is considering using revenues from gas 
production to set up a sovereign wealth fund that 
could fund social policies (see Box 4.4). 
In May 2014, Papua New Guinea started exporting liquefied natural gas to Asia under the LNG 
Project, and Government revenues are expected to increase substantially as a result. In order to 
manage the economic consequences of this resource boom, the Government has been considering 
the establishment of a Papua New Guinea Sovereign Wealth Fund (PNG SWF). It is hoped the SWF 
will address financial management challenges—including poor accountability, weak governance 
and lack of independence of fund managers—that have undermined budgetary and fiscal 
processes in the past and also allow the Government to better manage the macroeconomic 
consequences of a significant increase in financial flows into the country. The establishment of 
the SWF therefore has the potential of dramatically increasing fiscal space without compromising 
macroeconomic stability. The resources generated can be used to implement and expand social 
policies that address the challenges faced by women.73
BOX 4.4 
Creation of a sovereign wealth fund in Papua New Guinea
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Brazil introduced a tax on financial transactions 
in 1997 to expand fiscal space and used most 
of the revenue to fund social policies and 
services such as access to health care and 
social protection, including the Bolsa Família 
cash transfer programme. In 2008, the financial 
transaction tax was eliminated, and tax revenues 
are now raised from other sources such as 
an increase in the social security contribution 
of financial institutions and a tax on credit 
operations and currency transactions.74 For many 
countries, expanding contributions to the social 
security system has proven to be an effective 
means of enlarging fiscal space.75
Tax systems can be used to redistribute income 
and to redress socio-economic disadvantage 
by ensuring that women and marginalized 
groups are not disproportionately burdened 
and that they share equally in the benefits and 
services these revenues finance. For example, 
for value-added and sales taxes, expenditures 
on basic needs items should be exempted or 
zero-rated since such spending absorbs a 
large share of poorer people’s and specifically 
women’s income. Meanwhile, tax exemptions 
and allowances that primarily benefit wealthier 
groups can be minimized or removed. 
Resources can also be mobilized by re-
prioritizing spending to ensure better outcomes 
with regard to gender equality. Budget 
allocations should be moved from areas that 
have low social returns or fail to mitigate existing 
inequalities to areas that have higher returns and 
contribute to better distributive outcomes. The 
Governments of Cambodia, Costa Rica, Mauritius 
and Sri Lanka, for example, have reduced 
defence and security expenditures in order to 
support increased social spending.76 Similarly, 
Thailand expanded the resources available 
for universal health coverage, discussed in 
Chapter 3, through budget reprioritization.77 
Subsidies that support specific interest groups, 
such as large-scale bailouts of financial sectors, 
represent a poor use of scarce fiscal resources.78 
These should be reduced or eliminated to finance 
strategic social and public investments.
Public borrowing and debt restructuring
An additional way of financing social 
expenditures to support the realization of rights 
is through public borrowing. However, borrowing 
creates a claim on future budgets since debt has 
to be serviced and repaid. Moreover, external 
debt carries additional risks since a depreciation 
of the exchange rate can increase the burden of 
servicing it. In deciding whether deficit financing 
can contribute to the sustainable realization 
of rights over time, it is critical to consider 
whether the government is using the debt in 
ways that support the fulfilment of rights without 
compromising future streams of revenue—which 
would violate the principle of maximum available 
resources if future generations are considered. 
Borrowing to finance social investments can 
raise productivity and encourage greater private 
investment, leading to higher rates of growth. 
Faster growth generates additional economic 
resources that can support higher tax revenues 
and allow governments to pay back the debt.79 
For example, debt-financed fiscal expansions are 
more likely to be sustainable when the additional 
spending is concentrated in productivity-
enhancing areas such as education.80
At the same time, large debt burdens can 
reduce the resources available to finance social 
investments when debt-servicing costs crowd out 
other areas of spending. In these cases, reducing 
debt burdens or restructuring the national debt 
can free up financial resources. For example, 
Thailand was able to reduce its debt servicing 
costs, partly by reducing its reliance on external 
debt, and one third of the resources freed went to 
fund social programmes.81
The trade-offs associated with debt-financed 
government expenditures need to be taken into 
account. Government borrowing usually takes 
place in the context of unequal power relations. 
The threat of withholding access to credit and the 
ability to demand repayment on specified terms, 
for example, give lenders considerable power 
over borrowers. Debt becomes a disciplinary 
device that can be used to shape government 
policy and reinforce global dependencies. The 
imposition of structural adjustment programmes 
during the Latin American debt crisis in the 
1980s is just one example of these dynamics. The 
austerity programmes adopted as a result of 
the European sovereign debt crisis following the 
2008 global financial crisis reflect similar power 
relations.82 
Towards gender-responsive public 
spending
If economic policies are to support the 
achievement of substantive equality, they must be 
non-discriminatory in both design and effect. 
To comply with principles of non-discrimination, 
public spending should not be allocated in 
ways that reinforce existing inequalities or 
fail to deliver benefits to vulnerable and 
marginalized populations.83 This requires an 
auditing of budgets in terms of their distributive 
consequences in addition to specific areas 
of spending. Resources can be mobilized for 
gender equality by re-prioritizing spending to 
ensure better outcomes in this regard. 
Gender-responsive budgeting is a widely applied 
approach that aims to guide the formulation 
of fiscal and budgetary policies to enhance 
gender equality outcomes. It can also be 
used to assess compliance with human rights 
obligations such as those found in CEDAW.84 
Gender-responsive budgeting involves analysis 
of the gender-specific impacts of the allocation 
of public spending, taxation and public service 
delivery using sex-disaggregated data on the 
beneficiaries of different categories of spending 
or service provision and on the incidence of 
taxation.85 It has also been used to assess Official 
Development Assistance (ODA).86 A gender 
analysis of national budgets should also, ideally, 
examine fiscal policy at the aggregate level: total 
spending, total revenues and deficit financing. 
Given the key role of paid employment in 
improving gender equality, it is important not to 
limit budget analysis to social expenditures such 
as health, education and social security but to 
also include consideration of public investments in 
economic sectors such as infrastructure.
For example, the Government of Nepal 
introduced gender-responsive budgeting in 
fiscal year 2007/2008 by integrating a gender 
perspective into the country’s development policy 
framework. Specific measures included gender 
audits of line ministries, gender assessments, 
awareness-raising and the establishment of 
a Gender Responsive Budget Committee. The 
Ministry of Finance developed a budget tracking 
system to measure the gender responsiveness 
of public spending and donor aid. As a result 
of these changes, gender-responsive budget 
allocations in Nepal increased steadily from 11 
per cent in 2007 to almost 22 per cent in 2014. 
This has contributed to better public services 
for women and girls. The Government has now 
committed to conducting a comprehensive 
impact evaluation to assess how and to what 
extent the increase in allocations has contributed 
to changes in the lives of women.87 
Recommendations
Making women’s rights real requires raising 
sufficient resources and allocating them in ways 
that honour the principles of non-discrimination 
and equality. In designing and implementing 
fiscal policies governments should: 
• Improve the efficiency of tax collection 
through addressing institutional and capacity 
constraints, which can mobilize additional 
resources even if the tax mix and tax rates do 
not change 
• Increase tax revenues by introducing 
new taxes and tax policies that generate 
resources from under-taxed areas, such 
as the financial sector or natural resource 
exports
• Reprioritize expenditures towards areas that 
advance gender equality and support the 
realization of rights
• Design tax systems to redistribute income 
and to redress socio-economic disadvantage 
by ensuring that women and marginalized 
groups are not disproportionately burdened
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• Use borrowing where appropriate to 
mobilize resources to improve substantive 
equality, particularly when those resources 
are used to finance investments, including 
investments in human capacities, with 
significant long-term social returns
• Assess additional borrowing to ensure that 
it is sustainable and that growing debt 
servicing costs do not compromise the 
realization of rights in the future
• Use gender-responsive budgeting to guide 
revenue mobilization and spending decisions.
MAKING MONETARY POLICY WORK FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The human rights principles of non-discrimination 
and equality, the use of the maximum of available 
resources and accountability, transparency and 
participation have important implications for the 
conduct of monetary policy. Monetary policy directly 
affects the resources available for the realization of 
economic and social rights, especially the right to 
work, by influencing interest rates, exchange rates 
and the amount of credit available in the economy. 
However, central banks are rarely held accountable 
for human rights obligations. 
Conventional monetary policy typically has one 
target—inflation—and a narrow set of policy 
tools for achieving this goal: interest rates or the 
growth rate of the money supply. Central banks 
typically are expected to keep inflation as low as 
possible in line with policies of price stability. The 
trade-offs between maintaining inflation targets, 
the realization of rights and gender equality are 
rarely considered. Although managing inflation is 
an important goal of monetary policy, the benefits 
of maintaining very low rates of inflation are not 
always clear, particularly when trade-offs exist.88 
An alternative approach would be to incorporate 
other targets into the formulation of monetary 
policy, such as real economic activity, employment 
or incomes.89 Monetary policy committees could be 
mandated to consider the distributive consequences 
of their policy choices, including the impact of 
inflation and interest rates on gender equality and 
other distributive outcomes. 
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, many central banks 
altered their approach to monetary policy by 
focusing on stimulating real economic activity rather 
than exclusively on inflation. In Brazil, for example, 
the central bank (Banco Central do Brasil) lowered 
interest rates significantly in reaction to an initial 
sharp decline in real GDP.90 The Federal Reserve in 
the United States pursued a policy of quantitative 
easing—buying financial assets to directly increase 
the supply of money in the economy—in response 
to historically high levels of unemployment and the 
need to insure adequate liquidity for the financial 
sector.91 Although quantitative easing may help to 
address unemployment and stabilize the economy, 
the wealthy appear to have disproportionately 
benefited in countries where this policy was 
adopted.92 It may also have spill-over effects on 
other economies by increasing capital flows, raising 
asset prices and affecting exchange rate.93 These 
cross-border issues are explored in greater detail 
in the section (Global economic governance and 
gender equality).
Monetary policy influences the amount of credit 
created by the banking sector. How these resources 
are used—and the extent to which they support 
social objectives, including improvements in gender 
equality—depends on how the financial sector is 
organized and regulated.94 Central banks have 
a key regulatory role, setting out the rules and 
incentives and determining how the financial sector 
channels and allocates its resources. By changing 
these rules, central banks can channel credit to uses 
that support the realization of rights and promote 
gender equality. 
For example, central banks could strengthen the 
regulatory requirements on commercial banks 
that fail to extend a certain amount of credit to 
areas associated with the realization of economic 
and social rights, including housing, job-creating 
investments or loans to self-employed women. 
Public development banks could direct resources 
to priority areas when social goals and private 
incentives diverge. Credit allocation policies extend 
the toolkit available to pursue a range of objectives 
and should be considered as part of an alternative 
approach to macroeconomic management.
Due to the increased mobility of capital and finance 
across borders, however, governments may have 
restricted scope when it comes to implementing 
alternative monetary policies. Many countries 
cannot implement independent exchange rate 
and interest rate policies, limiting their ability to 
pursue monetary alternatives. This raises important 
issues of policy space, state sovereignty and global 
economic governance, which are explored in 
greater depth later in this chapter. 
Recommendations
In order to help realize economic and social rights 
and contribute to substantive equality for women, 
monetary policy should:
• Incorporate additional targets beyond a 
narrow focus on reducing inflation, such as real 
productive activity, employment or incomes 
with links to the realization of rights over time
• Consider distributive consequences, via monetary 
policy committees, including the impact of 
inflation and interest rates on gender equality
• Adopt central bank policies and regulations 
that encourage commercial lending to support 
the realization of economic and social rights, 
through investments in housing and sectors with 
high potential for job-creation or loans to small 
enterprises and self-employed workers
• Consider introducing requirements and 
incentives that encourage commercial 
banks to extend additional credit to areas of 
social concern such as housing, job-creating 
investments or credit to agricultural and small-
scale businesses; development banks could also 
direct resources to these priority areas
• Increase accountability, participation and 
transparency in the formulation of central bank 
policy, including through strengthening the 
voices of women’s rights organizations.
GUARDING AGAINST RETROGRESSION OF 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
Financial globalization has brought with it a 
threat of destabilizing financial flows and periodic 
economic crises that can result in a rollback in the 
realization of rights. As part of their obligations in 
the international human rights system, States should 
take steps to guard against retrogression in the 
enjoyment of rights, such as a reduction in labour 
rights, an increase in demands on women’s unpaid 
labour or increases in violence against women.  
Macroeconomic policy should therefore aim to 
reduce vulnerabilities by minimizing systemic risks. 
A range of experiences discussed in this Report 
highlight the gender-differentiated outcomes of the 
response to a negative economic shock that affect 
women’s labour force participation, demands on 
their unpaid labour and the distribution of income 
and power within the household. Macroeconomic 
policy can address instability by ensuring that 
adequate resources are available to finance social 
protection for vulnerable groups and populations 
to cope with adverse shock (as described in 
Chapter 3). Social protection policies also have 
macroeconomic implications. For example, 
countries with externally oriented economies are 
highly susceptible to shocks in the global economy. 
Social protection policies operate as automatic 
stabilizers in the face of such volatility, thereby 
contributing to the country’s economic development 
(see Box 4.5).
Macroeconomic policy has a fundamental role to 
play in decreasing the likelihood of a devastating 
economic setback, such as the 2008 global 
financial crisis, that can lead to retrogressive 
outcomes with regard to human rights. One of 
the contributing factors to the crisis was a lack 
of adequate regulation in countries with major 
financial centres—specifically United States 
financial markets.95 These kinds of financial crisis 
can be reduced, and their negative consequences 
contained, through prudential financial regulation. 
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Within the human rights framework, States have an 
obligation to protect rights from actions taken by 
third parties that threaten or undermine those rights. 
This includes maintaining an adequate system of 
regulation to restrict the kinds of investor behaviour 
that contribute to financial and economic crises. 
Stabilizing the macroeconomic environment can 
thus be seen as an aspect of complying with the 
human rights obligation to protect. 
Various measures can be adopted to promote this 
economic stability. Capital controls can reduce the 
chance that a country will experience a massive 
outflow of short-term financial resources that can 
trigger a crisis.97 Many countries, including Brazil, 
Chile, China, Colombia, India and Malaysia, have 
used these kinds of policies to reduce volatility and 
retain a stronger influence over domestic policy.98 
At the national level, macro-prudential policies 
can prevent the financial system from becoming 
dangerously fragile.99 Examples of macro-
prudential regulations include making the capital 
requirements of banks dependent on economic 
conditions, so that capital requirements increase 
when credit expands too rapidly; requiring that 
the assets of financial institutions be linked to their 
equity; and limiting debt-financed acquisition of 
financial assets. These interventions expand the 
scope for macroeconomic policy to supporting 
broader social objectives.
Recommendations
Macroeconomic and social policies need to work 
in tandem to improve economic stability, allowing 
individuals and households to cope with economic 
shocks that can lead to retrogression in economic and 
social rights and exacerbate gender inequalities. To 
facilitate policy synergies, governments should:
• Put in place social protection policies that act as 
‘stabilizers’ to reduce macroeconomic volatility 
while also contributing to substantive equality
• Introduce financial regulations that lessen the 
likelihood of macroeconomic volatility that can 
trigger an economic crisis
• Consider the implementation of capital controls 
and macro-prudential policies, which reduce 
the risk that a country will experience a massive 
outflow of short-term capital, in order to prevent 
the financial system from becoming dangerously  
fragile.
PREVENTING THE ACCUMULATION OF 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE 
The human rights framework stresses the 
progressive realization of rights over time. Realizing 
rights requires investments in human beings through 
a range of policies, including social protection and 
Costa Rica’s economy is heavily reliant on exports, including electronics and agricultural products, 
and tourism. Because of its outward orientation, the country is exposed to intense competitive 
pressures and the ups and downs of the global economy. To manage these risks, it has adopted 
inclusive social policies, including universal health and education services and broad-based 
social protection measures. Investments in infrastructure and education help support the country’s 
competitive position internationally. Not only does Costa Rica’s approach to social policy contribute 
to economic stability but there is also evidence that these policies support greater gender equality 
as well. Specifically, the social protection system allows women to choose alternatives to traditional 
household structures, including heading up households of their own.96 
BOX 4.5 
Social protection and gender equality in Costa Rica
social services (see Chapter 3). There are key stages 
in the life cycle when the impact of investing in 
human beings is particularly significant for realizing 
their potential. Early childhood and the transition 
from youth to adulthood are stages of heightened 
vulnerability, when the failure to adequately 
invest in human capacities can have long-term 
consequences for the realization of rights. Moreover, 
investments in human beings are essential for the 
sustainable functioning of the economy within which 
human rights are realized. Yet the macroeconomic 
implications of these investments are rarely 
recognized. 
An alternative approach to macroeconomics 
would make explicit these connections between 
social investments and economic outcomes and 
prioritize social policies and care work as key areas 
of investment for the long-term realization of rights. 
This would introduce the possibility of using fiscal 
expansion to mobilize resources for gender equality 
and enhance the scope for financing economic 
and social investments and supporting care work to 
reduce women’s socio-economic disadvantage. 
Investing in early childhood development
Investments in early childhood development have 
long-term macroeconomic implications but are 
typically ignored in macroeconomic policy-making. 
Such investments affect cognitive development, 
subsequent educational achievement and health 
outcomes, with important consequences for overall 
economic performance.100 In other words, they 
affect the realization of certain economic and social 
rights over time. The quality of investments made 
in children, however, is correlated with households’ 
socio-economic status, providing a channel 
for the transmission of poverty and inequality 
across generations.101 In order to prevent social 
inequality deepening over time and to equalize 
real opportunities, macroeconomic policies need 
to support adequate investment in the childhood 
development of low-income households in 
particular.
Unpaid care and domestic work is central to this 
investment in early childhood development. Direct 
interactions between children and caregivers—
including speech, gestures, facial expressions, 
physical contact and body movements—provide 
the stimulation necessary for children’s cognitive 
development.102 This direct care represents a 
critical component of the unpaid labour necessary 
to keep an economy going, and which, because 
of its long-term consequences, needs to be 
recognized in macroeconomic policy.
This raises a fundamental challenge for 
macroeconomic policy. Care work is necessary 
to the investment in human beings required to 
support a viable macroeconomic environment. 
But the current distribution of unpaid care and 
domestic work between women and men is 
highly unequal, as shown in Chapter 2, and so it 
entrenches women’s socio-economic disadvantage 
and perpetuates the undervaluation of this 
work. To redress this disadvantage and advance 
substantive equality, public investments in basic 
infrastructure and social services can be made to 
reduce and redistribute unpaid care and domestic 
work through, for example, investments in basic 
social infrastructure and childcare services (see 
Chapter 3).
Investing in youth and the demographic 
transition 
As Chapter 2 highlighted, the transition from 
adolescence into young adulthood is a period 
of heightened vulnerability for young women 
and men—with long-term consequences for 
the enjoyment of rights over the course of 
their lives. Studies suggest, for example, that 
conditions experienced before the age of 
18 explain approximately 50 per cent of the 
variation in lifelong earnings.103 Youth transitions 
are therefore not only critical for employment 
policies but also have far-reaching implications 
for macroeconomic performance and human 
development. 
The overall demographic structure of an 
economy has an important influence on 
economic development and living standards. 
In many lower-income countries in South Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa, the youth share of the 
population is sizeable. Young people represent 
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a critical resource that has the potential to 
positively support future economic development 
and structural transformations through what is 
known as the ‘demographic dividend’. As the youth 
population enters the labour force, productive 
activity increases and contributes to growth. At 
the same time, the number of dependents (young 
children and older adults who are no longer 
economically active) falls relative to the working 
age population, helping to raise average living 
standards.  
This transition can be observed, for example, 
in the Republic of Korea, which had a very 
young population in 1950 but where today the 
demographic distribution has changed and 
simultaneously living standards have risen very 
significantly.104 Two conditions are necessary for this 
demographic dividend to be realized: fertility rates 
must fall as youth enter the labour force; and youth 
must be productively employed.105  The realization 
of the demographic dividend therefore depends 
on young women’s and men’s reproductive choices 
and labour market opportunities.
Changes in fertility rates are linked to improving 
educational and economic opportunities for 
young women. Girls who stay in school longer 
tend to both marry and have children later in life. 
Not only does this affect average fertility rates, 
it also decreases the risk of maternal and child 
mortality.106 Over time, increasing girls’ and young 
women’s reproductive choices has the potential 
as well to increase their autonomy, their ability to 
make independent decisions and their enjoyment 
of rights. Research in Bangladesh, for example, 
indicates that delaying marriage for young women 
raises educational attainment, improves literacy 
and increases the use of preventative health 
services.107 
By contrast, girls who bear children at a young 
age face critical challenges to their human 
development. In Latin America, young women who 
give birth before the age of 16 are three to four 
times more likely to die in childbirth than women 
in their 20s; worldwide, complications during 
pregnancy and childbearing are leading causes 
of death among adolescent girls between 15 and 
19 years old.108 Access to health services is essential 
to securing women’s reproductive rights and 
protecting their bodily autonomy (see Chapter 3). 
Young men face a distinct set of vulnerabilities 
reflected in their disproportionate representation 
in deaths from violence, homicide and suicide.109 
In many circumstances, they face enormous 
pressures to demonstrate their ability to take on 
traditional male roles as the primary breadwinners 
and the source of support for their families, often 
including their parents.110 A failure to live up to these 
expectations can lead to intense emotional stress 
with dramatic implications for the lives of young 
men, manifesting itself as violence, depression or a 
propensity towards risky behaviour.111
The right to education is a critical factor 
determining the labour market risks that youth 
face and is a major path to better economic 
opportunities in the future.112 Access to education is 
unequally distributed among youth, however, and 
the quality of schooling varies with socio-economic 
status, with poorer youth having worse educational 
outcomes on average.113 As Chapter 2 highlighted, 
young women face more challenging labour 
market transitions than young men and gender 
gaps frequently widen in adolescence and young 
adulthood.114 Expectations that young women will 
assist older women with unpaid care and domestic 
work limit their choices with regard to education, 
labour force participation and the types of 
employment accessible to them. 
In a rights-based approach to macroeconomic 
policy, investments in human beings should not 
be judged solely with regard to their effects on 
productivity or per capita income. Social policies 
that support care for the elderly, discussed in 
Chapter 3, or that enhance the lives of those with 
severe disabilities, for example, are also critical to 
the realization of rights even when they have little 
direct impact on economic growth. 
Recommendations
Investments in human beings, particularly 
during the critical stages of early childhood and 
youth, can prevent the accumulation of socio-
economic disadvantage and its transmission across 
generations and improve long-term macroeconomic 
performance. Governments should:
• Support investments in early childhood 
development while reducing inequalities arising 
from the unequal burden of unpaid care and 
domestic work on women (see Chapter 3)
• Address the vulnerabilities that youth face 
by investing in education, implementing 
employment policies to create economic 
opportunities for youth and reducing inequalities 
between young women and men (see Chapter 2)
• Strengthen reproductive rights, sex education 
and access to reproductive health services, 
especially for adolescent girls and young women, 
so that they have a broader range of choices 
with regard to childbearing and marriage
• Administer regular time-use surveys in order 
to monitor the true costs of investing in human 
beings and the impact social policies, such as 
early childhood development initiatives, have on 
the distribution of unpaid work. 
DEMOCRATIZING MACROECONOMICS BY 
STRENGTHENING WOMEN’S AGENCY, VOICE 
AND PARTICIPATION
A human rights-based approach to macroeconomic 
policy requires that there is meaningful democratic 
participation, that policy processes are transparent 
and that governments are accountable for their 
policy decisions. Strengthening women’s agency, 
voice and participation is crucial to the achievement 
of substantive equality, as this Report has shown, and 
must be extended to macroeconomic policy-making. 
Macroeconomic policy formulation is typically seen 
as a technocratic process, carried out with little 
or no direct participation by the different social 
groups affected, including women’s organizations. 
Strengthening women’s voice in the development of 
macroeconomic policy partly involves increasing their 
presence in decision-making in general. In addition, 
women’s organizations and associations need to hold 
policy makers to account regardless of whether those 
making the decisions are women or men. Different 
forms of collective action can allow women to 
question current macroeconomic policies and, when 
needed, press for alternatives. 
The degree of participation in policy-making varies 
depending on the specific area. Take the example of 
monetary policy, where women’s voice is particularly 
silent in deliberations. Since central banks in most 
cases function independently from government, 
possibilities for participation and accountability 
through the state are often limited. As of July 2014, 
women were in the top leadership positions (e.g., 
they were the governor or equivalent) in just a 
handful of countries, including Botswana, Honduras, 
Israel, Lesotho, Malaysia, Russian Federation and 
the United States.115 Women are also grossly under-
represented on the decision-making bodies of 
central banks. There is only one woman on the six-
member executive board of the European Central 
Bank and two women on the 24-member governing 
council, for example.116 Women’s representation in 
key macroeconomic decision-making bodies must 
increase if improvements in women’s voice are 
to be realized (see also Figure 4.8). Nevertheless, 
better representation alone is not sufficient. 
Women’s interests, especially the interests of the 
most vulnerable women, must be brought into these 
organizations and political bodies.
Participation in macroeconomic decision-making 
and the ability to hold governments to account 
require information. Governments vary in the degree 
of transparency associated with their policy-making 
processes. Consider the example of fiscal policy. 
Budget processes vary widely in terms of the level 
of transparency, illustrated by the variation in score 
between countries on the Open Budget Index (OBI).117 
The OBI 2012 was calculated for a total of 100 
countries, with scores between 93 and zero. Figure 
4.7 shows the scores, which range from 93 (New 
Zealand) to 0 (Equatorial Guinea, Myanmar and 
Qatar).118 Some countries, such as New Zealand, 
South Africa and the United Kingdom, have achieved 
high levels of transparency. However, the wide 
variation in scores underlines that, for others, there is 
considerable room for improving the openness of the 
221
budget process. The index focuses primarily on the 
availability of budget information. Other dimensions 
of democratic macroeconomic management—such 
as public accountability and participation—are not 
fully reflected in these numbers.119
Women’s groups have engaged directly with policy 
makers on fiscal policies, focusing on gender 
inequalities in budget and tax policies. Part of this 
engagement has involved gender-responsive 
budgeting, discussed above. The Women’s Budget 
Group in the United Kingdom has generated research 
and analysis tracking inequalities between women 
and men in the implementation of the United 
Kingdom’s austerity programme following the 2008 
global economic crisis.120 Similarly, in the United 
Republic of Tanzania, TGNP Mtandao has engaged 
in gender budget analysis, training and lobbying to 
push for greater gender equality in economic policy-
making (see Box 4.6).121 
TGNP Mtandao (formerly the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme) began the Gender Budget 
Initiative in 1996 as a response to the falling quality of public social services following structural 
adjustment policies in the 1980s. The broad aim of the Initiative is to make decision-making 
processes on policies, budgets, taxes and debts more democratic, participatory and responsive to 
the needs and demands of marginalized women and their communities. 
TGNP Mtandao works closely with officials in the Ministries of Finance and Planning and provides inputs 
into the budget guidelines for sectoral ministries, as well as regional and local governments. Budget 
planners in priority sectors, as well as members of Parliament, are sensitized regarding the importance 
of gender-responsive resource allocation. MPs use the information provided by TGNP Mtandao to raise 
questions on gender equality issues during committee and plenary debates at the Parliament. In addition, 
TGSP Mtandao organizes local and regional courses on gender budgeting and macroeconomic policy for 
policy makers, practitioners and civil society activists. Media campaigns and publications are used to keep 
the public informed about the main issues of the gender budget review process.
As a result of these efforts, the Government has endorsed gender budgeting and included it in the 
budget guidelines. A growing number of other civil society organizations now engage with the broader 
budget process or focus on particular sectors such as health, education, water and agriculture. 
Government reports and budgets include more sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis. Unpaid 
care and domestic work is also being measured as part of the official Labour Force Survey. 
A number of concrete policy changes have followed. Primary school fees were abolished, again, and 
farm input subsidies reintroduced, in part due to public pressure supported by the campaign. Gender 
budgeting initiatives elsewhere in Africa have drawn heavily on the Tanzanian experience as a model.
A major and lasting achievement, overall, has been increased awareness among grassroots 
activists of the importance of budget processes and the strengthening of their capacity to hold 
elected representatives to account. Local government leaders at village, ward and district levels 
have responded positively, in many cases, by removing incompetent or corrupt practitioners or 
providing more resources to support the priorities of communities.122
BOX 4.6 
Campaigning for gender equality in budget policy in the United Republic of Tanzania
Recommendations
In order to contribute to substantive equality, civil 
society—including women rights activists—must 
be able to voice their concerns and priorities in the 
discussion, decision-making and implementation of 
macroeconomic policy. Key measures to strengthen 
women’s agency, voice and participation in these 
processes are:
• Improve the transparency, degree of participation 
and accountability of the institutions that develop 
and implement macroeconomic policy 
• Ensure that information regarding budgets, 
tax policy, monetary policy and other aspects 
of macroeconomic policy is readily available, 
accessible and presented in a form that can be 
used by the public
• Strengthen the capacity of civil society and 
women’s organizations to engage with 
macroeconomic policy through initiatives such 
as gender-responsive budgeting. 
Figure 4.7
Open Budget Index, 2012 
 There is large variation in the transparency of governments’ budget-making processes 
4628 4022 3416 4325 3719 3113 4527 3921 3315 4224 3618 3012 4426 3820 3214 4123 3517 2911109876543210
Source: IBP 2014. 
Note: The Open Budget Index is a survey that evaluates the transparency of governments’ policy making processes, through assessing: the extent to which they give public access to budget 
information—including the pre-budget statement, budget proposal, enacted budget, audit reports, etc.—and whether citizens are given the opportunity to participate in the budget process 
at the national level. The analysis also assesses the capacity and independence of formal oversight institutions. Countries are ranked based on a score between 0 and 100 (with 100 being the 
most transparent).
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GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
AND GENDER EQUALITY
Although macroeconomic policies are still primarily 
formulated at the national level, the economies of 
the world have become increasingly interconnected. 
Financial flows and productive resources are mobile 
across national boundaries and shift in response to 
changing economic conditions. Production processes 
are fragmented in global value chains. Corporations 
operate in many countries simultaneously and move 
operations and resources across their affiliates. 
The growing integration of the world’s economies 
means that actions taken by one government affect 
the realization of rights elsewhere. Moreover, the 
proliferation of agreements to liberalize trade and 
financial flows between countries limits the policies 
that individual governments can adopt. Increasingly, 
this disjuncture between national policy processes 
and global integration compromises economic 
management.  
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Article 2.1 of the ICESCR states the need for 
‘international assistance and co-operation’, 
suggesting that a coordinated approach to 
macroeconomic policy is necessary if rights are to 
be realized. However, international coordination of 
macroeconomic policies to support the realization 
of rights is rudimentary, at best. This lack of effective 
global governance places significant constraints 
on the ability of many governments to implement 
policies that would support the achievement of 
substantive equality for women. 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND 
POLICY SPACE
Global economic integration constrains the 
ability of governments, to varying degrees, to 
use macroeconomic policy to create an enabling 
environment for the realization of economic and social 
rights. 
The free flow of finance, for example, has the potential 
to destabilize national economies. A rapid inflow of 
capital, in the form of short-term investments, can 
easily reverse itself, leading to the depreciation of 
a country’s currency and a more general financial 
crisis—as was the case with the East Asian financial 
crisis and similar subsequent crises.123 The United 
States financial crisis, which affected countries around 
the world, was due in part to inadequate regulatory 
safeguards. Innovative financial products are often 
poorly regulated and contribute to systemic risks 
that, in the event of a meltdown, generate enormous 
human costs extending beyond national borders.124 
Monetary policy is constrained by unhindered capital 
flows. A central bank may not lower interest rates 
below those in other countries in an effort to keep 
capital from leaving. Yet, high interest rates make 
debt servicing more costly and may increase overall 
macroeconomic fragility, threatening the sustainability 
of employment and social policies.125
Not all countries are equal in terms of their ability to 
implement independent macroeconomic policies in a 
globally integrated world. Larger, more systemically 
influential economies have a wider range of policy 
options available when responding to economic 
shocks compared to smaller, more dependent 
economies.126 For example, China and the United 
States were able to respond to the 2008 crisis by 
implementing counter-cyclical stimulus policies in 
an effort to offset the negative consequences of the 
financial shock.127 Less well-positioned economies, 
however, experienced different effects of the crisis, 
including capital outflows as financial investors 
sought out safe havens.128 These economies often 
implement pro-cyclical policies such as higher 
interest rates and cuts to government spending in 
an effort to stem financial outflows, often under the 
influence of global institutions such as the IMF.129 For 
example, the austerity programmes implemented 
in countries such as Greece due to the sovereign 
debt crisis represent a type of pro-cyclical policy—
drastically cutting spending after a country has 
already received a substantial negative shock. 
As a result, national capacities to respond to global 
crises are highly uneven. Countries that are able to 
implement independent macroeconomic policies can 
take steps to mitigate backsliding on economic and 
social rights due to economic shocks. Meanwhile, 
other countries are obliged to adopt macroeconomic 
policies that contribute to, rather than alleviate, such 
retrogression. The options for conducting independent 
macroeconomic policy are particularly constrained in 
post-conflict countries (see Box 4.7).
Conflicts undermine the normal functioning of economies and destroy the institutional infrastructure 
needed to implement macroeconomic policies. Effective macroeconomic management requires that 
certain key institutions are in place, but in post-conflict situations those institutions have often been 
damaged or destroyed. Macroeconomic strategies for post-conflict countries must therefore rebuild 
many of the institutions that are often taken for granted elsewhere.
BOX 4.7 
Constraints on macroeconomic policy in post-conflict settings
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The lack of global coordination also affects the 
ability of governments to mobilize the maximum of 
available resources. Countries that act as tax havens, 
maintaining low tax rates, facilitate tax avoidance 
and evasion. Multinational corporations use a variety 
of accounting techniques, including ‘transfer pricing’, 
to suggest that their profits are accruing in tax havens 
and thereby to lower their overall contribution.131 
Estimates of the annual tax revenue lost to developing 
countries due to trade mispricing put it at between 
$98 and $106 billion, nearly $20 billion more than 
the annual capital costs needed to achieve universal 
water and sanitation coverage by 2015.132
Trade agreements limit policy space
Policy space is further limited by a growing number 
of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, which 
increasingly incorporate provisions involving foreign 
investment and services that protect the rights of 
transnational business in ways that make it more 
difficult to realize the rights of individuals. Since the 
mid-1990s, over 200 regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) have been signed, with provisions covering 
trade in services and foreign investment that typically 
set limits on regulatory actions by governments and 
create barriers to the expansion of public services. 
These agreements sometimes involve sales of 
state assets and greater economic deregulation, 
based on the assumption that the private sector is 
more efficient and better for growth. Many such 
agreements require commercial interests to be 
compensated when public services are expanded 
into new areas or when privatization is reversed. 
The liberalization of trade in services promoted by 
such trade agreements has particularly negative 
implications for unpaid work.133 As services such as 
water, health care or public transportation come 
to rely on market-based user fees, an unequal 
structure of access emerges with poor households 
marginalized or excluded. This leads to women and 
girls spending more time on daily livelihood activities 
such as fetching clean water, cooking and caring for 
the ill, young or frail elderly. 
Trade agreements have led to challenges to 
national health policies by private investors in, for 
example, Poland and Slovakia.134 Elsewhere, as 
in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, governments 
have resisted attempts by private investors to sue 
them under the rules of trade agreements following 
contract cancellations. In 1999, the Government 
of the Plurinational State of Bolivia privatized the 
municipal water system in Cochabamba, granting a 
40-year contract to Bechtel, a multinational based 
in the United States. It subsequently cancelled the 
contract in the face of widespread protest due to 
the company’s failure to supply adequate water, 
especially to poor communities. Bechtel then sued 
for compensation under a bilateral investment 
Consider Liberia, which emerged from over a decade of violent civil war in 2003. The macroeconomic 
toolkit had been severely depleted, and a huge gap existed between the need for social spending and 
the government revenues that could be generated. Resources for government spending predominantly 
came from donor countries, with a very small role for policies to support domestic resource mobilization. 
The Government was required by the donors to meet a balanced budget requirement that drastically 
narrowed the scope for implementing fiscal policy—for example, using deficit financing to increase 
public spending when the 2008 financial crisis negatively impacted the economy through rapidly falling 
commodity prices. One instrument of monetary policy involves the buying and selling of government bonds 
to influence the money supply, but a well-functioning bond market did not exist. This not only restricted the 
ability of the Government to borrow domestically, it also limited the scope of monetary policy. Monetary 
policy was further constrained by the use of the US dollar as the currency for many transactions.
Part of the reconstruction effort in post-conflict situations must involve institutional development 
to allow countries to pursue independent macroeconomic policies—such as creating a functioning 
bond market or setting up an effective system for administering tax policies. Donors should also relax 
conditionalities that bar a country from implementing its own macroeconomic policies. This kind 
of institutional development should explicitly incorporate gender equality as a goal and women’s 
participation as an essential part of efforts to rehabilitate macroeconomic policy-making.130 
treaty between the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
and the Netherlands. Finally, in 2006, Bechtel settled 
for a token amount in the wake of an international 
campaign against the company.135
In their responses to the 2008 financial crisis, 
European and North American government 
measures such as massive financial bailouts and 
subsidies to automakers transgressed the terms 
of trade agreements, underlining the limits that 
agreements place on policy space.136 
A RIGHTS-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
From a human rights perspective, international 
cooperation is essential for supporting individual 
States’ ability to meet their obligations to protect, 
respect and fulfil rights. The ICESCR recognizes that a 
country has obligations with regard to the realization 
of economic and social rights beyond its borders.137 
However, it does not define how this obligation 
is to be interpreted or applied and, as a result, 
‘international assistance’ is often interpreted narrowly 
as the obligation of high-income countries to provide 
ODA to poor countries.138  
To be sure, ODA can be an important source of 
budget support for low- and middle-income 
countries and represents one channel through 
which international assistance and co-operation 
can contribute to mobilizing resources for improving 
gender equality and realizing economic and social 
rights. However, whether ODA contributes to the 
realization of rights varies depending on how it is 
used. It may be restricted to specific uses or by-pass 
governments altogether; it may be tied to imports of 
goods and services from donor countries that limit 
its effect on the domestic economy; and significant 
amounts of donor funds could serve as a disincentive 
for governments to increase the effectiveness of their 
tax systems for mobilizing domestic resources.139
While ODA remains a potentially effective means 
through which resources can be mobilized at the 
global level, international law implies a broader 
commitment to international cooperation, although 
the extent of this cooperation with regard to economic 
and social rights has not been clearly spelled out.140  
Global economic governance describes the set 
of institutions and relationships that structure 
the actions of states and private agents across 
international borders. Current institutions of 
global economic governance are characterized 
by unequal power relationships that determine 
the space within which national governments 
can act, and not all players have an equal 
voice.141 Indeed, most existing institutions of global 
governance—for instance, the IMF, the World Bank, 
the G20, the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organization—exhibit clear power dynamics.142 
Women’s representation in the top decision-
making bodies of these governance institutions 
is at best low and in some cases negligible (see 
Figure 4.8). Representation of women is, of course, 
no guarantee that issues of gender equality will be 
taken up in policy discussions and decision-making 
processes. However, a lack of representation 
itself reveals a serious source of gender inequality 
and reduces the likelihood that other gender 
inequalities in global macroeconomic policy will be 
corrected.
The current system of global governance 
exacerbates, rather than mitigates, the problems 
with macroeconomic policy, reinforcing the divide 
between ‘social policy’ and ‘economic policy’ 
and the lack of attention to distributive outcomes, 
including persistent gender inequalities. Due to 
their links with international economic institutions, 
state agencies such as central banks and ministries 
of finance have gained in influence in recent years 
relative to those associated with social, rather than 
economic, policies.143 This ‘internationalization of 
the state’, whereby state institutions are increasingly 
attuned to global economic relationships rather 
than domestic policy concerns, exacerbates 
the biases towards and within macroeconomic 
policy.144 Investment in human development, 
social policy, unpaid care and domestic work and 
gender equality are considered domestic policy 
issues and are therefore not prioritized in global 
economic policy forums such as the G20.145
Global cooperation for the realization 
of economic and social rights could be 
achieved through the universal acceptance 
of extraterritorial obligations of governments 
with regard to the realization of rights beyond 
their own borders, as outlined in the Maastricht 
Principles (see Box 4.8), which include 
consideration of the roles of transnational 
corporations, non-government al organizations 
and intergovernmental institutions.  
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Figure 4.8
Sex composition of board of directors for select intergovernmental and private financial and regulatory 
institutions, 2014 
 Women are under-represented in key institutions of global economic governance
In 2011, a group of experts on international law and human rights developed a core set of principles 
on extraterritorial obligations in the area of economic, social and cultural rights. The result was the 
Maastricht Principles, which recognize that the policies adopted by governments affect the realization 
of rights beyond their own borders. The preamble to the Principles states:
‘The human rights of individuals, groups and peoples are affected by and dependent on the 
extraterritorial acts and omissions of States. The advent of economic globalization in particular, has 
meant that States and other global actors exert considerable influence on the realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights across the world.’146
The Maastricht Principles reaffirm the existing framework for economic, social and cultural rights—
as reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR and other international 
BOX 4.8 
Maastricht Principles, extraterritorial obligations and global economic governance
Source: a. IMF Board of Directors as of April 2014. b. World Bank’s Public Information Centre. c. IAS Plus 2015. d. IIF 2015. e. BIS 2015. f. IOSCO 2015.
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agreements—but they go further by elaborating the concept of extraterritorial obligations with regard 
to jurisdiction, government responsibilities and human rights obligations. They are not currently 
binding for governments but represent a careful interpretation of the extraterritorial human rights 
obligations of States based on existing international law.147  
The Principles lay out the extraterritorial dimensions of the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil rights. 
The obligation to respect: A government may not interfere with the enjoyment of economic and 
social rights outside of the State’s territory (principles 20 and 21). Direct interference refers to conduct 
by the government itself that impairs the realization of rights. Indirect interference refers to actions 
by one government that undermine the ability of another government to comply with human rights 
obligations. This can happen, for instance, if the policies of one government affect the choices 
available to another government in ways that undermine the realization of rights.
The obligation to protect: The obligation to protect includes the obligation to establish a regulatory 
environment that prevents international organizations, transnational corporations and individuals 
from taking actions that undermine the realization of rights beyond a State’s borders.148 These 
extraterritorial obligations include omissions by the State, such as one State’s failure to adequately 
regulate the actions of third parties in ways that have negative consequences for rights elsewhere 
(principle 20). The failure to adequately regulate financial markets in the United States, which 
contributed to the 2008 global economic crisis, is an example of this kind of omission.
The obligation to fulfil: Governments should create an environment conducive to realizing rights 
through their own policy choices and through international cooperation in a range of areas: 
international trade, investment, finance, taxation, environmental protection and development 
cooperation (principle 29). International coordination includes actions within international 
organizations—such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade 
Organization—that contribute to the fulfilment of rights within and beyond each State’s territory.
Recommendations
Transforming macroeconomic policy for the 
achievement of substantive equality requires 
more and better global coordination and changes 
to global governance institutions. Grounded in 
international law, the Maastricht Principles provide 
a foundation on which to build a rights-based 
system of global governance that would allow for a 
coordinated approach to macroeconomic policies. 
To move forward, countries should:
• Formally adopt a common approach to 
extraterritorial obligations and global 
cooperation, based on the Maastricht 
Principles, to improve global governance for 
the realization of economic and social rights
• Proceed to concretize the mechanisms for the 
effective application of these extraterritorial 
obligations, based on the Maastricht Principles
• Adopt a coordinated approach to tax policy 
to eliminate tax havens and to reduce tax 
avoidance and evasion
• Ensure that international trade and 
investment agreements do not curtail policy 
space in a way that undermines substantive 
equality and the realization of rights
• Improve women’s representation in 
leadership positions of global economic 
governance institutions. 
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CONCLUSIONS
Improving substantive equality for women and 
realizing their human rights require a rethinking of 
macroeconomics. Changes at the macroeconomic 
level affect women’s socio-economic disadvantage 
and the stigma, stereotypes and violence women 
face. Moreover, macroeconomic policy-making 
typically excludes women’s voice. At the same 
time, although macroeconomic policy can create 
a favourable environment for substantive equality 
and relax constraints on other policy efforts, it 
is important to recognize that it cannot achieve 
these goals by itself. It must be coordinated with 
the other policy areas highlighted in this Report, 
in particular employment, social protection and 
social services. 
If macroeconomic policy is to support substantive 
equality, it should comply with human rights 
obligations, both nationally and internationally, 
paying particular regard to the immediate 
obligations for non-discrimination and equality 
and ensuring that everyone enjoys the minimum 
essential level of economic and social rights. It 
must support, rather than undermine, efforts to 
redress women’s socio-economic disadvantage 
through employment policies, social protections 
and social services. This involves considering a 
broader set of goals and indicators—for example, 
considering potential trade-offs between 
maintaining very low rates of inflation and 
employment outcomes. It also requires ensuring 
that sufficient resources are available to support 
the realization of human rights. Governments 
should pursue strategies for expanding fiscal 
space by improving the efficiency of tax collection, 
enlarging the range of tax instruments and 
reprioritizing government expenditures. Debt-
financed fiscal expansions can be sustainable 
when used to finance employment programmes 
and social investments with long-term economic 
returns.
Macroeconomic policy processes and institutions 
at the national and international levels should 
be opened up and made more transparent, 
participatory and accountable on an equal 
basis to women and men. Governments should 
adopt measures to increase women’s presence in 
macroeconomic decision-making bodies, including 
central banks and ministries of finance. Information 
on budgets and monetary policy decisions must be 
publicly available and readily accessible. Meaningful 
participation requires that channels be created to 
enable dialogue with civil society organizations, 
women’s groups and non-governmental 
organizations.
As part of the commitment to non-discrimination 
and equality, macroeconomic policy-making 
should incorporate distributive impact analyses. 
This a would allow macroeconomic policies to be 
evaluated in terms of their impacts on women’s 
socio-economic disadvantage. Specifically, there is 
a need to analyse the effects that public spending, 
tax policy and monetary policy have on gender 
equality. When gender inequalities are uncovered, 
such as in the case of an unequal impact of tax 
policies, governments must take steps to correct these 
imbalances.
Finally, the development of human potential and the 
need to redistribute the burden of unpaid work 
should be at the heart of macroeconomic policy. 
Resources, both public and private, dedicated 
to developing human potential represent a 
form of investment with long-term returns. The 
macroeconomic contributions of social policy 
and unpaid care work need to be explicitly 
recognized and incorporated into macroeconomic 
measurement and concepts, policy formulation 
and the assessment of outcomes with regard to 
gender equality and the realization of human 
rights.
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When Mohamed Chafiki, a senior official in the Moroccan 
finance ministry, speaks about gender equality, the passion 
in his voice is unmistakable. Ensuring every government 
decision is assessed for its gender impact has been a defining 
feature of his career. And by working hand-in-hand with key 
partner organizations from the world of gender and human 
rights, he has helped Morocco become one of the leading 
lights in the region.
“I have always thought that gender equality was at the heart 
of democracy, both for my country and around the world,” 
he says from his office in Rabat. “I don’t think we can have 
balance in life, or achieve happiness if there is not equality 
between the sexes.”
Gender responsive budgeting - or GRB - can have a profound 
effect on women’s lives and a country’s development, 
explains Mohamed. “Morocco, like many countries in the 
region, suffers from widespread inequality,” he says. “And 
in each instance it is women who pay the biggest price - in 
terms of poverty, exclusion and marginalization. Addressing 
these inequalities is also absolutely central to questions of 
democracy and human rights.”
Putting gender equality at the 
heart of governance in Morocco
COUNTING 
WOMEN IN 
MAKING PROGRESS/STORIES OF CHANGE
Mohamed Chafiki, of Morocco’s Ministry of Economy and Finance
Photo: UN Women/Hassane Ouazzani Chahdi
 In Morocco the gender impact of any policy is not an afterthought 
- it is considered right from the word go. Which means that 
when it comes to crucial policies such as universal education, 
targets are set for both sexes and the barriers which could 
prevent girls going to school are factored into the budgeting 
process.  For example when a school is planned, money is put 
aside to ensure that there are adequate toilets that can be 
used by girls. Not only that, but in its efforts to improve access 
to running water, the government also collects information on 
the number of girls who have to collect water in rural areas, a 
burden that can prevent them from attending school. 
“You can’t have an effective budget, and an effective use of 
the public purse if you do not identify targets and consider 
the gender impact from the moment of policy conception,” 
says Mohamed.
The road to becoming fully gender responsive has been 
long. Morocco began looking at the impact of gender 
in budgets in 2002, outlining a strategy, training public 
servants and creating technical tools. Since 2005 Morocco 
has produced a gender report providing a vital tool to 
ensure accountability and in 2007 the Prime Minister 
of Morocco sent a letter to all departments urging them 
to take up GRB. Currently, a total of 27 departments, 
accounting for more than 80 per cent of the government’s 
budget, have adopted the tool.
A new landmark was reached in 2014, with the passing of a 
new finance law, which legally obliges the government to 
consider gender throughout the budget process.
“Since 2002 we have seen a pragmatic move forward - 
there have been constraints, there have been those who 
have attempted to take us backwards, but whereas GRB 
was informal before, now it is enshrined in law,” says 
Mohamed.
From a legal perspective, huge progress in women’s rights 
has also been made. A major advance was achieved 
in 2004 with the passing of a new family law which 
guaranteed equality of the sexes in marriage. In the same 
year, Morocco’s new labour code spelt out women’s rights 
to maternity leave. Meanwhile, the confederation of 
Moroccan businesses (CGEM) has produced guidance to 
its members to make crèches available in workplaces to 
support working mothers. 
“We have to reflect on every serious measure to make sure 
women can access work, while at the same time making 
sure there is a balance between family and professional 
life,” Mohamed said. 
In 2011, the country passed a new constitution guaranteeing 
gender equality in civil, political, economic, social, cultural 
and environmental rights. In the same year, Morocco 
removed several of its reservations to CEDAW, in relation to 
women’s rights to nationality and to rights within marriage 
and the family. 
Mohamed is quick to point out that this progress is not 
down to the work of government technocrats, but women’s 
rights campaigners who have been a formidable force. 
“You can’t have an effective 
budget, and effective use 
of the public purse if you 
do not identify targets and 
consider the gender impact 
from the moment of policy 
conception”
First grade student at an elementary school in a Moroccan village
Photo: World Bank
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“Everything I personally did, and we achieved in government 
was a homage to the groups fighting for women’s rights.” 
Rabéa Naciri, former president of the Association 
Démocratique du Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), explains 
that women’s rights groups were central to introducing the 
concept of GRB. 
“Women’s groups have been behind practically every 
reform made in Morocco. We didn’t just demand - we 
came up with solutions - and after, we mobilized in order to 
get reforms,” she says.
Rabéa urges other women’s 
groups around the world to 
focus on GRB as a tool for 
promoting gender equality. 
“Budgeting is not technical 
- it is political,” she says. “People make you think it’s too 
complicated - that’s not true. It’s a mechanism for holding 
governments to account - so it is incredibly important.”
The next frontier for Morocco is to measure how time is 
spent in each household, so women’s unpaid work can be 
taken into account in policymaking. “It’s a fundamental 
problem that part of society is working and yet not being 
paid,” says Mohamed. 
In Morocco women form only 27 per cent of the labour 
force. “That’s not to say they don’t work, but their work 
is not recognized. How can 
we hope to catch up with 
developed nations? Only by 
unleashing the earning and 
economic potential of those 
women.”
“Budgeting is not 
technical – it is political.” 
Story: Alexandra Topping. For more information on Gender responsive budgeting in Morocco see UN Women 2014c.
Across a sweeping range of issues, women’s 
movements, working with other key actors, have 
succeeded in bringing about significant change in the 
recognition of women’s equal rights in laws as well as 
in policies. In a majority of countries today, there are 
no legal barriers to prevent women from getting a 
job or pursuing a trade or profession in the same way 
as men, from owning and inheriting land and housing 
in their own name, from receiving a pension or from 
having access to a wide range of services, including 
education and health care.  
And yet, it is hard to think of a country where income, 
property ownership, social security entitlements, paid 
and unpaid work, leisure and power are equally 
distributed between women and men. 
What this Report has shown is that these inequalities 
are not random outcomes of an otherwise benign 
and gender-neutral economy and society. Rather, 
they are wired into the ways in which economic, social 
and political structures work. To achieve substantive 
equality, so that women can enjoy their rights in 
practice, it is not enough to do away with direct 
discrimination. There is a need to go much further 
to eliminate indirect forms of discrimination and the 
structural barriers that have the effect, if not always 
the intention, of producing unequal outcomes.  
This more profound task is a necessity for the 21st 
century because gender equality is a human rights 
obligation that remains vastly unfulfilled. It is also a 
development imperative: the growing inequalities 
between social groups, and between rich and 
poor women, undermine development by wasting 
human capabilities and talents, hindering economic 
dynamism and threatening social cohesion. 
Substantive equality for women is within reach: the 
experience of numerous countries, documented in 
this Report, shows that the right mix of economic 
and social policies—working in tandem and 
developed with the participation of different social 
groups—can significantly reduce gender disparities 
and support strong economies and societies more 
broadly. 
As this Report goes to press, momentum is building 
in the intergovernmental negotiations on financing 
for sustainable development for the post-2015 era. 
The Open Working Group of the General Assembly 
(OWG) on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
has articulated a vision of a world that is ‘just, 
equitable and inclusive’,1 making clear that gender 
equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment are 
central to this urgent endeavour. 
Human rights standards—set out in various 
international treaties that almost all governments 
have signed—are an enormous resource in helping 
the global community move forward. In particular 
they provide a substantive understanding of gender 
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equality, emphasizing women’s practical enjoyment 
of their rights. Human rights principles also underline 
the duty of governments to raise sufficient resources, 
allocate them in ways that meet the obligations 
of non-discrimination and equality, and ensure 
transparency and democratic participation in the 
deliberation of budget processes.
The framework for advancing substantive equality 
for women set out in this report draws on existing 
human rights standards and is intended to help 
governments and other policy makers shape 
concrete measures needed to address the specific 
challenges of gender inequality. Action is required 
along three dimensions: redressing women’s socio-
economic disadvantage; addressing stereotyping, 
stigma and violence; and strengthening women’s 
agency, voice and participation. Together, progress 
on these three dimensions can transform existing 
structures and institutions and, in turn, the lives of 
women and girls around the world.  
Progress towards substantive equality should 
be measured against how inclusive it is of the 
rights of all women and girls, especially those 
from marginalized groups. When the most 
disadvantaged are able to share both paid and 
unpaid work with men and boys in their families 
and communities and enjoy an adequate standard 
of living; when they can live a life that is free from 
stereotyping, stigma and violence; and when they 
are able to participate meaningfully in the decisions 
that affect their lives, then it is possible to speak of 
lasting transformation towards substantive equality.  
TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES, REALIZING 
RIGHTS: 10 PRIORITIES FOR PUBLIC ACTION 
Ten priorities for public action are set out below. 
They span the imperatives to create decent work, to 
implement gender-responsive social policies, and 
to adopt a rights-based macroeconomic policy 
framework. They highlight the need for resource 
mobilization, an enabling global environment, 
support for women’s organizing and an expanded 
evidence base on women’s economic and social 
rights, in order to achieve substantive equality. 
These are priorities primarily for governments, as 
the arbiters of economic and social rights, but they 
are also relevant for international organizations, 
the private sector, employers, donors, civil society 
organizations, such as trade unions, and women’s 
organizations.  
Not every recommendation is appropriate for all 
countries, and the capacity of States to advance 
substantive equality for women differs according 
to their size and level of development. The ‘starting 
points’ are also very different, with some regions 
having advanced significantly towards gender 
equality in a number of areas while others are 
lagging behind. Human rights treaties make it clear 
that there are core obligations that States must 
realize immediately, including non-discrimination 
and equality in the enjoyment of rights, as well 
as meeting minimum essential levels of rights, 
particularly in relation to food, education, health 
and housing. States must also ensure that rights 
are realized progressively over time and guard 
against their erosion. But, within this framework, 
there is scope for countries to identify their own 
paths and policy choices for achieving substantive 
equality for women. 
Low-income, primarily agrarian economies 
with serious deficits in basic social services 
might choose to focus on expanding access to 
safe drinking water, sanitation and accessible 
public health services, particularly in rural 
areas. Where women are predominantly 
self-employed, governments might prioritize 
investments in infrastructure, institutional credit 
and marketing facilities, as well as the extension 
of social protection, to support the viability of 
their enterprises and the sustainability of their 
livelihoods. Middle- and high-income countries, on 
the other hand, might place greater emphasis on 
work-family conciliation policies, including parental 
leave and child and elderly care services, and use 
real minimum wage increases to reduce income 
inequality and gender wage gaps at the bottom 
of the income hierarchy. In the current context of 
austerity it is critical for all States, regardless of 
their income level, to safeguard social protection 
and the services that are essential to women’s 
enjoyment of their rights. 
The following 10 policy priorities should be 
deliberated and fine-tuned through open dialogue 
involving the active participation of civil society 
organizations representing the interests of women 
and girls, especially the most disadvantaged. 
1. Create more and better jobs for women
Income from work is a foundation for people’s 
livelihoods and life chances. However, at global 
level, women’s labour force participation has 
stalled. In addition, economic policies have failed 
to create enough decent jobs, making it difficult 
for people to work their way out of poverty. This 
is particularly true for women, who are over-
represented among those in precarious, informal 
and low-wage employment. A number of concrete 
measures are needed to create more and better 
jobs for women: 
• Designing macroeconomic policies that 
stimulate economic activity and increase 
demand for labour, rather than focusing 
on an overly narrow set of targets such as 
maintaining inflation at very low levels 
• Investing in public services to create decent 
jobs in health, education, child and elderly 
care, public administration and agricultural 
extension services 
• Increasing the viability of, and returns to, self-
employment by investing in transport and other 
infrastructure, access to markets, training and 
subsidized credit
• Involving women informal workers in urban 
planning and decision-making to ensure 
that city environments are conducive to their 
work and provide decent and safe working 
conditions 
• Promoting joint land titling, extension services, 
input subsidies and measures to increase 
access to markets for women small-scale 
farmers.
2. Reduce occupational segregation and 
gender pay gaps
Gender-based occupational segregation is 
pervasive across all regions and a key factor in 
perpetuating gender pay gaps. Without redressing 
women’s socio-economic disadvantage resulting 
from occupational segregation and unequal 
earnings, substantive equality will remain out of 
reach. Public action must address the root causes 
of occupational segregation, including differences 
in education, training and experience as well as 
deeply ingrained stereotypes about women and 
men’s roles in society by: 
• Properly valuing female-dominated 
occupations, including care occupations, so 
that levels of remuneration are commensurate 
to workers’ skills and the contribution of their 
work to well-functioning economies and 
societies more broadly
• Promoting education, including basic literacy 
for adult women, on-the-job training, including 
in non-traditional skills, and mentoring to 
enable women to move up the occupational 
ladder
• Providing career advice for young women and 
encouragement to study science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics (STEM) and other 
male-dominated subjects, as well as access 
to technical and vocational education and 
training, complete with support for unpaid care 
responsibilities
• Addressing pervasive sexual harassment and 
violence in the workplace through specific laws, 
training for staff, adequate grievance procedures 
and support for women to take their cases 
through the justice system
• Using targets and quotas to increase women’s 
representation in male-dominated occupations, 
including in decision-making roles in the public 
sector. 
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3. Strengthen women’s income security 
throughout the life cycle
Due to their unequal employment opportunities 
and predominance in low-paid occupations, 
women are particularly vulnerable to economic 
insecurity and financial dependence. Household 
surveys show that women of prime working age are 
more likely than men to live in a poor household, in 
41 out of 75 countries with data. Properly designed 
fiscal, wage and social protection policies—including 
minimum wages, family and child allowances 
and old-age pensions—can be powerful tools to 
reduce poverty, redress women’s socio-economic 
disadvantage and guarantee their right to an 
adequate standard of living. These are particularly 
important in the context of changing demographic, 
family and household structures and in the face of 
economic shocks. Concrete steps can be taken to 
strengthen women’s income security by:
• Providing access to unemployment protection, 
including through public works programmes, 
and putting a floor under wages through well-
designed minimum wage policies, which are 
also shown to reduce gender pay gaps
• Providing child allowances to support families 
with the costs of raising children as well as 
non-contributory pensions to ensure women’s 
income security in old age 
• Making social transfers unconditional and 
universal where possible to avoid stigma and 
stereotyping 
• Ensuring cash transfer programmes have 
women’s rights at their heart by involving 
gender equality advocates in their design and 
by using them as a mechanism for providing 
skills training and access to services that 
enable women’s empowerment  
• Reforming contributory pension systems to 
reduce gender gaps in access and benefit 
levels, including through the introduction of 
care credits to compensate for contributions 
‘lost’ during periods out of the labour force 
looking after dependents 
• Ensuring that all benefit levels are regularly 
adjusted to increases in the cost of living. 
4. Recognize, reduce and redistribute 
unpaid care and domestic work
Unpaid care and domestic work contribute to 
economic development and human well-being 
through nurturing people who are fit, productive 
and capable of learning and creativity. But 
the burden of doing this work is unequally 
distributed. In the absence of adequate support 
for care services, women’s disproportionate 
responsibility for unpaid care and domestic work 
reinforces their socio-economic disadvantage 
by constraining their access to education, health 
care and paid work as well as their participation 
in political and cultural life. In order to achieve 
substantive equality for women, unpaid care and 
domestic work need to be recognized, reduced 
and redistributed by:
• Scaling up investments in basic infrastructure, 
including water and sanitation facilities that 
are accessible, affordable and meet quality 
standards 
• Strengthening basic social services, such 
as education and health, that complement 
unpaid caregiving and are an important 
source of employment for women
• Providing support to unpaid care givers, 
ensuring that they have a voice in health 
policy-making and recognizing them as part 
of, but not a substitute for, strong public care 
systems 
• Providing accessible, affordable and quality 
child and elderly care that is responsive to the 
needs of working parents and other unpaid 
caregivers 
• Working towards a comprehensive paid leave 
system, including maternity, paternity and 
parental leave, available to all workers, including 
those in informal employment, with special 
incentives for fathers to take up their share. 
5. Invest in gender-responsive social 
services
Social services are essential for the realization of 
women’s rights and the achievement of substantive 
equality in many areas. Without adequate health 
services, for example, women and girls struggle to 
realize their sexual and reproductive rights. And 
without affordable childcare options, women’s right 
to work is constrained. Investment in public services 
must to be scaled up and their delivery transformed 
to respond to women’s rights. Concrete steps 
include:
• Substantially increasing investments in 
public services, including health, water and 
sanitation and care services, and ensuring 
their affordability by replacing user fees with 
collective forms of financing—for example, 
through social security or general taxation
• Working towards universal access to affordable 
health care through national health systems 
or the effective combination of insurance 
contributions and public funding
• Bringing essential health-care services closer to 
women through community health workers and 
mobile clinics
• Providing integrated services to address 
violence against women as well as 
comprehensive sexual and reproductive health 
services., including family planning, information 
and education
• Scaling up the reach and quality of care services 
for children and dependent adults, including 
people with disabilities and the frail elderly
• Promoting positive relations between those 
using care services and service-providers by 
creating awareness about women’s rights 
among staff, providing incentives for them 
to respect women’s rights and ensuring the 
adequacy of their pay and conditions of 
work.
6. Maximize resources for the achievement 
of substantive equality
Progress towards substantive equality requires 
sufficient resources to be raised and allocated 
to the realization of women’s rights. Studies 
show that basic levels of social protection are 
affordable even for low-income countries: 
government revenues vary widely among countries 
with similar levels of gross domestic product (GDP), 
which shows that all countries can raise resources. 
But funding a comprehensive policy agenda for 
substantive equality will require further resource 
mobilization as well as making sure that funds are 
raised and allocated to the benefit of women and 
girls. Concrete measures for governments include:
• Reprioritizing expenditure, for example by 
redirecting military spending to gender-
responsive public services 
• Raising additional revenue through general 
taxation by enforcing existing tax obligations 
and expanding the overall tax base, being 
attentive to the distributive consequences. 
Income and property taxes, and taxes on 
luxury items, are generally more progressive 
than indirect taxes, such as value-added tax 
(VAT), which can also be made less regressive 
by exempting basic goods and services.
• Borrowing at domestic and international level 
for investments in education, health and care 
services which strengthen human capacities. 
Just like investments in infrastructure, social 
investments generate future pay-offs, including 
a skilled and healthy workforce 
• Ensuring revenue is raised from the utilization 
of natural resources, through measures such 
as royalties, and earmarking funds to spend on 
social protection and social services
239
• Implementing gender-responsive approaches 
to budgeting to ensure that policies for 
mobilizing resources and allocating 
expenditure are fair in their impact on income 
distribution and supportive of women’s rights.
7. Support women’s organizations to claim 
rights and shape policy agendas at all 
levels
Women’s collective action is key to the achievement 
of substantive equality. It is most effective when 
women’s rights advocates in grassroots and civil 
society organizations, think tanks and university 
departments can build strategic alliances with 
actors in political parties, state bureaucracies and 
regional and global institutions. This work demands 
judgment, skill, agility and persistence on the part of 
advocates, as well as access to information, policy 
debates and decision-making processes. Women’s 
agency, voice and participation in these processes 
can be strengthened by:
• Ensuring a conducive legal framework for 
women’s organizing, including measures to 
protect space for civil society advocacy on 
women’s rights and the right to form and join 
trade unions
• Scaling up funding for women’s organizations 
to engage in policy advocacy with their 
governments, including an increase in core and 
multi-year funding—an area where private 
and bilateral donors, as well as international 
organizations, have an important part to play
• Ensuring that women are equally represented 
in leadership positions in trade unions and other 
social movements, and that women’s rights 
issues are prioritized in collective bargaining 
processes  
• Supporting the creation of feminist knowledge 
on key policy issues—such as monetary policy, 
pension system design or health sector reform—
that are fundamentally important to women’s 
lives but often require a specialized technical 
understanding of the field 
• Facilitating capacity building among women’s 
organization to advocate for policy change 
by, for example, funding training on the 
gender implications of economic and social 
policies
• Creating feedback loops from policy 
implementation through social audits by 
women’s organizations and service users 
to improve the performance and gender 
responsiveness of government regulation, 
social protection and social services.
8. Create an enabling global environment 
for the realization of women’s rights
Global economic integration has constrained the 
ability of governments, to varying degrees, to 
use macroeconomic policy to create an enabling 
environment for the realization of economic 
and social rights. For example, it is difficult for 
developing countries to mobilize resources when 
other countries act as tax havens or maintain 
very low tax regimes. The current system of 
global governance reinforces the divide between 
economic and social policy and the lack of 
attention to distributive outcomes, including 
gender inequalities. Investment in human 
development and gender equality are considered 
domestic policy issues and are therefore not 
prioritized in global economic policy forums. 
Concrete measures to create an enabling global 
environment for the achievement of substantive 
equality for women include:
• Promoting economic stability and preventing 
shocks and crises, which always hit the 
poorest hardest through macro-prudential 
policies, which aim to mitigate economic 
volatility and the risk of financial crisis, as well 
as capital controls and better regulation of 
international financial markets
• Improving global coordination to eliminate 
tax havens and to reduce tax avoidance and 
tax competition in order to enable countries 
to mobilize resources more effectively in a 
globalized context
• Ensuring that international trade and investment 
agreements do not curtail policy space in a way 
that undermines the realization of women’s 
rights by, for example, creating barriers to the 
expansion of public health services or public 
transportation
• Increasing the accountability of global 
economic and financial institutions for the 
distributive impacts of their actions, including on 
gender equality  
• Formally adopting a common approach, based 
on the Maastricht Principles, to extraterritorial 
obligations of States, transnational corporations 
and international institutions 
• Democratizing the institutions of global 
economic governance by amplifying the 
voices of poorer countries and civil society 
organizations in decisions that affect them.  
9. Use human rights standards to shape 
policies and catalyse change
This report underlineds the imperative of 
bridging the gap between global human rights 
standards, on the one hand, and policies to 
advance women’s rights, on the other. By defining 
substantive equality, the international human 
rights system has underscored that equality should 
be understood in relation to outcomes as well as 
to opportunities, pointing to the structural causes 
of inequality and setting out the obligations of 
States to address them. 
The human rights system including the Human 
Rights Council, treaty bodies, special rapporteurs, 
and national and regional human rights bodies 
can further support governments to formulate 
and monitor policies to meet their obligations and 
realize substantive equality for women by:       
• Providing guidance on how the recognition, 
reduction and redistribution of unpaid care 
and domestic work can be advanced through 
economic and social policies
• Providing clarification and guidance on how 
macroeconomic policies can support, rather 
than constrain, women’s enjoyment of their 
rights
• Proposing concrete steps as to how the 
implementation of social protection floors at 
the national level can ensure that women are 
able to enjoy their right to social security on 
an equal basis with men.
10. Generate evidence to assess progress 
on women’s economic and social rights 
Data gaps on women’s economic and social 
rights remain very large. In view of the monitoring 
requirements for the post-2015 development 
agenda, there have been calls for a ‘data 
revolution’. This ‘data revolution’ needs to be 
engendered, to enable the production of more 
and better evidence, disaggregated by sex, socio-
economic status, geographical location, race and 
ethnicity, to capture the multiple and intersecting 
inequalities that women face. 
There is a need for coordinated support and 
funding from donors and governments to national 
statistical offices, especially those in low-income 
countries, to ensure the consistent and timely 
production of gender statistics in a wide range of 
areas. Priorities include:
• Complementing global poverty statistics with 
measures of women’s access to personal 
income from labour market earnings or social 
protection as a proxy for their economic 
autonomy
• Regularly conducting time-use surveys and 
ensuring their comparability across countries 
and over time to assess the impact of public 
policies, economic shocks and environmental 
disasters on women’s work burdens 
• Increasing the number of countries that 
regularly collect sex-disaggregated statistics 
on informal employment
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• Developing standards for the collection and 
analysis of statistics on gender pay gaps, 
including methodologies to capture gender 
inequalities in earnings from self-employment
• Supporting the ongoing development of 
new methodologies for the measurement 
of women’s asset ownership and 
entrepreneurship
• Producing comparable, disaggregated 
statistics on the benefit levels of child and 
family allowances, unemployment benefits 
and old-age pensions 
• Developing standards and methods for 
assessing the quality of social services, 
including their responsiveness to the rights of 
women and girls
• Conducting regular surveys on violence against 
women and girls based on globally agreed 
standards
• Investing in civil registration and vital 
systems to ensure that births and deaths are 
accurately recorded, in order to improve the 
quality and availability of data on maternal 
and child mortality
• Developing and funding other sources of 
evidence, including qualitative research, to 
capture dimensions of inequality that are 
not easily measurable but crucially shape 
women’s and girls’ enjoyment of rights, 
including stigma and deprivation of agency.
ANNEXES
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Statistics and data are important tools for assessing 
the gender impacts and dimensions of economic 
and social policies. At the international level, 
substantive work on gender statistics can be traced 
back to the 1980s, following the proclamation of 
the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, 
Development and Peace (1976–1985).1 Since 
then there have been important advances in 
related normative and technical standards. In 
1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action included a strong call ‘for generating and 
disseminating gender-disaggregated data and 
information for planning and evaluation’.2 More 
recently, in 2013, the United Nations Statistical 
Commission (UNSC) endorsed a minimum set 
of gender indicators to serve as a guide for the 
compilation of gender statistics;3 and, in response 
to a request from the United Nations General 
Assembly, adopted a core set of nine indicators on 
violence against women.4 
Despite these advances, as each of the previous 
chapters and the following annex tables show, 
gender data gaps still exist in all areas and are 
particularly acute when it comes to measuring 
poverty and women’s access to personal income 
or social protection; the quantity and quality of 
women’s work, including on informal employment 
and time spent on unpaid care and domestic work; 
and women’s participation in public and civic life 
and decision-making. 
CHALLENGES FOR GENDER STATISTICS 
In most developing countries, the production of 
gender statistics is predominantly in areas such as 
health, education and employment. Even in these 
areas, however, adequate, consistent and timely 
production of gender indicators is often lacking. On 
other issues that require more specialized surveys—
such as time use, violence against women and girls, 
and voice and participation—data availability is 
even more limited.5  
Labour market indicators
Labour force and other multipurpose household 
surveys are fairly well established, but their 
principal aim is to measure headline indicators 
such as labour force participation, employment 
and unemployment rates. This means that data 
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on employment quality such as informality and 
wages—where gender differences are pronounced 
and more detailed questionnaires are needed—are 
not well captured. 
As seen in Chapter 2, available data show that 
women are more likely than men to be in informal 
employment. However, documenting these gender 
disparities in different regions and over time is 
hampered by lack of regularly collected data for 
most countries.6 Over the last decade, only 47 
countries have produced reliable estimates of 
informal employment by sex (see Annex 4) and very 
few have produced comparable data over time to 
enable a trend analysis. 
Standard labour force surveys also tend to 
undercount the extent of women’s employment, 
which is more likely to be seasonal, intermittent and 
informal than men’s. Time-use surveys, which are 
not conducted regularly, are far better instruments 
to capture the full extent of women’s paid and 
unpaid work. In India, for example, the 1998–1999 
pilot time-use survey not only documented women’s 
unpaid work but also found women’s employment 
rates to be at least double those recorded in the 
regular labour force survey.7 
Income and consumption data
The regular collection of income data for women 
and men in developing countries is also challenging. 
In countries where agricultural employment and/
or self-employment are the norm, it is difficult to 
get accurate information on sources of income. In 
agriculture in particular, because income varies 
widely according to the season, to get an accurate 
picture of annual income would require yearlong 
surveys that may be too expensive for national 
statistical offices. For these and other reasons, 
most developing countries collect household level 
consumption data in lieu of income data.8  
Notwithstanding the difficulties in collecting income 
and consumption data, these data are used to 
derive headline poverty rates. Where both income 
and consumption data are collected at household 
level, attribution to individuals is impossible. In 
typical household surveys, the (self-identified) 
most knowledgeable person in the household is 
interviewed, making these surveys ill-suited to 
capturing the gendered dimensions of income 
and consumption.9 As a result, sex-disaggregated 
measures of poverty are scarce (see Box 1.4). 
Indicators on women’s access to their own income 
and the number of poor women for every 100 
poor men (i.e. the gender composition of poor 
households) are two proxies for measuring 
women’s poverty (see Annex 1). But these measures 
are still unable to take into account the distribution 
of resources within households. In households 
above the poverty line, resources may not be 
shared equitably between women and men; by 
the same token, even though a woman without her 
own income may lack financial independence and 
agency, she may still benefit from collective goods 
such as housing. 
Social protection and social services 
Indicators related to access to social protection 
and social services are affected by similar 
limitations. For example, while the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) provides data on 
pension coverage by sex for a growing number of 
countries, the difficulties in measuring individual 
level income mean that comparative data on 
benefit levels are not widely available. This can 
hide significant income disparities between 
older women and men, particularly in countries 
with contributory systems. Similarly, because 
indicators such as health expenditure are 
calculated on a per capita basis using aggregate 
household expenditure, they are likely to mask any 
intrahousehold gender differences. 
In terms of access to basic services, most of these 
are collective goods (e.g., water, electricity) 
that are consumed by all members, making 
disaggregation by sex difficult. However, both 
consumption and provisioning of collective goods 
have gender dimensions. As discussed in Chapter 
3, women and girls are typically in charge of 
collecting water and fuel, and using them to 
prepare meals and for other unpaid care and 
domestic work, for the benefit of all household 
members. Lack of access to water, and distance 
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from water sources, therefore affects women and 
girls to a greater extent than men and boys. This 
makes these indicators, along with indicators on 
the division of labour within the household (e.g., 
who is in charge of collecting water or firewood), 
essential for gender analysis.10  
THE PRODUCTION OF GENDER STATISTICS 
IS NOT ALWAYS PRIORITIZED 
Lack of accurate statistics is partly the consequence 
of weak, under-resourced statistical systems, 
particularly in developing countries. However, 
gaps in gender statistics also arise from failure to 
prioritize the collection of these data: as recent 
reviews have shown, there is evidence of a vicious 
cycle whereby low availability of gender statistics 
leads to a lack of demand from policy makers and 
researchers, which in turn can reduce the incentive 
for their production. 
In 2013, a global review of gender statistics 
programmes in 126 countries found that only 37 
per cent had a coordinating body for gender 
statistics at the national level and only 13 per cent 
had a regular dedicated budget for the production 
of these data.11 Reviews of the implementation 
of the Beijing Platform for Action found that 
besides technical and financial constraints, a 
lack of political will and limited awareness of the 
importance of gathering data on gender equality 
are critical barriers to progress.12 
Policy priorities matter
The adoption of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) led to significant efforts to improve 
statistical capacity in developing countries, 
including on gender equality and women’s 
empowerment,13 but this was to the detriment of 
areas that were not included in the framework such 
as violence against women or unpaid care work. 
Similarly, decades of neglect of agriculture 
in policy have been accompanied by large 
cutbacks in agricultural statistical services.14 
Given the importance of agriculture as a source 
of employment for women, particularly in South 
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, lack of investment 
in agricultural statistics leads to glaring gaps in 
knowledge of rural women’s lives, notably on 
control over land and other productive assets and 
on access to extension services and credit. 
The broader picture
The lack of reliable gender statistics cannot 
be separated from wider structural issues. 
For example, in the absence of adequate 
administrative data sources, data on the maternal 
mortality ratio mostly relies on estimates by 
international agencies, which are subject to high 
levels of uncertainty.15  
Yet, the development of civil registration and vital 
statistics (CRVS) systems, which is necessary for 
adequately recording deaths, calls for investment 
beyond the statistical systems themselves: it 
requires health systems that can adequately record 
the exact cause of death. 
According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), globally an estimated 7.6 million children 
under the age of 5 died in 2010, but fewer than 2.7 
per cent of those deaths were medically certified, 
assigned a cause of death by a health worker 
or recorded in an official database. This lack of 
basic information affects countries’ capacity for 
effective health planning and management.16 
BREAKING THE CYCLE: AN AGENDA FOR 
IMPROVING GENDER STATISTICS
Given the monitoring requirements for the 
post-2015 development agenda, as well as the 
ongoing implementation of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for 
Action, the need to produce more and better 
data, disaggregated by sex, socio-economic 
status, geographical location, race and ethnicity 
and other markers of disadvantage, as well as 
additional gender-sensitive indicators, is now 
greater than ever. The proposed Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and targets are far 
more expansive than the MDGs, so there are 
significant opportunities to improve gender 
statistics. 
Filling gender data gaps does not always require 
new data collection. Annex 1, for example, uses 
existing household survey data to analyse the 
characteristics of poor households, shedding light 
on the factors that contribute to their poverty. The 
World Bank has also developed the Gender Data 
Navigator, a searchable inventory of gender-
related questions found in survey and census 
questionnaires from low- and middle-income 
countries, providing easy access for researchers 
and policy makers.17   
As well as making better use of existing data, 
action in the following areas is urgently needed to 
improve gender statistics.
Strong institutional mandates 
Statistical systems need to be more responsive 
and accountable, and their institutional mandates, 
particularly with respect to gender equality, need 
to be strengthened. High-level commitments to 
gender equality in policy can help strengthen 
their mandates and ensure greater accountability 
and responsiveness. In some countries, this has 
been achieved through legislation that requires 
disaggregation of statistics by sex or the regular 
production of gender statistics.
In South Africa, for example, the Statistical Act of 
1999 includes a provision that requires production 
of statistics to be sensitive to gender, disability and 
other socio-economic characteristics.18 In other 
countries, gender equality legislation includes 
specific provisions on gender statistics. In Spain, for 
example, the 2007 Organic Law for the Effective 
Equality of Men and Women includes provisions on 
the need to increase sample sizes, to systematically 
include sex disaggregation and to add new 
indicators to enhance the measurement of gender 
equality.19 Such requirements can help to ensure 
that the statistics produced are used to inform 
policy, generating demand and contributing to 
regular user-producer dialogues.
Strengthening the mandates of national statistical 
systems also means protecting their funding and 
unique role, including from growing competition 
from private data providers. In the context of 
the post-2015 development framework, large 
investments in statistical capacity are expected. 
New players, including private providers that 
specialize in data collection, are putting themselves 
forward as faster and cheaper alternatives to 
traditional statistical systems. 
While fostering competition among different 
data providers can have some benefits, shifting 
resources to these players could weaken 
the capacity of national statistical systems. 
Furthermore, because data are a public good, an 
important function of national statistical systems 
is to ensure that the right to information as well as 
the right to have one’s information protected are 
upheld, imperatives that may be in tension with the 
objectives of for-profit companies.  
Better planning
Most statistical production is done in accordance 
with medium to long-term plans. In many low-
income countries, a national strategy for the 
development of statistics (NSDS) provides an 
important opportunity to improve the production 
of gender statistics, which need to be incorporated 
into plans at an early stage.20  
At the international level, the Partnership in 
Statistics for Development in the 21st Century 
(Paris21) Secretariat21 supports countries to 
develop and implement their respective plans, 
and has an important role to play in ensuring that 
gender statistics feature strongly.22 To improve 
the implementation of these national plans, 
resources are needed, including donor support 
for developing countries. Such support must be 
consistent, predictable, well-coordinated and 
consistent with the priorities of receiving countries 
to ensure the sustainability and quality of data 
production.23  
Harmonizing and developing new 
methodologies
In recent years, a number of methodological 
guides on the production of gender statistics have 
been developed including on gender analysis of 
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censuses, time use and violence against women and 
girls, among others.24 These resources can greatly 
improve the production of gender statistics.
In some cases, new methodological work is needed. 
Evidence and Data for Gender Equality (EDGE) 
is a three-year initiative led by the United Nations 
Statistics Division and UN Women, in collaboration 
with the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, the African Development Bank 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). EDGE aims to provide 
a platform for international data and metadata 
compilation covering basic health, education and 
employment indicators, but it is also developing 
new standards and guidelines for gender-
sensitive measurement of ownership of assets and 
entrepreneurship. EDGE is piloting data collection 
in several countries.25 A similar initiative is Data2X, 
which is a global partnership that aims to fill data 
gaps in five areas: health, education, economic 
opportunities, political participation and human 
security.26  
Additional methodological work is needed in 
a number of other areas. One example is the 
measurement of gender pay gaps. Besides the 
difficulties in measuring these gaps for self-
employed workers, the raw unadjusted gender 
pay gap, as presented in Annex 4, captures the 
difference between men’s and women’s earnings 
but does not tell us enough about the underlying 
drivers of gender inequality in pay. For example, as 
highlighted in Chapter 2, the gender pay gap often 
increases once education is accounted for. Declining 
wage gaps in some countries may therefore be the 
result of women’s increasing levels of education 
while other forms of gender discrimination remain 
unchanged. Context specific factors - not only 
women and men’s varying levels of education, but 
also related to types of employment, hours worked, 
and institutional and policy environments – can also 
make cross-country comparisons of the unadjusted 
pay gap difficult. 
The measurement of women’s voice and 
participation also needs some work. Household 
surveys usually include questions for women about 
decision-making at the household level, which 
provide valuable insights into women’s voice 
and agency in their daily lives. Women’s political 
participation, however, is currently measured 
using the percentage of women in national 
parliaments, which does not reveal anything about 
the impact of women’s representation on policy or 
about women’s decision-making in other spaces, 
including in local governments or civil society 
organizations. 
As shown throughout this report, women’s 
movements play a critical part in catalysing change, 
so measuring the strength and impact of these must 
be a central component of understanding women’s 
voice and participation. However, because such 
measures are inherently qualitative, developing 
indicators that are comparable across countries is 
difficult. Greater collaboration between statistical 
offices, researchers (both quantitative and 
qualitative) and civil society is necessary to develop 
better indicators that can capture processes of social 
transformation.
NOTE TO THE TABLES
The Annex presents six statistical tables with select 
indicators on broad thematic areas—poverty, 
education, rights at work, right to work and social 
security—to complement data used in the report. 
One further table presents the current state of 
ratifications of CEDAW and its optional protocol 
and reservations entered by Member States to the 
Convention.
Data sources and definition of indicators
Unless otherwise specified, data used for compilation 
of the Annex tables are from international agencies 
with the mandate, resources and expertise to collect, 
harmonize and compile national data for cross-
country comparison. The main sources of indicators 
and their definitions are presented at the bottom of 
each table. The cut-off date for data updates used in 
the tables is March 2015.
Discrepancies between national and 
international data sources
In some cases, national estimates of an indicator 
differ from those made by international agencies 
and presented in the tables. These discrepancies 
arise from three main factors: harmonization 
processes to make data comparable across 
countries; updates/revision periods of international 
agencies not coinciding with release of data by 
national statistical systems; and international 
agencies making estimates for missing data. 
Efforts by international agencies and their national 
counterparts to improve national coordination of 
data collection aim eventually to eliminate these 
discrepancies.
Regional groupings and aggregates
Regional groupings are based on UN Women’s 
regional classifications (see Annex 7). Where 
possible, population-weighted regional and world 
averages for indicators are presented in the tables. 
Generally, an average is presented when data are 
available for at least 50 per cent of countries in a 
region and/or represent about two thirds of the 
region’s population. 
Symbols
The following symbols are used in the tables:  
.. data are not available 
— indicates where average is not applicable or 
where available data are insufficient to derive 
average.  
0 or 0.0 nil or negligible
DESCRIPTION OF ANNEX TABLES
1. Profile of the poorest households 
The table focuses on the poorest 20 per cent of 
households. It looks at the gender composition 
of these households and compares how women 
and men within these households fare in term 
of key education, employment and poverty 
outcomes. It presents educational attainment by 
sex, employment status in the past 12 months, and 
earning status by sex. The number of women for 
every 100 men in poorest households is used to 
assess women’s greater risk of poverty. In addition, 
the proportion of female-only households among 
the poorest households assesses whether female-
only households (households with no male adults) 
are over-represented among the poorest 20 per 
cent.  
2. Realizing the right to education
The table contains indicators on participation in 
pre-primary education, means years of schooling 
attained by women and men aged 25 years and 
older, tertiary graduation by field of study, one 
proxy indicator for quality of education in primary 
and secondary schools (learner-teacher ratios) and 
government spending on education expressed as a 
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percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).  
3. Rights at work: Laws, policies and working 
conditions
The table aims to assess how supportive the 
legal environment is for both women and men to 
engage in the labour market on an equal basis 
in an environment free from sexual harassment. 
It presents the following indicators: existence of 
legislation mandating equal pay for work of equal 
value, prohibiting discrimination in hiring on the 
basis of gender and prohibiting sexual harassment; 
length of paid maternity leave and proportion 
of earnings paid during such leave; duration of 
paternity leave and whether paid or not; and time 
spent on unpaid care and domestic work and paid 
by women and men. 
4. Right to work: Opportunities and constraints 
The table reflects the opportunities and constraints 
to female and male engagement in the labour 
market. It presents two indicators (1991 and 
2013) for the female and male labour force 
participation rate to assess progress; one indicator 
for the unemployment rate among the labour 
force population aged 15 years and older and 
among youth aged 15–24 years, who tend to be 
disproportionately impacted by unemployment; 
and share of women in select occupations. The 
table also presents indicators on employment in 
the non-agricultural informal sector by sex and on 
gender pay gaps to capture quality of work.  
5. The right to social security 
The table contains indicators on three components 
of social security: active contribution to a social 
security scheme while working; access to social 
security in old age and adequacy of benefit 
level relative to the international poverty line; 
and expenditure on social security and on health 
services. It presents indicators on the proportion of 
females and males in the working age population 
contributing to a pension scheme; females and 
males of statutory pension age receiving an old 
age pension; non-contributory old age pension 
as a percentage of $1.25 (PPP$) a day poverty 
line; public expenditure on social security as a 
percentage of GDP; public expenditure on health 
(percentage of GDP and per capita); households’ 
out-of-pocket expenditure as a percentage of 
total health expenditure; and health personnel 
density (number of physicians, and nurses and 
midwives per 1,000 people).
6. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women was adopted 
in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly 
in its resolution A/RES/34/180. Ratification by 
member states signals a commitment to fulfilling 
the human rights of women and girls. The table 
presents current information on countries party 
to CEDAW and whether a ratifying country 
has imposed reservations on key areas of the 
Convention.  
 POVERTYb LEVEL OF EDUCATIONb TYPE OF EMPLOYMENTd
WOMEN’S EARNINGS 
COMPARED TO THEIR 
SPOUSES EARNINGSd
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Number of 
women for 
every 100 men 
in poorest 
householdsa
Number of 
‘female only’ 
households 
for every 
100 poorest 
householdsc
Women Men Women Men More Less
About the 
same as 
spouse ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
Ratio % with no education
% with only 
primary
% with 
secondary 
or higher
% with no 
education
% with only 
primary
% with 
secondary 
or higher
% not 
employed
% employed 
but with no pay
% employed with pay 
(either cash, cash & in 
kind, in kind only)
% not 
employed
% employed 
but with no 
pay
% employed with 
pay (either cash, 
cash & in kind, in 
kind only)
 (%)
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
ALB Albania 105 110 3.0 82.7 14.3 1.8 73.5 24.5 61.0 26.8 12.2 9.7 33.5 56.8 12.9 46.6 18.0 ALB
ARM Armenia 94 97 0.5 9.2 90.3 0.5 16.9 82.6 65.8 8.1 26.1 13.4 9.9 76.7 6.7 55.5 28.0 ARM
AZE Azerbaijan 104 97 3.1 3.5 93.4 1.1 1.8 97.1 79.3 3.5 17.2 15.2 11.9 72.9 13.9 44.0 31.1 AZE
BLR Belarus 83 103 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 99.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BLR
BIH Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
92 171 5.0 59.0 36.0 2.0 42.0 56.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BIH
BGR Bulgaria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BGR
HRV Croatia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HRV
CYP Cyprus .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CYP
CZE Czech Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CZE
EST Estonia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. EST
GEO Georgia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GEO
HUN Hungary .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HUN
KAZ Kazakhstan 87 65 1.0 0.0 99.0 1.0 0.0 99.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KAZ
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 91 47 0.4 0.5 99.1 0.4 0.1 99.5  69.8 2.9 27.3 13.1 10.9 76.0 9.7 44.7 41.3 KGZ
LVA Latvia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LVA
LTU Lithuania .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LTU
MNE Montenegro 81 88 4.0 42.0 54.0 1.0 30.0 69.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MNE
POL Poland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. POL
MDA Republic of Moldova 93 86 0.8 1.1 98.0 1.1 1.8 97.1 42.6 5.2 52.2 29.4 1.3 69.3 .. .. .. MDA
ROU Romania .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ROU
RUS Russian Federation .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. RUS
SRB Serbia 77 121 4.0 44.0 52.0 2.0 37.0 60.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SRB
SVK Slovakia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SVK
SVN Slovenia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SVN
TJK Tajikistan 105 83 5.2 5.2 89.6 1.9 2.9 95.1 55.7 12.3 32.0 .. .. .. 8.8 67.8 13.7 TJK
MKD The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MKD
TUR Turkey 99 144 45.7 47.9 6.4 13.2 65.1 20.8 44.3 32.1 23.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. TUR
TKM Turkmenistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TKM
UKR Ukraine 90 124 0.3 0.5 99.3 0.5 0.5 99.1 31.4 2.5 66.1 13.6 3.4 83.0 17.9 58.3 20.4 UKR
UZB Uzbekistan 96 53 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. UZB
East Asia and the Pacific East Asia and the Pacific
BRN Brunei Darussalam .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BRN
KHM Cambodia 106 131 38.6 55.1 6.0 25.0 56.1 18.0 9.8 3.5 86.7 2.2 2.8 95.0 10.3 57.5 31.1 KHM
CHN China .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CHN
PRK Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PRK
FJI Fiji .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FJI
HKG Hong Kong, China 
(SAR)
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HKG
IDN Indonesia 101 125 15.8 59.1 24.9 7.9 58.1 33.8 30.4 27.9 41.7 1.1 11.9 87.0 11.1 60.3 23.1 IDN
KIR Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KIR
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LAO Lao People's 
Democratic Republic
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LAO
MYS Malaysia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MYS
MHL Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MHL
FSM Micronesia (Federated 
States of)
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FSM
MNG Mongolia 88 71 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MNG
MMR Myanmar 97 93 41.9 49.1e 90.3 26.9 55.8e 17.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MMR
NRU Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NRU
PLW Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PLW
PNG Papua New Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PNG
PHL Philippines 89 76 7.4 48.8 43.8 6.2 60.2 33.6 41.9 10.2 47.9 .. .. .. 14.0 67.0 17.8 PHL
KOR Republic of Korea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KOR
WSM Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. WSM
SGP Singapore .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SGP
SLB Solomon Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SLB
THA Thailand 93 101 12.0 77.0 11.0 7.0 76.0 17.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. THA
TLS Timor-Leste 106 135 64.3 23.9 11.9 48.1 29.2 22.7 45.9 50.2 3.9 3.2 87.6 9.2 11.2 29.1 34.8 TLS
TON Tonga .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TON
TUV Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TUV
VUT Vanuatu 106 157 26.0 67.0 7.0 18.0 70.0 11.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VUT
VNM Viet Nam 95 89 28.1 43.7 28.2 16.8 43.9 39.3 5.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VNM
Middle East and North Africa Middle East and North Africa
DZA Algeria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DZA
BHR Bahrain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BHR
EGY Egypt 100 121 68.5 13.2 18.3 36.2 19.9 43.9 88.6 3.0 8.4 .. .. .. 5.4 54.4 18.9 EGY
IRQ Iraq 105 136 51.0 40.0 9.0 24.0 47.0 29.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. IRQ
JOR Jordan 100 146 12.7 16.8 70.4 3.9 16.2 79.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.4 48.6 12.7 JOR
KWT Kuwait .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KWT
LBN Lebanon 108 161 12.0 75.0 13.0 8.0 76.0 16.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBN
LBY Libya .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBY
MAR Morocco 102 113 91.7 6.8 1.5 64.4 24.8 10.6 76.3 11.8 11.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. MAR
OMN Oman .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. OMN
QAT Qatar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. QAT
SAU Saudi Arabia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SAU
PSE State of Palestine 106 157 9.7 64.0f 26.3 4.0 69.5f 26.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PSE
SYR Syrian Arab Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SYR
TUN Tunisia 107 133 51.0 33.0 17.0 16.0 50.0 34.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TUN
ARE United Arab Emirates .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ARE
YEM Yemen 102 141 93.0 7.0 1.0 42.0 42.0 16.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. YEM
South Asia South Asia
AFG Afghanistan 99 128 98.0 2.0 1.0 79.0 9.0 12.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AFG
BGD Bangladesh 103 132 58.5 31.3 10.2 56.3 32.1 11.6 80.8 0.2 19.0 0.4 .. .. .. .. .. BGD
BTN Bhutan 100 106 92.0 5.0 3.0 75.0 17.0 8.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BTN
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POVERTYb LEVEL OF EDUCATIONb TYPE OF EMPLOYMENTd
WOMEN’S EARNINGS 
COMPARED TO THEIR 
SPOUSES EARNINGSd
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Number of 
women for 
every 100 men 
in poorest 
householdsa
Number of 
‘female only’ 
households 
for every 
100 poorest 
householdsc
Women Men Women Men More Less
About the 
same as 
spouse ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
Ratio % with no education
% with only 
primary
% with 
secondary 
or higher
% with no 
education
% with only 
primary
% with 
secondary 
or higher
% not 
employed
% employed 
but with no pay
% employed with pay 
(either cash, cash & in 
kind, in kind only)
% not 
employed
% employed 
but with no 
pay
% employed with 
pay (either cash, 
cash & in kind, in 
kind only)
 (%)
LAO Lao People's 
Democratic Republic
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LAO
MYS Malaysia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MYS
MHL Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MHL
FSM Micronesia (Federated 
States of)
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FSM
MNG Mongolia 88 71 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MNG
MMR Myanmar 97 93 41.9 49.1e 90.3 26.9 55.8e 17.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MMR
NRU Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NRU
PLW Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PLW
PNG Papua New Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PNG
PHL Philippines 89 76 7.4 48.8 43.8 6.2 60.2 33.6 41.9 10.2 47.9 .. .. .. 14.0 67.0 17.8 PHL
KOR Republic of Korea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KOR
WSM Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. WSM
SGP Singapore .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SGP
SLB Solomon Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SLB
THA Thailand 93 101 12.0 77.0 11.0 7.0 76.0 17.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. THA
TLS Timor-Leste 106 135 64.3 23.9 11.9 48.1 29.2 22.7 45.9 50.2 3.9 3.2 87.6 9.2 11.2 29.1 34.8 TLS
TON Tonga .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TON
TUV Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TUV
VUT Vanuatu 106 157 26.0 67.0 7.0 18.0 70.0 11.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VUT
VNM Viet Nam 95 89 28.1 43.7 28.2 16.8 43.9 39.3 5.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VNM
Middle East and North Africa Middle East and North Africa
DZA Algeria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DZA
BHR Bahrain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BHR
EGY Egypt 100 121 68.5 13.2 18.3 36.2 19.9 43.9 88.6 3.0 8.4 .. .. .. 5.4 54.4 18.9 EGY
IRQ Iraq 105 136 51.0 40.0 9.0 24.0 47.0 29.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. IRQ
JOR Jordan 100 146 12.7 16.8 70.4 3.9 16.2 79.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.4 48.6 12.7 JOR
KWT Kuwait .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KWT
LBN Lebanon 108 161 12.0 75.0 13.0 8.0 76.0 16.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBN
LBY Libya .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBY
MAR Morocco 102 113 91.7 6.8 1.5 64.4 24.8 10.6 76.3 11.8 11.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. MAR
OMN Oman .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. OMN
QAT Qatar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. QAT
SAU Saudi Arabia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SAU
PSE State of Palestine 106 157 9.7 64.0f 26.3 4.0 69.5f 26.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PSE
SYR Syrian Arab Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SYR
TUN Tunisia 107 133 51.0 33.0 17.0 16.0 50.0 34.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TUN
ARE United Arab Emirates .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ARE
YEM Yemen 102 141 93.0 7.0 1.0 42.0 42.0 16.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. YEM
South Asia South Asia
AFG Afghanistan 99 128 98.0 2.0 1.0 79.0 9.0 12.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AFG
BGD Bangladesh 103 132 58.5 31.3 10.2 56.3 32.1 11.6 80.8 0.2 19.0 0.4 .. .. .. .. .. BGD
BTN Bhutan 100 106 92.0 5.0 3.0 75.0 17.0 8.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BTN
POVERTYb LEVEL OF EDUCATIONb TYPE OF EMPLOYMENTd
WOMEN’S EARNINGS 
COMPARED TO THEIR 
SPOUSES EARNINGSd
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Number of 
women for 
every 100 men 
in poorest 
householdsa
Number of 
‘female only’ 
households 
for every 
100 poorest 
householdsc
Women Men Women Men More Less
About the 
same as 
spouse ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
Ratio % with no education
% with only 
primary
% with 
secondary 
or higher
% with no 
education
% with only 
primary
% with 
secondary 
or higher
% not 
employed
% employed 
but with no pay
% employed with pay 
(either cash, cash & in 
kind, in kind only)
% not 
employed
% employed 
but with no 
pay
% employed with 
pay (either cash, 
cash & in kind, in 
kind only)
 (%)
IND India 109 152 84.7 9.4 5.9 54.5 21.3 24.0 34.9 13.7 51.4 1.5 6.0 92.5 8.4 74.8 10.4 IND
IRN Iran (Islamic Republic of) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. IRN
MDV Maldives 109 147 43.3 33.8 21.8 43.1 30.1 21.5 50.3 1.9 47.8 3.5 0.0 96.5 10.8 78.3 6.3 MDV
NPL Nepal 105 117 80.0 14.0 5.9 46.2 32.3 21.6 5.6 75.4 19.0 0.6 31.2 68.2 8.3 79.9 5.2 NPL
PAK Pakistan 97 117 93.2 4.9 1.9 61.5 19.6 18.9 48.5 6.8 44.7 1.4 0.1 98.5 5.1 82.4 9.1 PAK
LKA Sri Lanka .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LKA
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
AGO Angola .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AGO
BEN Benin 111 118 93.9 4.8 1.3 75.6 17.2 6.6 32.9 17.2 49.9 6.9 22.0 71.1 5.5 66.3 5.9 BEN
BWA Botswana .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BWA
BFA Burkina Faso 116 141 96.1 3.5 0.4 90.7 7.8 1.4 19.4 32.7 47.9 0.2 25.7 74.1 4.8 91.8 2.2 BFA
BDI Burundi 125 152 72.0 26.3 1.2 59.3 35.7 4.3 6.3 74.3 19.4 2.2 60.1 37.7 10.6 68.3 15.8 BDI
CPV Cabo Verde .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CPV
CMR Cameroon 115 99 72.9 24.8 2.3 42.2 42.3 15.5 20.0 10.4 69.6 3.0 5.5 91.5 6.8 75.7 9.5 CMR
CAF Central African 
Republic
106 134 65.0 33.0 2.0 24.0 62.0 14.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CAF
TCD Chad 117 153 98.3 1.7 0.0 94.6 5.3 0.1 13.0 28.9 58.1 2.5 .. .. .. .. .. TCD
COM Comoros 102 113 77.5 13.0 9.5 48.8 26.9 24.3 55.7 15.0 29.3 16.5 16.0 67.5 36.1 56.0 4.50 COM
COG Congo .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. COG
CIV Côte d'Ivoire 99 125 78.6 19.1 2.3 56.7 31.2 12.1 19.1 17.5 63.4 1.3 17.3 81.4 4.9 78.3 3.60 CIV
COD Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
117 139 34.9 49.4 15.6 10.7 36.1 53.2 15.3 3.1 81.6 6.3 5.0 88.7 8.1 72.3 17.0 COD
DJI Djibouti .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DJI
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 105 105 36.0 47.0 17.0 15.0 34.0 51.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GNQ
ERI Eritrea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ERI
ETH Ethiopia 109 119 87.0 12.5 0.5 61.4 36.4 2.2 41.8 21.5 36.7 1.3 15.9 82.8 9.3 66.7 20.1 ETH
GAB Gabon 118 125 10.4 53.1 36.2 6.9 35.5 56.7 43.0 15.0 42.0 16.0 12.3 71.7 11.3 67.7 9.0 GAB
GMB Gambia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GMB
GHA Ghana 98 75 73.4 15.3 11.3 54.7 18.1 27.2 7.1 17.7 75.2 3.5 28.2 68.3 8.0 71.3 9.7 GHA
GIN Guinea 107 105 93.9 4.9 1.2 80.3 10.6 9.1 9.3 42.7 48.0 3.5 32.4 64.1 12.2 80.6 6.0 GIN
GNB Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GNB
KEN Kenya 115 118 41.1 52.7 6.2 23.3 61.2 15.5 40.1 21.4 38.5 4.1 31.9 64.0 15.2 60.0 14.8 KEN
LSO Lesotho 87 93 5.4 78.5 14.3 40.4 52.5 6.5 53.0 24.6 22.4 .. .. .. 17.7 54.1 10.5 LSO
LBR Liberia 101 99 73.2 20.5 6.3 36.2 29.9 33.9 30.0 31.8 38.2 6.3 35.6 58.1 9.0 57.8 27.3 LBR
MDG Madagascar 108 115 50.6 44.8 3.9 42.3 48.8 6.9 3.2 13.5 83.3 0.3 14.1 85.6 4.2 41.1 47.8 MDG
MWI Malawi 125 149 36.6 60.5 2.9 21.7 68.8 9.4 20.0 36.5 43.5 3.4 37.9 58.7 8.0 72.0 15.1 MWI
MLI Mali 107 115 94.1 4.8 1.0 87.5 9.6 2.7 52.5 19.2 28.3 0.8 43.5 55.7 5.2 85.1 5.3 MLI
MRT Mauritania 104 109 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MRT
MUS Mauritius .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MUS
MOZ Mozambique 108 108 55.0 44.6 0.4 27.6 67.1 4.1 45.0 30.1 24.9 2.7 41.2 56.1 7.0 66.7 18.1 MOZ
NAM Namibia 115 125 18.6 44.3 37.0 23.2 39.0 36.6 70.7 5.8 23.5 43.8 4.1 52.1 6.3 67.9 2.0 NAM
NER Niger 109 139 94.7 4.7 0.6 90.3 7.8 1.9 77.9 1.5 20.6 2.6 44.4 53.0 5.7 81.0 3.1 NER
NGA Nigeria 113 82 88.3 9.1 2.5 73.2 15.3 11.5 38.3 5.6 56.1 4.1 17.1 78.8 2.2 93.2 1.9 NGA
RWA Rwanda 125 147 36.3 61.7 2.0 27.8 68.9 3.3 10.0 12.8 77.2 1.2 22.2 76.6 9.3 58.5 23.4 RWA
ANNEX 1:  
PROFILE OF WOMEN AND MEN IN THE POOREST HOUSEHOLDS
255
POVERTYb LEVEL OF EDUCATIONb TYPE OF EMPLOYMENTd
WOMEN’S EARNINGS 
COMPARED TO THEIR 
SPOUSES EARNINGSd
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COUNTRY 
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primary
% with 
secondary 
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secondary 
or higher
% not 
employed
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but with no pay
% employed with pay 
(either cash, cash & in 
kind, in kind only)
% not 
employed
% employed 
but with no 
pay
% employed with 
pay (either cash, 
cash & in kind, in 
kind only)
 (%)
IND India 109 152 84.7 9.4 5.9 54.5 21.3 24.0 34.9 13.7 51.4 1.5 6.0 92.5 8.4 74.8 10.4 IND
IRN Iran (Islamic Republic of) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. IRN
MDV Maldives 109 147 43.3 33.8 21.8 43.1 30.1 21.5 50.3 1.9 47.8 3.5 0.0 96.5 10.8 78.3 6.3 MDV
NPL Nepal 105 117 80.0 14.0 5.9 46.2 32.3 21.6 5.6 75.4 19.0 0.6 31.2 68.2 8.3 79.9 5.2 NPL
PAK Pakistan 97 117 93.2 4.9 1.9 61.5 19.6 18.9 48.5 6.8 44.7 1.4 0.1 98.5 5.1 82.4 9.1 PAK
LKA Sri Lanka .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LKA
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
AGO Angola .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AGO
BEN Benin 111 118 93.9 4.8 1.3 75.6 17.2 6.6 32.9 17.2 49.9 6.9 22.0 71.1 5.5 66.3 5.9 BEN
BWA Botswana .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BWA
BFA Burkina Faso 116 141 96.1 3.5 0.4 90.7 7.8 1.4 19.4 32.7 47.9 0.2 25.7 74.1 4.8 91.8 2.2 BFA
BDI Burundi 125 152 72.0 26.3 1.2 59.3 35.7 4.3 6.3 74.3 19.4 2.2 60.1 37.7 10.6 68.3 15.8 BDI
CPV Cabo Verde .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CPV
CMR Cameroon 115 99 72.9 24.8 2.3 42.2 42.3 15.5 20.0 10.4 69.6 3.0 5.5 91.5 6.8 75.7 9.5 CMR
CAF Central African 
Republic
106 134 65.0 33.0 2.0 24.0 62.0 14.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CAF
TCD Chad 117 153 98.3 1.7 0.0 94.6 5.3 0.1 13.0 28.9 58.1 2.5 .. .. .. .. .. TCD
COM Comoros 102 113 77.5 13.0 9.5 48.8 26.9 24.3 55.7 15.0 29.3 16.5 16.0 67.5 36.1 56.0 4.50 COM
COG Congo .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. COG
CIV Côte d'Ivoire 99 125 78.6 19.1 2.3 56.7 31.2 12.1 19.1 17.5 63.4 1.3 17.3 81.4 4.9 78.3 3.60 CIV
COD Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
117 139 34.9 49.4 15.6 10.7 36.1 53.2 15.3 3.1 81.6 6.3 5.0 88.7 8.1 72.3 17.0 COD
DJI Djibouti .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DJI
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 105 105 36.0 47.0 17.0 15.0 34.0 51.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GNQ
ERI Eritrea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ERI
ETH Ethiopia 109 119 87.0 12.5 0.5 61.4 36.4 2.2 41.8 21.5 36.7 1.3 15.9 82.8 9.3 66.7 20.1 ETH
GAB Gabon 118 125 10.4 53.1 36.2 6.9 35.5 56.7 43.0 15.0 42.0 16.0 12.3 71.7 11.3 67.7 9.0 GAB
GMB Gambia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GMB
GHA Ghana 98 75 73.4 15.3 11.3 54.7 18.1 27.2 7.1 17.7 75.2 3.5 28.2 68.3 8.0 71.3 9.7 GHA
GIN Guinea 107 105 93.9 4.9 1.2 80.3 10.6 9.1 9.3 42.7 48.0 3.5 32.4 64.1 12.2 80.6 6.0 GIN
GNB Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GNB
KEN Kenya 115 118 41.1 52.7 6.2 23.3 61.2 15.5 40.1 21.4 38.5 4.1 31.9 64.0 15.2 60.0 14.8 KEN
LSO Lesotho 87 93 5.4 78.5 14.3 40.4 52.5 6.5 53.0 24.6 22.4 .. .. .. 17.7 54.1 10.5 LSO
LBR Liberia 101 99 73.2 20.5 6.3 36.2 29.9 33.9 30.0 31.8 38.2 6.3 35.6 58.1 9.0 57.8 27.3 LBR
MDG Madagascar 108 115 50.6 44.8 3.9 42.3 48.8 6.9 3.2 13.5 83.3 0.3 14.1 85.6 4.2 41.1 47.8 MDG
MWI Malawi 125 149 36.6 60.5 2.9 21.7 68.8 9.4 20.0 36.5 43.5 3.4 37.9 58.7 8.0 72.0 15.1 MWI
MLI Mali 107 115 94.1 4.8 1.0 87.5 9.6 2.7 52.5 19.2 28.3 0.8 43.5 55.7 5.2 85.1 5.3 MLI
MRT Mauritania 104 109 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MRT
MUS Mauritius .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MUS
MOZ Mozambique 108 108 55.0 44.6 0.4 27.6 67.1 4.1 45.0 30.1 24.9 2.7 41.2 56.1 7.0 66.7 18.1 MOZ
NAM Namibia 115 125 18.6 44.3 37.0 23.2 39.0 36.6 70.7 5.8 23.5 43.8 4.1 52.1 6.3 67.9 2.0 NAM
NER Niger 109 139 94.7 4.7 0.6 90.3 7.8 1.9 77.9 1.5 20.6 2.6 44.4 53.0 5.7 81.0 3.1 NER
NGA Nigeria 113 82 88.3 9.1 2.5 73.2 15.3 11.5 38.3 5.6 56.1 4.1 17.1 78.8 2.2 93.2 1.9 NGA
RWA Rwanda 125 147 36.3 61.7 2.0 27.8 68.9 3.3 10.0 12.8 77.2 1.2 22.2 76.6 9.3 58.5 23.4 RWA
POVERTYb LEVEL OF EDUCATIONb TYPE OF EMPLOYMENTd
WOMEN’S EARNINGS 
COMPARED TO THEIR 
SPOUSES EARNINGSd
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Number of 
women for 
every 100 men 
in poorest 
householdsa
Number of 
‘female only’ 
households 
for every 
100 poorest 
householdsc
Women Men Women Men More Less
About the 
same as 
spouse ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
Ratio % with no education
% with only 
primary
% with 
secondary 
or higher
% with no 
education
% with only 
primary
% with 
secondary 
or higher
% not 
employed
% employed 
but with no pay
% employed with pay 
(either cash, cash & in 
kind, in kind only)
% not 
employed
% employed 
but with no 
pay
% employed with 
pay (either cash, 
cash & in kind, in 
kind only)
 (%)
STP São Tomé and 
Príncipe
93 115 20.7 71.4 7.9 5.3 76.2 18.5 31.7 3.0 65.3 0.4 5.0 94.6 2.8 76.1 5.8 STP
SEN Senegal 104 90 90.8 6.9 2.1 83.9 9.2 6.0 34.2 25.3 40.5 .. .. .. 3.8 92.6 1.5 SEN
SYC Seychelles .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SYC
SLE Sierra Leone 103 103 85.5 9.5 4.9 75.1 11.5 13.3 10.2 53.9 35.9 2.9 46.7 50.4 5.0 84.9 7.1 SLE
SOM Somalia 96 107 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SOM
ZAF South Africa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ZAF
SSD South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SSD
SDN Sudan 113 147 84.6 12.5 2.9g 60.6 29.4 10.0g .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SDN
SWZ Swaziland 112 115 27.6 47.7 24.7 30.1 49.1 20.8 58.2 3.4 38.4 41.6 4.7 53.7 6.7 57.8 2.9 SWZ
TGO Togo 109 107 73.0 23.0 4.0 42.0 39.0 19.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TGO
UGA Uganda 108 111 38.7 58.0 3.3 19.7 0.0 13.9 19.8 30.7 49.5 1.7 24.9 73.4 10.5 69.1 13.6 UGA
TZA United Republic of 
Tanzania
112 132 48.5 50.5 1.0 29.6 67.6 2.8 9.0 63.9 27.1 2.7 39.1 58.2 7.0 64.7 21.1 TZA
ZMB Zambia 97 84 24.2 67.8 7.9 11.5 68.1 20.3 31.8 36.6 31.6 3.7 36.2 60.1 8.8 65.3 19.6 ZMB
ZWE Zimbabwe 113 110 14.6 51.8 32.8 5.9 46.2 46.5 67.1 1.3 31.6 35.6 10.3 54.1 12.2 54.7 24.3 ZWE
Source:          
Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12: UN Women calculations based on most recent available data from Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS).
Columns 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17: Special tabulations for UN Women by ICF International.
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COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
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primary
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or higher
% with no 
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or higher
% not 
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but with no pay
% employed with pay 
(either cash, cash & in 
kind, in kind only)
% not 
employed
% employed 
but with no 
pay
% employed with 
pay (either cash, 
cash & in kind, in 
kind only)
 (%)
STP São Tomé and 
Príncipe
93 115 20.7 71.4 7.9 5.3 76.2 18.5 31.7 3.0 65.3 0.4 5.0 94.6 2.8 76.1 5.8 STP
SEN Senegal 104 90 90.8 6.9 2.1 83.9 9.2 6.0 34.2 25.3 40.5 .. .. .. 3.8 92.6 1.5 SEN
SYC Seychelles .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SYC
SLE Sierra Leone 103 103 85.5 9.5 4.9 75.1 11.5 13.3 10.2 53.9 35.9 2.9 46.7 50.4 5.0 84.9 7.1 SLE
SOM Somalia 96 107 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SOM
ZAF South Africa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ZAF
SSD South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SSD
SDN Sudan 113 147 84.6 12.5 2.9g 60.6 29.4 10.0g .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SDN
SWZ Swaziland 112 115 27.6 47.7 24.7 30.1 49.1 20.8 58.2 3.4 38.4 41.6 4.7 53.7 6.7 57.8 2.9 SWZ
TGO Togo 109 107 73.0 23.0 4.0 42.0 39.0 19.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TGO
UGA Uganda 108 111 38.7 58.0 3.3 19.7 0.0 13.9 19.8 30.7 49.5 1.7 24.9 73.4 10.5 69.1 13.6 UGA
TZA United Republic of 
Tanzania
112 132 48.5 50.5 1.0 29.6 67.6 2.8 9.0 63.9 27.1 2.7 39.1 58.2 7.0 64.7 21.1 TZA
ZMB Zambia 97 84 24.2 67.8 7.9 11.5 68.1 20.3 31.8 36.6 31.6 3.7 36.2 60.1 8.8 65.3 19.6 ZMB
ZWE Zimbabwe 113 110 14.6 51.8 32.8 5.9 46.2 46.5 67.1 1.3 31.6 35.6 10.3 54.1 12.2 54.7 24.3 ZWE
Notes:
“..” indicates that data are not available. 
Ψ ISO country code refers to the three letter standard for the representation of names of countries published by the International Organization for Standardization.  
a. This indicator is calculated as follows: ∑(female in poor households)⁄(∑(male in poor households)/∑(female in all households)⁄(∑(male in all households). Values above 103 indicate that women 
are overly represented in the poorest quintile. Values below 97 indicate that men are overly represented in the poorest quintile. Values between 97 and 103 indicate parity. ‘Poorest households’ 
refers to the bottom 20 per cent of households, using the wealth asset index in Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS).
b. Data refer to women and men aged 20-59.
c. The indicator is calculated as follows: (∑(‘female-only’ household in lowest quintile)⁄(∑(total households in lowest quintile))/(∑(All ‘female-only’ households)⁄(∑(All households)). ‘Female-only’ 
household refers to households with no male adults. The indicator represents the likelihood of ‘female-only’ households being among the poorest. Values above 103 indicate that ‘female-only’ 
households are overly represented in the poorest quintile. Values below 97 indicate that ‘female-only’ households are underrepresented in the poorest quintile. Values between 97 and 103 
indicate that the share of ‘female-only’ households in the poorest quintile is proportional to their overall share in the entire sample. ‘Poorest households’ refers to the bottom 20 per cent of 
households, using the wealth asset index in DHS and MICS.
d. Data refer to the population aged 20 to 49.
e. Primary includes non-standard and standard curriculum.
f. Primary includes semi-literate, elementary and preparatory.
g. Excludes Khalwa.
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Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
ALB Albania 3-5 65.7 64.7 9.6 10.2 4.8b 14.9b 7.6b 3.8b 6.9b 7.6b 19.1 14.8 3.3 ALB
ARM Armenia 3-5 .. .. 10.8 10.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.3 .. 3.3 ARM
AZE Azerbaijan 3-5 20.9c 21.1c .. .. 2.3 10.0 28.6 13.5 13.6 12.2 11.9 .. 2.4 AZE
BLR Belarus 3-5 97.7 99.8 .. .. 13.2c 44.8c 7.1c 2.8c 2.3c 2.8c 15.4 7.8 5.1 BLR
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina 3-5 .. .. 6.3b, d 8.2b, d 6.6 16.7 9.8 7.0 6.2 10.1 17.1 11.1 .. BIH
BGR Bulgaria 3-6 82.3 83.0 11.4 11.3 10.5 29.8 9.4 5.5 4.4 6.5 17.4 12.3 4.1 BGR
HRV Croatia 3-6 62.1 63.9 11.0 11.9 7.7 26.3 11.8 6.6 6.3 11.4 13.7 7.8 4.3 HRV
CYP Cyprus 3-5 69.1c 69.3c 10.8 11.5 6.0 18.8 14.6 6.8 7.6 10.2 13.8 9.7 7.3 CYP
CZE Czech Republic 3-5 .. .. 13.0 13.3 6.1 23.4 10.9 7.2 7.1 17.2 19.0 11.2 4.5 CZE
EST Estonia 3-6 91.0 93.6 12.7 12.2 6.5 26.8 16.5 9.3 7.3 17.7 11.5 8.4 5.2 EST
GEO Georgia 3-5 47.3 39.7 .. .. 2.2 9.3 18.7 5.9 11.9 16.9 9.1c 7.6c 2.0 GEO
HUN Hungary 3-6 84 85.2 12.1 12.2 5.1 27.7 10.1 7.8 4.4 11.0 10.5 10.0 4.7 HUN
KAZ Kazakhstan 3-6 57.9 58.0 11.3 11.5 12.0 31.7 5.9 3.7 3.5c 2.6c 16.5 8.6 3.1 KAZ
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 3-6 21.0 20.6 11.0 11.2  6.9c 20.2c 7.8c 3.9c 5.6 6.8 23.9 15.2c 6.8 KGZ
LVA Latvia 3-6 90.1 90.8 10.5 10.5 5.2 28.2 11.9 5.6 3.6 11.0 11.0 7.9 4.9 LVA
LTU Lithuania 3-6 74.7 76.1 11.0 11.1 5.5 32.3 9.4 5.1 3.5 8.2 12.4 8.3 5.2 LTU
MNE Montenegro 3-5 44.5 45.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MNE
POL Poland 3-6 75.7 76.1 11.3 11.5 7.9 25.0 10.6 6.7 5.3 11.9 10.2 8.7 5.2 POL
MDA Republic of Moldova 3-6 79.9c 81.3c 10.5 10.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 16.3 9.6 8.4 MDA
ROU Romania 3-6 76.6 75.4 10.5 11.2 11.2 31.5 9.2 6.7 5.0 5.5 17.6 12.8 3.1 ROU
RUS Russian Federation 3-6 73.8 74.1 11.6 11.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.6 8.8 4.1 RUS
SRB Serbia 3-6 58.4c 58.0c 10.5 11.4 8.5 23.3 13.0 8.1 8.2 12.8 15.2 9.0 4.8 SRB
SVK Slovakia 3-5 .. .. 13.0 13.2 7.4 25.7 8.2 6.4 5.7 12.4 14.9 11.3 4.1 SVK
SVN Slovenia 3-5 91.9 92.6 12.1 12.2 8.4 34.1 10.4 6.3 5.3 10.4 16.8 9.0 5.7 SVN
TJK Tajikistan 3-6 6.2 7.5 10.8 11.0 3.8 23.7 24.5 17.0 13.0 13.0 22.4 15.4 4.0 TJK
MKD The former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia
3-5 25.9 24.8 .. .. 7.7 14.6 14.7 9.9 8.4 16.3 15.2 10.5 .. MKD
TUR Turkey 3-5 30.1 31.1 5.7 7.5 5.2 15.2 11.7 7.8 7.0 7.0 20.1 17.9 2.9 TUR
TKM Turkmenistan 3-6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TKM
UKR Ukraine 3-5 .. .. 11.3 11.4 10.5 33.1 11.6 3.9 5.8 6.9 16.5 9.3 6.2 UKR
UZB Uzbekistan 3-6 19.5 19.4 .. .. 4.5 27.2 19.9 6.5 10.1 5.5 15.6 13.3 .. UZB
Developed Regions Developed Regions
AND Andorra 3-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.0 2.1 2.0 31.8 9.3 7.8 .. AND
AUS Australia 4 50.6 51.4 11.8 11.6 3.6 18.5 11.6 9.7 5.8 13.0 .. .. 5.1 AUS
AUT Austria 3-5 .. .. 9.0 10.9 6.7 23.6 15.4 9.2 7.3 15.1 10.8 9.5 5.8 AUT
BEL Belgium 3-5 99.4 99.4 10.5 11.0 3.9 18.8 10.2 9.6 2.5 8.6 11.2 .. 6.5 BEL
CAN Canada 4-5 71.2 70.7 12.6 12.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.4 CAN
DNK Denmark 3-5 97.9 99.2 11.3 11.7 6.4 16.7 14.1 10.7 4.9 12.8 .. .. 8.7 DNK
FIN Finland 3-6 70.2 70.0 10.2 10.2 8.4 42.2 18.0 8.9 6.9 13.3 13.6 9.3 6.8 FIN
FRA France 3-5 99.5 99.8 10.4 10.9 6.3 22.0 16.4 9.8 7.5 16.6 17.8 12.8 5.7 FRA
DEU Germany 3-5 .. .. 12.3 13.1 6.8 29.8 16.9 9.0 10.2 18.9 11.7 12.7 5.1 DEU
GRC Greece 4-5 76.0 74.8 10.0 10.7 9.4 25.6 20.1 8.6 11.1 18.9 9.2 7.9 4.1 GRC
ISL Iceland 3-5 96.0 98.0 10.8 10.4 4.3 15.4 16.0 15.4 5.7 15.9 9.9 .. 7.6 ISL
IRL Ireland 3-4 52.0 51.5 12.3 12.0 3.5 20.2 19.7 14.5 11.8 21.1 16.1 .. 6.2 IRL
ISR Israel 3-5 97.3 96.6 12.7 12.8 9.4 31.6 10.6 8.4 6.2 11.7 12.5 9.8b 5.6 ISR
ITA Italy 3-5 92.1 93.9 9.2 9.8 8.8 26.6 18.3 9.8 7.2 9.0 10.3 10.1 4.3 ITA
JPN Japan 3-5 .. .. 11.3 11.7 3.9 24.7 22.0 9.5 1.6 4.0 17.1 11.7 3.9 JPN
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Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
ALB Albania 3-5 65.7 64.7 9.6 10.2 4.8b 14.9b 7.6b 3.8b 6.9b 7.6b 19.1 14.8 3.3 ALB
ARM Armenia 3-5 .. .. 10.8 10.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.3 .. 3.3 ARM
AZE Azerbaijan 3-5 20.9c 21.1c .. .. 2.3 10.0 28.6 13.5 13.6 12.2 11.9 .. 2.4 AZE
BLR Belarus 3-5 97.7 99.8 .. .. 13.2c 44.8c 7.1c 2.8c 2.3c 2.8c 15.4 7.8 5.1 BLR
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina 3-5 .. .. 6.3b, d 8.2b, d 6.6 16.7 9.8 7.0 6.2 10.1 17.1 11.1 .. BIH
BGR Bulgaria 3-6 82.3 83.0 11.4 11.3 10.5 29.8 9.4 5.5 4.4 6.5 17.4 12.3 4.1 BGR
HRV Croatia 3-6 62.1 63.9 11.0 11.9 7.7 26.3 11.8 6.6 6.3 11.4 13.7 7.8 4.3 HRV
CYP Cyprus 3-5 69.1c 69.3c 10.8 11.5 6.0 18.8 14.6 6.8 7.6 10.2 13.8 9.7 7.3 CYP
CZE Czech Republic 3-5 .. .. 13.0 13.3 6.1 23.4 10.9 7.2 7.1 17.2 19.0 11.2 4.5 CZE
EST Estonia 3-6 91.0 93.6 12.7 12.2 6.5 26.8 16.5 9.3 7.3 17.7 11.5 8.4 5.2 EST
GEO Georgia 3-5 47.3 39.7 .. .. 2.2 9.3 18.7 5.9 11.9 16.9 9.1c 7.6c 2.0 GEO
HUN Hungary 3-6 84 85.2 12.1 12.2 5.1 27.7 10.1 7.8 4.4 11.0 10.5 10.0 4.7 HUN
KAZ Kazakhstan 3-6 57.9 58.0 11.3 11.5 12.0 31.7 5.9 3.7 3.5c 2.6c 16.5 8.6 3.1 KAZ
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 3-6 21.0 20.6 11.0 11.2  6.9c 20.2c 7.8c 3.9c 5.6 6.8 23.9 15.2c 6.8 KGZ
LVA Latvia 3-6 90.1 90.8 10.5 10.5 5.2 28.2 11.9 5.6 3.6 11.0 11.0 7.9 4.9 LVA
LTU Lithuania 3-6 74.7 76.1 11.0 11.1 5.5 32.3 9.4 5.1 3.5 8.2 12.4 8.3 5.2 LTU
MNE Montenegro 3-5 44.5 45.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MNE
POL Poland 3-6 75.7 76.1 11.3 11.5 7.9 25.0 10.6 6.7 5.3 11.9 10.2 8.7 5.2 POL
MDA Republic of Moldova 3-6 79.9c 81.3c 10.5 10.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 16.3 9.6 8.4 MDA
ROU Romania 3-6 76.6 75.4 10.5 11.2 11.2 31.5 9.2 6.7 5.0 5.5 17.6 12.8 3.1 ROU
RUS Russian Federation 3-6 73.8 74.1 11.6 11.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.6 8.8 4.1 RUS
SRB Serbia 3-6 58.4c 58.0c 10.5 11.4 8.5 23.3 13.0 8.1 8.2 12.8 15.2 9.0 4.8 SRB
SVK Slovakia 3-5 .. .. 13.0 13.2 7.4 25.7 8.2 6.4 5.7 12.4 14.9 11.3 4.1 SVK
SVN Slovenia 3-5 91.9 92.6 12.1 12.2 8.4 34.1 10.4 6.3 5.3 10.4 16.8 9.0 5.7 SVN
TJK Tajikistan 3-6 6.2 7.5 10.8 11.0 3.8 23.7 24.5 17.0 13.0 13.0 22.4 15.4 4.0 TJK
MKD The former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia
3-5 25.9 24.8 .. .. 7.7 14.6 14.7 9.9 8.4 16.3 15.2 10.5 .. MKD
TUR Turkey 3-5 30.1 31.1 5.7 7.5 5.2 15.2 11.7 7.8 7.0 7.0 20.1 17.9 2.9 TUR
TKM Turkmenistan 3-6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TKM
UKR Ukraine 3-5 .. .. 11.3 11.4 10.5 33.1 11.6 3.9 5.8 6.9 16.5 9.3 6.2 UKR
UZB Uzbekistan 3-6 19.5 19.4 .. .. 4.5 27.2 19.9 6.5 10.1 5.5 15.6 13.3 .. UZB
Developed Regions Developed Regions
AND Andorra 3-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.0 2.1 2.0 31.8 9.3 7.8 .. AND
AUS Australia 4 50.6 51.4 11.8 11.6 3.6 18.5 11.6 9.7 5.8 13.0 .. .. 5.1 AUS
AUT Austria 3-5 .. .. 9.0 10.9 6.7 23.6 15.4 9.2 7.3 15.1 10.8 9.5 5.8 AUT
BEL Belgium 3-5 99.4 99.4 10.5 11.0 3.9 18.8 10.2 9.6 2.5 8.6 11.2 .. 6.5 BEL
CAN Canada 4-5 71.2 70.7 12.6 12.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.4 CAN
DNK Denmark 3-5 97.9 99.2 11.3 11.7 6.4 16.7 14.1 10.7 4.9 12.8 .. .. 8.7 DNK
FIN Finland 3-6 70.2 70.0 10.2 10.2 8.4 42.2 18.0 8.9 6.9 13.3 13.6 9.3 6.8 FIN
FRA France 3-5 99.5 99.8 10.4 10.9 6.3 22.0 16.4 9.8 7.5 16.6 17.8 12.8 5.7 FRA
DEU Germany 3-5 .. .. 12.3 13.1 6.8 29.8 16.9 9.0 10.2 18.9 11.7 12.7 5.1 DEU
GRC Greece 4-5 76.0 74.8 10.0 10.7 9.4 25.6 20.1 8.6 11.1 18.9 9.2 7.9 4.1 GRC
ISL Iceland 3-5 96.0 98.0 10.8 10.4 4.3 15.4 16.0 15.4 5.7 15.9 9.9 .. 7.6 ISL
IRL Ireland 3-4 52.0 51.5 12.3 12.0 3.5 20.2 19.7 14.5 11.8 21.1 16.1 .. 6.2 IRL
ISR Israel 3-5 97.3 96.6 12.7 12.8 9.4 31.6 10.6 8.4 6.2 11.7 12.5 9.8b 5.6 ISR
ITA Italy 3-5 92.1 93.9 9.2 9.8 8.8 26.6 18.3 9.8 7.2 9.0 10.3 10.1 4.3 ITA
JPN Japan 3-5 .. .. 11.3 11.7 3.9 24.7 22.0 9.5 1.6 4.0 17.1 11.7 3.9 JPN
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LIE Liechtenstein 5-6 69.3c 74.1c .. .. 29.5 18.6 1.5 0.2 .. .. 7.4 10.7 2.1 LIE
LUX Luxembourg 3-5 89.9 86.6 10.6 11.9 2.7 12.2 13.9 8.2 6.7 15.7 8.4 7.9 .. LUX
MLT Malta 3-4 94.7 100.0 9.9 10.7 3.4 14.4 14.2 12.0 7.1 19.8 11.5 8.5 6.9 MLT
MCO Monaco 3-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.8 1.6 MCO
NLD Netherlands 4-5 90.8 91.0 11.3 11.9 2.8 13.3 8.6 7.4 2.8 10.3 11.5 13.9 5.9 NLD
NZL New Zealand 3-4 91.9 88.4 11.7 10.8 3.2 13.2 14.8 12.8 9.9 20.2 14.6 14.4 7.4 NZL
NOR Norway 3-5 98.6 98.6 11.9 11.8 3.7 15.2 10.4 10.4 4.9 14.0 .. .. 6.9 NOR
PRT Portugal 3-5 83.4 84.7 7.1 7.4 10.7 34.9 10.1 8.9 6.4 8.3 11.7 8.2 5.6 PRT
SMR San Marino 3-5 85.2 68.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.3 14.5 .. SMR
ESP Spain 3-5 97.4 97.5 10.1 10.4 8.4 26.8 12.1 9.7 5.9 13.6 12.6 11.4 5.0 ESP
SWE Sweden 3-6 94.7 94.9 12.0 11.7 8.1 29.0 14.0 12.7 6.6 13.3 9.6 9.5 7.0 SWE
CHE Switzerland 5-6 75.8 76.6 13.0 13.9 4.9 23.2 13.7 8.7 6.6 13.2 10.8 9.3 5.3 CHE
GBR United Kingdom 3-4 79.4 78.8 12.2 12.3 2.8 15.6 18.1 14.4 8.8 20.0 18.3 14.3 6.2 GBR
USA United States 3-5 67.5 68.3 13.4 13.4 2.2 13.9 15.1 15.0 6.4 11.4 14.4 14.7c 5.4 USA
East Asia and the Pacific East Asia and the Pacific
BRN Brunei Darussalam 3-5 59.3 57.6 8.5 9.0 8.7 17.3 26.4 21.6 19.4 26.2 10.2 9.8 3.5 BRN
KHM Cambodia 3-5 15.0 14.4 3.2 5.4 .. .. .. 14.0 .. .. 46.9 28.9 2.6 KHM
CHN China 4-6 .. .. 6.6 7.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 18.2 14.5 .. CHN
PRK Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea
5-6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PRK
FJI Fiji 3-5 15.9 15.5 9.5 9.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 28.0 19.3 4.2 FJI
HKG Hong Kong, China (SAR) 3-5 88.9 88.4 10.6 11.5 6.6 25.0 14.0 6.0 7.4 .. 14.0 .. 3.5 HKG
IDN Indonesia 5-6 32.5 32.8 6.7 7.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 18.6c 16.6 3.6 IDN
KIR Kiribati 3-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 25.0 17.4 .. KIR
LAO Lao People's Democratic 
Republic
3-5 26.5 25.6 3.8 5.3 2.4 13.2 13.8 12.0 3.9 6.6 25.6 17.8 2.8 LAO
MYS Malaysia 4-5 71.3 77.1 9.4 10.1 14.4 31.5 8.8 8.1 12.8 13.0 12.1 13.9 5.9 MYS
MHL Marshall Islands 4-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MHL
FSM Micronesia (Federated States of) 3-5 28.2 28.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FSM
MNG Mongolia 3-5 65.0 64.5 9.5 9.0 10.3 30.8 10.5 5.7 4.7 10.0 27.6 14.5 5.5 MNG
MMR Myanmar 3-4 9.4 8.9 4.3 3.8 17.0 17.3 19.8 17.5 26.3 19.8 28.2 34.1 0.8 MMR
NRU Nauru 3-5 61.8c 70.6c .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22.4 20.9 .. NRU
PLW Palau 3-5 68.8c 61.0c .. .. 1.6 25.5 24.5 16.9 2.8 1.4 .. .. .. PLW
PNG Papua New Guinea 3-5 .. .. 3.2 4.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27.4 .. PNG
PHL Philippines 5 38.9 38.6 8.4 7.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 31.4 34.8 2.7 PHL
KOR Republic of Korea 3-5 89.3 89.5 11.2 12.7 11.8 36.6 26.1 12.9 6.5 9.8 17.9 15.9 5.2 KOR
WSM Samoa 3-4 23.9 21.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 30.2 21.5 5.8 WSM
SGP Singapore 3-5 .. .. 10.1 10.9 13.9 34.5 11.6 6.4 12.2 16.1 17.4 14.9 3.0 SGP
SLB Solomon Islands 3-5 30.5 30.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20.6 25.9 9.9 SLB
THA Thailand 3-5 99.8 100.0 7.1 7.5 4.2b 17.1b 8.0b 6.7b 7.8b 8.8b 16.3 19.9 7.6 THA
TLS Timor-Leste 4-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31.4 24.3 9.4 TLS
TON Tonga 3-4 .. .. 10.7 10.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.1 14.6 .. TON
TUV Tuvalu 3-5 60.5c 57.6c .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TUV
VUT Vanuatu 3-5 43.7 41.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.7 .. 5.0 VUT
VNM Viet Nam 3-5 .. .. 7.0 7.9 14.6 33.0 5.1 3.0 .. .. 18.9 .. 6.3 VNM
Latin America and the Caribbean Latin America and the Caribbean
ATG Antigua and Barbuda 3-4 68.8 75.2 .. .. 0.2 0.7 15.4c, d 0.5 7.3 17.7 13.8 11.6 2.4 ATG
ARG Argentina 3-5 75.9 74.5 9.5 9.5 4.6 15.9 13.7 10.7 7.2 12.8 16.3 10.9 6.3 ARG
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LIE Liechtenstein 5-6 69.3c 74.1c .. .. 29.5 18.6 1.5 0.2 .. .. 7.4 10.7 2.1 LIE
LUX Luxembourg 3-5 89.9 86.6 10.6 11.9 2.7 12.2 13.9 8.2 6.7 15.7 8.4 7.9 .. LUX
MLT Malta 3-4 94.7 100.0 9.9 10.7 3.4 14.4 14.2 12.0 7.1 19.8 11.5 8.5 6.9 MLT
MCO Monaco 3-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.8 1.6 MCO
NLD Netherlands 4-5 90.8 91.0 11.3 11.9 2.8 13.3 8.6 7.4 2.8 10.3 11.5 13.9 5.9 NLD
NZL New Zealand 3-4 91.9 88.4 11.7 10.8 3.2 13.2 14.8 12.8 9.9 20.2 14.6 14.4 7.4 NZL
NOR Norway 3-5 98.6 98.6 11.9 11.8 3.7 15.2 10.4 10.4 4.9 14.0 .. .. 6.9 NOR
PRT Portugal 3-5 83.4 84.7 7.1 7.4 10.7 34.9 10.1 8.9 6.4 8.3 11.7 8.2 5.6 PRT
SMR San Marino 3-5 85.2 68.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.3 14.5 .. SMR
ESP Spain 3-5 97.4 97.5 10.1 10.4 8.4 26.8 12.1 9.7 5.9 13.6 12.6 11.4 5.0 ESP
SWE Sweden 3-6 94.7 94.9 12.0 11.7 8.1 29.0 14.0 12.7 6.6 13.3 9.6 9.5 7.0 SWE
CHE Switzerland 5-6 75.8 76.6 13.0 13.9 4.9 23.2 13.7 8.7 6.6 13.2 10.8 9.3 5.3 CHE
GBR United Kingdom 3-4 79.4 78.8 12.2 12.3 2.8 15.6 18.1 14.4 8.8 20.0 18.3 14.3 6.2 GBR
USA United States 3-5 67.5 68.3 13.4 13.4 2.2 13.9 15.1 15.0 6.4 11.4 14.4 14.7c 5.4 USA
East Asia and the Pacific East Asia and the Pacific
BRN Brunei Darussalam 3-5 59.3 57.6 8.5 9.0 8.7 17.3 26.4 21.6 19.4 26.2 10.2 9.8 3.5 BRN
KHM Cambodia 3-5 15.0 14.4 3.2 5.4 .. .. .. 14.0 .. .. 46.9 28.9 2.6 KHM
CHN China 4-6 .. .. 6.6 7.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 18.2 14.5 .. CHN
PRK Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea
5-6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PRK
FJI Fiji 3-5 15.9 15.5 9.5 9.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 28.0 19.3 4.2 FJI
HKG Hong Kong, China (SAR) 3-5 88.9 88.4 10.6 11.5 6.6 25.0 14.0 6.0 7.4 .. 14.0 .. 3.5 HKG
IDN Indonesia 5-6 32.5 32.8 6.7 7.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 18.6c 16.6 3.6 IDN
KIR Kiribati 3-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 25.0 17.4 .. KIR
LAO Lao People's Democratic 
Republic
3-5 26.5 25.6 3.8 5.3 2.4 13.2 13.8 12.0 3.9 6.6 25.6 17.8 2.8 LAO
MYS Malaysia 4-5 71.3 77.1 9.4 10.1 14.4 31.5 8.8 8.1 12.8 13.0 12.1 13.9 5.9 MYS
MHL Marshall Islands 4-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MHL
FSM Micronesia (Federated States of) 3-5 28.2 28.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FSM
MNG Mongolia 3-5 65.0 64.5 9.5 9.0 10.3 30.8 10.5 5.7 4.7 10.0 27.6 14.5 5.5 MNG
MMR Myanmar 3-4 9.4 8.9 4.3 3.8 17.0 17.3 19.8 17.5 26.3 19.8 28.2 34.1 0.8 MMR
NRU Nauru 3-5 61.8c 70.6c .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22.4 20.9 .. NRU
PLW Palau 3-5 68.8c 61.0c .. .. 1.6 25.5 24.5 16.9 2.8 1.4 .. .. .. PLW
PNG Papua New Guinea 3-5 .. .. 3.2 4.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27.4 .. PNG
PHL Philippines 5 38.9 38.6 8.4 7.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 31.4 34.8 2.7 PHL
KOR Republic of Korea 3-5 89.3 89.5 11.2 12.7 11.8 36.6 26.1 12.9 6.5 9.8 17.9 15.9 5.2 KOR
WSM Samoa 3-4 23.9 21.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 30.2 21.5 5.8 WSM
SGP Singapore 3-5 .. .. 10.1 10.9 13.9 34.5 11.6 6.4 12.2 16.1 17.4 14.9 3.0 SGP
SLB Solomon Islands 3-5 30.5 30.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20.6 25.9 9.9 SLB
THA Thailand 3-5 99.8 100.0 7.1 7.5 4.2b 17.1b 8.0b 6.7b 7.8b 8.8b 16.3 19.9 7.6 THA
TLS Timor-Leste 4-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31.4 24.3 9.4 TLS
TON Tonga 3-4 .. .. 10.7 10.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.1 14.6 .. TON
TUV Tuvalu 3-5 60.5c 57.6c .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TUV
VUT Vanuatu 3-5 43.7 41.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.7 .. 5.0 VUT
VNM Viet Nam 3-5 .. .. 7.0 7.9 14.6 33.0 5.1 3.0 .. .. 18.9 .. 6.3 VNM
Latin America and the Caribbean Latin America and the Caribbean
ATG Antigua and Barbuda 3-4 68.8 75.2 .. .. 0.2 0.7 15.4c, d 0.5 7.3 17.7 13.8 11.6 2.4 ATG
ARG Argentina 3-5 75.9 74.5 9.5 9.5 4.6 15.9 13.7 10.7 7.2 12.8 16.3 10.9 6.3 ARG
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BHS Bahamas 3-4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.1 12.1 .. BHS
BRB Barbados 3-4 72.5c 71.3c 9.5 9.2 .. .. 9.2c 7c 11.6c 29.0c 13.1c 14.6 5.6 BRB
BLZ Belize 3-4 46.1 46.8 11.6 11.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 22.6 17.4 6.6 BLZ
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 4-5 57.2 57.8 7.1 8.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 24.2 18.2 6.9 BOL
BRA Brazil 4-6 53.1 53.1 7.8 7.5 6.5 20.0 2.2 2.3 3.2 9.6 20.5 16.0 5.8 BRA
CHL Chile 4-5 84.9 85.0 9.6 10.0 6.3 29.9 4.8 4.6 2.4 9.8 21.2 20.0 4.5 CHL
COL Colombia 3-5 33.1 32.9 8.4 8.6 13.7 32.7 3.1 4.4 3.6 5.6 24.8 25.2 4.4 COL
CRI Costa Rica 4-5 75.4 75.0 7.9 8.0 .. .. .. 3.8 .. .. 16.4 13.8 6.3 CRI
CUB Cuba 3-5 96.8 99.8 9.5 9.9 1.5 5.1 1.4 1.1 2.5 5.2 9.1 8.4 12.8 CUB
DMA Dominica 3-4 82.1 71.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.8 12.2 .. DMA
DOM Dominican Republic 3-5 41.9 40.0 7.8 7.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 23.6 29.2 2.2 DOM
ECU Ecuador 5 86.2 83.8 7.4 7.5 5.9 21.6 0.6 0.9 4.8 10.6 18.7 14.1 4.4 ECU
SLV El Salvador 4-6 54.4 52.7 7.4 8.0 3.6 16.7 9.1 9.5 7.1 18.4 24.5 38.0 3.4 SLV
GRD Grenada 3-4 98.0 90.1 .. .. 3.0 3.9 3.9 1.0 4.1 6.7 16.1 15.5 .. GRD
GTM Guatemala 5-6 44.4 44.3 4.0 4.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 25.5 13.7 2.9 GTM
GUY Guyana 4-5 59.6 54.3 8.9 8.0 1.3 20.7 3.0 1.6 8.0 16.7 23.2 20.3 3.2 GUY
HTI Haiti 3-5 .. .. 3.1 6.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HTI
HND Honduras 3-5 38.8 37.7 5.5 5.8 6.8 20.3 4.4 3.5 3.1 8.1 33.9 .. .. HND
JAM Jamaica 3-5 85.9 84.6 10.0 9.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.3 16.2 6.1 JAM
MEX Mexico 4-5 82.9 81.5 8.1 8.6 14.0 37.8 5.3 4.1 5.4 6.8 28.0 17.7 5.2 MEX
NIC Nicaragua 3-5 55.7 54.3 6.2 5.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 30.2 30.8 4.6 NIC
PAN Panama 4-5 65.3 64.8 9.4 9.0 11.9 28.0 8.9 7.2 13.2 13.5 25.5 15.5 3.5 PAN
PRY Paraguay 3-5 32.2 31.7 7.1 7.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.7 8.9 4.8 PRY
PER Peru 3-5 85.5 84.7 8.0 9.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 18.1 15.5 2.8 PER
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis 3-4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.5 12.4 4.2 KNA
LCA Saint Lucia 3-4 59.7 55.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16.7 12.2c 4.1 LCA
VCT Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
3-4 67.9 67.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.3 14.7 5.1 VCT
SUR Suriname 4-5 71.1 68.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.3 11.4 .. SUR
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 3-4 66.7c 67.0c 10.3 10.4 .. .. .. 4.2 .. .. 17.6c .. .. TTO
URY Uruguay 3-5 77.6 77.6 8.3 7.9 6.3 15.8 4.9 4.6 8.9 16.8 13.8 11.3 4.5 URY
VEN Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3-5 72.8 72.2 8.4 7.9 8.9c 27.9c 1.1c 1.6c 5.5c 11.2c .. .. 6.9 VEN
Middle East and North Africa Middle East and North Africa
DZA Algeria 5 73.0 71.4 5.3 6.7 4.9 14.1 28.2 14.6 7.6 7.4 23.2 .. 4.3 DZA
BHR Bahrain 3-5 49.4 48.8 6.8 6.5 2.6 21.4 10.6 4.8 10.2 .. 11.8c 9.8c 2.6 BHR
EGY Egypt 4-5 22.0 23.2 5.4 7.7 11.1 8.2 25.4 15.0 4.4 4.2 27.7 12.1 3.8 EGY
IRQ Iraq 4-5 6.5b 6.5b 5.1 7.7 .. .. .. 10.5 .. .. 17.0 13.7 .. IRQ
JOR Jordan 4-5 33.5 34.8 8.6 9.8 13.2 24.5 14.7 13.8 9.5 9.7 .. .. .. JOR
KWT Kuwait 4-5 64.1 65.2 6.8 5.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.6 8.2b 3.8 KWT
LBN Lebanon 3-5 88.0 90.9 7.3b, e 7.9b, e 8.7 25.8 18.1 11.0 11.1 10.2 12.0 8.2 2.2 LBN
LBY Libya 4-5 8.5 8.8 7.7 7.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBY
MAR Morocco 4-5 50.7 62.0 3.2 5.3 5.3 10.8 17.8 16.9 20.1 24.0 25.7 .. 5.4 MAR
OMN Oman 4-5 38.8 37.7 7.0b, e 8.5b, e 9.8 29.1 15.0 6.1 24.7 18.3 .. .. 4.3 OMN
QAT Qatar 3-5 57.5 54.4 9.6 8.1 7.9 34.0 29.6 12.5 6.9 7.6 9.9 9.7 2.5 QAT
SAU Saudi Arabia 3-5 16.7 10.4 7.2 8.3 0.6 11.1 36.2 22.8 16.3 12.7 10.4c 11.3b 5.1 SAU
PSE State of Palestine 4-5 42.5 42.9 .. .. 4.1 11.6 9.3 6.6 7.6 8.8 23.6 19.9c .. PSE
SYR Syrian Arab Republic 3-5 5.3 5.4 5.4 7.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.1 SYR
TUN Tunisia 3-5 .. .. 5.7 7.6 9.6 22.6 26.4 12.9 21.9 27.2 17.4 13.6 6.2 TUN
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BHS Bahamas 3-4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.1 12.1 .. BHS
BRB Barbados 3-4 72.5c 71.3c 9.5 9.2 .. .. 9.2c 7c 11.6c 29.0c 13.1c 14.6 5.6 BRB
BLZ Belize 3-4 46.1 46.8 11.6 11.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 22.6 17.4 6.6 BLZ
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 4-5 57.2 57.8 7.1 8.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 24.2 18.2 6.9 BOL
BRA Brazil 4-6 53.1 53.1 7.8 7.5 6.5 20.0 2.2 2.3 3.2 9.6 20.5 16.0 5.8 BRA
CHL Chile 4-5 84.9 85.0 9.6 10.0 6.3 29.9 4.8 4.6 2.4 9.8 21.2 20.0 4.5 CHL
COL Colombia 3-5 33.1 32.9 8.4 8.6 13.7 32.7 3.1 4.4 3.6 5.6 24.8 25.2 4.4 COL
CRI Costa Rica 4-5 75.4 75.0 7.9 8.0 .. .. .. 3.8 .. .. 16.4 13.8 6.3 CRI
CUB Cuba 3-5 96.8 99.8 9.5 9.9 1.5 5.1 1.4 1.1 2.5 5.2 9.1 8.4 12.8 CUB
DMA Dominica 3-4 82.1 71.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.8 12.2 .. DMA
DOM Dominican Republic 3-5 41.9 40.0 7.8 7.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 23.6 29.2 2.2 DOM
ECU Ecuador 5 86.2 83.8 7.4 7.5 5.9 21.6 0.6 0.9 4.8 10.6 18.7 14.1 4.4 ECU
SLV El Salvador 4-6 54.4 52.7 7.4 8.0 3.6 16.7 9.1 9.5 7.1 18.4 24.5 38.0 3.4 SLV
GRD Grenada 3-4 98.0 90.1 .. .. 3.0 3.9 3.9 1.0 4.1 6.7 16.1 15.5 .. GRD
GTM Guatemala 5-6 44.4 44.3 4.0 4.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 25.5 13.7 2.9 GTM
GUY Guyana 4-5 59.6 54.3 8.9 8.0 1.3 20.7 3.0 1.6 8.0 16.7 23.2 20.3 3.2 GUY
HTI Haiti 3-5 .. .. 3.1 6.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HTI
HND Honduras 3-5 38.8 37.7 5.5 5.8 6.8 20.3 4.4 3.5 3.1 8.1 33.9 .. .. HND
JAM Jamaica 3-5 85.9 84.6 10.0 9.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.3 16.2 6.1 JAM
MEX Mexico 4-5 82.9 81.5 8.1 8.6 14.0 37.8 5.3 4.1 5.4 6.8 28.0 17.7 5.2 MEX
NIC Nicaragua 3-5 55.7 54.3 6.2 5.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 30.2 30.8 4.6 NIC
PAN Panama 4-5 65.3 64.8 9.4 9.0 11.9 28.0 8.9 7.2 13.2 13.5 25.5 15.5 3.5 PAN
PRY Paraguay 3-5 32.2 31.7 7.1 7.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.7 8.9 4.8 PRY
PER Peru 3-5 85.5 84.7 8.0 9.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 18.1 15.5 2.8 PER
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis 3-4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.5 12.4 4.2 KNA
LCA Saint Lucia 3-4 59.7 55.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16.7 12.2c 4.1 LCA
VCT Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
3-4 67.9 67.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.3 14.7 5.1 VCT
SUR Suriname 4-5 71.1 68.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.3 11.4 .. SUR
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 3-4 66.7c 67.0c 10.3 10.4 .. .. .. 4.2 .. .. 17.6c .. .. TTO
URY Uruguay 3-5 77.6 77.6 8.3 7.9 6.3 15.8 4.9 4.6 8.9 16.8 13.8 11.3 4.5 URY
VEN Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3-5 72.8 72.2 8.4 7.9 8.9c 27.9c 1.1c 1.6c 5.5c 11.2c .. .. 6.9 VEN
Middle East and North Africa Middle East and North Africa
DZA Algeria 5 73.0 71.4 5.3 6.7 4.9 14.1 28.2 14.6 7.6 7.4 23.2 .. 4.3 DZA
BHR Bahrain 3-5 49.4 48.8 6.8 6.5 2.6 21.4 10.6 4.8 10.2 .. 11.8c 9.8c 2.6 BHR
EGY Egypt 4-5 22.0 23.2 5.4 7.7 11.1 8.2 25.4 15.0 4.4 4.2 27.7 12.1 3.8 EGY
IRQ Iraq 4-5 6.5b 6.5b 5.1 7.7 .. .. .. 10.5 .. .. 17.0 13.7 .. IRQ
JOR Jordan 4-5 33.5 34.8 8.6 9.8 13.2 24.5 14.7 13.8 9.5 9.7 .. .. .. JOR
KWT Kuwait 4-5 64.1 65.2 6.8 5.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.6 8.2b 3.8 KWT
LBN Lebanon 3-5 88.0 90.9 7.3b, e 7.9b, e 8.7 25.8 18.1 11.0 11.1 10.2 12.0 8.2 2.2 LBN
LBY Libya 4-5 8.5 8.8 7.7 7.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBY
MAR Morocco 4-5 50.7 62.0 3.2 5.3 5.3 10.8 17.8 16.9 20.1 24.0 25.7 .. 5.4 MAR
OMN Oman 4-5 38.8 37.7 7.0b, e 8.5b, e 9.8 29.1 15.0 6.1 24.7 18.3 .. .. 4.3 OMN
QAT Qatar 3-5 57.5 54.4 9.6 8.1 7.9 34.0 29.6 12.5 6.9 7.6 9.9 9.7 2.5 QAT
SAU Saudi Arabia 3-5 16.7 10.4 7.2 8.3 0.6 11.1 36.2 22.8 16.3 12.7 10.4c 11.3b 5.1 SAU
PSE State of Palestine 4-5 42.5 42.9 .. .. 4.1 11.6 9.3 6.6 7.6 8.8 23.6 19.9c .. PSE
SYR Syrian Arab Republic 3-5 5.3 5.4 5.4 7.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.1 SYR
TUN Tunisia 3-5 .. .. 5.7 7.6 9.6 22.6 26.4 12.9 21.9 27.2 17.4 13.6 6.2 TUN
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ARE United Arab Emirates 4-5 60.1 58.9 9.9 8.5 9.8 22.5 13.4 3.6 8.2 7.9 16.1 11.5b .. ARE
YEM Yemen 3-5 0.7 0.8 1.3 3.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 30.3 16.1 5.2 YEM
South Asia South Asia
AFG Afghanistan 3-6 .. .. 1.2 5.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.7 31.6 .. AFG
BGD Bangladesh 3-5 23.3c 23.8c 4.5 5.5 1.5 4.5 30.8 29.8 9.6 15.9 40.2c 32.2 2.2 BGD
BTN Bhutan 4-5 .. .. .. .. 8.6 15.9 38.4 25.0 3.5 6.0 24.0 19.9 4.7 BTN
IND India 3-5 .. .. 3.6 7.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 35.2c 25.9 3.4 IND
IRN Iran (Islamic Republic of) 5 36.0 35.7 7.7 8.6 21.7 50.8 11.6 5.0 10.0 4.6 25.7 .. 3.6 IRN
MDV Maldives 3-5 65.7 64.3 4.1 4.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.4 .. 5.9 MDV
NPL Nepal 3-4 54.4 53.0 2.3 4.5 1.1 5.0 16.3 18.8 2.4 4.8 23.9 28.8 4.7 NPL
PAK Pakistan 3-4 38.2 42.1 2.9 5.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 42.5 21.0c 2.1 PAK
LKA Sri Lanka 4 .. .. 9.6 10.1 2.7 11.0 57.6 36.8 9.1 15.1 24.4 17.3 1.7 LKA
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
AGO Angola 5 77.2 52.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 42.5 27.4 3.5 AGO
BEN Benin 4-5 9.7 9.8 2.1 4.6 1.7 3.9 15.3 29.0 5.1 9.3 43.7 9.8 5.3 BEN
BWA Botswana 3-5 15.1 14.5 8.7 9.1 3.2 10.4 9.0 9.6 17.0 26.5 25.4 13.9 9.5 BWA
BFA Burkina Faso 3-5 3.7 3.6 0.3b, e 0.9b, e 1.9 4.4 17.3 16.7 7.2 18.8 46.1 26.9 3.4 BFA
BDI Burundi 4-6 4.9 4.8 2.2 3.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.8 31.7 5.8 BDI
CPV Cabo Verde 3-5 69.0 69.7 .. .. 5.6 21.5 5.8 4.2 7.5 8.6 22.6 16.7 5.0 CPV
CMR Cameroon 4-5 21.6 21.0 5.3 6.7 1.2 6.2 8.9 4.3 10.8 22.1 45.6 21.4 3.1 CMR
CAF Central African Republic 3-5 5.7 5.6 2.4 4.9 3.4 4.2 32.9 30.1 11.5 13.7 80.1 68.1 1.2 CAF
TCD Chad 3-5 1.3 1.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 62.4 29.8 2.3 TCD
COM Comoros 3-5 21.0 19.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27.8 8.7 7.6 COM
COG Congo 3-5 12.9 13.2 4.9 6.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.4 18.7 6.2 COG
CIV Côte d'Ivoire 3-5 5.2 5.2 3.2 5.3 4.0 14.0 1.4 3.2 8.1 22.1 41.0 22.7 4.6 CIV
COD Democratic Republic of the 
Congo
3-5 4.1 3.9 2.3 5.0 1.7 8.4 3.8 4.0 1.0 4.7 34.7 15.3 2.5 COD
DJI Djibouti 4-5 3.2 3.2 .. .. 12.8 13.6 40.4 29.4 10.9 17.5 33.2 24.5 8.4 DJI
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 4-6 53.1 53.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 26.2 .. .. GNQ
ERI Eritrea 5-6 .. .. .. .. 15.8 27.4 8.9 6.9 13.9 12.0 40.9 37.9 2.1 ERI
ETH Ethiopia 4-6 .. .. 1.4b, d 3.6b, d 3.7 8.1 7.5 7.7 7.7 13.1 53.7b 38.8b 4.7 ETH
GAB Gabon 3-5 35.9 34.6 8.6 6.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 24.5 .. .. GAB
GMB Gambia 3-6 28.4 26.3 2.0 3.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 36.1 .. 4.1 GMB
GHA Ghana 4-5 97.3 94.8 5.7 8.0 2.7 9.5 .. .. 6.0 11.0 30.1 15.8 8.1 GHA
GIN Guinea 4-6 10.4 10.9 .. .. 9.0 14.3 5.3 9.5 14.0 16.2 43.6 33.1 2.5 GIN
GNB Guinea-Bissau 3-5 4.5 4.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 51.9 37.3 .. GNB
KEN Kenya 3-5 29.9 26.7 5.8 7.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 56.6b 41.1b 6.7 KEN
LSO Lesotho 3-5 26.5 24.9 6.3 4.7 .. .. .. 6.2 .. .. 32.6 24.7b 13.0 LSO
LBR Liberia 3-5 .. .. 2.6 5.8 1.5 8.5 25.2 19.0 5.8 9.7 26.5 14.9 2.8 LBR
MDG Madagascar 3-5 11.3 10.7 .. .. 2.5 10.0 14.0 8.4 7.5 15.6 39.8 27.6 2.7 MDG
MWI Malawi 3-5 .. .. 3.4 5.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 69.1b 41.7b 5.4 MWI
MLI Mali 3-6 3.9 3.7 1.6 1.5 0.4 2.7 10.8 16.4 0.8 2.2 41.3 19.3 4.8 MLI
MRT Mauritania 3-5 .. .. 2.7 4.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 35.4 26.2 3.7 MRT
MUS Mauritius 3-4 97.5 100.0 7.7 8.8 2.8 13 8.3 2.7 8.3 14.4 19.8 14.7 3.5 MUS
MOZ Mozambique 3-5 .. .. 0.8 1.7 3.4 10.1 7.3 7.0 3.5 5.9 54.5 31.2b 5.0 MOZ
NAM Namibia 5-6 15.4 15.2 6.3 6.1 0.9 5.0 14.9 11.6 8.6 11.5 29.8 24.6 8.4 NAM
NER Niger 4-6 5.1 4.9 0.8 2.0 1.6 1.6 3.7 6.4 3.3 14.1 38.8 34.7 4.4 NER
NGA Nigeria 3-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 37.6b 33.1 .. NGA
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PRE-PRIMARYa ATTAINMENT FIELD OF STUDY OF TERTIARY STUDENTS (SELECT STUDY AREAS)a RESOURCES OF EDUCATION SYSTEMa
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Official ageж Net pre-primary enrollment,  2005-2014
Mean years of schooling of population 
aged 25 and above,  
2010
Engineering, Manufacturing 
and Construction,  
2006-2013
Humanities and Arts,             
2006-2013
Sciences,  
2006-2013
Pupil-teacher ratio,             
2006-2014
Public 
expenditure 
on education, 
2005-2014
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
2014
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Primary Secondary
(% of GDP)
(% of pre-primary age population) (% aged 25 years and older) (% of all students) (Ratio)
ARE United Arab Emirates 4-5 60.1 58.9 9.9 8.5 9.8 22.5 13.4 3.6 8.2 7.9 16.1 11.5b .. ARE
YEM Yemen 3-5 0.7 0.8 1.3 3.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 30.3 16.1 5.2 YEM
South Asia South Asia
AFG Afghanistan 3-6 .. .. 1.2 5.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.7 31.6 .. AFG
BGD Bangladesh 3-5 23.3c 23.8c 4.5 5.5 1.5 4.5 30.8 29.8 9.6 15.9 40.2c 32.2 2.2 BGD
BTN Bhutan 4-5 .. .. .. .. 8.6 15.9 38.4 25.0 3.5 6.0 24.0 19.9 4.7 BTN
IND India 3-5 .. .. 3.6 7.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 35.2c 25.9 3.4 IND
IRN Iran (Islamic Republic of) 5 36.0 35.7 7.7 8.6 21.7 50.8 11.6 5.0 10.0 4.6 25.7 .. 3.6 IRN
MDV Maldives 3-5 65.7 64.3 4.1 4.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.4 .. 5.9 MDV
NPL Nepal 3-4 54.4 53.0 2.3 4.5 1.1 5.0 16.3 18.8 2.4 4.8 23.9 28.8 4.7 NPL
PAK Pakistan 3-4 38.2 42.1 2.9 5.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 42.5 21.0c 2.1 PAK
LKA Sri Lanka 4 .. .. 9.6 10.1 2.7 11.0 57.6 36.8 9.1 15.1 24.4 17.3 1.7 LKA
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
AGO Angola 5 77.2 52.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 42.5 27.4 3.5 AGO
BEN Benin 4-5 9.7 9.8 2.1 4.6 1.7 3.9 15.3 29.0 5.1 9.3 43.7 9.8 5.3 BEN
BWA Botswana 3-5 15.1 14.5 8.7 9.1 3.2 10.4 9.0 9.6 17.0 26.5 25.4 13.9 9.5 BWA
BFA Burkina Faso 3-5 3.7 3.6 0.3b, e 0.9b, e 1.9 4.4 17.3 16.7 7.2 18.8 46.1 26.9 3.4 BFA
BDI Burundi 4-6 4.9 4.8 2.2 3.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.8 31.7 5.8 BDI
CPV Cabo Verde 3-5 69.0 69.7 .. .. 5.6 21.5 5.8 4.2 7.5 8.6 22.6 16.7 5.0 CPV
CMR Cameroon 4-5 21.6 21.0 5.3 6.7 1.2 6.2 8.9 4.3 10.8 22.1 45.6 21.4 3.1 CMR
CAF Central African Republic 3-5 5.7 5.6 2.4 4.9 3.4 4.2 32.9 30.1 11.5 13.7 80.1 68.1 1.2 CAF
TCD Chad 3-5 1.3 1.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 62.4 29.8 2.3 TCD
COM Comoros 3-5 21.0 19.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27.8 8.7 7.6 COM
COG Congo 3-5 12.9 13.2 4.9 6.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.4 18.7 6.2 COG
CIV Côte d'Ivoire 3-5 5.2 5.2 3.2 5.3 4.0 14.0 1.4 3.2 8.1 22.1 41.0 22.7 4.6 CIV
COD Democratic Republic of the 
Congo
3-5 4.1 3.9 2.3 5.0 1.7 8.4 3.8 4.0 1.0 4.7 34.7 15.3 2.5 COD
DJI Djibouti 4-5 3.2 3.2 .. .. 12.8 13.6 40.4 29.4 10.9 17.5 33.2 24.5 8.4 DJI
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 4-6 53.1 53.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 26.2 .. .. GNQ
ERI Eritrea 5-6 .. .. .. .. 15.8 27.4 8.9 6.9 13.9 12.0 40.9 37.9 2.1 ERI
ETH Ethiopia 4-6 .. .. 1.4b, d 3.6b, d 3.7 8.1 7.5 7.7 7.7 13.1 53.7b 38.8b 4.7 ETH
GAB Gabon 3-5 35.9 34.6 8.6 6.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 24.5 .. .. GAB
GMB Gambia 3-6 28.4 26.3 2.0 3.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 36.1 .. 4.1 GMB
GHA Ghana 4-5 97.3 94.8 5.7 8.0 2.7 9.5 .. .. 6.0 11.0 30.1 15.8 8.1 GHA
GIN Guinea 4-6 10.4 10.9 .. .. 9.0 14.3 5.3 9.5 14.0 16.2 43.6 33.1 2.5 GIN
GNB Guinea-Bissau 3-5 4.5 4.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 51.9 37.3 .. GNB
KEN Kenya 3-5 29.9 26.7 5.8 7.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 56.6b 41.1b 6.7 KEN
LSO Lesotho 3-5 26.5 24.9 6.3 4.7 .. .. .. 6.2 .. .. 32.6 24.7b 13.0 LSO
LBR Liberia 3-5 .. .. 2.6 5.8 1.5 8.5 25.2 19.0 5.8 9.7 26.5 14.9 2.8 LBR
MDG Madagascar 3-5 11.3 10.7 .. .. 2.5 10.0 14.0 8.4 7.5 15.6 39.8 27.6 2.7 MDG
MWI Malawi 3-5 .. .. 3.4 5.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 69.1b 41.7b 5.4 MWI
MLI Mali 3-6 3.9 3.7 1.6 1.5 0.4 2.7 10.8 16.4 0.8 2.2 41.3 19.3 4.8 MLI
MRT Mauritania 3-5 .. .. 2.7 4.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 35.4 26.2 3.7 MRT
MUS Mauritius 3-4 97.5 100.0 7.7 8.8 2.8 13 8.3 2.7 8.3 14.4 19.8 14.7 3.5 MUS
MOZ Mozambique 3-5 .. .. 0.8 1.7 3.4 10.1 7.3 7.0 3.5 5.9 54.5 31.2b 5.0 MOZ
NAM Namibia 5-6 15.4 15.2 6.3 6.1 0.9 5.0 14.9 11.6 8.6 11.5 29.8 24.6 8.4 NAM
NER Niger 4-6 5.1 4.9 0.8 2.0 1.6 1.6 3.7 6.4 3.3 14.1 38.8 34.7 4.4 NER
NGA Nigeria 3-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 37.6b 33.1 .. NGA
PRE-PRIMARYa ATTAINMENT FIELD OF STUDY OF TERTIARY STUDENTS (SELECT STUDY AREAS)a RESOURCES OF EDUCATION SYSTEMa
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Official ageж Net pre-primary enrollment,  2005-2014
Mean years of schooling of population 
aged 25 and above,  
2010
Engineering, Manufacturing 
and Construction,  
2006-2013
Humanities and Arts,             
2006-2013
Sciences,  
2006-2013
Pupil-teacher ratio,             
2006-2014
Public 
expenditure 
on education, 
2005-2014
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
2014
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Primary Secondary
(% of GDP)
(% of pre-primary age population) (% aged 25 years and older) (% of all students) (Ratio)
RWA Rwanda 4-6 11.5 10.9 3.3 3.7 3.2 7.3 3.5 6.7 9.7 16.5 59.8 22.8 5.1 RWA
STP São Tomé and Príncipe 3-5 43.0 40.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31.4 19.8 9.5 STP
SEN Senegal 4-6 10.4 9.2 1.8 3.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 31.6 27.4c 5.6 SEN
SYC Seychelles 4-5 96.1 98.7 .. .. .. .. 9.3 .. 3.6 40.0 12.6 12.2 3.6 SYC
SLE Sierra Leone 3-5 7.2 6.7 2.2 4.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 34.8 20.7 2.9 SLE
SOM Somalia 3-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 35.5 19.3 .. SOM
ZAF South Africa 6 .. .. 9.3 9.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 28.7 25.0 6.6 ZAF
SSD South Sudan 3-5 3.5 3.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 49.9b .. .. SSD
SDN Sudan 4-5 .. .. 2.5 3.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 46.1 31.1b .. SDN
SWZ Swaziland 3-5 18.1b 17.9b 3.9 4.2 2.2 11.6 9.8 6.7 4.2 9.7 29.1 16.3 8.3 SWZ
TGO Togo 3-5 14.6 14.1 2.9 6.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 41.3 26.2 4.5 TGO
UGA Uganda 3-5 13.9 13.3 4.5 6.3 .. .. .. 5.1 .. .. 45.6 21.3b 3.3 UGA
TZA United Republic of Tanzania 5-6 31.6 31.1 4.5 5.8 2.2 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.2 6.0 43.4b 26.4 6.2 TZA
ZMB Zambia 3-6 .. .. 5.8 7.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 47.9b .. 1.3 ZMB
ZWE Zimbabwe 3-5 23.9b 22.9b 6.7 7.7 5.9 18.4 12.7 11.0 5.5 11.3 35.9 22.4 2.5 ZWE
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia — 54.3 54.7 10.6 10.7 — — 11.4 6.3 6.1 8.8 17.5 12.1 4.2
Developed Regions — 77.9 78.4 11.8 12.1 — — 16.1 12.1 6.4 12.6 14.5 13.1 5.3
East Asia and the Pacific — 44.0 44.2 6.8 7.8 — — — — — — 20.3 17.0 —
Latin America and the Caribbean — 67.6 66.7 8.1 8.6 — — — — — — 23.7 18.3 5.5
Middle East and North Africa — 22.3 23.7 5.2 7.3 — — 25.2 15.0 9.3 — 22.8 — 4.5
South Asia — — — 3.9 5.7 — — — — — — 36.1 26.0 3.3
Sub-Saharan Africa — 17.3 16.2 4.3 5.9 — — — — — — 43.0 27.3 5.6
World — 42.9 43.2 7.3 8.2 — — — — — — 29.9 21.1 5.1
Source:
Columns 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13: UIS 2015.
Columns 4 and 5: Barro and Lee 2015.
Column 14: World Bank 2015d.
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PRE-PRIMARYa ATTAINMENT FIELD OF STUDY OF TERTIARY STUDENTS (SELECT STUDY AREAS)a RESOURCES OF EDUCATION SYSTEMa
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Official ageж Net pre-primary enrollment,  2005-2014
Mean years of schooling of population 
aged 25 and above,  
2010
Engineering, Manufacturing 
and Construction,  
2006-2013
Humanities and Arts,             
2006-2013
Sciences,  
2006-2013
Pupil-teacher ratio,             
2006-2014
Public 
expenditure 
on education, 
2005-2014
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
2014
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Primary Secondary
(% of GDP)
(% of pre-primary age population) (% aged 25 years and older) (% of all students) (Ratio)
RWA Rwanda 4-6 11.5 10.9 3.3 3.7 3.2 7.3 3.5 6.7 9.7 16.5 59.8 22.8 5.1 RWA
STP São Tomé and Príncipe 3-5 43.0 40.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31.4 19.8 9.5 STP
SEN Senegal 4-6 10.4 9.2 1.8 3.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 31.6 27.4c 5.6 SEN
SYC Seychelles 4-5 96.1 98.7 .. .. .. .. 9.3 .. 3.6 40.0 12.6 12.2 3.6 SYC
SLE Sierra Leone 3-5 7.2 6.7 2.2 4.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 34.8 20.7 2.9 SLE
SOM Somalia 3-5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 35.5 19.3 .. SOM
ZAF South Africa 6 .. .. 9.3 9.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 28.7 25.0 6.6 ZAF
SSD South Sudan 3-5 3.5 3.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 49.9b .. .. SSD
SDN Sudan 4-5 .. .. 2.5 3.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 46.1 31.1b .. SDN
SWZ Swaziland 3-5 18.1b 17.9b 3.9 4.2 2.2 11.6 9.8 6.7 4.2 9.7 29.1 16.3 8.3 SWZ
TGO Togo 3-5 14.6 14.1 2.9 6.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 41.3 26.2 4.5 TGO
UGA Uganda 3-5 13.9 13.3 4.5 6.3 .. .. .. 5.1 .. .. 45.6 21.3b 3.3 UGA
TZA United Republic of Tanzania 5-6 31.6 31.1 4.5 5.8 2.2 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.2 6.0 43.4b 26.4 6.2 TZA
ZMB Zambia 3-6 .. .. 5.8 7.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 47.9b .. 1.3 ZMB
ZWE Zimbabwe 3-5 23.9b 22.9b 6.7 7.7 5.9 18.4 12.7 11.0 5.5 11.3 35.9 22.4 2.5 ZWE
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia — 54.3 54.7 10.6 10.7 — — 11.4 6.3 6.1 8.8 17.5 12.1 4.2
Developed Regions — 77.9 78.4 11.8 12.1 — — 16.1 12.1 6.4 12.6 14.5 13.1 5.3
East Asia and the Pacific — 44.0 44.2 6.8 7.8 — — — — — — 20.3 17.0 —
Latin America and the Caribbean — 67.6 66.7 8.1 8.6 — — — — — — 23.7 18.3 5.5
Middle East and North Africa — 22.3 23.7 5.2 7.3 — — 25.2 15.0 9.3 — 22.8 — 4.5
South Asia — — — 3.9 5.7 — — — — — — 36.1 26.0 3.3
Sub-Saharan Africa — 17.3 16.2 4.3 5.9 — — — — — — 43.0 27.3 5.6
World — 42.9 43.2 7.3 8.2 — — — — — — 29.9 21.1 5.1
Notes:
“..” indicates that data are not available. 
“—”	indicates	where	average	is	not	applicable	or	where	available	data	are	insufficient	to	derive	average.		
Ψ.	 ISO	country	code	refers	to	the	three	letter	standard	for	the	representation	of	names	of	countries	published	by	the	International	Organization	for	Standardization.	
ж. Age at which students would enter pre-primary education level. The lowest value is the official entrance age; the upper bound is an estimate based on the theoretical duration of pre-primary 
level of education.
a. Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified. 
b. Estimate based on UIS 2015.
c. National estimate.
d. Refers to 2011.
e. Refers to a period earlier than specified.
LAWS MANDATING GENDER EQUALITY MATERNITY AND PATERNITY LEAVE TIME USEa
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Equal 
remuneration 
for  work of 
equal value
Non-
discrimination 
based on 
gender in 
hiring
Banning sexual 
harassment in 
employment
Minimum  
length of paid 
maternity 
leave
Wages 
paid during 
maternity 
leave
Funding for 
maternity leave
Minimum 
length of 
paternity 
leave Survey 
year
Age 
group
Unpaid care and domestic work Paid work Total work
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
2014
2013 Female Male Female Male Female Male
(in weeks) (% of total wage) Source (in  days) (minutes per day) (minutes per day) (minutes per day)
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
ALB Albania No Yes Yesc 52 80b Social insurance 0 2010-11 20–74 347 46 129 281 476 327 ALB
ARM Armenia Yes No Yesd 20 100 Social insurance 0 2008 15–80 296 53 88 261 384 314 ARM
AZE Azerbaijan Yes Yes Yesd 18 100 Social insurance 14 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AZE
BLR Belarus Yes No No 18 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BLR
BIH Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Yes Yes Yes 52 50e Social insurance 7f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BIH
BGR Bulgaria Yes No Yesc 32 90 Social insurance 15f 2009-10 20-74 284 139 152 204 436 343 BGR
HRV Croatia Yes Yes Yes 58 100g Social insurance 7f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HRV
CYP Cyprus .. .. Yes 18 75 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CYP
CZE Czech Republic Yes Yes Yesc 28 70 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CZE
EST Estonia No Yes Yesd 20 100 Social insurance 10f 2009-10 20-74 242 147 179 235 421 382 EST
GEO Georgia No No Yesd 18 100 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GEO
HUN Hungary Yes Yes Yesd 24 70 Social insurance 5 2009-10 20-74 285 153 132 201 417 354 HUN
KAZ Kazakhstan No Yes No 18 100 Social insurance 5 2012 10+ 246 110 133 203 379 313 KAZ
KGZ Kyrgyzstan Yes No No 18 7x min wgh Social insurance .. 2005 20–74 342 139 210 353 552 492 KGZ
LVA Latvia Yes No Yesd 16 80 Social insurance 10f  2003 20–74 236 110 209 300 445 410 LVA
LTU Lithuania No No Yesd 18 100 Social insurance 30f 2003 20–74 269 129 211 284 480 413 LTU
MNE Montenegro Yes Yes .. 52 100 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MNE
POL Poland Yes No Yesc 26 100 Social insurance 14f 2003-04 15-64 296 157 136 234 432 391 POL
MDA Republic of Moldova Yes Yes Yesd 18 100 Social insurance 0 2011-12i 20-74 305 168 187 246 492 414 MDA
ROU Romania No Yes Yesd 18 85 Social insurance 5f 2011-12 20-74 294 134 124 199 418 333 ROU
RUS Russian Federation No No Noj 20 100k Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. RUS
SRB Serbia No Yes Yesc 20 100 Social insurance 7f 2010-11l 15+ 291 136 129 227 420 363 SRB
SVK Slovakia No Yes Yesd 34 65 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SVK
SVN Slovenia No Yes Yesc 15 100 Social insurance 90m 2000-01 15-64 286 166 169 236 455 402 SVN
TJK Tajikistan Yes Yes No 20 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TJK
MKD The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
No Yes Yesc 39 100 Social insurance .. 2009 20–74 281 87 120 216 401 303 MKD
TUR Turkey No No Yesc 16 67 Social insurance 0 2006 15-64 377 116 73 282 450 398 TUR
TKM Turkmenistan .. .. No 16 100 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TKM
UKR Ukraine No Yes Yesd 18 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. UKR
UZB Uzbekistan No No Yesd 18 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. UZB
Developed Regions Developed Regions
AND Andorra .. .. .. 16 100 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AND
AUS Australia Yes Yes Yesd 52 ..n Social insurance 14o 2006 15+ 311 172 128 248 439 420 AUS
AUT Austria No No Yes 16 100 Social insurance 0 2008-09 15-64 327 135 195 307 522 442 AUT
BEL Belgium Yes Yes Yes 15 82p Social insurance 10 2005 15-64 245 151 125 202 370 353 BEL
CAN Canada Yes Yes Yes 17 55k Social insurance 0 2010 15+ 257 170 180 255 437 425 CAN
DNK Denmark Yes No Yes 18 100 Mixed 14f 2001 15-64 243 186 147 211 390 397 DNK
FIN Finland No No Yes 18 70k Social insurance 54 2009-10 15-64 232 159 159 199 391 358 FIN
FRA France No Yes Yes 16 100k Social insurance 11f 2009 15-64 233 143 116 173 349 316 FRA
DEU Germany No Yes Yesc 14 100 Mixed 0 2001-02 15-64 269 164 134 222 403 386 DEU
GRC Greece Yes Yes Yes 17 100 Social insurance 2f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GRC
ISL Iceland No No Yes 13 80q Social insurance 90 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ISL
IRL Ireland Yes Yes Yes 42 80r Social insurance 0 2005 15-64 296 129 142 280 438 409 IRL
ISR Israel No No Yes 14 100k Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ISR
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group
Unpaid care and domestic work Paid work Total work
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
2014
2013 Female Male Female Male Female Male
(in weeks) (% of total wage) Source (in  days) (minutes per day) (minutes per day) (minutes per day)
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
ALB Albania No Yes Yesc 52 80b Social insurance 0 2010-11 20–74 347 46 129 281 476 327 ALB
ARM Armenia Yes No Yesd 20 100 Social insurance 0 2008 15–80 296 53 88 261 384 314 ARM
AZE Azerbaijan Yes Yes Yesd 18 100 Social insurance 14 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AZE
BLR Belarus Yes No No 18 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BLR
BIH Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Yes Yes Yes 52 50e Social insurance 7f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BIH
BGR Bulgaria Yes No Yesc 32 90 Social insurance 15f 2009-10 20-74 284 139 152 204 436 343 BGR
HRV Croatia Yes Yes Yes 58 100g Social insurance 7f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HRV
CYP Cyprus .. .. Yes 18 75 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CYP
CZE Czech Republic Yes Yes Yesc 28 70 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CZE
EST Estonia No Yes Yesd 20 100 Social insurance 10f 2009-10 20-74 242 147 179 235 421 382 EST
GEO Georgia No No Yesd 18 100 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GEO
HUN Hungary Yes Yes Yesd 24 70 Social insurance 5 2009-10 20-74 285 153 132 201 417 354 HUN
KAZ Kazakhstan No Yes No 18 100 Social insurance 5 2012 10+ 246 110 133 203 379 313 KAZ
KGZ Kyrgyzstan Yes No No 18 7x min wgh Social insurance .. 2005 20–74 342 139 210 353 552 492 KGZ
LVA Latvia Yes No Yesd 16 80 Social insurance 10f  2003 20–74 236 110 209 300 445 410 LVA
LTU Lithuania No No Yesd 18 100 Social insurance 30f 2003 20–74 269 129 211 284 480 413 LTU
MNE Montenegro Yes Yes .. 52 100 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MNE
POL Poland Yes No Yesc 26 100 Social insurance 14f 2003-04 15-64 296 157 136 234 432 391 POL
MDA Republic of Moldova Yes Yes Yesd 18 100 Social insurance 0 2011-12i 20-74 305 168 187 246 492 414 MDA
ROU Romania No Yes Yesd 18 85 Social insurance 5f 2011-12 20-74 294 134 124 199 418 333 ROU
RUS Russian Federation No No Noj 20 100k Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. RUS
SRB Serbia No Yes Yesc 20 100 Social insurance 7f 2010-11l 15+ 291 136 129 227 420 363 SRB
SVK Slovakia No Yes Yesd 34 65 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SVK
SVN Slovenia No Yes Yesc 15 100 Social insurance 90m 2000-01 15-64 286 166 169 236 455 402 SVN
TJK Tajikistan Yes Yes No 20 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TJK
MKD The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
No Yes Yesc 39 100 Social insurance .. 2009 20–74 281 87 120 216 401 303 MKD
TUR Turkey No No Yesc 16 67 Social insurance 0 2006 15-64 377 116 73 282 450 398 TUR
TKM Turkmenistan .. .. No 16 100 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TKM
UKR Ukraine No Yes Yesd 18 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. UKR
UZB Uzbekistan No No Yesd 18 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. UZB
Developed Regions Developed Regions
AND Andorra .. .. .. 16 100 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AND
AUS Australia Yes Yes Yesd 52 ..n Social insurance 14o 2006 15+ 311 172 128 248 439 420 AUS
AUT Austria No No Yes 16 100 Social insurance 0 2008-09 15-64 327 135 195 307 522 442 AUT
BEL Belgium Yes Yes Yes 15 82p Social insurance 10 2005 15-64 245 151 125 202 370 353 BEL
CAN Canada Yes Yes Yes 17 55k Social insurance 0 2010 15+ 257 170 180 255 437 425 CAN
DNK Denmark Yes No Yes 18 100 Mixed 14f 2001 15-64 243 186 147 211 390 397 DNK
FIN Finland No No Yes 18 70k Social insurance 54 2009-10 15-64 232 159 159 199 391 358 FIN
FRA France No Yes Yes 16 100k Social insurance 11f 2009 15-64 233 143 116 173 349 316 FRA
DEU Germany No Yes Yesc 14 100 Mixed 0 2001-02 15-64 269 164 134 222 403 386 DEU
GRC Greece Yes Yes Yes 17 100 Social insurance 2f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GRC
ISL Iceland No No Yes 13 80q Social insurance 90 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ISL
IRL Ireland Yes Yes Yes 42 80r Social insurance 0 2005 15-64 296 129 142 280 438 409 IRL
ISR Israel No No Yes 14 100k Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ISR
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maternity 
leave
Funding for 
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(in weeks) (% of total wage) Source (in  days) (minutes per day) (minutes per day) (minutes per day)
ITA Italy Yes No Yesd 22 80 Social insurance 1f 2008-09 15-64 315 104 135 268 450 372 ITA
JPN Japan No Yes Yesd 14 67 Social insurance 0 2011 15-64 299 62 178 375 477 437 JPN
LIE Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LIE
LUX Luxembourg .. .. Yes 16 100 Social insurance 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LUX
MLT Malta .. .. .. 18 100s Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MLT
MCO Monaco .. .. .. 16 90k Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MCO
NLD Netherlands Yes Yes Yes 16 100k Social insurance 2f 2011 20–74 212 133 123 226 335 359 NLD
NZL New Zealand No Yes Yes 14 100k Social insurance 14 2009-10 15-64 264 141 160 279 424 420 NZL
NOR Norway Yes Yes Yesc 35 100t Social insurance 14 2010 16-74 296 184 185 251 481 435 NOR
PRT Portugal Yes Yes Yes 17 100u Social insurance 20f 1999 15+ 302 77 160 269 462 346 PRT
SMR San Marino .. .. .. 22 100 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SMR
ESP Spain Yes Yes Yes 16 100 Social insurance 15f 2009-10 15-64 258 154 195 280 453 434 ESP
SWE Sweden No Yes Yesc 14 80 Social insurance 10f 2010-11 20-64 254 155 227 275 481 430 SWE
CHE Switzerland No Yes Yes 14 80k Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CHE
GBR United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes 52 90v Mixed 14w 2005 15-64 258 141 169 259 427 400 GBR
USA United States Yes Yes Yes 12 0x .. 0 2013 15+ 232 86 166 252 398 338 USA
East Asia and the Pacific East Asia and the Pacific
BRN Brunei Darussalam .. .. .. 9 100y Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BRN
KHM Cambodia Yes Yes Yesc 13 50 Employer 10f 2004 18–60 234 56 237 370 471 426 KHM
CHN China No Yes Yesc 14 100 Social insurance 0 2008 15–80 234 91 263 360 497 451 CHN
PRK Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea
.. .. Yesc .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PRK
FJI Fiji Yes Yes Yesc 12 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FJI
HKG Hong Kong, China 
(SAR)
No Yes Yesd 10 80 Mixed .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HKG
IDN Indonesia No No Yesd 13 100 Employer 2f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. IDN
KIR Kiribati .. .. .. 12 25 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KIR
LAO Lao People's 
Democratic Republic
Yes No Yesd 13 100 Social insurance 0 2002-03 10+ 150 36 270 312 420 348 LAO
MYS Malaysia No No Yesd 9 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MYS
MHL Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MHL
FSM Micronesia (Federated 
States of)
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FSM
MNG Mongolia No No Yesd 17 70 Social insurance 0 2011 12+ 290 139 238 348 528 487 MNG
MMR Myanmar .. .. Yesd 12 67 Social insurance 6f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MMR
NRU Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NRU
PLW Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PLW
PNG Papua New Guinea No No No .. 0 .. 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PNG
PHL Philippines Yes No Yesd 9 100 Social insurance 7f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PHL
KOR Republic of Korea Yes Yes Yes 13 100 Mixed 3 2009 15-64 227 45 167 282 394 327 KOR
WSM Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. WSM
SGP Singapore No No Yesd 16 100z Mixed 7f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SGP
SLB Solomon Islands .. .. .. 12 25 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SLB
THA Thailand No No Yesd 13 100aa Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. THA
TLS Timor-Leste .. .. Yesd .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TLS
TON Tonga .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TON
TUV Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TUV
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ITA Italy Yes No Yesd 22 80 Social insurance 1f 2008-09 15-64 315 104 135 268 450 372 ITA
JPN Japan No Yes Yesd 14 67 Social insurance 0 2011 15-64 299 62 178 375 477 437 JPN
LIE Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LIE
LUX Luxembourg .. .. Yes 16 100 Social insurance 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LUX
MLT Malta .. .. .. 18 100s Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MLT
MCO Monaco .. .. .. 16 90k Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MCO
NLD Netherlands Yes Yes Yes 16 100k Social insurance 2f 2011 20–74 212 133 123 226 335 359 NLD
NZL New Zealand No Yes Yes 14 100k Social insurance 14 2009-10 15-64 264 141 160 279 424 420 NZL
NOR Norway Yes Yes Yesc 35 100t Social insurance 14 2010 16-74 296 184 185 251 481 435 NOR
PRT Portugal Yes Yes Yes 17 100u Social insurance 20f 1999 15+ 302 77 160 269 462 346 PRT
SMR San Marino .. .. .. 22 100 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SMR
ESP Spain Yes Yes Yes 16 100 Social insurance 15f 2009-10 15-64 258 154 195 280 453 434 ESP
SWE Sweden No Yes Yesc 14 80 Social insurance 10f 2010-11 20-64 254 155 227 275 481 430 SWE
CHE Switzerland No Yes Yes 14 80k Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CHE
GBR United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes 52 90v Mixed 14w 2005 15-64 258 141 169 259 427 400 GBR
USA United States Yes Yes Yes 12 0x .. 0 2013 15+ 232 86 166 252 398 338 USA
East Asia and the Pacific East Asia and the Pacific
BRN Brunei Darussalam .. .. .. 9 100y Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BRN
KHM Cambodia Yes Yes Yesc 13 50 Employer 10f 2004 18–60 234 56 237 370 471 426 KHM
CHN China No Yes Yesc 14 100 Social insurance 0 2008 15–80 234 91 263 360 497 451 CHN
PRK Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea
.. .. Yesc .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PRK
FJI Fiji Yes Yes Yesc 12 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FJI
HKG Hong Kong, China 
(SAR)
No Yes Yesd 10 80 Mixed .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HKG
IDN Indonesia No No Yesd 13 100 Employer 2f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. IDN
KIR Kiribati .. .. .. 12 25 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KIR
LAO Lao People's 
Democratic Republic
Yes No Yesd 13 100 Social insurance 0 2002-03 10+ 150 36 270 312 420 348 LAO
MYS Malaysia No No Yesd 9 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MYS
MHL Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MHL
FSM Micronesia (Federated 
States of)
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FSM
MNG Mongolia No No Yesd 17 70 Social insurance 0 2011 12+ 290 139 238 348 528 487 MNG
MMR Myanmar .. .. Yesd 12 67 Social insurance 6f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MMR
NRU Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NRU
PLW Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PLW
PNG Papua New Guinea No No No .. 0 .. 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PNG
PHL Philippines Yes No Yesd 9 100 Social insurance 7f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PHL
KOR Republic of Korea Yes Yes Yes 13 100 Mixed 3 2009 15-64 227 45 167 282 394 327 KOR
WSM Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. WSM
SGP Singapore No No Yesd 16 100z Mixed 7f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SGP
SLB Solomon Islands .. .. .. 12 25 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SLB
THA Thailand No No Yesd 13 100aa Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. THA
TLS Timor-Leste .. .. Yesd .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TLS
TON Tonga .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TON
TUV Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TUV
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VUT Vanuatu .. .. .. 12 67 Employer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VUT
VNM Viet Nam Yes Yes Yesc 26 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VNM
Latin America and the Caribbean Latin America and the Caribbean
ATG Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. 13 100ab Mixed .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ATG
ARG Argentina Yes Yes Yesc 13 100 Social insurance 2f 2005ac 15-74 257 93 165 314 422 407 ARG
BHS Bahamas .. .. .. 12 100 Mixed 7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BHS
BRB Barbados .. .. .. 12 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BRB
BLZ Belize .. .. .. 14 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BLZ
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
Yes No Yes 13 95 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BOL
BRA Brazil Yes Yes Yes 17 100 Social insurance 5f 2012 15+ 202 52 170 316 372 368 BRA
CHL Chile No No Yes 18 100k Social insurance 5f 2007ad 12+ 241 86 148 273 389 359 CHL
COL Colombia No No Yes 14 100 Social insurance 8f 2012 15+ 276 85 179 374 455 459 COL
CRI Costa Rica No Yes Yesc 17 100 Mixed 0 2011 15+ 154 34 317 446 471 480 CRI
CUB Cuba .. .. Yes 18 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CUB
DMA Dominica .. .. .. 12 60 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DMA
DOM Dominican Republic No No Yesd 12 100 Mixed 2f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DOM
ECU Ecuador Yes Yes Yesc 12 100 Mixed 10f 2012 15+ 330 81 163 342 493 423 ECU
SLV El Salvador No Yes Yesc 12 75 Social insurance 3f 2010 10+ 147 321 450 496 597 817 SLV
GRD Grenada .. .. .. 13 100ae Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GRD
GTM Guatemala No Yes Noj 12 100 Mixed 2f 2011 15+ 418 82 132 431 550 513 GTM
GUY Guyana .. .. .. 13 70 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GUY
HTI Haiti No No No 12 100af Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HTI
HND Honduras No Yes Yes 12 100ag Mixed 0 2009 15+ 247 83 145 351 392 434 HND
JAM Jamaica No No No 12 100y Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. JAM
MEX Mexico No Yes Yesd 12 100 Social insurance 0 2009 15+ 406 123 170 391 576 514 MEX
NIC Nicaragua No Yes Yes 12 100 Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NIC
PAN Panama No No Yes 14 100 Social insurance 0 2011 15+ 288 119 199 356 487 475 PAN
PRY Paraguay Yes No Yes 12 50ah Social insurance 3f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PRY
PER Peru No No Yes 13 100 Social insurance 4f 2010 15+ 397 127 184 368 581 495 PER
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. 13 65 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KNA
LCA Saint Lucia .. .. .. 13 65 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LCA
VCT Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
.. .. .. 13 65 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VCT
SUR Suriname .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SUR
TTO Trinidad and Tobago .. .. No 13 100 Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TTO
URY Uruguay Yes Yes Yesc 12 100 Social insurance 3 2007 15+ 376 148 162 311 538 459 URY
VEN Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
No Yes Yes 26 100 Social insurance 14f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VEN
Middle East and North Africa Middle East and North Africa
DZA Algeria Yes No Yesd 14 100 Social insurance 3f 2012 12+ 312 54 30 198 342 252 DZA
BHR Bahrain .. .. Yesd 9 100ai Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BHR
EGY Egypt No No Noj 13 100 Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. EGY
IRQ Iraq .. .. Yesd 9 100 Employer 0 2007 10+ 347 240 28 234 375 474 IRQ
JOR Jordan No No Yesd 10 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. JOR
KWT Kuwait No No No 10 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KWT
LBN Lebanon No No No 7 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBN
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VUT Vanuatu .. .. .. 12 67 Employer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VUT
VNM Viet Nam Yes Yes Yesc 26 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VNM
Latin America and the Caribbean Latin America and the Caribbean
ATG Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. 13 100ab Mixed .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ATG
ARG Argentina Yes Yes Yesc 13 100 Social insurance 2f 2005ac 15-74 257 93 165 314 422 407 ARG
BHS Bahamas .. .. .. 12 100 Mixed 7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BHS
BRB Barbados .. .. .. 12 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BRB
BLZ Belize .. .. .. 14 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BLZ
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
Yes No Yes 13 95 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BOL
BRA Brazil Yes Yes Yes 17 100 Social insurance 5f 2012 15+ 202 52 170 316 372 368 BRA
CHL Chile No No Yes 18 100k Social insurance 5f 2007ad 12+ 241 86 148 273 389 359 CHL
COL Colombia No No Yes 14 100 Social insurance 8f 2012 15+ 276 85 179 374 455 459 COL
CRI Costa Rica No Yes Yesc 17 100 Mixed 0 2011 15+ 154 34 317 446 471 480 CRI
CUB Cuba .. .. Yes 18 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CUB
DMA Dominica .. .. .. 12 60 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DMA
DOM Dominican Republic No No Yesd 12 100 Mixed 2f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DOM
ECU Ecuador Yes Yes Yesc 12 100 Mixed 10f 2012 15+ 330 81 163 342 493 423 ECU
SLV El Salvador No Yes Yesc 12 75 Social insurance 3f 2010 10+ 147 321 450 496 597 817 SLV
GRD Grenada .. .. .. 13 100ae Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GRD
GTM Guatemala No Yes Noj 12 100 Mixed 2f 2011 15+ 418 82 132 431 550 513 GTM
GUY Guyana .. .. .. 13 70 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GUY
HTI Haiti No No No 12 100af Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. HTI
HND Honduras No Yes Yes 12 100ag Mixed 0 2009 15+ 247 83 145 351 392 434 HND
JAM Jamaica No No No 12 100y Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. JAM
MEX Mexico No Yes Yesd 12 100 Social insurance 0 2009 15+ 406 123 170 391 576 514 MEX
NIC Nicaragua No Yes Yes 12 100 Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NIC
PAN Panama No No Yes 14 100 Social insurance 0 2011 15+ 288 119 199 356 487 475 PAN
PRY Paraguay Yes No Yes 12 50ah Social insurance 3f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PRY
PER Peru No No Yes 13 100 Social insurance 4f 2010 15+ 397 127 184 368 581 495 PER
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. 13 65 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KNA
LCA Saint Lucia .. .. .. 13 65 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LCA
VCT Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
.. .. .. 13 65 Social insurance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VCT
SUR Suriname .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SUR
TTO Trinidad and Tobago .. .. No 13 100 Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TTO
URY Uruguay Yes Yes Yesc 12 100 Social insurance 3 2007 15+ 376 148 162 311 538 459 URY
VEN Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
No Yes Yes 26 100 Social insurance 14f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VEN
Middle East and North Africa Middle East and North Africa
DZA Algeria Yes No Yesd 14 100 Social insurance 3f 2012 12+ 312 54 30 198 342 252 DZA
BHR Bahrain .. .. Yesd 9 100ai Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BHR
EGY Egypt No No Noj 13 100 Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. EGY
IRQ Iraq .. .. Yesd 9 100 Employer 0 2007 10+ 347 240 28 234 375 474 IRQ
JOR Jordan No No Yesd 10 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. JOR
KWT Kuwait No No No 10 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KWT
LBN Lebanon No No No 7 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBN
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LBY Libya .. .. No 14 50aj Mixed 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBY
MAR Morocco Yes Yes Yesd 14 100 Social insurance 3f 2011-12 15+ 300 43 81 325 381 368 MAR
OMN Oman No No No 7 100 Employer .. 2007-08 15+ 274 115 58 187 332 302 OMN
QAT Qatar .. .. Yes 7 100 Employer 0 2012-13 15+ 199 110 120 229 319 339 QAT
SAU Saudi Arabia No No No 10 50ak Employer 1f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SAU
PSE State of Palestine No No No 10 100 Employer .. 2012-13 10+ 293 55 36 249 329 304 PSE
SYR Syrian Arab Republic No No Yesc 17 100 Employer 6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SYR
TUN Tunisia No No Yesd 4 67 Social insurance 1 2005-06 15+ 315 40 92al 257al 407 297 TUN
ARE United Arab Emirates No No Yesd 6 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ARE
YEM Yemen No No No 9 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. YEM
South Asia South Asia
AFG Afghanistan .. .. No 13 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AFG
BGD Bangladesh Yes No Yesc 16 100 Employer 10f 2012am 15+ 216 84 312 414 528 498 BGD
BTN Bhutan .. .. Yesc .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BTN
IND India No Yes Yes 12 100 Social insurance 0 1998-99 15-64 352 52 149 318 501 370 IND
IRN Iran (Islamic Republic 
of)
No No Yesd 13an 67ao Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. IRN
MDV Maldives .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MDV
NPL Nepal No No Yesd 7 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NPL
PAK Pakistan No No Yes 12 100 Employer 0 2007 10+ 287 28 78 321 365 349 PAK
LKA Sri Lanka No No Yesc 12 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LKA
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
AGO Angola Yes Yes No 13 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AGO
BEN Benin Yes Yes Yesc 14 90 Mixed 10f 1998 6–65 195 60 235 235 430 295 BEN
BWA Botswana No No Yesd 12 50 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BWA
BFA Burkina Faso Yes No Yesd 14 100 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BFA
BDI Burundi Yes Yes Yesc 12 100 Mixed 15ap .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BDI
CPV Cabo Verde .. .. .. 9 90 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CPV
CMR Cameroon No No Noj 14 100 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CMR
CAF Central African 
Republic
.. .. Yesd 14 50 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CAF
TCD Chad Yes Yes No 14 100 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TCD
COM Comoros .. .. .. 14 100 Employer 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. COM
COG Congo No No Yesd 15 100 Mixed 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. COG
CIV Côte d'Ivoire Yes Yes Yesc 14 100 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CIV
COD Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
No No Yes 14 67 Employer 2f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. COD
DJI Djibouti .. .. .. 14 100 Mixed 3f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DJI
GNQ Equatorial Guinea .. .. Yesd 12 75 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GNQ
ERI Eritrea .. .. Yesd 9 ..aq Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ERI
ETH Ethiopia No No Noj 13 100 Employer 5 2013 10+ 246 66 177 318 423 384 ETH
GAB Gabon No No Noj 14 100 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GAB
GMB Gambia .. .. No 12 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GMB
GHA Ghana No Yes No 12 100 Employer 0 2009 10+ 209 69 246 309 455 378 GHA
GIN Guinea Yes No No 14 100 Mixed 0 2002-03 15+ 177 78 154 222 331 300 GIN
GNB Guinea-Bissau .. .. No 9 100 Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GNB
KEN Kenya Yes No Yesc 13 100 Employer 14f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KEN
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LBY Libya .. .. No 14 50aj Mixed 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBY
MAR Morocco Yes Yes Yesd 14 100 Social insurance 3f 2011-12 15+ 300 43 81 325 381 368 MAR
OMN Oman No No No 7 100 Employer .. 2007-08 15+ 274 115 58 187 332 302 OMN
QAT Qatar .. .. Yes 7 100 Employer 0 2012-13 15+ 199 110 120 229 319 339 QAT
SAU Saudi Arabia No No No 10 50ak Employer 1f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SAU
PSE State of Palestine No No No 10 100 Employer .. 2012-13 10+ 293 55 36 249 329 304 PSE
SYR Syrian Arab Republic No No Yesc 17 100 Employer 6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SYR
TUN Tunisia No No Yesd 4 67 Social insurance 1 2005-06 15+ 315 40 92al 257al 407 297 TUN
ARE United Arab Emirates No No Yesd 6 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ARE
YEM Yemen No No No 9 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. YEM
South Asia South Asia
AFG Afghanistan .. .. No 13 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AFG
BGD Bangladesh Yes No Yesc 16 100 Employer 10f 2012am 15+ 216 84 312 414 528 498 BGD
BTN Bhutan .. .. Yesc .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BTN
IND India No Yes Yes 12 100 Social insurance 0 1998-99 15-64 352 52 149 318 501 370 IND
IRN Iran (Islamic Republic 
of)
No No Yesd 13an 67ao Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. IRN
MDV Maldives .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MDV
NPL Nepal No No Yesd 7 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NPL
PAK Pakistan No No Yes 12 100 Employer 0 2007 10+ 287 28 78 321 365 349 PAK
LKA Sri Lanka No No Yesc 12 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LKA
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
AGO Angola Yes Yes No 13 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AGO
BEN Benin Yes Yes Yesc 14 90 Mixed 10f 1998 6–65 195 60 235 235 430 295 BEN
BWA Botswana No No Yesd 12 50 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BWA
BFA Burkina Faso Yes No Yesd 14 100 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BFA
BDI Burundi Yes Yes Yesc 12 100 Mixed 15ap .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. BDI
CPV Cabo Verde .. .. .. 9 90 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CPV
CMR Cameroon No No Noj 14 100 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CMR
CAF Central African 
Republic
.. .. Yesd 14 50 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CAF
TCD Chad Yes Yes No 14 100 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TCD
COM Comoros .. .. .. 14 100 Employer 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. COM
COG Congo No No Yesd 15 100 Mixed 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. COG
CIV Côte d'Ivoire Yes Yes Yesc 14 100 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. CIV
COD Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
No No Yes 14 67 Employer 2f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. COD
DJI Djibouti .. .. .. 14 100 Mixed 3f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DJI
GNQ Equatorial Guinea .. .. Yesd 12 75 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GNQ
ERI Eritrea .. .. Yesd 9 ..aq Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ERI
ETH Ethiopia No No Noj 13 100 Employer 5 2013 10+ 246 66 177 318 423 384 ETH
GAB Gabon No No Noj 14 100 Social insurance 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GAB
GMB Gambia .. .. No 12 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GMB
GHA Ghana No Yes No 12 100 Employer 0 2009 10+ 209 69 246 309 455 378 GHA
GIN Guinea Yes No No 14 100 Mixed 0 2002-03 15+ 177 78 154 222 331 300 GIN
GNB Guinea-Bissau .. .. No 9 100 Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GNB
KEN Kenya Yes No Yesc 13 100 Employer 14f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KEN
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LSO Lesotho Yes No Yesd 12 100 Employer 0 2002-03 15+ 342 175 124 279 466 454 LSO
LBR Liberia No No Noj .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBR
MDG Madagascar Yes No Yes 14 100 Mixed 10f 2001 6–65 225 55 175 290 400 345 MDG
MWI Malawi Yes Yes Yesd 8 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MWI
MLI Mali No No No 14 100 Social insurance 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MLI
MRT Mauritania No Yes No 14 100 Social insurance 10 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MRT
MUS Mauritius Yes Yes Yesc 12 100 Employer 5 2003 10+ 277 73 116 296 393 369 MUS
MOZ Mozambique No No Yes 9 100 Social insurance 1ar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MOZ
NAM Namibia Yes Yes Yesd 12 100k Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NAM
NER Niger Yes Yes Yesc 14 100 Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NER
NGA Nigeria No No No 12 50 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NGA
RWA Rwanda No No Yes 12 100as Employer 4f 2010-11 16+ 231 77 205 265 436 342 RWA
STP São Tomé and Príncipe .. .. .. 9 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. STP
SEN Senegal No No Yesc 14 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SEN
SYC Seychelles .. .. .. 14 Flat rateat Social insurance 4f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SYC
SLE Sierra Leone No No Yesd 12 100 Employer .. 2003-04au 15+ 314 105 .. .. .. .. SLE
SOM Somalia .. .. No 14 50 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SOM
ZAF South Africa No No Yesd 17 60 Social insurance 3f 2000 15-64 257 92 127 207 384 299 ZAF
SSD South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SSD
SDN Sudan No No No 8 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SDN
SWZ Swaziland .. .. Noj 12 100av Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SWZ
TGO Togo Yes Yes Yes 14 100 Mixed 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TGO
UGA Uganda Yes No Yesc 10 100 Employer 4f 2009-10 14-64 223 188 256 308 479 496 UGA
TZA United Republic of 
Tanzania
Yes Yes Yesd 12 100 Social insurance 3f 2006 15+ 253 75 251 345 504 420 TZA
ZMB Zambia No No Yesd 12 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ZMB
ZWE Zimbabwe Yes Yes Yesd 14 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ZWE
“..” indicates that data are not available.
Ψ. ISO country code refers to the three letter standard for the representation of names of 
countries published by the International Organization for Standardization. 
a. The classification of unpaid care and domestic work activities differs across countries. 
Caution is thus needed in cross-country comparisons. Total work is the sum of unpaid care 
and domestic work and paid work. 
b. 80 per cent prior to birth up to 150 days after; 50 per cent for remainder.
c. There is specific legislation in place. The law is adequate overall, but there are reported 
problems of implementation.
d. There is specific legislation in place, but the law is inadequate.
e. The replacement rate varies depending on the various cantonal regulations: 50–80  per cent 
(Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina); 100 per cent (Republic of Srpska). The employer is 
reimbursed for initial payment.
f. 100 per cent.
g. 100 per cent until 6 months after birth, then a flat-rate benefit.
h. 7 times the minimum wage level.
i. Data excludes the territory of the Transnistria and municipality of Bender.
j. There is no specific legislation, but there is evidence of legislation being planned or drafted.
k. Up to a ceiling.
l. AP Kosovo and Metohija are excluded from this survey.
m. 100 per cent for first 15 days, and flat rate for the remaining.
n. 18 weeks paid at Federal minimum wage.
o. Paid at Federal minimum wage.
p. 82 per cent for the first 30 days; 75 per cent for the remainder (up to a ceiling).
q. 80 per cent up to a ceiling for 26 weeks.
r. For 26 weeks.
s. For 14 weeks.
t. Or 80 per cent for 45 weeks.
u. 100 per cent (or 80 per cent for 150 days).
v. 6 weeks at 90 per cent; lower of 90 per cent/flat rate for weeks 7–39; weeks 40–52 unpaid.
Notes:
Source:
Columns 1 and 2: World Bank 2015c.
Column 3: OECD 2015.
Columns 4-7: ILO 2014d.
Columns 8-15: UN Women compilation based on various sources. Sources available upon request.
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LAWS MANDATING GENDER EQUALITY MATERNITY AND PATERNITY LEAVE TIME USEa
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Equal 
remuneration 
for  work of 
equal value
Non-
discrimination 
based on 
gender in 
hiring
Banning sexual 
harassment in 
employment
Minimum  
length of paid 
maternity 
leave
Wages 
paid during 
maternity 
leave
Funding for 
maternity leave
Minimum 
length of 
paternity 
leave Survey 
year
Age 
group
Unpaid care and domestic work Paid work Total work
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
2014
2013 Female Male Female Male Female Male
(in weeks) (% of total wage) Source (in  days) (minutes per day) (minutes per day) (minutes per day)
LSO Lesotho Yes No Yesd 12 100 Employer 0 2002-03 15+ 342 175 124 279 466 454 LSO
LBR Liberia No No Noj .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LBR
MDG Madagascar Yes No Yes 14 100 Mixed 10f 2001 6–65 225 55 175 290 400 345 MDG
MWI Malawi Yes Yes Yesd 8 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MWI
MLI Mali No No No 14 100 Social insurance 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MLI
MRT Mauritania No Yes No 14 100 Social insurance 10 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MRT
MUS Mauritius Yes Yes Yesc 12 100 Employer 5 2003 10+ 277 73 116 296 393 369 MUS
MOZ Mozambique No No Yes 9 100 Social insurance 1ar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MOZ
NAM Namibia Yes Yes Yesd 12 100k Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NAM
NER Niger Yes Yes Yesc 14 100 Mixed 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NER
NGA Nigeria No No No 12 50 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NGA
RWA Rwanda No No Yes 12 100as Employer 4f 2010-11 16+ 231 77 205 265 436 342 RWA
STP São Tomé and Príncipe .. .. .. 9 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. STP
SEN Senegal No No Yesc 14 100 Social insurance 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SEN
SYC Seychelles .. .. .. 14 Flat rateat Social insurance 4f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SYC
SLE Sierra Leone No No Yesd 12 100 Employer .. 2003-04au 15+ 314 105 .. .. .. .. SLE
SOM Somalia .. .. No 14 50 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SOM
ZAF South Africa No No Yesd 17 60 Social insurance 3f 2000 15-64 257 92 127 207 384 299 ZAF
SSD South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SSD
SDN Sudan No No No 8 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SDN
SWZ Swaziland .. .. Noj 12 100av Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SWZ
TGO Togo Yes Yes Yes 14 100 Mixed 10f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. TGO
UGA Uganda Yes No Yesc 10 100 Employer 4f 2009-10 14-64 223 188 256 308 479 496 UGA
TZA United Republic of 
Tanzania
Yes Yes Yesd 12 100 Social insurance 3f 2006 15+ 253 75 251 345 504 420 TZA
ZMB Zambia No No Yesd 12 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ZMB
ZWE Zimbabwe Yes Yes Yesd 14 100 Employer 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ZWE
w. 90 per cent of average weekly earning.
x. United States: provisions for paid maternity leave benefits exist in 5 states: New York, New Jersey, 
California, Hawaii and Rhode Island. For instance, California provides 6 weeks at 55 per cent of 
previous earnings.”
y. For 8 weeks.
z. For first 2 births.
aa. 100 per cent for first 45 days (employer); 50 per cent for last 45 days (social insurance).
ab. 100 per cent for 6 weeks; 60 per cent for 7 weeks.
ac. Only for Greater Buenos Aires.
ad. Only for Greater Santiago.
ae. 100 per cent for 2 months; 65 per cent for last month.
af. For 6 weeks.
ag. For 10 weeks.
ah. For 9 weeks.
ai. 100 per cent for 45 days.
aj. 100 per cent for self-employed women for 13 weeks.
ak. Between 50 and 100 per cent.
al. Includes looking for work.
am. Pilot survey. Data refer to employed only.
an. For 13 weeks; 17 weeks if breastfeeding.
ao. For 12 weeks.
ap. Paid 50 per cent.
aq. Amount unidentified.
ar. Biennially.
as. First 6 weeks and 20 per cent thereafter.
at. Flat rate monthly benefit for 12 weeks.
au. Urban only.
av. For 2 weeks only.
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATEЖ UNEMPLOYMENT RATEΦ YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE¥
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION  
(SELECT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS)a
NON-AGRICULTURAL 
INFORMAL 
EMPLOYMENTa
UNADJUSTED 
GENDER PAY 
GAP*, a
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Managerial. 
professional and 
technical positions
Clerical. services 
and sales 
workers
Plant and 
machine 
operators
Female Male
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ1990 2013 1990 2013 2013 2013 2000-2013 2004-2010 2008-2014
(% aged 15 years and older) (% of total labour force 15 years and older)
(% of total labour force 
aged 15-24) (Female as % of total employment)
(% of total non-agricultural 
employment) (%)
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
ALB Albania 53.2 44.9 74.7 65.5 13.8 17.6 24.1 32.0 52.8 37.4 32.4 .. .. 11.5b ALB
ARM Armenia 60.0 54.2 77.1 72.6 17.5 15.2 39.1 29.6 54.3 53.3 3.9 12.7 24.8 34.4c ARM
AZE Azerbaijan 54.0 62.9 70.7 69.6 6.6 4.4 15.8 13.3 58.1 58.4 8.1 .. .. 52.5d AZE
BLR Belarus 60.4 50.1 75.3 63.1 4.3 7.3 12.6 12.0 63.3 77.6 18.4 .. .. 25.5d BLR
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina 35.8 34.1 57.5 57.3 30.9 26.8 61.5 59.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. BIH
BGR Bulgaria 54.9 47.9 62.7 59.0 11.9 13.8 26.4 31.7 55.3 62.2 25.9 .. .. 20.6c, d BGR
HRV Croatia 46.5 44.7 68.5 58.4 16.8 18.4 51.7 51.4 49.3 63.7 25.6 .. .. 10.0c, d HRV
CYP Cyprus 40.8 56.0 70.8 71.1 14.9 16.5 34.7 38.5 46.6 62.9 7.4 .. .. 18.2c, d CYP
CZE Czech Republic 51.6 51.1 70.6 68.3 8.2 5.9 19.2 18.6 45.0 70.8 24.2 .. .. 21.5d, e CZE
EST Estonia 63.0 56.2 76.6 68.9 8.3 9.3 19.4 17.3 54.9 76.0 27.1 .. .. 25.6f EST
GEO Georgia 55.1 56.5 74.5 75.1 13.2 15.2 34.8 28.7 57.4 55.7 2.0 .. .. 36.4c GEO
HUN Hungary 46.2 44.8 64.4 60.0 10.2 10.1 28.1 26.1 55.5 63.8 30.1 .. .. 21.6c, d HUN
KAZ Kazakhstan 62.4 67.7 78.0 77.9 6.3 4.1 5.1 3.9 58.1 63.4 11.3 .. .. 36.2 KAZ
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 58.4 56.0 74.3 79.5 9.2 7.2  18.2 13.8 60.2 53.8 18.3 47.4 62.8 26.7d KGZ
LVA Latvia 62.6 54.9 76.7 67.6 10.5 11.8 21.7 19.1 58.8 75.3 10.5 .. .. 16.8d LVA
LTU Lithuania 59.4 55.8 74.4 67.3 10.5 13.1 20.4 23.0 60.8 73.6 21.8 .. .. 14.3e LTU
MNE Montenegro 44.7 43.0 63.2 57.3 20.8 19.0 40.5 41.9 47.5 54.8 7.1 .. .. .. MNE
POL Poland 55.2 48.9 72.1 64.9 11.1 9.7 29.9 25.2 54.9 63.5 13.3 .. .. 15.0c POL
MDA Republic of Moldova 61.1 37.6 74.2 44.2 3.9 6.2 13.1 16.1 58.3 73.3 7.9 11.4 20.8 11.6g MDA
ROU Romania 51.6 48.7 66.8 64.9 6.6 7.9 24.2 23.5 54.8 62.1 24.6 .. .. 7.8d ROU
RUS Russian Federation 59.6 57.1 76.3 71.7 5.2 5.9 14.9 14.1 58.8 72.9 10.7 .. .. 25.8c, e RUS
SRB Serbia 44.3 44.5 67.3 60.9 26.0 19.2 56.2 44.2 52.3 54.6 11.0 4.3 7.5 11.7c SRB
SVK Slovakia 58.9 51.1 72.1 68.6 14.5 13.9 31.3 34.9 51.8 65.6 23.9 .. .. 22.5d SVK
SVN Slovenia 47.8 52.3 59.9 63.2 11.2 9.4 24.4 21.6 52.3 59.9 28.3 .. .. 4.6d, e, h SVN
TJK Tajikistan 58.1 58.9 75.6 77.1 9.6 11.5 12.4 17.7 .. .. .. .. .. 50.9b TJK
MKD The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
42.6 43.1 66.9 67.5 28.9 29.0 51.0 52.9 46.6 43.2 40.8 8.1 15.2 6.3d MKD
TUR Turkey 34.1 29.4 80.8 70.8 11.9 9.1 23.6 18.7 30.8 31.2 10.8 31.3 29.7 7.1c, d TUR
TKM Turkmenistan 46.4 46.9 74.8 76.9 10.7 10.5 21.6 19.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. TKM
UKR Ukraine 56.1 53.2 70.7 66.9 6.7 9.0 16.4 18.8 57.8 71.0 18.2 6.4 12.4 22.8c, d UKR
UZB Uzbekistan 46.2 48.1 73.3 75.6 10.9 10.5 22.0 19.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. UZB
Developed Regions Developed Regions
AND Andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AND
AUS Australia 52.3 58.8 75.7 71.8 5.6 5.7 11.3 13.0 49.3 71.7 13.4 .. .. 35.4i AUS
AUT Austria 43.0 54.6 69.7 67.7 4.9 4.9 9.5 8.8 46.3 69.0 14.2 .. .. 38.1d AUT
BEL Belgium 36.6 47.5 61.1 59.3 8.1 8.6 21.8 24.1 47.2 64.9 13.7 .. .. 22.7j BEL
CAN Canada 57.9 61.6 76.0 71.0 6.6 7.5 12.3 15.1 53.2 68.4 16.1 .. .. 24.4c CAN
DNK Denmark 61.5 58.7 75.3 66.4 7.3 6.7 11.8 14.1 50.6 65.6 16.7 .. .. 15f, k DNK
FIN Finland 58.8 55.7 71.8 64.0 7.5 8.8 17.5 21.5 50.3 73.8 14.8 .. .. 21.9d, l FIN
FRA France 46.1 50.7 65.2 61.6 10.4 10.4 25.0 22.7 46.2 70.3 18.4 .. .. 18.6d, g FRA
DEU Germany 43.4 53.6 69.6 66.4 4.9 5.6 7.0 8.5 48.5 64.4 14.6 .. .. 19.3e DEU
GRC Greece 36.0 44.2 66.8 62.5 31.3 24.3 64.4 53.5 47.2 50.2 9.0 .. .. 23.3e GRC
ISL Iceland 67.7 70.5 81.9 77.4 5.2 5.9 8.2 14.1 52.3 65.7 11.6 .. .. 23.1e ISL
IRL Ireland 35.5 53.1 70.6 68.1 10.8 15.0 23.4 29.7 48.5 70.8 14.9 .. .. 27.3f, l, m, n IRL
ISR Israel 41.3 57.9 62.6 69.1 6.3 6.2 10.8 10.6 51.3 64.4 9.8 .. .. 33.9d ISR
ITA Italy 35.1 39.6 66.5 59.5 13.1 11.6 41.0 38.7 43.0 61.3 18.8 .. .. 20o ITA
JPN Japan 50.1 48.8 77.2 70.4 3.7 4.3 5.9 7.6 36.0 59.9p 18.9q .. .. 28.6e JPN
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LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATEЖ UNEMPLOYMENT RATEΦ YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE¥
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION  
(SELECT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS)a
NON-AGRICULTURAL 
INFORMAL 
EMPLOYMENTa
UNADJUSTED 
GENDER PAY 
GAP*, a
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Managerial. 
professional and 
technical positions
Clerical. services 
and sales 
workers
Plant and 
machine 
operators
Female Male
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ1990 2013 1990 2013 2013 2013 2000-2013 2004-2010 2008-2014
(% aged 15 years and older) (% of total labour force 15 years and older)
(% of total labour force 
aged 15-24) (Female as % of total employment)
(% of total non-agricultural 
employment) (%)
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
ALB Albania 53.2 44.9 74.7 65.5 13.8 17.6 24.1 32.0 52.8 37.4 32.4 .. .. 11.5b ALB
ARM Armenia 60.0 54.2 77.1 72.6 17.5 15.2 39.1 29.6 54.3 53.3 3.9 12.7 24.8 34.4c ARM
AZE Azerbaijan 54.0 62.9 70.7 69.6 6.6 4.4 15.8 13.3 58.1 58.4 8.1 .. .. 52.5d AZE
BLR Belarus 60.4 50.1 75.3 63.1 4.3 7.3 12.6 12.0 63.3 77.6 18.4 .. .. 25.5d BLR
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina 35.8 34.1 57.5 57.3 30.9 26.8 61.5 59.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. BIH
BGR Bulgaria 54.9 47.9 62.7 59.0 11.9 13.8 26.4 31.7 55.3 62.2 25.9 .. .. 20.6c, d BGR
HRV Croatia 46.5 44.7 68.5 58.4 16.8 18.4 51.7 51.4 49.3 63.7 25.6 .. .. 10.0c, d HRV
CYP Cyprus 40.8 56.0 70.8 71.1 14.9 16.5 34.7 38.5 46.6 62.9 7.4 .. .. 18.2c, d CYP
CZE Czech Republic 51.6 51.1 70.6 68.3 8.2 5.9 19.2 18.6 45.0 70.8 24.2 .. .. 21.5d, e CZE
EST Estonia 63.0 56.2 76.6 68.9 8.3 9.3 19.4 17.3 54.9 76.0 27.1 .. .. 25.6f EST
GEO Georgia 55.1 56.5 74.5 75.1 13.2 15.2 34.8 28.7 57.4 55.7 2.0 .. .. 36.4c GEO
HUN Hungary 46.2 44.8 64.4 60.0 10.2 10.1 28.1 26.1 55.5 63.8 30.1 .. .. 21.6c, d HUN
KAZ Kazakhstan 62.4 67.7 78.0 77.9 6.3 4.1 5.1 3.9 58.1 63.4 11.3 .. .. 36.2 KAZ
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 58.4 56.0 74.3 79.5 9.2 7.2  18.2 13.8 60.2 53.8 18.3 47.4 62.8 26.7d KGZ
LVA Latvia 62.6 54.9 76.7 67.6 10.5 11.8 21.7 19.1 58.8 75.3 10.5 .. .. 16.8d LVA
LTU Lithuania 59.4 55.8 74.4 67.3 10.5 13.1 20.4 23.0 60.8 73.6 21.8 .. .. 14.3e LTU
MNE Montenegro 44.7 43.0 63.2 57.3 20.8 19.0 40.5 41.9 47.5 54.8 7.1 .. .. .. MNE
POL Poland 55.2 48.9 72.1 64.9 11.1 9.7 29.9 25.2 54.9 63.5 13.3 .. .. 15.0c POL
MDA Republic of Moldova 61.1 37.6 74.2 44.2 3.9 6.2 13.1 16.1 58.3 73.3 7.9 11.4 20.8 11.6g MDA
ROU Romania 51.6 48.7 66.8 64.9 6.6 7.9 24.2 23.5 54.8 62.1 24.6 .. .. 7.8d ROU
RUS Russian Federation 59.6 57.1 76.3 71.7 5.2 5.9 14.9 14.1 58.8 72.9 10.7 .. .. 25.8c, e RUS
SRB Serbia 44.3 44.5 67.3 60.9 26.0 19.2 56.2 44.2 52.3 54.6 11.0 4.3 7.5 11.7c SRB
SVK Slovakia 58.9 51.1 72.1 68.6 14.5 13.9 31.3 34.9 51.8 65.6 23.9 .. .. 22.5d SVK
SVN Slovenia 47.8 52.3 59.9 63.2 11.2 9.4 24.4 21.6 52.3 59.9 28.3 .. .. 4.6d, e, h SVN
TJK Tajikistan 58.1 58.9 75.6 77.1 9.6 11.5 12.4 17.7 .. .. .. .. .. 50.9b TJK
MKD The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
42.6 43.1 66.9 67.5 28.9 29.0 51.0 52.9 46.6 43.2 40.8 8.1 15.2 6.3d MKD
TUR Turkey 34.1 29.4 80.8 70.8 11.9 9.1 23.6 18.7 30.8 31.2 10.8 31.3 29.7 7.1c, d TUR
TKM Turkmenistan 46.4 46.9 74.8 76.9 10.7 10.5 21.6 19.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. TKM
UKR Ukraine 56.1 53.2 70.7 66.9 6.7 9.0 16.4 18.8 57.8 71.0 18.2 6.4 12.4 22.8c, d UKR
UZB Uzbekistan 46.2 48.1 73.3 75.6 10.9 10.5 22.0 19.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. UZB
Developed Regions Developed Regions
AND Andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. AND
AUS Australia 52.3 58.8 75.7 71.8 5.6 5.7 11.3 13.0 49.3 71.7 13.4 .. .. 35.4i AUS
AUT Austria 43.0 54.6 69.7 67.7 4.9 4.9 9.5 8.8 46.3 69.0 14.2 .. .. 38.1d AUT
BEL Belgium 36.6 47.5 61.1 59.3 8.1 8.6 21.8 24.1 47.2 64.9 13.7 .. .. 22.7j BEL
CAN Canada 57.9 61.6 76.0 71.0 6.6 7.5 12.3 15.1 53.2 68.4 16.1 .. .. 24.4c CAN
DNK Denmark 61.5 58.7 75.3 66.4 7.3 6.7 11.8 14.1 50.6 65.6 16.7 .. .. 15f, k DNK
FIN Finland 58.8 55.7 71.8 64.0 7.5 8.8 17.5 21.5 50.3 73.8 14.8 .. .. 21.9d, l FIN
FRA France 46.1 50.7 65.2 61.6 10.4 10.4 25.0 22.7 46.2 70.3 18.4 .. .. 18.6d, g FRA
DEU Germany 43.4 53.6 69.6 66.4 4.9 5.6 7.0 8.5 48.5 64.4 14.6 .. .. 19.3e DEU
GRC Greece 36.0 44.2 66.8 62.5 31.3 24.3 64.4 53.5 47.2 50.2 9.0 .. .. 23.3e GRC
ISL Iceland 67.7 70.5 81.9 77.4 5.2 5.9 8.2 14.1 52.3 65.7 11.6 .. .. 23.1e ISL
IRL Ireland 35.5 53.1 70.6 68.1 10.8 15.0 23.4 29.7 48.5 70.8 14.9 .. .. 27.3f, l, m, n IRL
ISR Israel 41.3 57.9 62.6 69.1 6.3 6.2 10.8 10.6 51.3 64.4 9.8 .. .. 33.9d ISR
ITA Italy 35.1 39.6 66.5 59.5 13.1 11.6 41.0 38.7 43.0 61.3 18.8 .. .. 20o ITA
JPN Japan 50.1 48.8 77.2 70.4 3.7 4.3 5.9 7.6 36.0 59.9p 18.9q .. .. 28.6e JPN
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATEЖ UNEMPLOYMENT RATEΦ YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE¥
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION  
(SELECT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS)a
NON-AGRICULTURAL 
INFORMAL 
EMPLOYMENTa
UNADJUSTED 
GENDER PAY 
GAP*, a
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Managerial. 
professional and 
technical positions
Clerical. services 
and sales 
workers
Plant and 
machine 
operators
Female Male
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ1990 2013 1990 2013 2013 2013 2000-2013 2004-2010 2008-2014
(% aged 15 years and older) (% of total labour force 15 years and older)
(% of total labour force 
aged 15-24) (Female as % of total employment)
(% of total non-agricultural 
employment) (%)
LIE Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17.2d, e, r LIE
LUX Luxembourg 34.2 50.7 68.3 64.6 6.6 5.3 18.9 19.5 45.8 57.6 7.9 .. .. 12.9e LUX
MLT Malta 27.0 37.9 78.5 66.3 6.5 6.5 12.0 15.8 39.1 55.5 22.3 .. .. 23.9 MLT
MCO Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MCO
NLD Netherlands 43.0 58.5 70.2 70.6 6.2 7.1 11.2 10.8 45.4 67.3 9.0 .. .. 42.4d NLD
NZL New Zealand 53.6 62.0 74.3 73.8 6.9 5.6 16.3 15.4 50.5 70.4 16.0 .. .. 30.8c, d, s NZL
NOR Norway 55.2 61.2 71.3 68.7 3.3 3.7 7.5 10.7 46.4 68.4 13.5 .. .. 12.1d, e NOR
PRT Portugal 49.0 54.9 72.3 66.2 16.6 16.4 39.5 36.3 49.4 63.2 33.2 .. .. 17.8c PRT
SMR San Marino .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SMR
ESP Spain 33.8 52.5 68.9 65.8 27.3 26.0 56.7 57.8 46.6 60.9 13.1 .. .. 23.0t ESP
SWE Sweden 62.4 60.3 71.2 67.9 7.9 8.2 22.6 25.1 50.2 68.4 15.6 .. .. 11.0u SWE
CHE Switzerland 56.0 61.8 80.5 74.9 4.5 4.3 8.8 8.9 44.8 67.3 17.5 .. .. 38.3c, d, r CHE
GBR United Kingdom 52.6 55.7 74.7 68.7 7.0 7.9 17.8 22.5 45.8 68.1 11.4 .. .. 36.2d GBR
USA United States 56.4 56.3 75.4 68.9 7.1 7.7 14.2 17.2 51.4 59.5 .. .. .. 17.4e, r USA
East Asia and the Pacific East Asia and the Pacific
BRN Brunei Darussalam 45.2 52.6 82.5 75.3 4.1 3.6 12.8 10.8 41.3 42.4 5.6 .. .. .. BRN
KHM Cambodia 76.8 78.8 83.8 86.5 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.7 32.8 63.3 7.0 .. .. 27.4f KHM
CHN China 72.7 63.9 84.8 78.3 3.8 5.2 8.1 11.7 43.8 45.0 .. 35.5v 30.0v 22.9w CHN
PRK Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea
76.6 72.2 87.9 84.2 4.0 5.1 8.6 11.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. PRK
FJI Fiji 29.1 37.5 83.4 72.0 11.4 6.4 25.1 15.6 .. .. .. .. .. 14.9x FJI
HKG Hong Kong, China (SAR) 47.2 51.3 79.3 67.8 2.8 3.8 7.6 10.6 40.2 64.3 3.1 .. .. 30.0r HKG
IDN Indonesia 50.2 51.4 81.1 84.2 7.3 5.6 22.1 21.2 43.7 50.6 14.3 72.9y 72.3y 21.6d IDN
KIR Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 49.0 54.6 3.6 .. .. .. KIR
LAO Lao People's Democratic 
Republic
80.0 76.3 82.9 79.1 1.2 1.7 2.6 4.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. LAO
MYS Malaysia 43.1 44.4 79.8 75.5 3.4 3.1 11.8 10.5 39.3 55.6 20.9 .. .. 3.2c, d, e MYS
MHL Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MHL
FSM Micronesia (Federated 
States of)
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FSM
MNG Mongolia 52.5 56.6 62.6 69.3 4.8 4.9 9.7 8.8 57.5 66.6 6.5 .. .. 15.1c, z MNG
MMR Myanmar 72.4 75.2 79.2 82.3 3.7 3.1 10.9 8.9 .. .. .. .. .. 12.2f, aa MMR
NRU Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NRU
PLW Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PLW
PNG Papua New Guinea 70.9 70.5 73.9 74.0 2.6 1.7 5.4 3.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. PNG
PHL Philippines 47.9 51.1 82.8 79.7 6.9 7.2 18.6 15.4 52.0 54.4 12.2 70.2 69.9 -3.2c, f PHL
KOR Republic of Korea 47.1 50.1 73.4 72.1 2.8 3.3 8.9 9.5 43.7 52.6 13.3 .. .. 31.9c, ab KOR
WSM Samoa 40.0 23.5 76.7 58.4 .. .. .. .. 48.7 50.5 14.8 .. .. 14.1d WSM
SGP Singapore 50.7 58.8 79.3 77.2 3.0 2.6 11.3 9.4 42.5 64.6 15.8 .. .. 11.1c, d, e, r SGP
SLB Solomon Islands 52.7 53.4 77.1 79.0 4.3 3.5 10.9 8.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. SLB
THA Thailand 76.0 64.3 87.3 80.7 0.7 0.8 3.3 2.9 50.2 61.1 32.2 43.5 41.2 2.5c, d, e THA
TLS Timor-Leste 41.5 24.6 80.0 50.8 6.1 3.6 18.7 10.1 35.4 36.4 .. .. .. .. TLS
TON Tonga 35.9 53.5 75.5 74.6 .. .. .. .. 39.7 60.7 2.0 .. .. .. TON
TUV Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.1 63.4 .. .. .. .. TUV
VUT Vanuatu 78.6 61.5 88.1 80.0 .. .. .. .. 40.1 51.9 17.4 .. .. .. VUT
VNM Viet Nam 74.2 73.0 84.6 82.2 2.2 1.8 6.2 4.8 50.4 61.5 36.5 61.6 65.4 9.4d, s VNM
Latin America and the Caribbean Latin America and the Caribbean
ATG Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 52.6 70.7 6.3 .. .. .. ATG
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LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATEЖ UNEMPLOYMENT RATEΦ YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE¥
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION  
(SELECT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS)a
NON-AGRICULTURAL 
INFORMAL 
EMPLOYMENTa
UNADJUSTED 
GENDER PAY 
GAP*, a
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Managerial. 
professional and 
technical positions
Clerical. services 
and sales 
workers
Plant and 
machine 
operators
Female Male
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ1990 2013 1990 2013 2013 2013 2000-2013 2004-2010 2008-2014
(% aged 15 years and older) (% of total labour force 15 years and older)
(% of total labour force 
aged 15-24) (Female as % of total employment)
(% of total non-agricultural 
employment) (%)
LIE Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17.2d, e, r LIE
LUX Luxembourg 34.2 50.7 68.3 64.6 6.6 5.3 18.9 19.5 45.8 57.6 7.9 .. .. 12.9e LUX
MLT Malta 27.0 37.9 78.5 66.3 6.5 6.5 12.0 15.8 39.1 55.5 22.3 .. .. 23.9 MLT
MCO Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MCO
NLD Netherlands 43.0 58.5 70.2 70.6 6.2 7.1 11.2 10.8 45.4 67.3 9.0 .. .. 42.4d NLD
NZL New Zealand 53.6 62.0 74.3 73.8 6.9 5.6 16.3 15.4 50.5 70.4 16.0 .. .. 30.8c, d, s NZL
NOR Norway 55.2 61.2 71.3 68.7 3.3 3.7 7.5 10.7 46.4 68.4 13.5 .. .. 12.1d, e NOR
PRT Portugal 49.0 54.9 72.3 66.2 16.6 16.4 39.5 36.3 49.4 63.2 33.2 .. .. 17.8c PRT
SMR San Marino .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SMR
ESP Spain 33.8 52.5 68.9 65.8 27.3 26.0 56.7 57.8 46.6 60.9 13.1 .. .. 23.0t ESP
SWE Sweden 62.4 60.3 71.2 67.9 7.9 8.2 22.6 25.1 50.2 68.4 15.6 .. .. 11.0u SWE
CHE Switzerland 56.0 61.8 80.5 74.9 4.5 4.3 8.8 8.9 44.8 67.3 17.5 .. .. 38.3c, d, r CHE
GBR United Kingdom 52.6 55.7 74.7 68.7 7.0 7.9 17.8 22.5 45.8 68.1 11.4 .. .. 36.2d GBR
USA United States 56.4 56.3 75.4 68.9 7.1 7.7 14.2 17.2 51.4 59.5 .. .. .. 17.4e, r USA
East Asia and the Pacific East Asia and the Pacific
BRN Brunei Darussalam 45.2 52.6 82.5 75.3 4.1 3.6 12.8 10.8 41.3 42.4 5.6 .. .. .. BRN
KHM Cambodia 76.8 78.8 83.8 86.5 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.7 32.8 63.3 7.0 .. .. 27.4f KHM
CHN China 72.7 63.9 84.8 78.3 3.8 5.2 8.1 11.7 43.8 45.0 .. 35.5v 30.0v 22.9w CHN
PRK Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea
76.6 72.2 87.9 84.2 4.0 5.1 8.6 11.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. PRK
FJI Fiji 29.1 37.5 83.4 72.0 11.4 6.4 25.1 15.6 .. .. .. .. .. 14.9x FJI
HKG Hong Kong, China (SAR) 47.2 51.3 79.3 67.8 2.8 3.8 7.6 10.6 40.2 64.3 3.1 .. .. 30.0r HKG
IDN Indonesia 50.2 51.4 81.1 84.2 7.3 5.6 22.1 21.2 43.7 50.6 14.3 72.9y 72.3y 21.6d IDN
KIR Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 49.0 54.6 3.6 .. .. .. KIR
LAO Lao People's Democratic 
Republic
80.0 76.3 82.9 79.1 1.2 1.7 2.6 4.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. LAO
MYS Malaysia 43.1 44.4 79.8 75.5 3.4 3.1 11.8 10.5 39.3 55.6 20.9 .. .. 3.2c, d, e MYS
MHL Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. MHL
FSM Micronesia (Federated 
States of)
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. FSM
MNG Mongolia 52.5 56.6 62.6 69.3 4.8 4.9 9.7 8.8 57.5 66.6 6.5 .. .. 15.1c, z MNG
MMR Myanmar 72.4 75.2 79.2 82.3 3.7 3.1 10.9 8.9 .. .. .. .. .. 12.2f, aa MMR
NRU Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. NRU
PLW Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PLW
PNG Papua New Guinea 70.9 70.5 73.9 74.0 2.6 1.7 5.4 3.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. PNG
PHL Philippines 47.9 51.1 82.8 79.7 6.9 7.2 18.6 15.4 52.0 54.4 12.2 70.2 69.9 -3.2c, f PHL
KOR Republic of Korea 47.1 50.1 73.4 72.1 2.8 3.3 8.9 9.5 43.7 52.6 13.3 .. .. 31.9c, ab KOR
WSM Samoa 40.0 23.5 76.7 58.4 .. .. .. .. 48.7 50.5 14.8 .. .. 14.1d WSM
SGP Singapore 50.7 58.8 79.3 77.2 3.0 2.6 11.3 9.4 42.5 64.6 15.8 .. .. 11.1c, d, e, r SGP
SLB Solomon Islands 52.7 53.4 77.1 79.0 4.3 3.5 10.9 8.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. SLB
THA Thailand 76.0 64.3 87.3 80.7 0.7 0.8 3.3 2.9 50.2 61.1 32.2 43.5 41.2 2.5c, d, e THA
TLS Timor-Leste 41.5 24.6 80.0 50.8 6.1 3.6 18.7 10.1 35.4 36.4 .. .. .. .. TLS
TON Tonga 35.9 53.5 75.5 74.6 .. .. .. .. 39.7 60.7 2.0 .. .. .. TON
TUV Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.1 63.4 .. .. .. .. TUV
VUT Vanuatu 78.6 61.5 88.1 80.0 .. .. .. .. 40.1 51.9 17.4 .. .. .. VUT
VNM Viet Nam 74.2 73.0 84.6 82.2 2.2 1.8 6.2 4.8 50.4 61.5 36.5 61.6 65.4 9.4d, s VNM
Latin America and the Caribbean Latin America and the Caribbean
ATG Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 52.6 70.7 6.3 .. .. .. ATG
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COUNTRY 
CODEΨ1990 2013 1990 2013 2013 2013 2000-2013 2004-2010 2008-2014
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employment) (%)
ARG Argentina 41.0 47.5 77.7 75.0 9.0 6.5 24.3 17.2 49.0 50.2 13.6 49.6 49.8 22.2r ARG
BHS Bahamas 64.8 69.3 79.4 79.3 14.0 13.2 31.0 27.0 57.5 68.8 .. .. .. .. BHS
BRB Barbados 61.4 65.9 77.7 76.6 14.5 10.2 30.4 24.4 53.8 69.4 16.0 .. .. .. BRB
BLZ Belize 36.0 49.2 82.3 82.3 21.0 10.8 42.2 21.7 46.1 59.8 9.0 .. .. .. BLZ
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 50.4 64.2 82.7 80.9 3.2 2.1 6.0 4.1 39.0 65.4 0.8 78.5 72.4 25.7c, d, g BOL
BRA Brazil 44.6 59.4 85.4 80.8 7.8 4.5 17.5 10.7 50.8 61.2 22.4 45.9 39.2 22.1c BRA
CHL Chile 32.2 49.2 77.1 74.8 7.0 5.3 19.2 13.9 44.6 63.6 6.7 .. .. 33.2c, r, ac, ad CHL
COL Colombia 31.6 55.8 77.3 79.7 13.8 8.1 26.4 16.2 42.2 62.9 .. 62.7 57.0 8.2 COL
CRI Costa Rica 32.9 46.6 84.0 79.0 10.4 6.0 24.3 14.5 43.1 53.3 8.9 46.0 42.2 6.2c, d, e CRI
CUB Cuba 35.0 43.4 72.3 70.0 3.9 2.9 7.6 6.4 38.1 38.1 42.2 .. .. .. CUB
DMA Dominica .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 52.3 65.8 5.7 .. .. .. DMA
DOM Dominican Republic 44.1 51.3 84.3 78.6 22.5 9.9 41.8 21.9 51.4 56.4 10.0 51.4 46.7 10.9c, d DOM
ECU Ecuador 39.3 54.7 84.0 82.7 5.6 3.2 13.2 8.1 48.5 55.5 8.1 63.7 58.8 2.8d ECU
SLV El Salvador 40.6 47.8 83.1 79.0 4.3 7.8 10.8 12.8 45.9 62.6 28.5 72.5 60.1 11.5n, ae, af SLV
GRD Grenada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GRD
GTM Guatemala 40.5 49.3 87.9 88.2 4.0 2.0 8.0 3.0 49.1 57.7 11.8 .. .. 5.7c, d GTM
GUY Guyana 36.2 42.6 83.0 80.5 14.2 9.5 32.0 20.1 51.5 50.7 4.5 .. .. 8.9f, n GUY
HTI Haiti 56.8 60.9 77.4 71.0 8.0 6.1 20.5 14.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. HTI
HND Honduras 33.2 42.8 86.2 82.9 5.7 3.4 12.1 5.7 .. .. .. 74.8 73.0 -2.4f HND
JAM Jamaica 66.4 56.1 81.8 70.9 19.5 11.3 45.2 28.3 59.3 67.4 8.3 .. .. .. JAM
MEX Mexico 34.3 45.1 83.9 79.9 5.0 4.9 10.9 8.6 39.3 55.6 17.6 57.8 50.8 17.4 MEX
NIC Nicaragua 35.0 47.4 83.1 80.3 7.5 7.0 13.5 8.8 49.5 63.5 19.4 66.6 64.9 .. NIC
PAN Panama 38.9 49.0 79.3 81.8 5.1 3.4 13.6 8.5 51.6 56.9 3.5 46.5 41.8 2.2ag PAN
PRY Paraguay 53.6 55.7 90.9 84.8 6.5 4.3 15.1 9.0 49.8 58.4 3.4 74.4 67.9 17.4c PRY
PER Peru 46.0 68.2 77.6 84.4 4.2 3.6 9.1 8.7 42.8 64.4 3.5 75.7 65.1 30.3ab PER
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KNA
LCA Saint Lucia 57.3 62.7 75.9 76.2 .. .. .. .. 54.8 60.8 24.2 .. .. .. LCA
VCT Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
44.2 55.7 80.8 78.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VCT
SUR Suriname 43.5 40.5 71.8 68.8 10.7 6.1 31.4 18.7 54.8p 60.9 3.4 .. .. .. SUR
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 38.6 53.0 76.3 75.5 7.5 4.5 16.5 10.9 52.5 66.9p 7.1 .. .. .. TTO
URY Uruguay 45.0 55.6 77.5 76.8 8.4 5.1 22.3 15.8 52.5 64.1 14.1 38.3ah 39.3ah 24.8c, f URY
VEN Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
37.3 51.1 80.8 79.2 8.2 7.0 20.1 14.0 58.0 56.7 3.0 47.4 47.5 7.5c VEN
Middle East and North Africa Middle East and North Africa
DZA Algeria 9.9 15.2 74.7 72.2 16.8 8.4 38.7 21.0 39.8 16.1 1.1 .. .. -0.1ai DZA
BHR Bahrain 27.9 39.2 87.9 86.9 17.7 4.9 33.0 25.7 26.9 30.8 0.1 .. .. 0.4n, ab BHR
EGY Egypt 25.8 23.7 74.6 74.8 29.3 7.4 71.1 25.8 23.8 16.1 8.3 23.1 56.3 22.2n, af EGY
IRQ Iraq 10.8 14.9 71.6 69.8 24.1 14.3 59.3 30.0 .. .. .. .. .. 18.2f, n, aj IRQ
JOR Jordan 9.2 15.6 65.6 66.6 22.1 10.5 55.9 28.0 33.7 11.0 0.2 .. .. 10.9f, ak JOR
KWT Kuwait 34.7 43.6 78.3 83.1 2.4 3.3 12.7 22.8 31.9 32.9 0.3 .. .. .. KWT
LBN Lebanon 16.5 23.3 70.3 70.9 11.0 5.1 24.3 18.8 33.4 36.5 2.6 .. .. 6.0f LBN
LBY Libya 18.0 30.0 73.9 76.4 30.2 15.3 77.2 38.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. LBY
MAR Morocco 26.2 26.5 80.4 75.8 9.8 9.0 16.9 19.0 32.5 15.9 3.2 .. .. 17.0al MAR
OMN Oman 17.3 29.0 80.9 82.6 15.3 6.7 32.1 17.9 29.7 9.4 7.9 .. .. 3.1f, ab, am OMN
QAT Qatar 41.6 50.8 94.1 95.5 3.4 0.2 9.7 0.5 21.8 19.8 0.2 .. .. 15.5d QAT
SAU Saudi Arabia 14.4 20.2 80.4 78.3 21.3 2.9 55.3 21.1 21.7 15.6 .. .. .. 1.6c, d SAU
PSE State of Palestine 10.0 15.4 67.7 66.4 21.3 23.8 56.4 34.6 38.2 12.7 5.7 40.0 54.5 15.9c, f, aj PSE
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ARG Argentina 41.0 47.5 77.7 75.0 9.0 6.5 24.3 17.2 49.0 50.2 13.6 49.6 49.8 22.2r ARG
BHS Bahamas 64.8 69.3 79.4 79.3 14.0 13.2 31.0 27.0 57.5 68.8 .. .. .. .. BHS
BRB Barbados 61.4 65.9 77.7 76.6 14.5 10.2 30.4 24.4 53.8 69.4 16.0 .. .. .. BRB
BLZ Belize 36.0 49.2 82.3 82.3 21.0 10.8 42.2 21.7 46.1 59.8 9.0 .. .. .. BLZ
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 50.4 64.2 82.7 80.9 3.2 2.1 6.0 4.1 39.0 65.4 0.8 78.5 72.4 25.7c, d, g BOL
BRA Brazil 44.6 59.4 85.4 80.8 7.8 4.5 17.5 10.7 50.8 61.2 22.4 45.9 39.2 22.1c BRA
CHL Chile 32.2 49.2 77.1 74.8 7.0 5.3 19.2 13.9 44.6 63.6 6.7 .. .. 33.2c, r, ac, ad CHL
COL Colombia 31.6 55.8 77.3 79.7 13.8 8.1 26.4 16.2 42.2 62.9 .. 62.7 57.0 8.2 COL
CRI Costa Rica 32.9 46.6 84.0 79.0 10.4 6.0 24.3 14.5 43.1 53.3 8.9 46.0 42.2 6.2c, d, e CRI
CUB Cuba 35.0 43.4 72.3 70.0 3.9 2.9 7.6 6.4 38.1 38.1 42.2 .. .. .. CUB
DMA Dominica .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 52.3 65.8 5.7 .. .. .. DMA
DOM Dominican Republic 44.1 51.3 84.3 78.6 22.5 9.9 41.8 21.9 51.4 56.4 10.0 51.4 46.7 10.9c, d DOM
ECU Ecuador 39.3 54.7 84.0 82.7 5.6 3.2 13.2 8.1 48.5 55.5 8.1 63.7 58.8 2.8d ECU
SLV El Salvador 40.6 47.8 83.1 79.0 4.3 7.8 10.8 12.8 45.9 62.6 28.5 72.5 60.1 11.5n, ae, af SLV
GRD Grenada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. GRD
GTM Guatemala 40.5 49.3 87.9 88.2 4.0 2.0 8.0 3.0 49.1 57.7 11.8 .. .. 5.7c, d GTM
GUY Guyana 36.2 42.6 83.0 80.5 14.2 9.5 32.0 20.1 51.5 50.7 4.5 .. .. 8.9f, n GUY
HTI Haiti 56.8 60.9 77.4 71.0 8.0 6.1 20.5 14.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. HTI
HND Honduras 33.2 42.8 86.2 82.9 5.7 3.4 12.1 5.7 .. .. .. 74.8 73.0 -2.4f HND
JAM Jamaica 66.4 56.1 81.8 70.9 19.5 11.3 45.2 28.3 59.3 67.4 8.3 .. .. .. JAM
MEX Mexico 34.3 45.1 83.9 79.9 5.0 4.9 10.9 8.6 39.3 55.6 17.6 57.8 50.8 17.4 MEX
NIC Nicaragua 35.0 47.4 83.1 80.3 7.5 7.0 13.5 8.8 49.5 63.5 19.4 66.6 64.9 .. NIC
PAN Panama 38.9 49.0 79.3 81.8 5.1 3.4 13.6 8.5 51.6 56.9 3.5 46.5 41.8 2.2ag PAN
PRY Paraguay 53.6 55.7 90.9 84.8 6.5 4.3 15.1 9.0 49.8 58.4 3.4 74.4 67.9 17.4c PRY
PER Peru 46.0 68.2 77.6 84.4 4.2 3.6 9.1 8.7 42.8 64.4 3.5 75.7 65.1 30.3ab PER
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. KNA
LCA Saint Lucia 57.3 62.7 75.9 76.2 .. .. .. .. 54.8 60.8 24.2 .. .. .. LCA
VCT Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
44.2 55.7 80.8 78.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. VCT
SUR Suriname 43.5 40.5 71.8 68.8 10.7 6.1 31.4 18.7 54.8p 60.9 3.4 .. .. .. SUR
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 38.6 53.0 76.3 75.5 7.5 4.5 16.5 10.9 52.5 66.9p 7.1 .. .. .. TTO
URY Uruguay 45.0 55.6 77.5 76.8 8.4 5.1 22.3 15.8 52.5 64.1 14.1 38.3ah 39.3ah 24.8c, f URY
VEN Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
37.3 51.1 80.8 79.2 8.2 7.0 20.1 14.0 58.0 56.7 3.0 47.4 47.5 7.5c VEN
Middle East and North Africa Middle East and North Africa
DZA Algeria 9.9 15.2 74.7 72.2 16.8 8.4 38.7 21.0 39.8 16.1 1.1 .. .. -0.1ai DZA
BHR Bahrain 27.9 39.2 87.9 86.9 17.7 4.9 33.0 25.7 26.9 30.8 0.1 .. .. 0.4n, ab BHR
EGY Egypt 25.8 23.7 74.6 74.8 29.3 7.4 71.1 25.8 23.8 16.1 8.3 23.1 56.3 22.2n, af EGY
IRQ Iraq 10.8 14.9 71.6 69.8 24.1 14.3 59.3 30.0 .. .. .. .. .. 18.2f, n, aj IRQ
JOR Jordan 9.2 15.6 65.6 66.6 22.1 10.5 55.9 28.0 33.7 11.0 0.2 .. .. 10.9f, ak JOR
KWT Kuwait 34.7 43.6 78.3 83.1 2.4 3.3 12.7 22.8 31.9 32.9 0.3 .. .. .. KWT
LBN Lebanon 16.5 23.3 70.3 70.9 11.0 5.1 24.3 18.8 33.4 36.5 2.6 .. .. 6.0f LBN
LBY Libya 18.0 30.0 73.9 76.4 30.2 15.3 77.2 38.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. LBY
MAR Morocco 26.2 26.5 80.4 75.8 9.8 9.0 16.9 19.0 32.5 15.9 3.2 .. .. 17.0al MAR
OMN Oman 17.3 29.0 80.9 82.6 15.3 6.7 32.1 17.9 29.7 9.4 7.9 .. .. 3.1f, ab, am OMN
QAT Qatar 41.6 50.8 94.1 95.5 3.4 0.2 9.7 0.5 21.8 19.8 0.2 .. .. 15.5d QAT
SAU Saudi Arabia 14.4 20.2 80.4 78.3 21.3 2.9 55.3 21.1 21.7 15.6 .. .. .. 1.6c, d SAU
PSE State of Palestine 10.0 15.4 67.7 66.4 21.3 23.8 56.4 34.6 38.2 12.7 5.7 40.0 54.5 15.9c, f, aj PSE
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SYR Syrian Arab Republic 18.1 13.5 81.0 72.7 28.4 7.7 65.9 23.2 36.5 11.1 1.9 .. .. 3.4n, z SYR
TUN Tunisia 20.9 25.1 76.3 70.9 15.5 12.4 29.3 32.0 33.0 25.3 38.3 .. .. .. TUN
ARE United Arab Emirates 25.0 46.5 91.3 92.0 8.8 2.8 17.0 8.1 19.4 36.9 0.7 .. .. 29.9c, an ARE
YEM Yemen 16.2 25.4 73.7 72.2 38.8 9.9 53.7 20.3 9.9 5.0 1.6 .. .. .. YEM
South Asia South Asia
AFG Afghanistan 15.5 15.8 81.4 79.5 12.2 7.1 22.8 16.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. AFG
BGD Bangladesh 61.7 57.4 88.7 84.1 5.0 3.9 9.5 9.0 12.5 21.7 4.5 .. .. .. BGD
BTN Bhutan 49.4 66.7 78.1 77.2 2.5 1.9 6.8 6.5 30.1 56.3 4.2 .. .. .. BTN
IND India 34.8 27.0 85.1 79.9 4.0 3.5 11.3 10.3 .. .. .. 84.7 83.3 32.6c IND
IRN Iran (Islamic Republic of) 9.7 16.6 80.6 73.6 20.1 11.6 41.7 26.4 32.1 16.2 1.3 .. .. 25.0ao IRN
MDV Maldives 20.2 56.2 77.1 77.5 18.3 6.7 36.4 18.7 42.4 45.0 4.1 .. .. 29.2 MDV
NPL Nepal 79.8 79.9 90.4 87.1 2.4 3.0 3.3 5.9 28.4 37.4 6.2 .. .. 40.5c, f, ak NPL
PAK Pakistan 13.4 24.6 84.6 82.9 9.3 4.0 11.9 7.5 9.6 2.5 0.8 78.6 75.8 38.5d, e PAK
LKA Sri Lanka 36.4 35.1 78.1 76.3 6.6 3.1 24.0 14.1 41.5 35.8 11.5 55.7ap 65.2ap 31.5c, e LKA
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
AGO Angola 65.8 63.3 76.2 76.9 7.2 6.5 11.1 10.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. AGO
BEN Benin 57.2 67.6 89.4 78.3 1.0 1.1 1.8 1.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. BEN
BWA Botswana 66.8 71.9 80.6 81.6 21.6 15.6 39.9 28.7 47.2 66.5 10.4 .. .. 2.7d BWA
BFA Burkina Faso 76.5 77.1 91.1 90.0 2.2 3.9 3.7 6.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. BFA
BDI Burundi 90.8 83.3 90.4 82.0 7.4 6.4 11.4 9.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. BDI
CPV Cabo Verde 41.8 51.5 85.3 83.7 7.3 6.7 11.4 10.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. CPV
CMR Cameroon 55.2 63.8 79.6 76.8 4.4 3.7 7.9 7.0 .. .. .. .. .. 39.2r, aq CMR
CAF Central African Republic 69.3 72.6 87.1 85.1 8.3 7.0 13.8 11.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. CAF
TCD Chad 64.2 64.0 80.7 79.2 7.5 6.7 11.3 10.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. TCD
COM Comoros 27.2 35.2 80.6 80.1 7.0 6.4 11.4 10.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. COM
COG Congo 59.6 68.5 73.1 73.0 6.8 6.3 11.2 10.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. COG
CIV Côte d'Ivoire 43.4 52.4 87.7 81.4 3.6 4.2 5.1 6.1 .. .. .. 82.8 60.5 .. CIV
COD Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
67.5 70.7 75.1 73.2 8.9 7.2 14.7 13.8 .. .. .. .. .. 37.1f, n COD
DJI Djibouti 27.3 36.3 66.5 67.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DJI
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 80.2 80.7 91.6 92.2 8.1 7.9 13.2 12.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. GNQ
ERI Eritrea 75.7 80.0 92.0 89.8 7.5 6.9 11.4 10.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. ERI
ETH Ethiopia 72.0 78.2 90.1 89.3 8.8 2.9 12.0 4.4 31.7 65.2 14.6 .. .. 31.5c, ae ETH
GAB Gabon 56.6 56.2 69.2 65.4 25.6 14.4 40.6 30.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. GAB
GMB Gambia 69.6 72.2 85.2 82.9 7.4 6.6 11.2 10.2 24.4 57.0 2.0 .. .. .. GMB
GHA Ghana 69.6 67.3 72.8 71.4 4.8 4.3 10.0 7.4 39.1 74.4 5.8 .. .. 33.3n GHA
GIN Guinea 64.4 65.6 79.0 78.3 1.5 2.0 0.8 2.0 58.6 59.2 0.0 .. .. .. GIN
GNB Guinea-Bissau 60.0 68.2 78.1 78.5 7.4 6.8 11.7 10.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. GNB
KEN Kenya 70.2 62.2 80.4 72.4 10.5 8.1 17.3 16.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. KEN
LSO Lesotho 67.2 59.0 83.1 73.5 28.3 21.7 41.2 27.6 56.7 56.2 49.0 .. .. .. LSO
LBR Liberia 56.1 58.2 64.6 64.8 3.8 3.6 5.6 3.4 33.3 64.9 15.4 72.0 46.7 .. LBR
MDG Madagascar 83.6 86.6 88.8 90.5 4.6 2.5 5.7 4.7 40.9 65.8 15.9 .. .. 26.0c, d MDG
MWI Malawi 76.0 84.6 79.6 81.5 8.8 6.3 14.4 12.5 .. .. .. .. .. 39.2ar MWI
MLI Mali 37.1 50.8 65.2 81.4 11.3 6.3 14.4 8.3 .. .. .. .. .. 62.5r, aq MLI
MRT Mauritania 18.4 28.7 77.6 79.1 28.0 32.1 38.7 44.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. MRT
MUS Mauritius 37.1 43.6 81.2 74.2 13.5 5.2 32.3 17.0 39.5 47.2 22.6 18.1 14.9 29.7as MUS
MOZ Mozambique 85.3 85.5 80.6 82.8 9.3 7.2 14.6 13.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. MOZ
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LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATEЖ UNEMPLOYMENT RATEΦ YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE¥
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION  
(SELECT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS)a
NON-AGRICULTURAL 
INFORMAL 
EMPLOYMENTa
UNADJUSTED 
GENDER PAY 
GAP*, a
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Managerial. 
professional and 
technical positions
Clerical. services 
and sales 
workers
Plant and 
machine 
operators
Female Male
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ1990 2013 1990 2013 2013 2013 2000-2013 2004-2010 2008-2014
(% aged 15 years and older) (% of total labour force 15 years and older)
(% of total labour force 
aged 15-24) (Female as % of total employment)
(% of total non-agricultural 
employment) (%)
SYR Syrian Arab Republic 18.1 13.5 81.0 72.7 28.4 7.7 65.9 23.2 36.5 11.1 1.9 .. .. 3.4n, z SYR
TUN Tunisia 20.9 25.1 76.3 70.9 15.5 12.4 29.3 32.0 33.0 25.3 38.3 .. .. .. TUN
ARE United Arab Emirates 25.0 46.5 91.3 92.0 8.8 2.8 17.0 8.1 19.4 36.9 0.7 .. .. 29.9c, an ARE
YEM Yemen 16.2 25.4 73.7 72.2 38.8 9.9 53.7 20.3 9.9 5.0 1.6 .. .. .. YEM
South Asia South Asia
AFG Afghanistan 15.5 15.8 81.4 79.5 12.2 7.1 22.8 16.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. AFG
BGD Bangladesh 61.7 57.4 88.7 84.1 5.0 3.9 9.5 9.0 12.5 21.7 4.5 .. .. .. BGD
BTN Bhutan 49.4 66.7 78.1 77.2 2.5 1.9 6.8 6.5 30.1 56.3 4.2 .. .. .. BTN
IND India 34.8 27.0 85.1 79.9 4.0 3.5 11.3 10.3 .. .. .. 84.7 83.3 32.6c IND
IRN Iran (Islamic Republic of) 9.7 16.6 80.6 73.6 20.1 11.6 41.7 26.4 32.1 16.2 1.3 .. .. 25.0ao IRN
MDV Maldives 20.2 56.2 77.1 77.5 18.3 6.7 36.4 18.7 42.4 45.0 4.1 .. .. 29.2 MDV
NPL Nepal 79.8 79.9 90.4 87.1 2.4 3.0 3.3 5.9 28.4 37.4 6.2 .. .. 40.5c, f, ak NPL
PAK Pakistan 13.4 24.6 84.6 82.9 9.3 4.0 11.9 7.5 9.6 2.5 0.8 78.6 75.8 38.5d, e PAK
LKA Sri Lanka 36.4 35.1 78.1 76.3 6.6 3.1 24.0 14.1 41.5 35.8 11.5 55.7ap 65.2ap 31.5c, e LKA
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
AGO Angola 65.8 63.3 76.2 76.9 7.2 6.5 11.1 10.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. AGO
BEN Benin 57.2 67.6 89.4 78.3 1.0 1.1 1.8 1.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. BEN
BWA Botswana 66.8 71.9 80.6 81.6 21.6 15.6 39.9 28.7 47.2 66.5 10.4 .. .. 2.7d BWA
BFA Burkina Faso 76.5 77.1 91.1 90.0 2.2 3.9 3.7 6.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. BFA
BDI Burundi 90.8 83.3 90.4 82.0 7.4 6.4 11.4 9.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. BDI
CPV Cabo Verde 41.8 51.5 85.3 83.7 7.3 6.7 11.4 10.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. CPV
CMR Cameroon 55.2 63.8 79.6 76.8 4.4 3.7 7.9 7.0 .. .. .. .. .. 39.2r, aq CMR
CAF Central African Republic 69.3 72.6 87.1 85.1 8.3 7.0 13.8 11.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. CAF
TCD Chad 64.2 64.0 80.7 79.2 7.5 6.7 11.3 10.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. TCD
COM Comoros 27.2 35.2 80.6 80.1 7.0 6.4 11.4 10.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. COM
COG Congo 59.6 68.5 73.1 73.0 6.8 6.3 11.2 10.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. COG
CIV Côte d'Ivoire 43.4 52.4 87.7 81.4 3.6 4.2 5.1 6.1 .. .. .. 82.8 60.5 .. CIV
COD Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
67.5 70.7 75.1 73.2 8.9 7.2 14.7 13.8 .. .. .. .. .. 37.1f, n COD
DJI Djibouti 27.3 36.3 66.5 67.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. DJI
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 80.2 80.7 91.6 92.2 8.1 7.9 13.2 12.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. GNQ
ERI Eritrea 75.7 80.0 92.0 89.8 7.5 6.9 11.4 10.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. ERI
ETH Ethiopia 72.0 78.2 90.1 89.3 8.8 2.9 12.0 4.4 31.7 65.2 14.6 .. .. 31.5c, ae ETH
GAB Gabon 56.6 56.2 69.2 65.4 25.6 14.4 40.6 30.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. GAB
GMB Gambia 69.6 72.2 85.2 82.9 7.4 6.6 11.2 10.2 24.4 57.0 2.0 .. .. .. GMB
GHA Ghana 69.6 67.3 72.8 71.4 4.8 4.3 10.0 7.4 39.1 74.4 5.8 .. .. 33.3n GHA
GIN Guinea 64.4 65.6 79.0 78.3 1.5 2.0 0.8 2.0 58.6 59.2 0.0 .. .. .. GIN
GNB Guinea-Bissau 60.0 68.2 78.1 78.5 7.4 6.8 11.7 10.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. GNB
KEN Kenya 70.2 62.2 80.4 72.4 10.5 8.1 17.3 16.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. KEN
LSO Lesotho 67.2 59.0 83.1 73.5 28.3 21.7 41.2 27.6 56.7 56.2 49.0 .. .. .. LSO
LBR Liberia 56.1 58.2 64.6 64.8 3.8 3.6 5.6 3.4 33.3 64.9 15.4 72.0 46.7 .. LBR
MDG Madagascar 83.6 86.6 88.8 90.5 4.6 2.5 5.7 4.7 40.9 65.8 15.9 .. .. 26.0c, d MDG
MWI Malawi 76.0 84.6 79.6 81.5 8.8 6.3 14.4 12.5 .. .. .. .. .. 39.2ar MWI
MLI Mali 37.1 50.8 65.2 81.4 11.3 6.3 14.4 8.3 .. .. .. .. .. 62.5r, aq MLI
MRT Mauritania 18.4 28.7 77.6 79.1 28.0 32.1 38.7 44.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. MRT
MUS Mauritius 37.1 43.6 81.2 74.2 13.5 5.2 32.3 17.0 39.5 47.2 22.6 18.1 14.9 29.7as MUS
MOZ Mozambique 85.3 85.5 80.6 82.8 9.3 7.2 14.6 13.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. MOZ
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATEЖ UNEMPLOYMENT RATEΦ YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE¥
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION  
(SELECT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS)a
NON-AGRICULTURAL 
INFORMAL 
EMPLOYMENTa
UNADJUSTED 
GENDER PAY 
GAP*, a
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Managerial. 
professional and 
technical positions
Clerical. services 
and sales 
workers
Plant and 
machine 
operators
Female Male
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ1990 2013 1990 2013 2013 2013 2000-2013 2004-2010 2008-2014
(% aged 15 years and older) (% of total labour force 15 years and older)
(% of total labour force 
aged 15-24) (Female as % of total employment)
(% of total non-agricultural 
employment) (%)
NAM Namibia 48.0 54.7 64.5 63.7 18.7 15.2 39.1 29.9 53.5 64.3 3.5 47.0 41.1 16.3c NAM
NER Niger 24.5 40.0 92.3 89.7 4.5 5.3 5.7 7.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. NER
NGA Nigeria 39.0 48.2 74.8 63.7 7.4 7.6 13.2 14.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. NGA
RWA Rwanda 88.9 86.4 89.0 85.3 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.9 41.2 44.4 3.0 .. .. .. RWA
STP São Tomé and Príncipe 36.4 45.3 76.4 77.8 .. .. .. .. 35.3 57.3 9.2 .. .. .. STP
SEN Senegal 62.1 66.0 89.2 88.0 13.2 7.9 19.4 11.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. SEN
SYC Seychelles .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 52.8 70.8 12.3 .. .. 21.2 SYC
SLE Sierra Leone 63.3 65.7 66.1 69.0 2.1 4.3 3.0 6.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. SLE
SOM Somalia 35.0 37.2 78.2 75.5 7.4 6.7 11.3 10.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. SOM
ZAF South Africa 39.4 44.5 68.2 60.5 28.0 22.3 59.2 48.9 44.4 57.5 13.0 36.8 29.5 20.9 ZAF
SSD South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SSD
SDN Sudan 27.3 31.3 78.1 76.0 20.4 13.0 27.5 22.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. SDN
SWZ Swaziland 41.9 43.9 73.7 71.6 25.6 20.5 46.0 39.9 .. .. .. .. .. 14.6 SWZ
TGO Togo 66.6 80.6 84.5 81.3 7.2 6.6 11.2 10.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. TGO
UGA Uganda 82.4 75.8 81.9 79.2 4.5 3.2 7.0 6.1 39.1 57.0 3.4 73.2 67.7 36.7r UGA
TZA United Republic of Tanzania 86.9 88.1 91.4 90.2 4.5 2.4 7.4 5.5 36.6 47.8 12.9 82.7 72.8 5.8d TZA
ZMB Zambia 73.6 73.1 86.0 85.6 11.4 14.9 22.5 26.6 .. .. .. 76.1 60.9 37.2at ZMB
ZWE Zimbabwe 67.1 83.4 79.5 89.8 5.4 5.3 9.2 9.3 42.3 51.4 6.4 66.1 42.7 .. ZWE
Central and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia
53.9 50.0 73.6 69.2 8.8 8.8 20.0 18.9 55.4 62.1 13.9 — — 21.8
Developed Regions 49.3 53.4 72.8 67.6 8.4 8.6 15.8 18.2 47.3 62.5 15.1 — — 22.9
East Asia and the Pacific 68.6 62.2 83.9 79.2 4.1 4.8 9.8 12.1 .. .. .. — — 20.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 40.4 53.8 82.2 79.6 7.7 5.2 16.9 11.1 47.1 58.8 17.8 — — 18.8
Middle East and North Africa 19.7 21.9 76.3 75.2 22.7 8.1 51.1 23.1 27.0 17.1 4.7 — — 13.7
South Asia 34.7 29.8 85.1 80.3 5.5 4.0 11.6 10.4 16.3 18.2 2.6 — — 33.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 58.9 63.6 79.8 76.6 9.4 7.3 12.8 11.0 .. .. .. — — 29.5au
World 52.3 50.3 80.6 76.7 7.0 5.9 13.4 12.7 45.2 54.3 14.1 — — 23.5av
Source:             
Columns 1-8: ILO 2015c.             
Columns 9, 10, 11 and 14: ILO 2015a, unless otherwise specified.
Columns 12 and 13: ILO and WIEGO 2013.           
“..” indicates that data are not available. 
“—” indicates where average is not applicable or where available data are insufficient to derive 
average.  
 The unadjusted gender pay gap is measured as the difference between women’s and men’s 
gross earnings as a percentage of men’s earnings. It aims to capture the difference between 
women’s and men’s earnings, irrespective of the number of hours worked, the type of activity or 
the type of occupation. Unless otherwise noted it refers to the gross monthly earnings of wage 
and salaried employees working full- or part-time. Because wage data generally excludes self-
employed workers, particularly contributing family workers who are mostly women, and who by 
definition do not recieve direct compensation for their labour, the gender wage gap as presented 
here is likely to understate the true difference between women and men. Therefore it should be 
considered together with other labour market indicators such as those presented in this Table 
and discussed in Chapter 2. Due to differences in how wage data are collected, cross-country 
comparisons should also be made with caution.
Ψ. ISO country code refers to the three letter standard for the representation of names of countries 
published by the International Organization for Standardization.  
ж. The labour force participation rate (LFPR) captures people who are currently employed and 
those who are unemployed (i.e., people who are not employed but are available and actively 
looking for a job) as a percentage of the working-age population. The working-age population 
is generally defined as people aged 15 and above (with some national variation in cut-off points).
ϕ. The unemployment rate indicates the proportion of the labour force that does not have a job and 
is actively looking and available for work. 
¥. Indicates the proportion of ‘youth’ (for the purpose of this indicator defined as persons aged 15 to 
24) in the labour force that does not have a job and is actively looking and available for work.   
a. Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified.
b. ECE 2015.
c. Refers to main job only.
d. Includes institutional population.
e. Refers to full-time.
f. Calculated using data from ILO 2015b.
g. Full-time equivalents.
h. Refers to all jobs with the same employer.
i. OECD 2014a.
j. Excluding agriculture and non-market services.
k. Refers to private sector only.
l. Excluding agriculture.
m. Including overtime and/or irregular bonuses.
n. Refers to a period earlier than specified.
o. Eurostat 2015.
p. Including armed forces.
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LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATEЖ UNEMPLOYMENT RATEΦ YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE¥
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION  
(SELECT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS)a
NON-AGRICULTURAL 
INFORMAL 
EMPLOYMENTa
UNADJUSTED 
GENDER PAY 
GAP*, a
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Managerial. 
professional and 
technical positions
Clerical. services 
and sales 
workers
Plant and 
machine 
operators
Female Male
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ1990 2013 1990 2013 2013 2013 2000-2013 2004-2010 2008-2014
(% aged 15 years and older) (% of total labour force 15 years and older)
(% of total labour force 
aged 15-24) (Female as % of total employment)
(% of total non-agricultural 
employment) (%)
NAM Namibia 48.0 54.7 64.5 63.7 18.7 15.2 39.1 29.9 53.5 64.3 3.5 47.0 41.1 16.3c NAM
NER Niger 24.5 40.0 92.3 89.7 4.5 5.3 5.7 7.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. NER
NGA Nigeria 39.0 48.2 74.8 63.7 7.4 7.6 13.2 14.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. NGA
RWA Rwanda 88.9 86.4 89.0 85.3 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.9 41.2 44.4 3.0 .. .. .. RWA
STP São Tomé and Príncipe 36.4 45.3 76.4 77.8 .. .. .. .. 35.3 57.3 9.2 .. .. .. STP
SEN Senegal 62.1 66.0 89.2 88.0 13.2 7.9 19.4 11.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. SEN
SYC Seychelles .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 52.8 70.8 12.3 .. .. 21.2 SYC
SLE Sierra Leone 63.3 65.7 66.1 69.0 2.1 4.3 3.0 6.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. SLE
SOM Somalia 35.0 37.2 78.2 75.5 7.4 6.7 11.3 10.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. SOM
ZAF South Africa 39.4 44.5 68.2 60.5 28.0 22.3 59.2 48.9 44.4 57.5 13.0 36.8 29.5 20.9 ZAF
SSD South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. SSD
SDN Sudan 27.3 31.3 78.1 76.0 20.4 13.0 27.5 22.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. SDN
SWZ Swaziland 41.9 43.9 73.7 71.6 25.6 20.5 46.0 39.9 .. .. .. .. .. 14.6 SWZ
TGO Togo 66.6 80.6 84.5 81.3 7.2 6.6 11.2 10.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. TGO
UGA Uganda 82.4 75.8 81.9 79.2 4.5 3.2 7.0 6.1 39.1 57.0 3.4 73.2 67.7 36.7r UGA
TZA United Republic of Tanzania 86.9 88.1 91.4 90.2 4.5 2.4 7.4 5.5 36.6 47.8 12.9 82.7 72.8 5.8d TZA
ZMB Zambia 73.6 73.1 86.0 85.6 11.4 14.9 22.5 26.6 .. .. .. 76.1 60.9 37.2at ZMB
ZWE Zimbabwe 67.1 83.4 79.5 89.8 5.4 5.3 9.2 9.3 42.3 51.4 6.4 66.1 42.7 .. ZWE
Central and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia
53.9 50.0 73.6 69.2 8.8 8.8 20.0 18.9 55.4 62.1 13.9 — — 21.8
Developed Regions 49.3 53.4 72.8 67.6 8.4 8.6 15.8 18.2 47.3 62.5 15.1 — — 22.9
East Asia and the Pacific 68.6 62.2 83.9 79.2 4.1 4.8 9.8 12.1 .. .. .. — — 20.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 40.4 53.8 82.2 79.6 7.7 5.2 16.9 11.1 47.1 58.8 17.8 — — 18.8
Middle East and North Africa 19.7 21.9 76.3 75.2 22.7 8.1 51.1 23.1 27.0 17.1 4.7 — — 13.7
South Asia 34.7 29.8 85.1 80.3 5.5 4.0 11.6 10.4 16.3 18.2 2.6 — — 33.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 58.9 63.6 79.8 76.6 9.4 7.3 12.8 11.0 .. .. .. — — 29.5au
World 52.3 50.3 80.6 76.7 7.0 5.9 13.4 12.7 45.2 54.3 14.1 — — 23.5av
q. Including mining and construction labourers and craft and related trades workers.
r. Refers to median.
s. Excluding overseas territories.
t. Excluding agriculture, public administration, activities of households as employers and of 
extraterritorial organisations and bodies.
u. Includes only private sector, wage earners, blue color, production workers.
v. Urban, 6 cities only.
w. ILO 2015b.
x. Weighted average calculated using Narsey 2014a.
y. Banten and Yogyakarta only
z. Salaried, white colar, office workers only.
aa. Manufacturing industries only.
ab. Private sector only.
ac. Calculated using data from Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (Chile) 2014.
ad. Excludes domestic work.
ae. Urban areas only.
af. Includes only wage earners, blue color and production workers.
ag. Full-time workers.
ah. Including persons with unknown kind of activity
ai. Office National des Statistiques (Algeria) 2014.
aj. Refers to net earnings.
ak. Includes payments in kind and/or overtime/irregular bonuses and/or family allowances.
al. Douidich 2011.
am. Nationals only.
an. Excluding labour camps.
ao. Said, Petrovich and Aboul-Ezz 2014.
ap. Excludes Northern Province
aq. Comblon et al. 2014.
ar. National Statistical Office (Malawi) 2014.
as. Employees, employers and own-account workers.
at. Central Statistical Office (Zambia) 2013.
au. Due to the low coverage in sub-Saharan Africa (16 out of 49 countries which together account for 
50 per cent of the region’s employed population), this value needs to be interpreted with caution.
av. Value represents a weighted average of data for 119 countries that together account for 90 per 
cent of the world’s total employed population. The regional coverage is as follows: CEECA (93 per 
cent of employed population), Developed (100 per cent), EAP (98 per cent), LAC (97 per cent), 
MENA (87 per cent), SA (88 per cent) and SSA (50 per cent).
SOCIAL TRANSFERS HEALTH SERVICES
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ
COUNTRIES  
AND AREAS
Female active 
contribution 
to pension 
schemea
Male active 
contribution 
to pension 
schemea
Gender equality 
in statutory 
pensionable ageb
Female old 
age pension 
recipientsc, d
Male old 
age pension 
recipientsc, d
Benefit level of 
social pensionж, d
Public social 
security 
expenditure,  
% of GDPd, e
Public health expenditure, % 
of GDPf
Health expenditure per capita, 
PPPg
Out of pocket health 
expenditureh
Number of 
physiciansd, i
Number of nurses and 
midwivesd, p
ISO 
COUNTRY 
CODEΨ2003-2012 2014 2001-2013 2006-2014 2005-2013 2012 2000-2013
(% aged 15-64) (% above statutory  pension age)
(% of $1.25 per day 
poverty line) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (PPP$, 2005 constant prices) (% of total health expenditure) (per 1,000 people)
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
ALB Albania .. .. No 60.8 100.0 .. 8.2 2.8 541 52.2 1.1 4.0 ALB
ARM Armenia .. .. Yes .. .. 123j 7.0 1.9 299 54.6 2.7 4.9 ARM
AZE Azerbaijan .. .. No 79.0 82.6 261j 7.3 1.2 572 69.0 3.4 6.7 AZE
BLR Belarus 57.4 29.1 No .. .. 255j 11.8 3.9 790 19.5 3.8 10.5 BLR
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina .. .. No .. .. .. 10.5 7.0 928 27.8 1.7 5.2 BIH
BGR Bulgaria 51.6 57.2 No 95.5 99.4 372k 12.9 4.2 1,177 42.3 3.8 4.7 BGR
HRV Croatia 46.8 54.9 No 44.2 85.1 .. 14.8 5.6 1,410 13.9 3.0 5.3 HRV
CYP Cyprus 57.1 59.0 .. 57.2 100.0 1,157j 19.5 3.2 2,266 49.5 2.3 4.5 CYP
CZE Czech Republic .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 .. 14.1 6.5 2,046 14.2 3.6 8.4 CZE
EST Estonia .. .. Yes 97.5 98.5 654j 14.7 4.7 1,385 18.4 3.3 6.5 EST
GEO Georgia .. .. No .. .. 264l 6.6 1.7 561 64.7 4.2 0.2 GEO
HUN Hungary 71.1 70.9 Yes 87.6 97.7 406k 17.7 5.0 1,729 27.1 3.0 6.4 HUN
KAZ Kazakhstan .. .. No .. .. 173j 4.1 2.4 608 41.7 3.6 8.2 KAZ
KGZ Kyrgyzstan .. .. No 100.0 100.0 103j 5.8  4.3 175 34.8 2.0 6.1 KGZ
LVA Latvia .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 282j 12.3 3.4 1,188 37.4 2.9 4.7 LVA
LTU Lithuania .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 125j 12.2 4.7 1,426 28.5 4.1 7.2 LTU
MNE Montenegro .. .. No .. .. .. 13.8 4.5 1,019 36.7 2.0 5.2 MNE
POL Poland .. .. No 94.9 100.0 .. 15.9 4.7 1,489 22.8 2.2 5.8 POL
MDA Republic of Moldova 33.7 33.5 No 77.0 63.7 30j 13.1 5.3 490 45.3 2.9 6.5 MDA
ROU Romania .. .. No 88.0 100.0 .. 13.2 4.0 873 21.8 2.4 5.5 ROU
RUS Russian Federation .. .. No 100.0 100.0 .. 12.0 3.8 1,474 34.3 4.3 8.5 RUS
SRB Serbia .. .. No 44.8 48.4 .. 17.7 6.4 1,250 37.1 2.1 4.5 SRB
SVK Slovakia .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 .. 11.4 5.5 1,977 22.8 3.0 0.3 SVK
SVN Slovenia 55.4 67.9 Yes 85.9 100.0 761k 17.4 6.4 2,420 11.9 2.5 8.5 SVN
TJK Tajikistan .. .. No 72.1 95.6 46j 5.0 1.7 129 60.1 1.9 4.5 TJK
MKD The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
.. .. No .. .. .. 13.5 4.6 835 35.9 2.6 0.6 MKD
TUR Turkey 11.7 44.1 No .. .. 226k 7.2 4.7 1,144 16.8 1.7 2.4 TUR
TKM Turkmenistan .. .. .. .. .. 134j .. 1.3 209 36.8 2.4 4.4 TKM
UKR Ukraine .. .. Yes .. .. 428k 13.6 4.1 562 42.4 3.5 7.6 UKR
UZB Uzbekistan .. .. No .. .. 270j 8.4 3.1 221 44.1 2.4 12.0 UZB
Developed Regions Developed Regions
AND Andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.4 3,499 17.5 3.9 4.6 AND
AUS Australia 64.6 74.5 Yes 87.6 77.5 2,537k 10.6 6.1 4,068 18.5 3.3 10.6 AUS
AUT Austria .. .. Yes 93.7 77.5 .. 20.4 8.7 5,065 15.2 4.8 7.9 AUT
BEL Belgium .. .. Yes 67.8 100.0 2,940k 21.1 8.2 4,320 19.7 3.0 15.8 BEL
CAN Canada 66.8 69.9 Yes .. .. 1,150m 10.7 7.7 4,676 15.0 2.1 9.3 CAN
DNK Denmark .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 1,758k 23.0 9.6 4,720 12.6 3.4 16.1 DNK
FIN Finland .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 1,585j 22.0 6.9 3,545 18.6 2.9 10.8 FIN
FRA France .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 2,294k 23.8 9.0 4,260 7.4 3.2 9.3 FRA
DEU Germany 58.7 61.1 Yes 100.0 100.0 1,029k 19.1 8.6 4,617 12.1 3.8 11.5 DEU
GRC Greece 55.8 72.7 Yes 54.6 100.0 1,284k 18.9 6.3 2,346 29.7 6.2 0.2 GRC
ISL Iceland .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 484k 10.9 7.3 3,436 17.9 3.5 15.6 ISL
IRL Ireland .. .. Yes 66.3 100.0 2,177k 17.3 5.2 3,529 15.0 2.7 15.7 IRL
ISR Israel .. .. No .. .. 1,058k 11.7 4.6 2,239 25.0 3.3 4.9 ISR
ITA Italy .. .. Yes 69.2 100.0 1,417k 20.2 7.2 3,040 20.2 4.1 0.3 ITA
JPN Japan .. .. Yes .. .. .. 16.8 8.3 3,578 14.1 2.3 11.5 JPN
LIE Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LIE
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Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
ALB Albania .. .. No 60.8 100.0 .. 8.2 2.8 541 52.2 1.1 4.0 ALB
ARM Armenia .. .. Yes .. .. 123j 7.0 1.9 299 54.6 2.7 4.9 ARM
AZE Azerbaijan .. .. No 79.0 82.6 261j 7.3 1.2 572 69.0 3.4 6.7 AZE
BLR Belarus 57.4 29.1 No .. .. 255j 11.8 3.9 790 19.5 3.8 10.5 BLR
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina .. .. No .. .. .. 10.5 7.0 928 27.8 1.7 5.2 BIH
BGR Bulgaria 51.6 57.2 No 95.5 99.4 372k 12.9 4.2 1,177 42.3 3.8 4.7 BGR
HRV Croatia 46.8 54.9 No 44.2 85.1 .. 14.8 5.6 1,410 13.9 3.0 5.3 HRV
CYP Cyprus 57.1 59.0 .. 57.2 100.0 1,157j 19.5 3.2 2,266 49.5 2.3 4.5 CYP
CZE Czech Republic .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 .. 14.1 6.5 2,046 14.2 3.6 8.4 CZE
EST Estonia .. .. Yes 97.5 98.5 654j 14.7 4.7 1,385 18.4 3.3 6.5 EST
GEO Georgia .. .. No .. .. 264l 6.6 1.7 561 64.7 4.2 0.2 GEO
HUN Hungary 71.1 70.9 Yes 87.6 97.7 406k 17.7 5.0 1,729 27.1 3.0 6.4 HUN
KAZ Kazakhstan .. .. No .. .. 173j 4.1 2.4 608 41.7 3.6 8.2 KAZ
KGZ Kyrgyzstan .. .. No 100.0 100.0 103j 5.8  4.3 175 34.8 2.0 6.1 KGZ
LVA Latvia .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 282j 12.3 3.4 1,188 37.4 2.9 4.7 LVA
LTU Lithuania .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 125j 12.2 4.7 1,426 28.5 4.1 7.2 LTU
MNE Montenegro .. .. No .. .. .. 13.8 4.5 1,019 36.7 2.0 5.2 MNE
POL Poland .. .. No 94.9 100.0 .. 15.9 4.7 1,489 22.8 2.2 5.8 POL
MDA Republic of Moldova 33.7 33.5 No 77.0 63.7 30j 13.1 5.3 490 45.3 2.9 6.5 MDA
ROU Romania .. .. No 88.0 100.0 .. 13.2 4.0 873 21.8 2.4 5.5 ROU
RUS Russian Federation .. .. No 100.0 100.0 .. 12.0 3.8 1,474 34.3 4.3 8.5 RUS
SRB Serbia .. .. No 44.8 48.4 .. 17.7 6.4 1,250 37.1 2.1 4.5 SRB
SVK Slovakia .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 .. 11.4 5.5 1,977 22.8 3.0 0.3 SVK
SVN Slovenia 55.4 67.9 Yes 85.9 100.0 761k 17.4 6.4 2,420 11.9 2.5 8.5 SVN
TJK Tajikistan .. .. No 72.1 95.6 46j 5.0 1.7 129 60.1 1.9 4.5 TJK
MKD The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
.. .. No .. .. .. 13.5 4.6 835 35.9 2.6 0.6 MKD
TUR Turkey 11.7 44.1 No .. .. 226k 7.2 4.7 1,144 16.8 1.7 2.4 TUR
TKM Turkmenistan .. .. .. .. .. 134j .. 1.3 209 36.8 2.4 4.4 TKM
UKR Ukraine .. .. Yes .. .. 428k 13.6 4.1 562 42.4 3.5 7.6 UKR
UZB Uzbekistan .. .. No .. .. 270j 8.4 3.1 221 44.1 2.4 12.0 UZB
Developed Regions Developed Regions
AND Andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.4 3,499 17.5 3.9 4.6 AND
AUS Australia 64.6 74.5 Yes 87.6 77.5 2,537k 10.6 6.1 4,068 18.5 3.3 10.6 AUS
AUT Austria .. .. Yes 93.7 77.5 .. 20.4 8.7 5,065 15.2 4.8 7.9 AUT
BEL Belgium .. .. Yes 67.8 100.0 2,940k 21.1 8.2 4,320 19.7 3.0 15.8 BEL
CAN Canada 66.8 69.9 Yes .. .. 1,150m 10.7 7.7 4,676 15.0 2.1 9.3 CAN
DNK Denmark .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 1,758k 23.0 9.6 4,720 12.6 3.4 16.1 DNK
FIN Finland .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 1,585j 22.0 6.9 3,545 18.6 2.9 10.8 FIN
FRA France .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 2,294k 23.8 9.0 4,260 7.4 3.2 9.3 FRA
DEU Germany 58.7 61.1 Yes 100.0 100.0 1,029k 19.1 8.6 4,617 12.1 3.8 11.5 DEU
GRC Greece 55.8 72.7 Yes 54.6 100.0 1,284k 18.9 6.3 2,346 29.7 6.2 0.2 GRC
ISL Iceland .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 484k 10.9 7.3 3,436 17.9 3.5 15.6 ISL
IRL Ireland .. .. Yes 66.3 100.0 2,177k 17.3 5.2 3,529 15.0 2.7 15.7 IRL
ISR Israel .. .. No .. .. 1,058k 11.7 4.6 2,239 25.0 3.3 4.9 ISR
ITA Italy .. .. Yes 69.2 100.0 1,417k 20.2 7.2 3,040 20.2 4.1 0.3 ITA
JPN Japan .. .. Yes .. .. .. 16.8 8.3 3,578 14.1 2.3 11.5 JPN
LIE Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LIE
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LUX Luxembourg 100.0 100.0 .. 56.4 100.0 .. 16.5 5.8 6,341 11.2 2.8 12.5 LUX
MLT Malta .. .. .. 32.0 97.5 1,838k 14.3 6.0 2,548 32.3 3.5 7.1 MLT
MCO Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.9 6,026 7.0 7.2 17.2 MCO
NLD Netherlands 100.0 100.0 Yes 100.0 100.0 3,138l 15.7 9.9 5,385 5.6 2.9 8.4 NLD
NZL New Zealand .. .. Yes 96.5 99.8 2,378l 12.8 8.5 3,292 10.9 2.7 10.9 NZL
NOR Norway .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 1,481k 15.8 7.7 5,970 13.4 3.7 13.4 NOR
PRT Portugal .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 777k 18.5 5.9 2,400 31.7 3.9 5.3 PRT
SMR San Marino .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.3 5.7 3,736 12.3 5.1 8.9 SMR
ESP Spain 59.4 72.4 Yes 46.6 97.4 1,297k 19.2 7.1 3,145 20.3 3.7 5.1 ESP
SWE Sweden .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 2,248j 21.3 7.9 4,158 16.1 3.8 11.9 SWE
CHE Switzerland .. .. No 100.0 100.0 1,888j 13.8 7.0 6,062 28.1 3.9 17.4 CHE
GBR United Kingdom .. .. Yesn 99.2 100.0 2,289k 16.4 7.8 3,495 9.9 2.8 8.8 GBR
USA United States 76.0 81.1 Yes 90.8 94.8 1,896k 11.3 8.3 8,895 11.1 2.5 9.8 USA
East Asia and the Pacific East Asia and the Pacific
BRN Brunei Darussalam .. .. .. .. .. 729l 0.7 2.1 1,218 8.1 1.5 7.7 BRN
KHM Cambodia 0.0 0.0 Yes .. .. .. 0.8 1.3 135 61.7 0.2 0.9 KHM
CHN China .. .. No .. .. 34 5.6 3.0 480 34.3 1.9 1.9 CHN
PRK Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.3 4.1 PRK
FJI Fiji .. .. Yes .. .. 46j .. 2.6 197 22.5 0.4 2.2 FJI
HKG Hong Kong, China (SAR) .. .. Yes .. .. 515k 2.3 .. .. .. .. .. HKG
IDN Indonesia .. .. Yes .. .. 107k 1.6 1.2 150 45.4 0.2 1.4 IDN
KIR Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. 510l 1.6 8.9 264 0.1 0.4 3.7 KIR
LAO Lao People's 
Democratic Republic
.. .. No .. .. .. 0.5 1.5 84 38.2 0.2 0.9 LAO
MYS Malaysia 23.6 32.4 Yes .. .. 414k 1.0 2.2 676 35.6 1.2 3.3 MYS
MHL Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.6 12.9 418 13.1 0.4 1.7 MHL
FSM Micronesia (Federated 
States of)
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.5 489 9.5 0.2 3.3 FSM
MNG Mongolia .. .. No 100.0 100.0 87k 5.8 4.0 345 34.6 2.8 3.5 MNG
MMR Myanmar .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.7 0.4 25 71.3 0.6 1.0 MMR
NRU Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.2 .. .. 7.5 .. .. NRU
PLW Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.0 7.3 1,680 10.6 1.4 5.7 PLW
PNG Papua New Guinea .. .. Yes .. .. 42l,o 1.1 4.3 151 9.5 0.1 0.5 PNG
PHL Philippines .. .. Yes .. .. 51k 1.0 1.7 203 52.0 1.2 6.0 PHL
KOR Republic of Korea .. .. Yes .. .. 300k 5.1 4.1 2,321 36.1 2.1 5.0 KOR
WSM Samoa .. .. .. .. .. 255l 1.1 6.0 308 7.3 0.5 1.9 WSM
SGP Singapore 0.0 0.0 Yes .. .. .. 1.6 1.7 2,881 58.6 1.9 6.4 SGP
SLB Solomon Islands 26.1 66.5 .. .. .. .. 1.3 7.7 252 2.2 0.2 2.1 SLB
THA Thailand .. .. Yes 84.6 77.9 88j 5.0 3.0 385 13.1 0.4 2.1 THA
TLS Timor-Leste 0.0 0.0 .. 100.0 100.0 287l 2.6 3.2 80 4.0 0.1 1.1 TLS
TON Tonga .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.1 4.5 270 10.9 0.6 3.9 TON
TUV Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.7 15.4 433 0.1 1.1 5.8 TUV
VUT Vanuatu 17.5 16.4 .. .. .. .. 0.8 3.1 167 7.6 0.1 1.7 VUT
VNM Viet Nam 16.8 17.7 No .. .. 56k 3.7 2.8 233 48.8 1.2 1.1 VNM
Latin America and the Caribbean Latin America and the Caribbean
ATG Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. .. .. 323k 3.1 3.9 1,029 22.2 .. .. ATG
ARG Argentina 25.8 45.7 No 93.3 86.8 1,439k 12.8 5.9 1,551 20.1 3.2 0.5 ARG
BHS Bahamas .. .. .. .. .. 876k 2.8 3.5 2,377 29.1 2.8 4.1 BHS
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LUX Luxembourg 100.0 100.0 .. 56.4 100.0 .. 16.5 5.8 6,341 11.2 2.8 12.5 LUX
MLT Malta .. .. .. 32.0 97.5 1,838k 14.3 6.0 2,548 32.3 3.5 7.1 MLT
MCO Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.9 6,026 7.0 7.2 17.2 MCO
NLD Netherlands 100.0 100.0 Yes 100.0 100.0 3,138l 15.7 9.9 5,385 5.6 2.9 8.4 NLD
NZL New Zealand .. .. Yes 96.5 99.8 2,378l 12.8 8.5 3,292 10.9 2.7 10.9 NZL
NOR Norway .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 1,481k 15.8 7.7 5,970 13.4 3.7 13.4 NOR
PRT Portugal .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 777k 18.5 5.9 2,400 31.7 3.9 5.3 PRT
SMR San Marino .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.3 5.7 3,736 12.3 5.1 8.9 SMR
ESP Spain 59.4 72.4 Yes 46.6 97.4 1,297k 19.2 7.1 3,145 20.3 3.7 5.1 ESP
SWE Sweden .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 2,248j 21.3 7.9 4,158 16.1 3.8 11.9 SWE
CHE Switzerland .. .. No 100.0 100.0 1,888j 13.8 7.0 6,062 28.1 3.9 17.4 CHE
GBR United Kingdom .. .. Yesn 99.2 100.0 2,289k 16.4 7.8 3,495 9.9 2.8 8.8 GBR
USA United States 76.0 81.1 Yes 90.8 94.8 1,896k 11.3 8.3 8,895 11.1 2.5 9.8 USA
East Asia and the Pacific East Asia and the Pacific
BRN Brunei Darussalam .. .. .. .. .. 729l 0.7 2.1 1,218 8.1 1.5 7.7 BRN
KHM Cambodia 0.0 0.0 Yes .. .. .. 0.8 1.3 135 61.7 0.2 0.9 KHM
CHN China .. .. No .. .. 34 5.6 3.0 480 34.3 1.9 1.9 CHN
PRK Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.3 4.1 PRK
FJI Fiji .. .. Yes .. .. 46j .. 2.6 197 22.5 0.4 2.2 FJI
HKG Hong Kong, China (SAR) .. .. Yes .. .. 515k 2.3 .. .. .. .. .. HKG
IDN Indonesia .. .. Yes .. .. 107k 1.6 1.2 150 45.4 0.2 1.4 IDN
KIR Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. 510l 1.6 8.9 264 0.1 0.4 3.7 KIR
LAO Lao People's 
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.. .. No .. .. .. 0.5 1.5 84 38.2 0.2 0.9 LAO
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NRU Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.2 .. .. 7.5 .. .. NRU
PLW Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.0 7.3 1,680 10.6 1.4 5.7 PLW
PNG Papua New Guinea .. .. Yes .. .. 42l,o 1.1 4.3 151 9.5 0.1 0.5 PNG
PHL Philippines .. .. Yes .. .. 51k 1.0 1.7 203 52.0 1.2 6.0 PHL
KOR Republic of Korea .. .. Yes .. .. 300k 5.1 4.1 2,321 36.1 2.1 5.0 KOR
WSM Samoa .. .. .. .. .. 255l 1.1 6.0 308 7.3 0.5 1.9 WSM
SGP Singapore 0.0 0.0 Yes .. .. .. 1.6 1.7 2,881 58.6 1.9 6.4 SGP
SLB Solomon Islands 26.1 66.5 .. .. .. .. 1.3 7.7 252 2.2 0.2 2.1 SLB
THA Thailand .. .. Yes 84.6 77.9 88j 5.0 3.0 385 13.1 0.4 2.1 THA
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TUV Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.7 15.4 433 0.1 1.1 5.8 TUV
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VNM Viet Nam 16.8 17.7 No .. .. 56k 3.7 2.8 233 48.8 1.2 1.1 VNM
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BRB Barbados .. .. .. .. .. 1,289k 7.1 4.1 1,307 34.4 1.8 4.9 BRB
BLZ Belize 30.6 58.0 .. .. .. 248k 2.0 3.8 458 24.5 0.8 2.0 BLZ
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
15.8 28.6 No 100.0 100.0 180l 8.5 4.1 305 23.2 0.5 1.0 BOL
BRA Brazil 26.2 36.8 No 83.0 90.6 870k 15.5 4.3 1,109 31.0 1.9 7.6 BRA
CHL Chile 32.0 48.8 No 73.4 76.4 515k 6.8 3.5 1,606 32.2 1.0 0.1 CHL
COL Colombia 22.5 25.7 No 18.4 28.3 115k,o 8.6 5.2 723 14.8 1.5 0.6 COL
CRI Costa Rica 27.2 53.4 No 48.8 65.4 444k 8.9 7.6 1,311 23.1 1.1 0.8 CRI
CUB Cuba .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.1 8.1 405 5.8 6.7 9.1 CUB
DMA Dominica 56.1 49.9 .. .. .. .. 3.8 4.2 740 23.8 1.6 5.6 DMA
DOM Dominican Republic 17.5 22.5 Yes 6.2 16.5 .. 3.1 2.8 553 38.7 1.5 1.3 DOM
ECU Ecuador 11.5 18.1 Yes 50.8 55.5 158k 2.3 2.9 652 51.4 1.7 2.0 ECU
SLV El Salvador 16.3 24.0 No 10.3 31.6 251k,o 4.0 4.2 475 32.4 1.6 0.4 SLV
GRD Grenada .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.6 3.0 691 52.2 0.7 3.8 GRD
GTM Guatemala 10.5 18.3 Yes 10.3 18.2 208k 3.1 2.4 346 53.3 0.9 0.9 GTM
GUY Guyana 0.0 0.0 .. 100.0 100.0 358l 3.7 4.3 223 31.3 0.2 0.5 GUY
HTI Haiti .. .. Yes .. .. .. 1.1 1.5 84 3.5 .. .. HTI
HND Honduras 9.6 12.8 No 5.8 13.8 .. 0.9 4.3 354 45.6 0.4 1.1 HND
JAM Jamaica .. .. No .. .. 39k 1.6 3.3 461 28.9 0.4 1.1 JAM
MEX Mexico 18.3 32.1 Yes 17.2 34.6 160j 5.0 3.2 1,062 44.1 2.1 2.5 MEX
NIC Nicaragua 12.4 16.6 Yes 16.2 42.3 .. 2.9 4.5 335 39.1 0.4 1.1 NIC
PAN Panama 35.3 57.5 No 28.9 49.4 195j 4.4 5.2 1,260 24.8 1.6 2.4 PAN
PRY Paraguay 11.1 15.9 Yes 20.0 24.9 445k 4.1 4.3 633 53.3 1.1 1.8 PRY
PER Peru 17.6 32.4 Yes 26.1 41.4 197k 5.3 3.0 555 35.7 1.1 1.5 PER
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis 79.3 76.6 .. 39.7 51.6 .. 3.0 2.3 1,065 55.2 1.2 7.0 KNA
LCA Saint Lucia 42.3 44.1 .. 8.3 10.3 .. 1.7 4.7 945 44.3 0.5 2.2 LCA
VCT Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
.. .. .. .. .. 279k 4.4 4.3 573 17.9 .. .. VCT
SUR Suriname .. .. .. .. .. 557l .. 3.4 521 10.1 0.9 5.9 SUR
TTO Trinidad and Tobago .. .. .. .. .. 1,234k 5.6 2.7 1,450 42.0 1.2 3.6 TTO
URY Uruguay 58.1 72.7 Yes 77.7 74.6 953k 13.1 6.1 1,427 16.5 3.7 5.5 URY
VEN Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
20.8 27.4 No 50.2 70.0 548k 5.3 1.6 628 63.7 1.9 1.1 VEN
Middle East and North Africa Middle East and North Africa
DZA Algeria .. .. No .. .. 162k 5.4 4.4 439 15.0 1.2 1.9 DZA
BHR Bahrain 7.3 12.4 .. .. .. .. 1.6 2.8 971 16.5 0.9 2.4 BHR
EGY Egypt 12.7 45.1 Yes 8.0 61.7 .. 11.7 2.0 323 59.6 2.8 3.5 EGY
IRQ Iraq .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.3 1.9 149 46.4 0.6 1.4 IRQ
JOR Jordan 11.5 33.0 No 11.8 82.3 .. 8.8 6.2 483 28.5 2.6 4.0 JOR
KWT Kuwait .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.2 2.1 1,377 15.8 1.8 4.6 KWT
LBN Lebanon .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.4 2.9 1,016 44.8 3.2 2.7 LBN
LBY Libya 3.5 18.5 .. .. .. .. 4.4 3.0 439 22.7 1.9 6.8 LBY
MAR Morocco .. .. Yes .. .. .. 4.5 2.1 340 58.8 0.6 0.9 MAR
OMN Oman 4.4 11.3 No .. .. .. 2.3 2.1 810 12.0 2.2 5.0 OMN
QAT Qatar .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.2 1.8 1,805 8.5 7.7 11.9 QAT
SAU Saudi Arabia 2.1 43.8 No .. .. .. 1.1 2.1 1,004 18.7 0.9 2.1 SAU
PSE State of Palestine .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PSE
SYR Syrian Arab Republic .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.4 1.6 196 53.9 1.5 1.9 SYR
TUN Tunisia .. .. Yes .. .. .. 8.9 4.2 686 35.5 1.2 3.3 TUN
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BRB Barbados .. .. .. .. .. 1,289k 7.1 4.1 1,307 34.4 1.8 4.9 BRB
BLZ Belize 30.6 58.0 .. .. .. 248k 2.0 3.8 458 24.5 0.8 2.0 BLZ
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
15.8 28.6 No 100.0 100.0 180l 8.5 4.1 305 23.2 0.5 1.0 BOL
BRA Brazil 26.2 36.8 No 83.0 90.6 870k 15.5 4.3 1,109 31.0 1.9 7.6 BRA
CHL Chile 32.0 48.8 No 73.4 76.4 515k 6.8 3.5 1,606 32.2 1.0 0.1 CHL
COL Colombia 22.5 25.7 No 18.4 28.3 115k,o 8.6 5.2 723 14.8 1.5 0.6 COL
CRI Costa Rica 27.2 53.4 No 48.8 65.4 444k 8.9 7.6 1,311 23.1 1.1 0.8 CRI
CUB Cuba .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.1 8.1 405 5.8 6.7 9.1 CUB
DMA Dominica 56.1 49.9 .. .. .. .. 3.8 4.2 740 23.8 1.6 5.6 DMA
DOM Dominican Republic 17.5 22.5 Yes 6.2 16.5 .. 3.1 2.8 553 38.7 1.5 1.3 DOM
ECU Ecuador 11.5 18.1 Yes 50.8 55.5 158k 2.3 2.9 652 51.4 1.7 2.0 ECU
SLV El Salvador 16.3 24.0 No 10.3 31.6 251k,o 4.0 4.2 475 32.4 1.6 0.4 SLV
GRD Grenada .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.6 3.0 691 52.2 0.7 3.8 GRD
GTM Guatemala 10.5 18.3 Yes 10.3 18.2 208k 3.1 2.4 346 53.3 0.9 0.9 GTM
GUY Guyana 0.0 0.0 .. 100.0 100.0 358l 3.7 4.3 223 31.3 0.2 0.5 GUY
HTI Haiti .. .. Yes .. .. .. 1.1 1.5 84 3.5 .. .. HTI
HND Honduras 9.6 12.8 No 5.8 13.8 .. 0.9 4.3 354 45.6 0.4 1.1 HND
JAM Jamaica .. .. No .. .. 39k 1.6 3.3 461 28.9 0.4 1.1 JAM
MEX Mexico 18.3 32.1 Yes 17.2 34.6 160j 5.0 3.2 1,062 44.1 2.1 2.5 MEX
NIC Nicaragua 12.4 16.6 Yes 16.2 42.3 .. 2.9 4.5 335 39.1 0.4 1.1 NIC
PAN Panama 35.3 57.5 No 28.9 49.4 195j 4.4 5.2 1,260 24.8 1.6 2.4 PAN
PRY Paraguay 11.1 15.9 Yes 20.0 24.9 445k 4.1 4.3 633 53.3 1.1 1.8 PRY
PER Peru 17.6 32.4 Yes 26.1 41.4 197k 5.3 3.0 555 35.7 1.1 1.5 PER
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis 79.3 76.6 .. 39.7 51.6 .. 3.0 2.3 1,065 55.2 1.2 7.0 KNA
LCA Saint Lucia 42.3 44.1 .. 8.3 10.3 .. 1.7 4.7 945 44.3 0.5 2.2 LCA
VCT Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
.. .. .. .. .. 279k 4.4 4.3 573 17.9 .. .. VCT
SUR Suriname .. .. .. .. .. 557l .. 3.4 521 10.1 0.9 5.9 SUR
TTO Trinidad and Tobago .. .. .. .. .. 1,234k 5.6 2.7 1,450 42.0 1.2 3.6 TTO
URY Uruguay 58.1 72.7 Yes 77.7 74.6 953k 13.1 6.1 1,427 16.5 3.7 5.5 URY
VEN Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
20.8 27.4 No 50.2 70.0 548k 5.3 1.6 628 63.7 1.9 1.1 VEN
Middle East and North Africa Middle East and North Africa
DZA Algeria .. .. No .. .. 162k 5.4 4.4 439 15.0 1.2 1.9 DZA
BHR Bahrain 7.3 12.4 .. .. .. .. 1.6 2.8 971 16.5 0.9 2.4 BHR
EGY Egypt 12.7 45.1 Yes 8.0 61.7 .. 11.7 2.0 323 59.6 2.8 3.5 EGY
IRQ Iraq .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.3 1.9 149 46.4 0.6 1.4 IRQ
JOR Jordan 11.5 33.0 No 11.8 82.3 .. 8.8 6.2 483 28.5 2.6 4.0 JOR
KWT Kuwait .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.2 2.1 1,377 15.8 1.8 4.6 KWT
LBN Lebanon .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.4 2.9 1,016 44.8 3.2 2.7 LBN
LBY Libya 3.5 18.5 .. .. .. .. 4.4 3.0 439 22.7 1.9 6.8 LBY
MAR Morocco .. .. Yes .. .. .. 4.5 2.1 340 58.8 0.6 0.9 MAR
OMN Oman 4.4 11.3 No .. .. .. 2.3 2.1 810 12.0 2.2 5.0 OMN
QAT Qatar .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.2 1.8 1,805 8.5 7.7 11.9 QAT
SAU Saudi Arabia 2.1 43.8 No .. .. .. 1.1 2.1 1,004 18.7 0.9 2.1 SAU
PSE State of Palestine .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. PSE
SYR Syrian Arab Republic .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.4 1.6 196 53.9 1.5 1.9 SYR
TUN Tunisia .. .. Yes .. .. .. 8.9 4.2 686 35.5 1.2 3.3 TUN
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ARE United Arab Emirates .. .. No .. .. .. 2.2 1.9 1,355 20.4 1.9 4.1 ARE
YEM Yemen 0.5 4.8 No .. .. .. 4.4 1.5 118 71.7 0.2 0.7 YEM
South Asia South Asia
AFG Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.0 1.8 47 74.4 0.2 0.1 AFG
BGD Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 Yes .. .. 22k 1.6 1.2 68 63.4 0.4 0.2 BGD
BTN Bhutan 6.1 12.1 .. .. .. .. 2.2 3.2 253 15.3 0.3 1.0 BTN
IND India .. .. Yes .. .. 22k 1.4 1.3 157 57.6 0.7 1.7 IND
IRN Iran (Islamic Republic 
of)
.. .. No .. .. .. 10.7 2.7 1,562 52.5 0.9 1.4 IRN
MDV Maldives .. .. .. .. .. 431j 5.9 3.9 771 48.3 1.4 5.0 MDV
NPL Nepal 1.0 4.1 .. .. .. 36j 0.7 2.2 80 49.2 0.2 0.5 NPL
PAK Pakistan .. .. No .. .. .. 1.3 1.0 91 61.9 0.8 0.6 PAK
LKA Sri Lanka .. .. No .. .. .. 1.7 1.3 189 49.9 0.7 1.6 LKA
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
AGO Angola .. .. No .. .. .. 4.6 2.2 212 26.7 0.2 1.7 AGO
BEN Benin .. .. Yes .. .. .. 2.0 2.3 70 44.3 0.1 0.8 BEN
BWA Botswana .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 148l 3.0 3.0 872 5.5 0.3 2.8 BWA
BFA Burkina Faso 1.7 4.9 Yes 0.5 7.1 .. 1.8 3.4 90 36.4 0.0 0.6 BFA
BDI Burundi 1.0 8.2 Yes 2.0 6.8 .. 2.1 4.8 45 28.3 0.0 0.2 BDI
CPV Cabo Verde 17.7 23.6 .. 52.8 59.8 178l 4.5 3.0 166 21.2 0.3 0.5 CPV
CMR Cameroon 1.7 8.7 Yes 5.9 20.2 .. 0.8 1.7 120 62.7 0.1 0.4 CMR
CAF Central African Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.6 1.9 32 45.6 0.0 0.3 CAF
TCD Chad .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.3 0.9 42 66.4 0.0 0.2 TCD
COM Comoros .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.5 56 44.1 0.1 0.7 COM
COG Congo 4.2 9.5 Yes 4.7 42.4 .. 1.4 2.3 140 25.1 0.1 0.8 COG
CIV Côte d'Ivoire .. .. Yes .. .. .. 1.1 1.9 144 55.8 0.1 0.5 CIV
COD Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
.. .. No .. .. .. 0.7 2.9 24 32.5 0.1 0.5 COD
DJI Djibouti .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.0 5.3 231 40.0 0.2 0.8 DJI
GNQ Equatorial Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.4 2.6 1,432 43.5 0.3 0.5 GNQ
ERI Eritrea .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.4 1.2 17 52.5 0.1 0.6 ERI
ETH Ethiopia .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.6 1.9 44 41.2 0.0 0.2 ETH
GAB Gabon 23.6 89.1 Yes .. .. .. .. 1.8 558 41.4 0.3 5.0 GAB
GMB Gambia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 3.3 98 16.3 0.0 0.6 GMB
GHA Ghana 3.9 9.4 Yes .. .. .. 2.4 3.0 106 28.7 0.1 0.9 GHA
GIN Guinea .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.5 1.8 67 66.6 0.1 0.0 GIN
GNB Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.1 1.3 66 43.2 0.0 0.6 GNB
KEN Kenya .. .. Yes .. .. 115k 0.9 1.8 84 47.6 0.2 0.8 KEN
LSO Lesotho .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 243j 0.2 9.1 227 14.8 0.0 0.6 LSO
LBR Liberia .. .. Yes .. .. .. 9.9 4.6 102 21.2 0.0 0.3 LBR
MDG Madagascar .. .. No .. .. .. 0.3 2.5 40 31.5 0.2 0.3 MDG
MWI Malawi 0.0 0.0 Yes .. .. .. 1.4 7.0 83 12.6 0.0 0.3 MWI
MLI Mali .. .. Yes 3.7 8.5 .. 2.1 2.3 74 60.7 0.1 0.4 MLI
MRT Mauritania .. .. No .. .. .. 0.8 4.1 122 34.1 0.1 0.7 MRT
MUS Mauritius .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 532l 6.7 2.4 784 46.8 1.1 3.7 MUS
MOZ Mozambique .. .. No 15.9 20.0 40k 2.0 2.8 66 5.0 0.0 0.4 MOZ
NAM Namibia .. .. Yes .. .. 225l 4.6 5.1 619 6.9 0.4 2.8 NAM
NER Niger 0.7 1.9 Yes .. .. .. 0.5 2.8 44 53.1 0.0 0.1 NER
NGA Nigeria 3.1 7.6 Yes .. .. 270k,o 1.1 1.9 161 65.9 0.4 1.6 NGA
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ARE United Arab Emirates .. .. No .. .. .. 2.2 1.9 1,355 20.4 1.9 4.1 ARE
YEM Yemen 0.5 4.8 No .. .. .. 4.4 1.5 118 71.7 0.2 0.7 YEM
South Asia South Asia
AFG Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.0 1.8 47 74.4 0.2 0.1 AFG
BGD Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 Yes .. .. 22k 1.6 1.2 68 63.4 0.4 0.2 BGD
BTN Bhutan 6.1 12.1 .. .. .. .. 2.2 3.2 253 15.3 0.3 1.0 BTN
IND India .. .. Yes .. .. 22k 1.4 1.3 157 57.6 0.7 1.7 IND
IRN Iran (Islamic Republic 
of)
.. .. No .. .. .. 10.7 2.7 1,562 52.5 0.9 1.4 IRN
MDV Maldives .. .. .. .. .. 431j 5.9 3.9 771 48.3 1.4 5.0 MDV
NPL Nepal 1.0 4.1 .. .. .. 36j 0.7 2.2 80 49.2 0.2 0.5 NPL
PAK Pakistan .. .. No .. .. .. 1.3 1.0 91 61.9 0.8 0.6 PAK
LKA Sri Lanka .. .. No .. .. .. 1.7 1.3 189 49.9 0.7 1.6 LKA
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
AGO Angola .. .. No .. .. .. 4.6 2.2 212 26.7 0.2 1.7 AGO
BEN Benin .. .. Yes .. .. .. 2.0 2.3 70 44.3 0.1 0.8 BEN
BWA Botswana .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 148l 3.0 3.0 872 5.5 0.3 2.8 BWA
BFA Burkina Faso 1.7 4.9 Yes 0.5 7.1 .. 1.8 3.4 90 36.4 0.0 0.6 BFA
BDI Burundi 1.0 8.2 Yes 2.0 6.8 .. 2.1 4.8 45 28.3 0.0 0.2 BDI
CPV Cabo Verde 17.7 23.6 .. 52.8 59.8 178l 4.5 3.0 166 21.2 0.3 0.5 CPV
CMR Cameroon 1.7 8.7 Yes 5.9 20.2 .. 0.8 1.7 120 62.7 0.1 0.4 CMR
CAF Central African Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.6 1.9 32 45.6 0.0 0.3 CAF
TCD Chad .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.3 0.9 42 66.4 0.0 0.2 TCD
COM Comoros .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.5 56 44.1 0.1 0.7 COM
COG Congo 4.2 9.5 Yes 4.7 42.4 .. 1.4 2.3 140 25.1 0.1 0.8 COG
CIV Côte d'Ivoire .. .. Yes .. .. .. 1.1 1.9 144 55.8 0.1 0.5 CIV
COD Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
.. .. No .. .. .. 0.7 2.9 24 32.5 0.1 0.5 COD
DJI Djibouti .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.0 5.3 231 40.0 0.2 0.8 DJI
GNQ Equatorial Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.4 2.6 1,432 43.5 0.3 0.5 GNQ
ERI Eritrea .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.4 1.2 17 52.5 0.1 0.6 ERI
ETH Ethiopia .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.6 1.9 44 41.2 0.0 0.2 ETH
GAB Gabon 23.6 89.1 Yes .. .. .. .. 1.8 558 41.4 0.3 5.0 GAB
GMB Gambia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 3.3 98 16.3 0.0 0.6 GMB
GHA Ghana 3.9 9.4 Yes .. .. .. 2.4 3.0 106 28.7 0.1 0.9 GHA
GIN Guinea .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.5 1.8 67 66.6 0.1 0.0 GIN
GNB Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.1 1.3 66 43.2 0.0 0.6 GNB
KEN Kenya .. .. Yes .. .. 115k 0.9 1.8 84 47.6 0.2 0.8 KEN
LSO Lesotho .. .. Yes 100.0 100.0 243j 0.2 9.1 227 14.8 0.0 0.6 LSO
LBR Liberia .. .. Yes .. .. .. 9.9 4.6 102 21.2 0.0 0.3 LBR
MDG Madagascar .. .. No .. .. .. 0.3 2.5 40 31.5 0.2 0.3 MDG
MWI Malawi 0.0 0.0 Yes .. .. .. 1.4 7.0 83 12.6 0.0 0.3 MWI
MLI Mali .. .. Yes 3.7 8.5 .. 2.1 2.3 74 60.7 0.1 0.4 MLI
MRT Mauritania .. .. No .. .. .. 0.8 4.1 122 34.1 0.1 0.7 MRT
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RWA Rwanda 2.0 5.7 Yes .. .. .. 1.6 6.1 144 21.1 0.1 0.7 RWA
STP São Tomé and Príncipe .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.7 2.5 144 51.6 0.5 1.9 STP
SEN Senegal .. .. Yes .. .. .. 2.1 2.8 96 34.1 0.1 0.4 SEN
SYC Seychelles .. .. .. 100.0 100.0 1,015l 4.4 4.3 1,197 2.4 1.5 7.9 SYC
SLE Sierra Leone .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.6 2.5 205 76.2 0.0 0.2 SLE
SOM Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.0 0.1 SOM
ZAF South Africa .. .. .. .. .. 652k 5.1 4.2 982 7.2 0.8 4.9 ZAF
SSD South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.0 33 56.7 .. .. SSD
SDN Sudan .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.3 1.7 159 73.7 0.3 0.8 SDN
SWZ Swaziland .. .. .. .. .. 95j 1.8 6.3 447 10.9 0.2 1.6 SWZ
TGO Togo .. .. Yes .. .. .. 2.3 4.4 75 41.1 0.1 0.3 TGO
UGA Uganda 4.2 3.4 Yes .. .. 56l,o 1.2 1.9 108 49.3 0.1 1.3 UGA
TZA United Republic of 
Tanzania
1.9 4.2 Yes .. .. .. 2.3 2.8 109 31.8 0.0 0.2 TZA
ZMB Zambia 5.5 12.1 Yes .. .. 37l,o 1.8 4.2 112 23.9 0.1 0.8 ZMB
ZWE Zimbabwe .. .. Yes .. .. .. 1.3 .. .. .. 0.1 1.3 ZWE
Central and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia
— — — — — — 11.8 4.4 1,105 30.2 3.1 6.7
Developed Regions — — — — — — 15.3 8.1 5,575 15.5 3.0 9.2
East Asia and the Pacific — — — — — — 4.8 3.0 449 29.7 1.5 2.1
Latin America and the Caribbean — — — — — — 9.5 3.9 964 32.1 1.9 3.8
Middle East and North Africa — — — — — — 3.7 2.4 447 23.9 1.6 2.5
South Asia — — — — — — 2.7 1.5 202 49.4 0.7 1.4
Sub-Saharan Africa — — — — — — 2.8 3.0 159 28.1 0.2 1.0
World — — — — — — 12.3 6.5 1,121 22.2 1.5 3.2
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Notes:
“..” indicates that data are not available. 
“—” indicates where average is not applicable or where available data are insufficient to derive 
average.  
Ψ.	 ISO country code refers to the three letter standard for the representation of names of 
countries published by the International Organization for Standardization. 
ж. This indicator reflects the amount of the transfer relative to the US $1.25 a day extreme 
poverty line. It is calculated by taking the amount of the transfer in PPP$ and then dividing 
it by 38.02, which is the $1.25 a day poverty line for a month. Many countries will have a 
percentage that is much higher than 100 per cent. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that the pension is enough to provide an adequate standard of living in that country.  
a. Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified. Data refer to women 
and men aged 20-59, unless otherwise specified.
b. Based on the age at which women and men can retire and receive full or partial benefits.
c. Proportion of older women and men (above statutory pensionable age) receiving an old-
age pension.
d. Data refer to the most recent available during the period specified. 
e. Total annual public social protection expenditure is the sum of expenditure (including benefit 
expenditure and administration costs) of all existing public social security/social protection 
schemes or programmes in the country. The scope of the indicators corresponds to the 
scope of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, (No. 102) (ILO 1952), which 
established 9 classes of benefits: medical care, sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, old-
age benefit, employment injury benefit, family benefit, maternity benefit, invalidity benefit 
Source:
Columns 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7: ILO 2014e.
Column 3: World Bank 2015c.
Column 6: HelpAge International 2014c.
Columns 8-12: World Bank 2015d.
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RWA Rwanda 2.0 5.7 Yes .. .. .. 1.6 6.1 144 21.1 0.1 0.7 RWA
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SYC Seychelles .. .. .. 100.0 100.0 1,015l 4.4 4.3 1,197 2.4 1.5 7.9 SYC
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SOM Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.0 0.1 SOM
ZAF South Africa .. .. .. .. .. 652k 5.1 4.2 982 7.2 0.8 4.9 ZAF
SSD South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.0 33 56.7 .. .. SSD
SDN Sudan .. .. Yes .. .. .. 0.3 1.7 159 73.7 0.3 0.8 SDN
SWZ Swaziland .. .. .. .. .. 95j 1.8 6.3 447 10.9 0.2 1.6 SWZ
TGO Togo .. .. Yes .. .. .. 2.3 4.4 75 41.1 0.1 0.3 TGO
UGA Uganda 4.2 3.4 Yes .. .. 56l,o 1.2 1.9 108 49.3 0.1 1.3 UGA
TZA United Republic of 
Tanzania
1.9 4.2 Yes .. .. .. 2.3 2.8 109 31.8 0.0 0.2 TZA
ZMB Zambia 5.5 12.1 Yes .. .. 37l,o 1.8 4.2 112 23.9 0.1 0.8 ZMB
ZWE Zimbabwe .. .. Yes .. .. .. 1.3 .. .. .. 0.1 1.3 ZWE
Central and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia
— — — — — — 11.8 4.4 1,105 30.2 3.1 6.7
Developed Regions — — — — — — 15.3 8.1 5,575 15.5 3.0 9.2
East Asia and the Pacific — — — — — — 4.8 3.0 449 29.7 1.5 2.1
Latin America and the Caribbean — — — — — — 9.5 3.9 964 32.1 1.9 3.8
Middle East and North Africa — — — — — — 3.7 2.4 447 23.9 1.6 2.5
South Asia — — — — — — 2.7 1.5 202 49.4 0.7 1.4
Sub-Saharan Africa — — — — — — 2.8 3.0 159 28.1 0.2 1.0
World — — — — — — 12.3 6.5 1,121 22.2 1.5 3.2
and survivors’ benefit, plus other income support and assistance programmes, including 
conditional cash transfers, available to the poor and not included under the above classes.
f. Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central 
and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international 
agencies and non-governmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance 
funds.
g. The total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditures as a ratio 
of total population. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family 
planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health, but does 
not include provision of water and sanitation. Data are in international dollars converted 
using 2005 PPP rates.
h. Out-of-pocket expenditure is any direct outlay by households, including gratuities and 
in-kind payments, to health practitioners and suppliers of pharmaceuticals, therapeutic 
appliances, and other goods and services whose primary intent is to contribute to the 
restoration or enhancement of the health status of individuals or population groups. It is a 
part of private health expenditure.
i. Physicians include generalist and specialist medical practitioners.
p. Nurses and midwives include professional nurses, professional midwives, auxiliary nurses, 
auxiliary midwives, enrolled nurses, enrolled midwives and other associated personnel, such 
as dental nurses and primary care nurses.
j. Pensions tested.
k. Means tested.
l. Universal.
m. Universal with recovery from high-income earners.
n. Based on the age at which women and men can retire and receive full benefits.
o. Regional programme.
RESERVATIONS TO CEDAW
CEDAW statusa Optional protocolb
Compatibility with 
religious, customary 
or traditional laws 
and practicesc
Elimination of 
discriminationd
Equality in 
employmente
Equality of 
nationalityf
Equality 
to choose 
residenceg
Equal rights 
in marriage 
and familyh
Social 
protectioni
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Albania ratified ratified
Armenia ratified ratified
Azerbaijan ratified ratified
Belarus ratified ratified
Bosnia and Herzegovina ratified ratified
Bulgaria ratified ratified
Croatia ratified ratified
Cyprus ratified ratified
Czech Republic ratified ratified
Estonia ratified
Georgia ratified ratified
Hungary ratified ratified
Kazakhstan ratified ratified
Kyrgyzstan ratified ratified
Latvia ratified
Lithuania ratified ratified
Montenegro ratified ratified
Poland ratified ratified
Moldova, Republic of ratified ratified
Romania ratified ratified
Russian Federation ratified ratified
Serbia ratified ratified
Slovakia ratified ratified
Slovenia ratified ratified
Tajikistan ratified ratified
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
ratified ratified
Turkey ratified ratified
Turkmenistan ratified ratified
Ukraine ratified ratified
Uzbekistan ratified
Developed Regions
Andorra ratified ratified
Australia ratified ratified reservation reservation
Austria ratified ratified reservation
Belgium ratified ratified
Canada ratified ratified
Denmark ratified ratified
Finland ratified ratified
France ratified ratified reservation
Germany ratified ratified
Greece ratified ratified
Iceland ratified ratified
Ireland ratified ratified reservation reservationm
Israel ratified reservation reservation
Italy ratified ratified
Japan ratified
Liechtenstein ratified ratified
Luxembourg ratified ratified
Malta ratified reservation reservation reservation
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RESERVATIONS TO CEDAW
CEDAW statusa Optional protocolb
Compatibility with 
religious, customary 
or traditional laws 
and practicesc
Elimination of 
discriminationd
Equality in 
employmente
Equality of 
nationalityf
Equality 
to choose 
residenceg
Equal rights 
in marriage 
and familyh
Social 
protectioni
Monaco ratified reservation reservation reservation
Netherlands ratified ratified
New Zealand ratified ratified reservation reservation
Norway ratified ratified
Portugal ratified ratified
San Marino ratified ratified
Spain ratified ratified
Sweden ratified ratified
Switzerland ratified ratified reservation
United Kingdom ratified ratified reservation reservationl reservation
United States has signed but not ratified - - - - - - - -
East Asia and the Pacific
Brunei Darussalam ratified reservation reservation ῀
Cambodia ratified ratified
China ratified
Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea
ratified reservation reservation
Fiji ratified
Hong Kong, China (SAR) - - - - - - - - -
Indonesia ratified signature 
only
Kiribati ratified
Lao People's 
Democratic Republic
ratified
Malaysia ratified reservation reservation reservation
Marshall Islands ratified
Micronesia (Federated 
States of)
ratified reservation reservation reservation reservation
Mongolia ratified ratified
Myanmar ratified
Nauru has not signed or ratified - - - - - - - -
Palau has not signed or ratified - - - - - - - -
Papua New Guinea ratified
Philippines ratified ratified
Korea, Republic of ratified ratified reservation reservation
Samoa ratified
Singapore ratified reservation reservation reservation reservation
Solomon Islands ratified ratified
Thailand ratified ratified
Timor-Leste ratified ratified
Tonga has not signed or ratified - - - - - - - -
Tuvalu ratified
Vanuatu ratified ratified
Viet Nam ratified
Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda ratified ratified
Argentina ratified ratified
Bahamas ratified reservation reservation
Barbados ratified
Belize ratified ratified
RESERVATIONS TO CEDAW
CEDAW statusa Optional protocolb
Compatibility with 
religious, customary 
or traditional laws 
and practicesc
Elimination of 
discriminationd
Equality in 
employmente
Equality of 
nationalityf
Equality 
to choose 
residenceg
Equal rights 
in marriage 
and familyh
Social 
protectioni
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
ratified ratified
Brazil ratified ratified
Chile ratified signature 
only
Colombia ratified ratified
Costa Rica ratified ratified
Cuba ratified signature 
only
Dominica ratified
Dominican Republic ratified ratified
Ecuador ratified ratified
El Salvador ratified signature 
only
Grenada ratified
Guatemala ratified ratified
Guyana ratified
Haiti ratified
Honduras ratified
Jamaica ratified
Mexico ratified ratified
Nicaragua ratified
Panama ratified ratified
Paraguay ratified ratified
Peru ratified ratified
Saint Kitts and Nevis ratified ratified
Saint Lucia ratified
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
ratified
Suriname ratified
Trinidad and Tobago ratified
Uruguay ratified ratified
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
ratified ratified
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria ratified reservation reservation reservation
Bahrain ratified reservation reservation reservation reservation reservation
Egypt ratified reservation reservation reservation
Iraq ratified reservation reservation reservation
Jordan ratified reservation reservation
Kuwait ratified reservation reservation reservation
Lebanon ratified reservation reservation
Libya ratified ratified reservation reservation reservation
Morocco ratified reservationk reservationk reservationk ῀
Oman ratified reservation reservation reservation reservation
Qatar ratified reservationk reservation reservation reservation reservation
Saudi Arabia ratified reservation reservation ῀
State of Palestine ratified
Syrian Arab Republic ratified reservation reservation reservation reservation reservation
Tunisia ratified ratified
United Arab Emirates ratified reservation reservation reservation reservation
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RESERVATIONS TO CEDAW
CEDAW statusa Optional protocolb
Compatibility with 
religious, customary 
or traditional laws 
and practicesc
Elimination of 
discriminationd
Equality in 
employmente
Equality of 
nationalityf
Equality 
to choose 
residenceg
Equal rights 
in marriage 
and familyh
Social 
protectioni
Yemen ratified
South Asia
Afghanistan ratified
Bangladesh ratified ratified reservation reservation ῀
Bhutan ratified
India ratified reservationk reservationk
Iran (Islamic Republic of) has not signed or ratified - - - - - - - -
Maldives ratified ratified reservation reservation
Nepal ratified ratified
Pakistan ratified
Sri Lanka ratified ratified
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola ratified ratified
Benin ratified signature 
only
Botswana ratified ratified
Burkina Faso ratified ratified
Burundi ratified signature 
only
Cabo Verde ratified ratified
Cameroon ratified ratified
Central African Republic ratified
Chad ratified signature 
only
Comoros ratified
Congo ratified signature 
only
Côte d'Ivoire ratified ratified
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
ratified
Djibouti ratified
Equatorial Guinea ratified ratified
Eritrea ratified
Ethiopia ratified
Gabon ratified ratified
Gambia ratified
Ghana ratified ratified
Guinea ratified
Guinea-Bissau ratified ratified
Kenya ratified
Lesotho ratified ratified reservation reservation
Liberia ratified signature 
only
Madagascar ratified signature 
only
Malawi ratified signature 
only
Mali ratified ratified
Mauritania ratified reservation reservation reservation
Mauritius ratified ratified
Mozambique ratified ratified
RESERVATIONS TO CEDAW
CEDAW statusa Optional protocolb
Compatibility with 
religious, customary 
or traditional laws 
and practicesc
Elimination of 
discriminationd
Equality in 
employmente
Equality of 
nationalityf
Equality 
to choose 
residenceg
Equal rights 
in marriage 
and familyh
Social 
protectioni
Namibia ratified ratified
Niger ratified ratified reservation reservation reservation reservation
Nigeria ratified ratified
Rwanda ratified ratified
São Tomé and 
Príncipe
ratified signature 
only
Senegal ratified ratified
Seychelles ratified ratified
Sierra Leone ratified signature 
only
Somalia has not signed or ratified - - - - - - - -
South Africa ratified ratified
South Sudan has not signed or ratified - - - - - - - -
Sudan has not signed or ratified - - - - - - - -
Swaziland ratified
Togo ratified
Uganda ratified
United Republic of 
Tanzania
ratified ratified
Zambia ratified signature 
only
Zimbabwe ratified
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Columns 1-9: UN Women systematisation based on data from UN 2015, as of March 2015.
“-” indicates where information on CEDAW status and/or CEDAW reservations are not 
applicable. 
 The table does not include reservations entered by countries which extend, or reserve the right 
to extend, more favourable treatment to women, because these measures, used to address 
structural discrimination against women, are explicitly mandated by the Convention, in the 
form of temporary special measures. 
῀. Indicates countries that have no explicit reservation to Article 16 on equal rights in marriage 
and family, but they maintain a general reservation in relation to the use of religious laws that 
mandate differential treatment of men and women in respect to family law or “personal law” 
matters.
a. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted 
in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution A/RES/34/180. It came into 
force on 3 September 1981. 
b. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 6 October 1999 in 
its resolution A/RES/54/4 and came into force on 22 December 2000. Article 2 of the Protocol 
states that: ‘Communications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of 
individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of 
the rights set forth in the Convention by that State Party. Where a communication is submitted 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, this shall be with their consent unless the 
author can justify acting on their behalf without such consent.’”
c. ‘Compatibility with religious laws or traditional codes’ indicates that a State finds some 
provisions of CEDAW incompatible with traditional codes that the State cannot or will not 
change; this category includes countries that explicitly adhere to Shari’a or tribal laws or that 
protect and grant supremacy to minority traditions over their own national laws.
d. ‘Elimination of discrimination’ indicates reservations to the commitments to condemn 
discrimination against women in ‘all its forms’ contained in Article 2. The CEDAW Committee 
has identified these rights as central to the object and purpose of the Convention.
e. ‘Equality in employment’ indicates reservations to CEDAW’s provisions on equality in 
employment.
f. ‘Equality of nationality’ refers to reservations concerning Article 9, which ensures equal 
nationality and citizenship rights, including the transmission of citizenship from mother to child.
g. ‘Equality to choose residence’ reflects a country’s reservation to Article 15(4), which 
accords to men and women the same legal rights with regard to their movement and the 
freedom to choose their residence and domicile.
h. ‘Equal rights in marriage and family’ encapsulates reservations from countries to CEDAW’s 
provisions on rights relating to marital and family issues, including the obligation to ensure 
women and men equal rights to marry, to exercise free and full consent, to dissolve 
marriage, to make parental decisions, to decide on the number and spacing of children, 
to act as guardian to their children, to choose a profession, and to own and manage 
property. Most of these relate to Article 16. The CEDAW Committee has identified these 
rights as central to the object and purpose of the Convention.
i. Reservations in this category are entered by Member States in relation to articles of 
CEDAW on social protection and social security (Articles 11(e); 14(2)(c); 11(2)(b); and 13 (a)), 
including on pensions, maternity leave, family benefits and unemployment and disability 
benefits.
k. This reservation is expressed in the form of a Declaration.
l. The text of the reservation reads: ‘As regards subparagraph 1 (f) of article 16, the United 
Kingdom does not regard the reference to the paramountcy of the interests of the children 
as being directly relevant to the elimination of discrimination against women, and declares 
in this connection that the legislation of the United Kingdom regulating adoption, while 
giving a principal position to the promotion of the children’s welfare, does not give to the 
child’s interests the same paramount place as in issues concerning custody over children’.
m. The text of the reservation reads: ‘Articles 16, 1 (d) and (f): Ireland is of the view that 
the attainment in Ireland of the objectives of the Convention does not necessitate the 
extension to men of rights identical to those accorded by law to women in respect of the 
guardianship, adoption and custody of children born out of wedlock and reserves the right 
to implement the Convention subject to that understanding’.
Notes:
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Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
State of Palestine
Syrian Arab Republic
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
SOUTH ASIA
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d’Ivoire
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
São Tomé and Príncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
Sudan
Swaziland
Togo
Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
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Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Montenegro
Poland
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Tajikistan
The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
Andorra
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Malta
Monaco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
San Marino
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
DEVELOPED REGIONS
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
China
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Fiji
Hong Kong, China (SAR)
Indonesia
Kiribati
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Malaysia
Marshall Islands
Micronesia (Federated States of)
Mongolia
Myanmar
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Republic of Korea
Samoa
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Viet Nam
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
BACKGROUND PAPERS
TO SUPPORT THE PREPARATION OF THE PROGRESS OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN REPORT, 
UN WOMEN COMMISSIONED OVER 35 BACKGROUND PAPERS BASED ON RESEARCH OF 
MORE THAN 50 EXPERTS FROM AROUND THE WORLD:  
Albelda, Randy and Diana Salas Coronado. Healthcare Access in the United States: The Patchwork 
“Universalism” of the Affordable Care Act.
Allotey, Pascale and Sharuna Verghis. Gender, Social Protection and Universal Health Coverage. 
Arza, Camila. The Gender Dimensions of Pension Systems: Policies and Constraints for the Protection of 
Women in Old Age.
Bakker, Isabella. Gender and Global Economic Governance: Ideas, Institutions and Power Potentials. 
Başlevent, Cem and Ayşenur Acar. Turkey: Gender and Labour Market Analysis.
Blofield, Merike and Juliana Martìnez Franzoni. Work-Family Relations and Inequality in Latin America: The 
Case of Parental Leave and Care Services.
Braunstein, Elissa. Economic Growth and Social Reproduction: Gender Inequality as Cause and 
Consequence. 
Budlender, Debbie. Gender Equality and Funding Social Policy: Does the Source of Revenue Matter? 
Brown, Merle and Debbie Budlender. Spring-Cleaning at Supercare.
Cichon, Rebecca. A Long Way to Go Towards Equality: An Actuarial Estimation of Gender Specific Lifetime 
Income Gaps in Selected European Countries.
Comblon, Virginie, Anne-Sophie Robillard and François Roubaud. Gender Analysis of Labor Market 
Outcomes in the African Region: Evidence from Cameroon and Mali over the Last Decade.
Daly, Mary. Child-Related Financial Transfers and Early Childhood Education and Care: A Review of Key 
Developments, Impacts and Influences in Child-Related Support to Families.
Dong, Xiao-yuan, Shi Li and Sui Yang. Gender Analysis of Labor Market Outcomes in China in the First 
Decade of the 21st Century. 
Elson, Diane. Redressing Socio-Economic Disadvantage: Women’s Economic and Social Rights and 
Economic Policy.
Folbre, Nancy. The Production of People by Means of People. 
Fredman, Sandra and Beth Goldblatt. Gender Equality and Human Rights.
Gammage, Sarah and Carla Kraft. Mexico: Gender and Labour Market Analysis in the Decade of the 
Millennium.
305
Gammage, Sarah, Carla Kraft and Tomas Albuquerque. Brazil: Gender and Labour Market Analysis in the 
Decade of the Millennium.
Gammage, Sarah, Carla Kraft and Tomas Albuquerque. Ecuador: Gender and Labour Market Analysis in 
the Decade of the Millennium.
Gornick, Janet C. and Markus Jäntti. Gender and Poverty: A Cross-National Study of 37 High- and Middle-
Income Countries.
Hassim, Shireen. Precarious Democracy: Rebuilding States, Rights and the Public Sphere in Rebellious 
Times.
Htun, Mala and Laurel Weldon. Progressive Policy Change on Women’s Economic and Social Rights. 
Jolly, Margaret, Helen Lee, Katherine Lepani, Anna Naupa, and Michelle Rooney. Falling through the Net? 
Gender and Social Protection in the Pacific. 
Kedir, Abbi. Ethiopia: Livelihood and Labour Market Insecurity.
Kothari, Miloon. Women’s Right to Adequate Housing. 
Narsey, Wadan. Fiji: Gender and Labour Market Analysis.
Narsey, Wadan. Vanuatu: Gender and Labour Market Analysis.
O’Hanlon, Lucinda. Women and the Right to Water and Sanitation.
Pickbourn, Lynda. Gender Equality and Social Protection in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, 2000-2013. 
Plomien, Ania and Monika Potoczna. Gender Analysis of Labour Market Outcomes in Poland, Romania 
and Russia in the 2000s. 
Posel, Dorrit and Daniela Casale. Gender, Education and Labour Market Outcomes. 
Pose, Dorrit and Daniela Casale. Gender, Education and Labour Market Outcomes: Case Study-South 
Africa. 
Raveendran, Govindan. India: Gender and Labour Market Analysis.
Roever, Sally and Martha Chen. Making Women’s Self-Employment More Viable.
Said, Mona, Andrew Petrovich and Amira Khalil. Egypt: Gender and Labour Market Analysis. 
Said, Mona, Andrew Petrovich and Merna Aboul-Ezz. Iran: Gender and Labour Market Analysis.
Suh, Jooyeoun and Nancy Folbre. Valuing Unpaid Child Care in the U.S.: A Prototype Satellite Account Using 
the American Time Use Survey.
Tripp, Aili Mari. Women’s Rights Mobilization across Difference.
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Statisticians (ICLS) in 1993, various efforts 
have been made to develop guidelines 
and other tools to assist countries in the 
production of data on informal employment. 
These include the Guidelines on Informal 
Employment adopted by the 17th ICLS in 
2003 (ILO 2003) as well as a manual on the 
measurement of informality (ILO 2013e). 
7. Hirway and Jose 2011. 
8. See Deaton and Grosh 2000 for details on the   
merits and challenges of collecting income 
and consumption data using household 
surveys.
9. Even though the intent is usually to interview 
the most knowledgeable person, surveyors 
have to content with the realities on the 
ground and the person who is available 
at the time of the survey—who may be a 
woman—is usually selected for the interview. 
10. This is an example of the difference between 
gender statistics and sex-disaggregated 
data: while sex-disaggregated data are 
needed to show the differences between 
women and men, gender statistics is a 
broader concept that enables the analysis of 
gender issues. 
11. UN Economic and Social Council 2012b. 
12. UN Economic and Social Council 2014; see 
also UN regional reviews ECA 2014, ECE 2014, 
ECLAC 2014, ESCAP 2014 and ESCWA 2014.
13. UN 2013.
14. Maetz 2013.
15. The number of maternal deaths in 2013 was 
estimated to be 289,000. However, based 
on the range of uncertainty published by 
the inter-agency monitoring group (WHO, 
UNPOP, UNICEF, World Bank), the value could 
be anywhere between 170,000 (40 per cent 
less) to 500,000 (75 per cent more) deaths. 
UN Women calculations using data from 
WHO et al. 2014.
16. WHO 2014d. 
17. See IHSN 2015 for more details. 
18. UN 2010.
19. Ibid.
20. Paris21 2011. 
21. PARIS21 was founded in November 1999 
by the United Nations, the European 
Commission, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, the 
International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, in response to the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council 
resolution on the goals of the United Nations 
Conference on Development. It set up a 
global framework of national, regional and 
international statisticians, analysts, policy 
makers, development professionals and other 
users of statistics. It is a forum and network 
to promote, influence and facilitate statistical 
capacity development and the better use of 
statistics. See http://www.paris21.org/ for 
more information.
22. The Busan Action Plan for Statistics, which 
was endorsed at the 4th High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness, includes several provisions 
related to gender equality, including the 
requirement that gender statistics are fully 
mainstreamed into the national statistical 
system and including an indicator on the 
number of countries incorporating specific 
plans for gender statistics in their NSDS in 
order to track progress.
23. OPM 2009. 
24. See, for example, UN 2010; UN Statistics 
Division 2013; UNFPA 2014a; UN DESA 2014; 
UN DESA 2005. 
25. UN Statistics Division 2015. 
26. See http://data2x.org/.
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